Foreign Policy: Americans and the World: A Survey at Century’s End

Foreign Policy
Spring 1999

Americans and the World: A Survey at Century’s End

By John E. Rielly _*

This article is adapted from a report titled American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1999, which is being published simultaneously by the Chicago Council.

As the twentieth century closes, Americans feel secure, prosperous, and confident. They see the United States as the world’s most important and powerful country, with the fear of armed threats from a rival superpower diminished. In an era of increasing globalization, Americans view economic rather than military power as the most significant measure of global strength. Apprehension about economic competition from Japan or Europe has dissipated, as have concerns about immigration. Nevertheless, Americans are alarmed by violence at home and abroad. They support measures to thwart terrorists, prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and keep defense strong, but shy away from deploying U.S. troops on foreign soil. American public and leadership opinion on foreign policy today reflects a “guarded engagement” by a largely satisfied superpower.

These are some of the most significant conclusions from the latest quadrennial survey of American public and leadership opinion sponsored by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. The survey was conducted during the last three months of 1998, the seventh in a series that has tracked foreign-policy opinions in the United States over two and a half decades. This is the third survey since the end of the Cold War.

A (Mostly) Self-Satisfied Superpower

As in all our previous surveys, support for an active role by the United States in world affairs remains strong, with 61 percent of the public and 96 percent of leaders in favor. On the question of the country’s biggest foreign-policy problems, one of the responses chosen by the public, “staying out of the affairs of other countries,” is down 12 points, from 19 percent in 1994 to 7 percent today. The American public is also more confident about the role of the United States in the world: Fifty percent believe it now plays a more important and powerful role as a world leader than it did 10 years ago, and only 19 percent (down seven points) foresee a lesser role. More than three-quarters of the public (79 percent) and 71 percent of leaders believe the United States will play a greater role in the world 10 years from now.

Reflecting other domestic polls finding record economic and personal satisfaction among Americans, the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations survey shows contentment on the foreign-policy front. When asked to list the two or three biggest foreign-policy problems facing the United States today, the most common public response (by 21 percent) was “I don’t know.” Though this might indicate a lack of interest in or attentiveness to foreign policy, the survey’s findings suggest instead that Americans are feeling a sense of relative security.

President Bill Clinton has made a dramatic comeback from four years ago in approval ratings for his conduct of foreign policy. By one measure of the survey, he has risen from eighth to first place among postwar presidents considered “very successful” by the public in the conduct of foreign policy. Clinton’s high overall approval ratings in this area suggest that Americans are giving him credit for the strong position of the United States in the world and for its apparent lack of foreign-policy problems. Moreover, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright ranks fifth among various world leaders on the survey’s “feeling thermometer,” behind the pope, former U.S. presidents George Bush and Jimmy Carter, and South African president Nelson Mandela.

Congress is perceived as playing about the right role in determining foreign policy vis-à-vis the president, despite concern over matters surrounding the president and the impeachment process (which the public listed second most frequently as one of the biggest problems facing the country). Forty-three percent of Americans say Congress’ role in foreign policy is about right, the highest number since the surveys began in 1974—in other words, the public is the most satisfied it has been in 25 years with Congress’ role in making foreign policy.

Despite the general sense of power, confidence, and contentment, there is some unease. A majority of Americans (53 percent) believe there will be more bloodshed and violence in the twenty-first century than in the twentieth century, with 19 percent saying less. Leaders disagree, with a plurality (40 percent) believing there will be less violence and only 23 percent believing there will be more.

The number one “critical threat” to U.S. vital interests in the minds of the public is international terrorism, named by 84 percent of respondents, up 15 points from four years ago. This is followed by chemical and biological weapons (76 percent) and the possibility of unfriendly countries becoming nuclear powers (75 percent). Of the biggest foreign-policy problems that the public mentions, seven of the eleven most common responses relate to a fear of weapons, violence, and conflict. Although the terrorist bombings against U.S. embassies in Africa, and the subsequent retaliatory U.S. air strikes in Afghanistan and Sudan, were probably fresh in the minds of the public during this survey, these fears of international violence also mirror the survey’s finding of crime as the biggest perceived problem at home.

Guarded Engagement

Perhaps reflecting this fear of violence, Americans show a degree of caution about becoming involved internationally. Overall public commitment to engagement coexists with reluctance to support the use of U.S. troops overseas.

In only one hypothetical case—if Iraq invaded Saudi Arabia—is there a plurality of public support for using U.S. troops in other parts of the world; otherwise, at least a plurality oppose military intervention. Because of their unlikeliness, possible attacks on Europe or Japan—cases that in the past have received the strongest support for intervention—were not included in the 1998 survey. Nevertheless, in the instances for which there is comparative data, the proportion of the public in favor of using troops has dropped and the percentage opposed has risen by four points to ten points from 1994.

