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CIAO DATE: 04/04
Revisiting the Case for War
Joseph Cirincione*, Dipali Mukhopadhyay**, and Alexis Orton***
In an effort to quell the controversy over the "16 words" in U.S. President George W. Bush's State of the Union address, the White House declassified and released intelligence documents on July 18, 2003 to prove there was ample evidence that Saddam Hussein had a continuing and expanding nuclear weapons program. Yet those same documents indicate that some senior officials had serious doubts about the threat of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and the regime's links to al Qaeda. A look back at President Bush's October 7, 2002 speech in Cincinnati, Ohio, where he made a detailed case for war against Iraq, reveals that what the president said did not always reflect what U.S. intelligence analysts believed at that time and often departs significantly from what has been found on the ground in Iraq after the war.
Remarks by the President on Iraq
Cincinnati, Ohio
October 7, 2002
Thank you all. Thank you for that very gracious and warm Cincinnati welcome. I'm honored to be here tonight; I appreciate you all coming.
Tonight I want to take a few minutes to discuss a grave threat to peace, and America's determination to lead the world in (Commentary 1) confronting that threat.
The threat comes from Iraq. It arises directly from the Iraqi regime's own actions—its history of aggression, and its drive toward an arsenal of terror. Eleven years ago, as a condition for ending the Persian Gulf War, (Commentary 2) the Iraqi regime was required to destroy its weapons of mass destruction, to cease all development of such weapons, and to stop all support for terrorist groups. The Iraqi regime has violated all of those obligations. (Commentary 3) It possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons. It is (Commentary 4) seeking nuclear weapons. It has given shelter and support to terrorism, and practices terror against its own people. The entire world has witnessed Iraq's eleven-year history of defiance, deception and bad faith.
We also must never forget the most vivid events of recent history. On September the 11th, 2001, America felt its vulnerability—even to threats that gather on the other side of the earth. We resolved then, and we are resolved today, to confront every threat, from any source, that could bring sudden terror and suffering to America.
Members of the Congress of both political parties, and members of the United Nations Security Council, agree that Saddam Hussein is a threat to peace and must disarm. We agree that the Iraqi dictator must not be permitted to threaten America and the world with horrible poisons and diseases and gases and atomic weapons. Since we all agree on this goal, the issues is: how can we best achieve it?
Many Americans have raised legitimate questions: about the nature of the threat; about the urgency of action—why be concerned now; about the link between Iraq developing weapons of terror, and the wider war on terror. These are all issues we've discussed broadly and fully within my administration. And tonight, I want to share those discussions with you.
First, some ask why Iraq is different from other countries or regimes that also have terrible weapons. While there are many dangers in the world, the threat from Iraq stands alone—because it gathers the most serious dangers of our age in one place. (Commentary 5) Iraq's weapons of mass destruction are controlled by a murderous tyrant who has already used chemical weapons to kill thousands of people. This same tyrant has tried to dominate the Middle East, has invaded and brutally occupied a small neighbor, has struck other nations without warning, and holds an unrelenting hostility toward the United States.
By its past and present actions, by its technological capabilities, by the merciless nature of its regime, Iraq is unique. (Commentary 6) As a former chief weapons inspector of the U.N. has said, "The fundamental problem with Iraq remains the nature of the regime, itself. Saddam Hussein is a homicidal dictator who is addicted to weapons of mass destruction."
Some ask how urgent this danger is to America and the world. The danger is already significant, and it only grows worse with time. (Commentary 7) If we know Saddam Hussein has dangerous weapons today—and we do—does it make any sense for the world to wait to confront him as he grows even stronger and develops even more dangerous weapons?
In 1995, after several years of deceit by the Iraqi regime, the head of Iraq's military industries defected. It was then that the regime was forced to admit that it had produced more than 30,000 liters of anthrax and other deadly biological agents. (Commentary 8) The inspectors, however, concluded that Iraq had likely produced two to four times that amount. This is a massive stockpile of biological weapons that has never been accounted for, and capable of killing millions.
