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CIAO DATE: 03/01
Foreign Policy
Time for an Asian NATO?
Derek Chollet
Shouldn't there be an Asian NATO? According to Hebrew University's Galia Press-Barnathan, the idea‹which found its stilted expression in the now defunct Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, or SEATO‹never had a chance. She explains why in the winter 2001 issue of Security Studies, an upstart journal published by Frank Cass, which has quickly won a reputation in academia and policy circles for sensible theoretical pieces, sound historical research, fresh ideas, and, most important, new voices.
Press-Barnathan begins by comparing U.S. policy toward Europe and Asia after World War II and explaining why the United States never seriously pursued an Asian NATO. She puts together a kind of litmus test, which lays out the minimum requirements for Washington to pursue regional alliances versus going it alone‹and then tests her criteria against history.
When deciding what kinds of regional organizations to create, she argues, U.S. policymakers pursue several goals simultaneously (for instance, deter a rival, strengthen a partner, and open new markets); minimize trade-offs between these goals; and lower the costs of foreign commitments by sharing the financial burden with allies. Washington tends to choose regional alliances that allow a moderate power disparity with would-be partners‹meaning Washington wants to dominate, but not too much, lest its partners decide to free ride. And U.S. policymakers will seek alliances only if their partners want them and if their goals are compatible. Sensible enough.
So how do her proposed criteria stack up against history? From the case Press-Barnathan presents, pretty well. In the late 1940s, Washington and its Asian partners shared a similar goal‹a stronger Japan, but one that was part of a wider security arrangement that would reassure other Asian nations about Japan's intentions. After the outbreak of war in Korea, the United States pushed to create a Pacific pact along the lines of the North Atlantic Treaty but gave up when it became clear that its regional partners were simply too weak to share any meaningful burden, and that Japan was unwilling to remilitarize, even for a defensive security arrangement. Therefore, to the United States, a regional alliance had little advantage over bilateral security arrangements, such as the treaties later forged with Japan, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand.
The opposite was true in Europe. As the Soviet threat emerged, Western Europe and the United States had every reason to join together. Britain and France were strong regional partners, and they had plenty of incentive to join the United States to create a regional security arrangement that would reintegrate Germany into Europe‹or, to paraphrase former NATO Secretary General Baron Lionel Ismay, to keep the Americans in and the Germans down.
Press-Barnathan argues that given more moderate power disparities in Asia today, conditions are now conducive to a U.S.-Asian alliance. Asian powers are stronger, so they can assume more of the burden. They are also more interested in multilateral solutions to regional stability. Indeed, during the last decade, the United States has sought to bolster regional cooperation in Asia by strengthening the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum (President Clinton first introduced annual summits of APEC's leaders in Seattle in 1993) and by helping create the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum to tackle security issues. Most recently, Washington has explored the potential for a regional security institution in Northeast Asia, which would include Japan, Russia, China, and the Koreas and could become a forum to discuss transnational issues such as the environment, arms control, drug trafficking, and organized crime.
While there may be the will and the way, there might not be the reason‹Press-Barnathan's last criterion for alliances, which she seems to overlook here. There is no single, overarching menace like Soviet communism to bind the United States to Asia or the Asian states to each other. Even in Europe, where for 50 years NATO has thrived, there are questions about the future of the alliance absent a clear threat. If Asian and U.S. leaders are intent on coming together, they must do more to answer the fundamental question‹for what?
Derek Chollet served in the U.S. Department of State during 1999-2001.