By contrast, leaders generally favor the use of U.S. troops under hypothetical scenarios, with a majority supporting intervention in Israel, Kosovo, Poland, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and Taiwan. The only exception is Cuba, where leaders overwhelmingly oppose intervention (80 percent against) in the case of a revolution.

The public’s aversion to the use of troops may also reflect a lingering post-Vietnam “syndrome.” Sixty-three percent of the public agree that “the Vietnam War was more than a mistake, it was fundamentally wrong and immoral,” an increase of four points from 1994, but lower than in earlier surveys. Moreover, the survey’s scenarios for using troops were mostly traditional cases of defending allies, which as an overall goal of foreign policy is ranked relatively low by the public (but not by leaders). In a more economically and politically pragmatic world, the public may perceive fewer direct national or personal consequences from troubles overseas and hence be less willing to put U.S. troops in harm’s way.

The picture changes dramatically, however, in the fight against terrorism, where Americans are prepared to use significant force. Seventy-four percent of the public favor U.S. air strikes against terrorist training camps and other facilities. Fifty-seven percent favor attacks by U.S. ground troops. Fifty-four percent of the public even favor assassination of terrorist leaders, though only 34 percent of leaders. Among the public and leaders, diplomatic efforts to improve U.S. relations with potential adversary countries receive an even greater degree of support (79 percent for the public and 96 percent for leaders) than military measures to combat international terrorism. Since the survey began not long after the bombing of American embassies and the retaliatory U.S. air strikes, it is not surprising that concern about terrorism was high. Nevertheless, the responses clearly illustrate that Americans will support the use of force under certain circumstances.

Despite confidence in the U.S. position as a world power, Americans are not taking chances. While a plurality of both the public and leaders still favor keeping levels of defense spending the same (as they did in 1994), the number who would expand it has increased. Among the public, 30 percent would expand the defense budget (an increase of nine points from four years ago to the highest level since 1978), 38 percent would keep it the same, and 28 percent would cut it back. The percentage of leaders who would increase defense spending has risen from 15 percent in 1994 to 26 percent today, with 41 percent preferring to keep it the same and 32 percent still favoring a cutback. Support for expanding federal spending to gather intelligence about other countries is on the rise, jumping from 18 percent to 27 percent among the public and from 16 percent to 34 percent among leaders. The percentage of respondents who would cut it back has dropped from 29 percent to 22 percent among the public and 37 percent to 15 percent among leaders, with the remainder preferring to keep spending levels the same.

A Preference for Multilateralism

An important aspect of the public’s commitment to engagement abroad is support for a multilateral foreign policy. Fifty-seven percent agree that the United States should take part in UN peacekeeping efforts in troubled parts of the world, with only 20 percent preferring to leave the job to other countries. Seventy-two percent think the United States should not take action alone in international crises if it does not have the support of allies. Leaders are more evenly divided: Forty-eight percent prefer not to act alone and 44 percent are willing to take action without allied support.

Support for the principal military alliance of the United States, nato, is solid. Most of the public (59 percent, up three points from 1994) would keep support for nato the same. Twenty-one percent would decrease it or withdraw from nato entirely, down five points from four years ago, while the 9 percent in favor of increasing support represents a gain of four points. Among leaders, support for maintaining the current level of U.S. commitment to nato has risen from 57 percent to 64 percent, and sentiment for decreasing commitment or withdrawing entirely has declined from 37 percent to 28 percent; only 7 percent want to increase U.S. commitment.

Although unilateral American initiatives continue, as in the peace process in Northern Ireland and the U.S. bombing of suspected terrorist facilities, preference for engagement through multilateral institutions and alliances suggests that Americans would rather share risks and build consensus. However, this inclination does not necessarily translate into support for engagement that would primarily benefit others. A continuing focus on national self-interest is clearly evident in the foreign-policy priorities of Americans.

Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, stopping the flow of illegal drugs into the United States, and protecting the jobs of American workers top the list of goals that the public perceives as “very important.” Of the 11 goals with at least plurality support as very important, only three do not stem strictly from self-interest: combating world hunger; improving the global environment; and strengthening the United Nations. The lowest priorities are all associated with other examples of altruistic internationalism: defending our allies’ security; promoting and defending human rights in other countries; promoting market economies abroad; protecting weaker nations against foreign aggression; helping bring a democratic form of government to other nations; and helping improve the standard of living of less-developed nations. The findings suggest that Americans prefer a guarded engagement, becoming involved mainly to defend their interests and alleviate their fears rather than to foster change according to an American model.