We know that the regime has produced thousands of tons of chemical agents, including mustard gas, sarin nerve gas, VX nerve gas. Saddam Hussein also has experience in using chemical weapons. He has ordered chemical attacks on Iran, and on more than forty villages in his own country. (Commentary 9) These actions killed or injured at least 20,000 people, more than six times the number of people who died in the attacks of September the 11th.
(Commentary 10) And surveillance photos reveal that the regime is rebuilding facilities that it had used to produce chemical and biological weapons. Every chemical and biological weapon that Iraq has or makes is a direct violation of the truce that ended the Persian Gulf War in 1991. (Commentary 11) Yet, Saddam Hussein has chosen to build and keep these weapons despite international sanctions, U.N. demands, and isolation from the civilized world.
(Commentary 12) Iraq possesses ballistic missiles with a likely range of hundreds of miles—far enough to strike Saudi Arabia, Israel, Turkey, and other nations —in a region where more than 135,000 American civilians and service members live and work. We've also discovered through intelligence that (Commentary 13) Iraq has a growing fleet of manned and unmanned aerial vehicles that could be used to disperse chemical or biological weapons across broad areas. We're concerned that Iraq is exploring ways of using these UAVs for missions targeting the United States. And, of course, sophisticated delivery systems aren't required for a chemical or biological attack; all that might be required are a small container and one terrorist or Iraqi intelligence operative to deliver it.
And that is the source of our urgent concern about Saddam Hussein's links to international terrorist groups. Over the years, Iraq has provided safe haven to terrorists such as Abu Nidal, whose terror organization carried out more than 90 terrorist attacks in 20 countries that killed or injured nearly 900 people, including 12 Americans. Iraq has also provided safe haven to Abu Abbas, who was responsible for seizing the Achille Lauro and killing an American passenger. And we know that Iraq is continuing to finance terror and gives assistance to groups that use terrorism to undermine Middle East peace.
(Commentary 14) We know that Iraq and al Qaeda have had high-level contacts that go back a decade. Some al Qaeda leaders who fled Afghanistan went to Iraq. (Commentary 15) These include one very senior al Qaeda leader who received medical treatment in Baghdad this year, and who has been associated with planning for chemical and biological attacks. We've learned that Iraq has trained al Qaeda members in bomb-making and poisons and deadly gases. And we know that after September the 11th, Saddam Hussein's regime gleefully celebrated the terrorist attacks on America.
(Commentary 16) Iraq could decide on any given day to provide a biological or chemical weapon to a terrorist group or individual terrorists. (Commentary 17) Alliance with terrorists could allow the Iraqi regime to attack America without leaving any fingerprints.
Some have argued that confronting the threat from Iraq could detract from the war against terror. To the contrary; confronting the threat posed by Iraq is crucial to winning the war on terror. When I spoke to Congress more than a year ago, I said that those who harbor terrorists are as guilty as the terrorists themselves. Saddam Hussein is harboring terrorists and the instruments of terror, the instruments of mass death and destruction. And he cannot be trusted. The risk is simply too great that he will use them, or provide them to a terror network.
(Commentary 18) Terror cells and outlaw regimes building weapons of mass destruction are different faces of the same evil. Our security requires that we confront both. And the United States military is capable of confronting both.
(Commentary 19) Many people have asked how close Saddam Hussein is to developing a nuclear weapon. Well, we don't know exactly, and that's the problem. Before the Gulf War, the best intelligence indicated that Iraq was eight to ten years away from developing a nuclear weapon. After the war, international inspectors learned that the regime has been much closer—the regime in Iraq would likely have possessed a nuclear weapon no later than 1993. The inspectors discovered that Iraq had an advanced nuclear weapons development program, had a design for a workable nuclear weapon, and was pursuing several different methods of enriching uranium for a bomb.
Before being barred from Iraq in 1998, the International Atomic Energy Agency dismantled extensive nuclear weapons-related facilities, including three uranium enrichment sites. (Commentary 20) That same year, information from a high-ranking Iraqi nuclear engineer who had defected revealed that despite his public promises, Saddam Hussein had ordered his nuclear program to continue.
