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CIAO DATE: 09/03
Foreign Policy
From Victory to Success: An FP-Carnegie Special Report
Lessons of the Past
Minxin Pei*
Nation building—the restructuring of the governing institutions in foreign societies—is probably the most complex, costly, and, ultimately, frustrating foreign-policy undertaking. Even for great powers endowed with unsurpassed military strength and wealth, most attempts to rebuild other nations in their own image have historically ended in disappointment, if not outright failure. To make nation building work in Iraq, the United States must first and foremost recall its own experiences in other countries. Such a historical examination would show that a key aspect of nation-building failures has been a unilateral approach.
According to the Congressional Research Service, the United States has conducted more than 200 military interventions abroad since its founding. Sixteen of these interventions, or about 8 percent, can be categorized as nation-building attempts.
These missions have three characteristics. First, their practical goal was to achieve regime change or the survival of a regime that would have otherwise collapsed. (As in Iraq, creating or restoring democracy was not the original mission objective. Rather, core U.S. security and economic interests were the principal drivers of U.S. interventions.) Second, American nation-building efforts typically required that a large number of ground troops be deployed to provide security and basic services. Third, U.S. military and civilian personnel were active in post-conflict political administration. Such deep U.S. involvement in the political life of the target nations allowed Washington to select friendly leaders, influence policy, and restructure institutions.
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Keep Your Eyes On
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What To Expect |
If we judge these nation-building attempts by whether they created durable democratic regimes after the withdrawal of U.S. forces, the results are sobering. Of the 16 attempts (see facing page), only four (Japan, Germany, Panama in 1989, and Grenada in 1983) qualify as successes. In these four countries, democracy, as measured by the widely used Polity democracy index maintained at the University of Maryland, was sustained 10 years after U.S. troops left. In the other 11 countries (excluding Afghanistan), democracy failed to emerge or endure during the same time frame. Worse, in the countries where U.S. nation-building efforts foundered, brutal dictatorships and corrupt, autocratic regimes gained power after the U.S. exit. This record implies a success rate of 26 percent (four out of 15 attempts).
The factors contributing to failed nation-building efforts are complex, and some of them, such as socio-economic characteristics and governing capacities in target nations, are beyond U.S. control. Yet one factor is not: U.S. decisions to “go it alone.” It appears that unilateral efforts are more likely to cause nation building to fail. Of the 16 cases included in this analysis, 12 were unilateral attempts. Of these, 10 failed.
The key variable in failed unilateral nation-building attempts seems to be the type of interim administration deployed immediately following military intervention. Of the 16 cases, seven saw interim rule by U.S.-supported surrogate regimes—governments that were almost totally dependent on Washington. The United States picked, or deemed acceptable, the individuals who headed these regimes, and their survival usually hinged on U.S. military and economic support. Such surrogate governments might have served short-term American interests, but the regimes never developed democratic institutions. In the 10 years following U.S. troop withdrawals, none of the target countries ruled by such governments had made the transition to democracy.
One possible explanation is that, in building these interim regimes, the United States facilitated the rise of the target country’s military, an institution indispensable to restoring security and order. Later, strongmen seized the military to advance their personal ambitions. Another explanation is that these surrogate governments, lacking indigenous legitimacy, could survive only through repression after U.S. forces departed.
Another mode of nation building, direct U.S. administration, has a mixed record. This approach failed in Cuba (1898-1902 and 1906-1909) and the Dominican Republic (1916-1924) but worked in Japan (1945-1952). [See chart, “If at First You Don't Succeed.”]
The ideal form of political transition in nation building appears to be the quick transfer of power to legitimately elected local leaders, as happened in Grenada and Panama. But this approach assumes a functioning electoral system and the existence of credible, moderate local leaders who have genuine indigenous political support. In the case of Iraq, a fully open electoral process is very likely to elevate radical religious leaders to power because they have extensive organizational networks and broad popular support. In other Muslim societies, such as Algeria, early efforts to introduce democracy have led to the rise of extremist Islamic parties and brutal civil conflict.