Adjusting to Globalization

Economics in general has risen dramatically as an important dimension of international activity and U.S. engagement. When respondents were asked whether a country’s economic strength or military strength is more important in determining its overall power and influence in the world, 63 percent of the public chose economic, compared with 28 percent who chose military. Leaders (89 percent) are even more overwhelmingly convinced of the power of economics. On the question of globalization, defined as the increasing connections of our economy with others around the world, 54 percent of the public believe that globalization is mostly good for the United States, with 20 percent saying mostly bad. Leaders are again more unified, with 87 percent believing globalization is mostly good.

The positive evaluation of globalization and the perceived economic strength of the United States coexist with concern about troubles in the global economy. While the United States has been largely insulated from financial turmoil in Asia and elsewhere, fears of instability persist, with the “world economy” appearing second only to terrorism on the list of foreign-policy problems mentioned by the public. Leaders are even more concerned, with 21 percent citing the world economy most often on the list of the country’s biggest foreign-policy problems. An additional 13 percent of leaders specify “Japan/Asian Economy/Crisis” as a significant problem.

Despite concern about the global economy, the public is unsupportive of efforts to bail out other countries suffering from financial crises. To the question of whether the United States, along with other countries, should contribute more money to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to meet world financial crises, 51 percent of the public respond no, 25 percent respond yes, and 24 percent do not know. A plurality of Americans (38 percent) believe Russia should solve its own economic problems, with 34 percent preferring Europe take the lead in providing assistance. Only 17 percent want the United States to do so. This finding is consistent with the long-term trend of low support for federal spending on economic aid to other nations. Forty-eight percent of the public want to cut it back, down 10 points from four years ago, and only 13 percent want to expand.

By contrast, 82 percent of leaders favor giving more money to the imf, and 44 percent favor Europe taking the lead on assistance to Russia, with 34 percent wanting the United States to take the lead and only 17 percent believing Russia should solve its own problems. A plurality of leaders (43 percent) are happy with the current level of federal spending on economic aid to other nations, though a notable number (38 percent) favor expanding it, a significant 18-point increase from 1994.

Global economic turmoil may have led to the increase in the number of leaders who believe tariffs are necessary, from 20 percent in 1994 to 34 percent in 1998, although most still prefer to eliminate tariffs (62 percent). The public maintains its historic belief in the need for tariffs, though by a plurality (49 percent) and not a majority, as was the case prior to 1994.

Old Friends, New Rivals

Europe: Increasing Comity

As in previous surveys, the public ranks European nations as America’s closest friends and allies on the feeling thermometer. A plurality of Americans also believe that Europe is more important to the United States than Asia (42 percent to 28 percent). However, the gap has narrowed since 1994, with Asia’s importance up seven points and Europe’s down seven points, a trend that likely reflects the impact of Asia’s financial crash last year. Among leaders, Europe’s relative importance over Asia has increased from 42 percent to 51 percent, with those citing Asia as more important (37 percent) remaining largely the same as four years ago. Public concern about economic competition from Europe as a critical threat has lessened during the last four years from 27 percent to 24 percent. Although concern has increased among leaders (from 11 percent to 16 percent), it remains far below the 41 percent reported in 1990.

Russia: End of the Honeymoon?

The general optimism and goodwill that characterized U.S.–Russian relations in the immediate post–Cold War years appear to have dissipated somewhat, strained by Russia’s economic woes, unstable domestic politics, dangerous nuclear arsenal, and bilateral foreign-policy tensions. As mentioned, although a plurality of Americans believe Russia should solve its own economic problems, a plurality of leaders want Europe to take the lead in providing assistance. Leaders rank dealings with Russia among the five biggest foreign-policy problems (tied with Japan/Asian Economy/Crisis), even though the public is less concerned. A solid, if lower, majority of the public (77 percent) and leaders (93 percent) still consider Russia a vital interest to the United States, even though there is relatively low concern about the military threat that it poses. Consistent with a greater general willingness by leaders to use U.S. troops, many more leaders (58 percent) than the public (28 percent) would favor the use of U.S. troops to counter a Russian invasion of Poland.

Japan: Declining Preoccupation

America’s economic success and Japan’s continuing recession have mitigated fears of economic competition from Tokyo. Although public concern about such competition has not disappeared, the 45 percent who perceive it as a critical threat is considerably less than the 62 percent of 1994. Even fewer leaders see economic competition from Japan as a critical threat, dropping from 63 percent in 1990 to 21 percent in 1994 and 14 percent in 1998. Although 55 percent of the public and 75 percent of leaders believe Japan practices unfair trade, the proportion thinking Japan practices fair trade is up from 17 percent to 31 percent among the public and from 18 percent to 22 percent among leaders. Declining public preoccupation with Japan is also reflected in the decreasing percentage of Americans who believe Japan will play a greater role in world affairs in the next 10 years (from 66 percent to 59 percent), while the opinions of leaders remain largely unchanged (from 47 percent to 46 percent).