(Commentary 21) The evidence indicates that Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. Saddam Hussein has held numerous meetings with Iraqi nuclear scientists, a group he calls his "nuclear mujahideen"—his nuclear holy warriors. (Commentary 22) Satellite photographs reveal that Iraq is rebuilding facilities at sites that have been part of its nuclear program in the past. (Commentary 23) Iraq has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes and other equipment needed for gas centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons.
(Commentary 24) If the Iraqi regime is able to produce, buy, or steal an amount of highly enriched uranium a little larger than a single softball, it could have a nuclear weapon in less than a year. And if we allow that to happen, a terrible line would be crossed. Saddam Hussein would be in a position to blackmail anyone who opposes his aggression. He would be in a position to dominate the Middle East. He would be in a position to threaten America. And Saddam Hussein would be in a position to pass nuclear technology to terrorists.
Some citizens wonder, after 11 years of living with this problem, why do we need to confront it now? And there's a reason. We've experienced the horror of September the 11th. We have seen that those who hate America are willing to crash airplanes into buildings full of innocent people. Our enemies would be no less willing, in fact, they would be eager, to use biological or chemical, or a nuclear weapon.
Knowing these realities, America must not ignore the threat gathering against us. Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof—the smoking gun—that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud. As President Kennedy said in October of 1962, (Commentary 25) "Neither the United States of America, nor the world community of nations can tolerate deliberate deception and offensive threats on the part of any nation, large or small. We no longer live in a world," he said, "where only the actual firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nations security to constitute maximum peril."
Understanding the threats of our time, knowing the designs and deceptions of the Iraqi regime, we have every reason to assume the worst, and we have an urgent duty to prevent the worst from occurring.
Some believe we can address this danger by simply resuming the old approach to inspections, and applying diplomatic and economic pressure. Yet this is precisely what the world has tried to do since 1991. The U.N. inspections program was met with systematic deception. The Iraqi regime bugged hotel rooms and offices of inspectors to find where they were going next; they forged documents, destroyed evidence, and developed mobile weapons facilities to keep a step ahead of inspectors. Eight so-called presidential palaces were declared off-limits to unfettered inspections. These sites actually encompass twelve square miles, with hundreds of structures, both above and below the ground, where sensitive materials could be hidden.
The world has also tried economic sanctions—and watched Iraq use billions of dollars in illegal oil revenues to fund more weapons purchases, rather than providing for the needs of the Iraqi people.
The world has tried limited military strikes to destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capabilities—only to see them openly rebuilt, while the regime again denies they even exist.
The world has tried no-fly zones to keep Saddam from terrorizing his own people—and in the last year alone, the Iraqi military has fired upon American and British pilots more than 750 times.
(Commentary 26) After eleven years during which we have tried containment, sanctions, inspections, even selected military action, the end result is that Saddam Hussein still has chemical and biological weapons and is increasing his capabilities to make more. And he is moving ever closer to developing a nuclear weapon.
Clearly, to actually work, any new inspections, sanctions or enforcement mechanisms will have to be very different. America wants the U.N. to be an effective organization that helps keep the peace. And that is why we are urging the Security Council to adopt a new resolution setting out tough, immediate requirements. Among those requirements: the Iraqi regime must reveal and destroy, under U.N. supervision, all existing weapons of mass destruction. To ensure that we learn the truth, the regime must allow witnesses to its illegal activities to be interviewed outside the country—and these witnesses must be free to bring their families with them so they all beyond the reach of Saddam Hussein's terror and murder. (Commentary 27) And inspectors must have access to any site, at any time, without pre-clearance, without delay, without exceptions.
The time for denying, deceiving, and delaying has come to an end. Saddam Hussein must disarm himself—or, for the sake of peace, we will lead a coalition to disarm him.
