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CIAO DATE: 09/03
Foreign Policy
From Victory to Success: An FP-Carnegie Special Report
Terror's Undiminished Threat
Vincent Cannistraro*
Though the war on Iraq was called a major battle in the war on terrorism, the removal of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein from power will not dramatically reduce the direct threat to the United States from terrorists. Saddam and his regime were not a major influence on international terrorism. The Iraqi government had tenuous, if any, links to the only international terrorist group that has been targeting and killing Americans during the last several years: al Qaeda. (Ironically, northeastern Iraq, which had been an autonomous area protected by U.S. air patrols and outside Baath control, was the only part of Iraq known to harbor an al Qaeda presence. However, the war has denied al Qaeda a new staging area there.) Baghdad certainly harbored some known terrorists, primarily from the Abu Nidal Organization and the Palestinian Liberation Front, but neither of these groups has recently promoted anti-American violence. The Iraqi regime also gave refuge to Saudi dissidents plotting against the Saudi monarchy and provided financial assistance to Palestinian families of suicide bombers.
More than reducing direct terrorist threats to the United States, the removal of Saddam’s government and the establishment of a large U.S. military presence in the region are likely to lessen the resistance of local governments to broader U.S. foreign-policy goals, particularly the protection of Israel against terrorism. Syria, which has not harbored groups targeting Americans, recognizes the changed strategic balance in the Middle East and may do more to help U.S. intelligence monitor al Qaeda and track down fugitive Iraqi officials. Damascus will continue to provide political support to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, but it may be less likely to stimulate Hezbollah military action in southern Lebanon. Iran, the major patron of Hezbollah, is unlikely to abandon the organization but will probably advise caution to avoid antagonizing the United States. Iran also accommodates some al Qaeda leaders within its territory and will face greater internal pressure to expel them in order to deflect American demands. Saudi Arabia may now seriously curtail support of fundamentalist religious terrorists. Of course, ungovernable havens for terrorists such as Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province or Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge will be harder to affect.
If the dynamic U.S. military presence on Muslim soil intimidates governments from confronting the United States, it also may substantially increase grassroots hostility and, potentially, terrorist recruitment against the U.S. government and Israel. Postwar animosity has provoked attacks on a McDonald’s restaurant in Beirut, as well as Coca-Cola and Pizza Hut facilities in Cairo and boycotts of American products throughout Indonesia and other southern Asian countries. The festering Israeli-Palestinian conflict will feed this resentment and draw new recruits to groups that engage in asymmetrical armed struggle against the United States.
Despite popular resentment and official pique among U.S. allies over the war in Iraq, international cooperation on antiterrorism measures has continued. Law enforcement and intelligence collaboration between the United States and allied countries has been central in detecting al Qaeda cells in France, Germany, and Western Europe as well as in Pakistan, Malaysia, and Central Asia. Where there is a marked difference between the United States and allies is in their opposing views of Hamas, Hezbollah, and some other groups: The United States characterizes them as terrorist units, while several allies believe they are resistance groups, opposing illegal occupation by the Israelis. It is in this area that intelligence sharing tends to be less than fulsome.
Notes
Note *: Vincent Cannistraro, a former chief of CIA counterterrorism operations and analysis, is currently a consultant for corporate and U.S. government clients. Back