CIAO DATE: 08/02

Foreign Policy

Foreign Policy

July/August 2002

Inbox: Accountable Aid

 

"Accountability" was the buzzword of choice when the Bush administration unveiled its compact for sustainable development in mid-March, pledging $5 billion over the next three years to help poor nations who demonstrated a "strong commitment" to rooting out corruption, upholding human rights, and adhering to the rule of law.

That zeal for accountability does not seem to apply, however, when it comes to the more than $7.7 billion that the White House has budgeted for various types of foreign military assistance in fiscal 2003. According to "U.S. Foreign Military Training: Global Reach, Global Power, and Oversight Issues"—recently published by the left-leaning think tank Foreign Policy in Focus (FPIF)—the Bush administration is aiding militaries that have a documented record of corruption, trampling human rights, and undermining the rule of law.

These programs have expanded since the early 1990s, but the attacks of September 11, 2001, provided a key rationale for a big boost. Today, the United States trains nearly 100,000 foreign soldiers annually in at least 150 U.S.-based institutions and 180 countries. Nineteen recipients of such assistance—including Azerbaijan, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Yemen, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Colombia—have been cited by the Bush administration as "friends and allies in the fight against terrorism." Yet the security forces in 14 of those nations were also cited by the State Department's 2002 "Human Rights Report" for abuses that include extrajudicial killings, torture, and arbitrary arrests and detentions. In fact, 51 of the 180 countries receiving military aid have been described by the State Department as having "poor" human rights records.

Some might argue that focusing on human rights abuses is an unaffordable luxury in the worldwide fight against al Qaeda. But FPIF warns that supporting lawless, oppressive governments merely fosters the anger and misery that helps give rise to terrorists in the first place—suggesting that, in a few years, the United States might be held accountable in ways it had not intended.

These findings also fit most European and South American nations. Reaffirming their colonial connections, Spain and Portugal remain prominent destinations for South American players; top African players are more likely to arrive in the European leagues, notably France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Spain; and the larger South American economies of Brazil and Argentina continue to draw in elite players from smaller countries in the region, notably Uruguay. Italy is perhaps exceptional: It has long recruited players from a wider pool of nations, including large numbers from South American countries, since the interwar years. In general, however, postwar evidence suggests that distinctive regional patterns underlie the formation of the soccer world's top club sides.

Of course, many realist analysts highlight globalization's unevenness and regionalism. Political economist Linda Weiss of the University of Sydney argues that sovereign states are not disarmed by globalization but instead actively promote corporate internationalism, notably at the regional level. Paul Smith of George Mason University notes that the largest corporations are not truly transnational but are still tied strongly to localities by business centers and cultural symbolism. And University of Aberdeen sociologist Roland Robertson coined the term "glocalization" to explain how global social processes are selectively redefined and adapted to suit local cultural exigencies.

These interpretations fit the soccer context as well. National soccer associations can be seen as statelike actors in Weiss's terms—witness the English Football Association in its regional recruitment of a Swedish team coach. Perhaps more relevant, many top English and other European soccer clubs operate very much like modern multinational corporations. Manchester United, for example, may play its home matches in northwest England, but it has a global fan (i.e., consumer) base of over 50 million supporters; with 20 million of these in Asia, it becomes Singapore's "home team." Moreover, to retain a local cultural definition and identity, the world's largest clubs still appoint a long-serving team captain who has close personal ties to the club's civic or national base. Thus, the world's most famous club, Real Madrid, has the Spanish star Fernando Ruis Hierro to lead his cosmopolitan teammates, Roma has the renowned local star Francesco Totti as its captain, and ac Milan has Paolo Maldini as its leader.

Nevertheless, we should recognize that in the past decade or so, English soccer has undergone increasingly rapid structural and cultural changes, and recruitment practices are no exception. Clubs such as Chelsea, Arsenal, Newcastle United, Liverpool, and Fulham have recruited European coaches with avowedly European (not "British") coaching techniques, playing systems, dietary programs, and management styles. Britain has experienced an unprecedented influx of elite players from nontraditional nations, such as Italy, France, Germany, and Croatia, as well as African and South American countries. Most of the 20 English Premier League soccer clubs could field a team consisting primarily of players from outside the British Isles.

This trend has certainly enhanced the aesthetic sophistication of English club soccer. Whether or not it improves the standard of English players—and thus boosts the World Cup chances of England's national team—remains a matter of serious debate.