Many nations are joining us in insisting that Saddam Hussein's regime be held accountable. They are committed to defending the international security that protects the lives of both our citizens and theirs. And that's why America is challenging all nations to take the resolutions of the U.N. Security Council seriously.
And these resolutions are clear. In addition to declaring and destroying all of its weapons of mass destruction, Iraq must end its support for terrorism. It must cease the persecution of its civilian population. It must stop all illicit trade outside the Oil For Food program. It must release or account for all Gulf War personnel, including an American pilot, whose fate is still unknown.
By taking these steps, and by only taking these steps, the Iraqi regime has an opportunity to avoid conflict. Taking these steps would also change the nature of the Iraqi regime itself. America hopes the regime will make that choice. Unfortunately, at least so far, we have little reason to expect it. And that's why two administrations—mine and President Clinton's—have stated that regime change in Iraq is the only certain means of removing a great danger to our nation.
I hope this will not require military action, but it may. And military conflict could be difficult. An Iraqi regime faced with its own demise may attempt cruel and desperate measures. If Saddam Hussein orders such measures, his generals would be well advised to refuse those orders. If they do not refuse, they must understand that all war criminals will be pursued and punished. If we have to act, we will take every precaution that is possible. We will plan carefully; we will act with the full power of the United States military; we will act with allies at our side, and we will prevail. (Applause.)
There is no easy or risk-free course of action. Some have argued we should wait—and that's an option. In my view, it's the riskiest of all options, because the longer we wait, the stronger and bolder Saddam Hussein will become. (Commentary 28) We could wait and hope that Saddam does not give weapons to terrorists, or develop a nuclear weapon to blackmail the world. But I'm convinced that is a hope against all evidence. As Americans, we want peace—we work and sacrifice for peace. But there can be no peace if our security depends on the will and whims of a ruthless and aggressive dictator. I'm not willing to stake one American life on trusting Saddam Hussein.
Failure to act would embolden other tyrants, allow terrorists access to new weapons and new resources, and make blackmail a permanent feature of world events. The United Nations would betray the purpose of its founding, and prove irrelevant to the problems of our time. And through its inaction, the United States would resign itself to a future of fear.
That is not the America I know. That is not the America I serve. We refuse to live in fear. (Applause.) This nation, in world war and in Cold War, has never permitted the brutal and lawless to set history's course. Now, as before, we will secure our nation, protect our freedom, and help others to find freedom of their own.
Some worry that a change of leadership in Iraq could create instability and make the situation worse. The situation could hardly get worse, for world security and for the people of Iraq. The lives of Iraqi citizens would improve dramatically if Saddam Hussein were no longer in power, just as the lives of Afghanistan's citizens improved after the Taliban. The dictator of Iraq is a student of Stalin, using murder as a tool of terror and control, within his own cabinet, within his own army, and even within his own family.
On Saddam Hussein's orders, opponents have been decapitated, wives and mothers of political opponents have been systematically raped as a method of intimidation, and political prisoners have been forced to watch their own children being tortured.
America believes that all people are entitled to hope and human rights, to the non-negotiable demands of human dignity. People everywhere prefer freedom to slavery; prosperity to squalor; self-government to the rule of terror and torture. America is a friend to the people of Iraq. Our demands are directed only at the regime that enslaves them and threatens us. When these demands are met, the first and greatest benefit will come to Iraqi men, women and children. The oppression of Kurds, Assyrians, Turkomans, Shi'a, Sunnis and others will be lifted. The long captivity of Iraq will end, and an era of new hope will begin.
Iraq is a land rich in culture, resources, and talent. Freed from the weight of oppression, Iraq's people will be able to share in the progress and prosperity of our time. If military action is necessary, (Commentary 29) the United States and our allies will help the Iraqi people rebuild their economy, and create the institutions of liberty in a unified Iraq at peace with its neighbors.