None of these three modes of interim administration seems suited to the complex, uncertain conditions in Iraq. To calm Arab fears of U.S. neoimperialism, Washington has promised to end direct U.S. administration as soon as possible. But a speedy transition to full democracy will likely produce political instability that will harm U.S. interests and decrease the long-term viability of democracy in Iraq. Establishing a pro-American surrogate regime, however, might serve Washington’s short-term needs but will most likely hinder the emergence of democracy, as demonstrated by the historical record of similar regimes.
There is another option: multilateralism. This approach has been tried in four of the 16 cases of U.S. nation building. Of these four cases, two (Haiti in 1994 and Afghanistan in 2001) were authorized by the United Nations, one (Germany after World War II) was undertaken with allies, and one (Japan after World War II) was multilateral in form although unilateral on the ground. Certainly, a multilateral approach does not always succeed, as the current political crisis in Haiti demonstrates. Afghanistan remains a work in progress.
Still, multilateralism in nation building has great benefits. U.N.-sanctioned nation building garners more international legitimacy than attempts by a lone intervener. In addition, multilateralism helps distribute the costs—in money and manpower—more widely. Most important, multilateralism provides an insurance policy against the huge risks of failure for the image and interests of countries such as the United States.
The poor record of past unilateral nation building leaves a U.N.-led approach as the least risky alternative. In addition to bringing legitimacy, experience in managing post-conflict societies, and economic and military contributions from its members, a U.N.-led interim administration of Iraq will help discredit popular conspiracy theories deriding Washington’s intentions toward Iraq. Since the Bush administration has publicly disavowed an intent to establish long-term military bases in Iraq or to take advantage of its vast oil resources, having the United Nations as the lead partner would give the administration instant credibility.
A U.N.-led effort by no means guarantees success. Multilateralism has its limitations, such as poor coordination and burdensome bureaucracy. Yet history suggests that multilateralism manages risk, while unilateralism invites it. The Bush administration has been undaunted by risk, arguing that no country has ever been as powerful as the United States is today. But in the case of nation building, will that power allow the United States to transcend the lessons of history?
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First You Don't Succeed: U.S. Nation-Building, 1898-2003 |
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| Target
Country |
Population |
Years |
Multilateral
or Unilateral |
Interim
Administration |
Democracy After 10 Years? |
| Afghanistan |
26.8 million |
2001-present |
Multilateral |
U.N. Administration |
N/A |
| Haiti |
7 million |
1994-96 |
Unilateral |
Local Administration |
No |
| Panama |
2.3 million |
1989 |
Unilateral |
Local Administration |
Yes |
| Grenada |
92,000 |
1983 |
Unilateral |
Local Administration |
Yes |
Cambodia |
7 million |
1970-73 |
Unilateral |
U.S. Surrogate Regime |
No |
| South Vietnam |
19 million |
1964-73 |
Unilateral |
U.S. Surrogate Regime |
No |
Dominican Republic |
3.8 million |
1965-66 |
Unilateral |
U.S. Surrogate Regime |
No |
| Japan |
72 million |
1945-52 |
Both* |
U.S. Direct Administration |
Yes |
West Germany |
46 million |
1945-49 |
Multilateral |
Multilateral Administration |
Yes |
| Dominican Republic |
895,000 |
1916-24 |
Unilateral |
U.S. Direct Administration |
No |
Cuba |
2.8 million |
1917-22 |
Unilateral |
U.S. Surrogate Regime |
No |
| Haiti |
2 million |
1915-34 |
Unilateral |
U.S. Surrogate Regime |
No |
Nicaragua |
620,000 |
1909-33 |
Unilateral |
U.S. Surrogate Regime |
No |
| Cuba |
2 million |
1906-09 |
Unilateral |
U.S. Direct Adminitration |
No |
Panama |
450,000 |
1903-36 |
Unilateral |
U.S. Surrogate Regime |
No |
| Cuba |
1.6 million |
1898-1902 |
Unilateral |
U.S. Direct Administration |
No |
*The United States won the war as part of the Allied victory over Japan but assumed exclusive occupation authority in Japan after the war.
Notes
Note *: Minxin Pei is the author of From Reform to Revolution: The Demise of Communism in China and the Soviet Union (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994) and a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment. Back