Later this week, the United States Congress will vote on this matter. I have asked Congress to authorize the use of America's military, if it proves necessary, to enforce U.N. Security Council demands. Approving this resolution does not mean that military action is imminent or unavoidable. The resolution will tell the United Nations, and all nations, that America speaks with one voice and is determined to make the demands of the civilized world mean something. Congress will also be sending a message to the dictator in Iraq: that his only chance—his only choice is full compliance, and the time remaining for that choice is limited.
(Commentary 30) Members of Congress are nearing an historic vote. I'm confident they will fully consider the facts, and their duties.
The attacks of September the 11th showed our country that vast oceans no longer protect us from danger. Before that tragic date, we had only hints of al Qaeda's plans and designs. Today in Iraq, we see a threat whose outlines are far more clearly defined, and whose consequences could be far more deadly. Saddam Hussein's actions have put us on notice, and there is no refuge from our responsibilities.
We did not ask for this present challenge, but we accept it. Like other generations of Americans, we will meet the responsibility of defending human liberty against violence and aggression. By our resolve, we will give strength to others. By our courage, we will give hope to others. And by our actions, we will secure the peace, and lead the world to a better day.
May God bless America. (Applause.)
Comentaries
Commentary 1
This speech includes no mention of the alleged Niger uranium deal. On October 5 and 6, 2002, the CIA sent Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley two memos raising objections to references in a draft of the speech that Iraq was trying to buy uranium from Niger. One of the memos was also sent to National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. CIA Director George Tenet also telephoned Hadley about the claims. The memos detailed a long list of CIA doubts about the Niger story, reportedly saying there was "weakness in the evidence" and that the purchase, even if true, "was not particularly significant." The Niger reference was deleted from the Cincinnati speech but resurfaced in the 2003 State of the Union address. The documents supporting this statement were later determined to be forgeries. Former Iraq Survey Group (ISG) Special Advisor David Kay, who led the U.S. weapons hunt from June 2003 to January 2004, said his team had not found any evidence to support this claim. Back
Commentary 2
United Nations teams destroyed or accounted for almost all of Iraq's chemical, biological, and nuclear programs, but officials had serious unanswered questions about the remnants of these programs when they were forced to leave in 1998. Among the concerns: nuclear weapons designs that might still exist, scientists that might still be developing nuclear weapons, and Iraq's failure to prove that it had destroyed all the chemical weapons it was known to have produced. Back
Commentary 3
At the time of the president's speech, a classified National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) about Iraq circulating within the administration stated with "high confidence" that "Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons." However, in September 2002, a Defense Intelligence Agency study had warned that "no reliable information" exists "on whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons. . ." In January 2004, Kay said the ISG did not find evidence that large-scale chemical or biological weapons production had occurred in the 1990s, and that it was "highly unlikely" Iraq had stockpiles of biological or chemical weapons. In late January 2004, President Bush and Vice President Cheney backed away from prior statements that claimed weapons of mass destruction would eventually be found in Iraq. However, Cheney said in March 2004 that inspectors have "still got a lot of work to do" before they can determine whether there are currently such weapons in Iraq. Back
Commentary 4
Richard J. Kerr, a former CIA deputy now leading an evaluation of U.S. intelligence estimates on Iraq, says that the CIA collected almost no hard information about Iraqi weapons programs after U.N. inspectors left in 1998, and that many of the intelligence community's reasons for saying that Iraq had reconstituted its nuclear program were largely "inferential." Back
Commentary 5
Saddam employed chemical weapons against Iranian forces during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War. Iranian officials claim that Iraq exposed more than 60,000 soldiers to chemical agents. Despite Iraq's clear violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol against the use of chemical weapons, the United States increased economic aid to Iraq in 1983 and restored normal diplomatic relations in 1984. Back
Commentary 6
The president is quoting former chief weapons inspector Richard Butler, who observed in September 2002: ". . .I flinch when I hear American, British, and French fulminations against weapons of mass destruction, ignoring the fact that they are the proud owners of massive quantities of those weapons, unapologetically insisting that they are essential for their national security, and will remain so." Back
Commentary 7
The United Nations Security Council, thanks to President Bush's leadership, did confront Iraq, voting unanimously on November 8, 2002, for Security Council Resolution 1441 to impose an intrusive inspection regime to find and destroy any and all illegal weapons programs. U.N. inspectors returned to Iraq in November, but only operated in Iraq at full strength—including U-2 overflights, helicopters, and additional intelligence from national governments—for less than a month before the war began. Back
Commentary 8
The U.N. inspectors did not reach this conclusion. Their final report in 1999 indicated that 520 kilograms (1,144 pounds) of yeast extract (bacterial growth media) remained unaccounted for and was "sufficient to produce 26,000 liters of Bacillus anthracis spores or over 3 times the amount declared by Iraq." Inspectors did not know if Iraq had actually used this growth media to produce more anthrax; nor did they draw any conclusions about what weapons Iraq might possess. Iraq's biological weapons, if they existed, could "kill millions" only if the regime possessed highly effective long-range missile and rocket delivery systems, such as those the United States and the Soviet Union perfected during the Cold War. There was and is no evidence that Iraq possessed such delivery systems or any stockpiles of biological weapons in 2002. Back
Commentary 9
In March 1988, an estimated 5,000 people died and many thousands more were injured in a chemical weapons attack on the Kurdish village of Halabja. The Reagan administration, which considered Iraq a key ally in the effort to contain Iran, condemned the attack but hesitated to punish Iraq openly. Although Congress drafted legislation to sanction Iraq, the administration protested that sanctions were "premature," and the measures failed to become law. According to Samantha Power's book, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide, the head of the State Department's Near Eastern Affairs Bureau warned senior officials against further diplomatic confrontations with Saddam: "Our condemnation of Iraq's use of chemical weapons against the Kurdish insurgency has shaken the fragile U.S.-Iraqi relationship and been heavily criticized in the Arab world. . .We should oppose legislation which uses inaccurate terms like genocide." Back
Commentary 10
U.N. teams conducted 731 inspections covering 411 sites between December 2002 and March 2003 and saw no evidence of active production facilities or indications that Iraq had renewed its weapons program. Since the war, the ISG has not uncovered any evidence of weapons production, although Kay says that Iraq continued research that could be associated with biological and chemical weapons programs. Back
Commentary 11
Kay said evidence indicates Saddam did not produce nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons after the Gulf War and that most stockpiles were destroyed unilaterally or under U.N. supervision. Many theories have emerged that attempt to explain why Saddam refused to provide evidence of their destruction if he did not possess illegal weapons. Former United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission Chairman Hans Blix, for example, suggested Saddam believed those programs protected him from outside aggression, comparing the Iraqi leader's subterfuge to those who put up a 'Beware of Dog' sign yet do not own a dog. Back
Commentary 12
In the 1980s, Iraq had hundreds of Scud missiles with ranges from 300 to 600 kilometers (186 to 373 miles), firing over 500 in its war with Iran, and almost 100 in the 1991 Gulf War. The U.N. inspectors were able to confirm that at all but two of the Scuds remaining after the war were destroyed. Unclassified and declassified U.S. intelligence documents from 1998 to 2002 reveal that there was concern Iraq retained several covert Scuds, but none of the assessments judged that Iraq had produced missiles with a range of "hundreds of miles." Under U.N. sanctions, Iraq was allowed to build short-range missiles with ranges of up to 150 kilometers (93 miles). In early 2003, U.N. inspectors reported that they had found 97 missiles that exceeded that range by some 30 kilometers (19 miles). These missiles could have struck neighboring countries such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey but could not have hit more distant nations such as Israel or Egypt. Inspectors had destroyed 72 of these missiles when the U.S. attacked Iraq. According to Kay, Saddam intended to develop a program for longer-range missiles, but he had to abandon many of his efforts due to the new U.N. inspection and monitoring regime imposed in 2002. Back
Commentary 13
The U.N. inspectors were not able to complete the inquiry into Iraq's unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) programs prior to the onset of the war. In late August 2003, evidence surfaced that the Air Force had objected to the October NIE assertion that Iraqi UAVs could be used for offensive purposes. The Air Force concluded that the Iraqi drones were primarily for reconnaissance and likely too small for the delivery of weapons of mass destruction. The estimated 25 to 30 Iraqi drones found so far confirm the Air Force's assessment. To date, U.S. forces have not found any UAVs matching the president's description. Kay likewise says there is no conclusive evidence that the UAVs were intended to deliver biological or chemical weapons agents. Back
Commentary 14
The October 2002 NIE warned that evidence of a connection between Iraq and al Qaeda was largely circumstantial. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Abu Zubaydah, the two highest-ranking al Qaeda operatives in custody, told investigators that Osama bin Laden despised Saddam Hussein and had vetoed the idea of working with him. U.S. troops have captured dozens of alleged al Qaeda members, but these arrests have so far failed to bring additional evidence of Iraqi - al Qaeda cooperation. Back
Commentary 15
The president is referring to Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian who received medical treatment in Baghdad. However, the Washington Post, citing unnamed intelligence analysts and congressional sources, noted that at the time President Bush delivered this speech, "U.S. intelligence already had concluded that Zarqawi was not an al Qaeda member but the leader of an unaffiliated terrorist group who occasionally associated with al Qaeda adherents." In February 2003, the Wall Street Journal cited German officials and captured members of Zarqawi's group, who said that Zarqawi did not operate closely with either Iraq or al Qaeda. Back
Commentary 16
The October 2002 NIE reached the opposite conclusion. Intelligence agencies said that if Saddam ever struck U.S. targets, he would likely rely on his own "special forces or intelligence operatives." Saddam might turn over his weapons to terrorists only as a "last chance to exact vengeance by taking a large number of victims with him." The NIE deemed this scenario an "extreme step" on Hussein's part. Kay testified in January 2004 that "there's no evidence that I can think of, that I know of" to indicate Iraq ever considered giving weapons of mass destruction to al Qaeda or other terrorist groups. Back
Commentary 17 To date, no nation that has produced chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons has ever given such weapons to terrorist groups. In March 2002, CIA Director George Tenet told the U.S. Senate that if Saddam did cooperate with al Qaeda or another terrorist network against the United States, he would be "well aware that such activity would carry serious consequences." The 2002 NIE reached a similar conclusion. Back
Commentary 18
There is no evidence yet of weapons or weapons scientists going from Iraq to work with terrorist groups. However, there are reports that Iran is actively recruiting former Iraqi missile experts to help with its program to develop medium-range missiles capable of striking Israel and other nations. Back
Commentary 19
In the months after this speech, administration officials used this uncertainty to imply that Saddam might soon get, or might already have, a nuclear weapon. But the October 2002 NIE said, if "left unchecked, it [Baghdad] will probably have a nuclear weapon during this decade." President Bush told reporters on December 31, "We don't know whether or not he has a nuclear weapon." The International Atomic Energy Agency, however, concluded in March 2003 that there was no evidence of Iraqi efforts to import uranium or enrichment equipment, and that most of Iraq's nuclear sites had "deteriorated substantially." Kay found no postwar evidence that Saddam had an active nuclear program, although he asserted that Saddam maintained nuclear ambitions. Back
Commentary 20
A great deal of the new evidence the administration presented in the months leading up to the war was based on information provided by defectors that later proved false. The Los Angeles Times reported that in at least three major cases defector information was flawed or inaccurate. (According to the Washington Post, the "high-ranking Iraqi nuclear engineer" is Khidhir Hamza, who quit work on Iraq's nuclear program in 1991 and left Iraq in 1995.) To date, U.S. forces have discovered no evidence of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons at any of the dozens of sites that the Iraqi defectors identified as weapons facilities. Back
Commentary 21
In a lengthy dissent to the October 2002 NIE, the State Department's Intelligence and Research Bureau concluded that it lacked "persuasive evidence that Baghdad has launched a coherent effort to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program." Kay's October 2003 interim report said that the ISG found no evidence that Iraq took "significant" steps to build nuclear weapons after 1998. Back
Commentary 22
In January 2004, Kay said that in 2000 Iraq had begun some "rudimentary" nuclear activities, such as renovating buildings associated with its nuclear program, but these did not represent "anything meaningful." Back
Commentary 23
According to the October 2002 NIE, the State Department's Intelligence Bureau was "not persuaded that the tubes in question are intended for use as centrifuge rotors." The State Department cited the conclusions of technical experts at the U.S. Department of Energy, who deemed the tubes "poorly suited for use in gas centrifuges to be used for uranium enrichment." The IAEA reached similar conclusions in March 2003. Kay found no evidence of active Iraqi centrifuge research or development, noting that "It's more than probable that those tubes were intended for use in a conventional missile program, rather than in a centrifuge program." Back
Commentary 24
The president here collapses very different timelines when he uses "produce" and "buy, or steal" uranium within the same sentence. The October 2002 NIE noted this distinction: "If Baghdad acquires sufficient fissile material from abroad, it could make a nuclear weapon within a year. Without such material from abroad, Iraq probably would not be able to make a weapon until 2007 to 2009. . ." Back
Commentary 25
Theodore Sorensen, the Kennedy advisor who wrote these words, complained that this quote was taken totally out of context: "It was not intended to justify a preemptive strike, because JFK had specifically ruled out a preemptive strike." Back
Commentary 26
In October 2003, Kay told the U.S. Congress that "Information found to date suggests that Iraq's large-scale capability to develop, produce, and fill new CW [chemical weapons] munitions was reduced—if not entirely destroyed—during Operations Desert Storm and Desert Fox, 13 years of U.N. sanctions and U.N. inspections." Kay also said in an interview that Iraq's nuclear program had "been seriously degraded. The activities of the inspectors in the early '90s did a tremendous amount." Back
Commentary 27
Chief U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix reported to the Security Council on January 27, 2003: "Iraq has on the whole cooperated rather well so far. . .The most important point to make is that access has been provided to all sites we have wanted to inspect and with one exception it has been prompt. . .Our inspections have included universities, military bases, presidential sites and private residences. Inspections have also taken place on Fridays, the Muslim day of rest, on Christmas day and New Year's day." Back
Commentary 28
In fact, the evidence pointed against Saddam developing a nuclear weapon anytime soon. In 2001, the U.S. Department of Defense concluded, "Iraq would need five or more years and key foreign assistance to rebuild the infrastructure to enrich enough material for a nuclear weapon." Likely, it would have taken Iraq much longer, as Iraq's nuclear program had deteriorated in the 1990s, the existing sanctions precluded any significant foreign assistance, and the return of U.N. inspectors to Iraq made it possible to detect any significant nuclear-related activity. Back
Commentary 29
Testifying before the U.S. Senate on July 30, 2003, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz and White House Budget Director Joshua Bolten said it was impossible to estimate the total costs of rebuilding Iraq since the situation there is changing so rapidly. Paul Bremer, the U.S. administrator of Iraq, initially said that rebuilding the country could cost anywhere between $50 billion and $100 billion during the next couple of years. In November 2003, Congress approved over $70 billion for the reconstruction and ongoing military presence in Iraq for fiscal year 2004 alone. Back
Commentary 30
Three days later, Congress voted in favor of a resolution authorizing President Bush to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein refused to give up weapons of mass destruction as required by U.N. resolutions. (House of Representatives vote: 296 to 133, Senate vote: 77 to 23). Prior to the vote, the intelligence community released an unclassified version of the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs, to members of Congress. This version excluded key agency dissents related to Iraq's nuclear program and doubts about Saddam's willingness to give weapons of mass destruction to terrorists. Back
Notes
Note *: Joseph Cirincione is author of Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 2002) and a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment. Back
Note **: Dipali Mukhopadhyay is a former junior fellow at the Non-Proliferation Project of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Back
Note ***: Alexis Orton is a junior fellow at the Non-Proliferation Project of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Back