Japan’s temperature rating on the feeling thermometer continues to be lukewarm (55 degrees), but it remains the country considered most vital to American interests by the public and is a close second to China among leaders, moving ahead of Mexico and Russia. A greater percentage of the public view Japan (47 percent) as more important to the United States than China (28 percent), while leaders are split evenly on this issue. A strong majority of leaders (75 percent) believe that reform of Japan’s economic and financial structures is very important for addressing the Asian financial crisis.

China: Measured Concern

Public attitudes toward China reflect some concern about this Asian giant’s changing role in the world. Sixty-nine percent of Americans believe China will play a greater role in the next 10 years than today, while 97 percent of leaders hold that opinion. As mentioned, leaders are split on whether China (47 percent) is more important than Japan (48 percent). Leaders consider China to be the most vital country to the United States (95 percent), just ahead of Japan (94 percent), while the public puts China fourth (74 percent), behind Japan, Russia, and Saudi Arabia. A nearly equal percentage of the public and leaders consider the development of China as a world power to be a possible critical threat to U.S. vital interests, a moderate 57 percent and 56 percent, respectively.

Concern about China among leaders can also be seen in the 9 percent who consider relations with China to be among the biggest foreign-policy problems, compared with 3 percent of the public. On the subject of economic sanctions, the public (52 percent) is much more willing than leaders (36 percent) to impose such sanctions on China. Conversely, more leaders (51 percent) than the public (27 percent) support the use of U.S. troops if China were to invade Taiwan.

Israel: Qualified Support

Israel continues to rank high on the vital-interest scale for both the public and leaders, yet receives a lukewarm rating on the feeling thermometer (55 degrees) from the public. The Middle East situation is cited among the six most important foreign-policy problems by the public and the leaders. Nevertheless, public support for economic aid to Israel remains virtually unchanged from 1994, with a plurality believing aid levels should remain the same (42 percent) and substantially more favoring a decrease (23 percent) than an increase (10 percent). If Arab forces were to invade Israel, leaders strongly support intervention by U.S. troops. Although evenly divided on the issue in the past two surveys, a plurality of the public are now opposed to such intervention (49 percent opposed, 38 percent in favor).

On a key issue in Middle East relations—whether an independent Palestinian state should be established on the West Bank and Gaza Strip—leaders are overwhelmingly in favor (77 percent), with only 18 percent opposed. Support is much lower among the public (36 percent), with 26 percent opposed and a plurality (38 percent) offering no opinion.

The most pressing perceived problems in the Middle East do not appear to include Islamic fundamentalism. This phenomenon is low on the list of perceived critical threats to U.S. vital interests for both the public and leaders. Yet, a plurality of 38 percent of the public now perceive it as a critical threat, a five-point increase from 1994.

Persian Gulf: Crisis Redux

A series of new crises involving Iraq raised the foreign-policy profile of the region during 1998, particularly at the end of the year. Since the U.S.–British attack on Iraq occurred after the public survey had been conducted but before the leadership survey was fully completed, leaders, not surprisingly, view Iraq as more threatening than do the public, ranking relations with this country as the second biggest foreign-policy problem. Leaders are significantly more supportive than the public of U.S. intervention if Iraq were to invade Saudi Arabia (79 percent vs. 46 percent). In terms of vital interests, Saudi Arabia remains high among both leaders (88 percent) and the public (77 percent).

Bracing for the Twenty-First Century

As the United States enjoys the strongest economic strength and military strength in decades, the survey findings point to some clouds on the horizon that warrant attention.

During a period when the United States has been acting unilaterally in response to some crises abroad, nearly three-quarters of the public prefer that the United States act together with allies, not alone.

Despite the perception of many vital interests around the world, public support for using troops to defend those interests has declined.

Perhaps the most poignant finding in the survey is the dramatic difference in future outlook between the public and their leaders. Although leaders are optimistic about a more peaceful twenty-first century, the public fear more bloodshed and violence than in the present one, during which an estimated 150 million people have perished in conflict. At a time when most people believe increased global cooperation and strong leadership are needed to solve current problems and thereby prevent future violence and instability, continued public support for international involvement is encouraging. Nevertheless, the guarded nature of that engagement could prove problematic if global leadership requires the United States to make tougher choices in the next century than it has faced thus far as the post–Cold War world’s only superpower.

*The analysis for this study was prepared with the following collaborators: Arthur Cyr, Clausen distinguished professor at Carthage College; Stephen Del Rosso Jr., program director of the Chicago Council; April Kanne Donnellan, program officer of the Chicago Council; Catherine Hug, consultant; Benjamin Page, Fulcher professor of decision making at Northwestern University; Richard Sobel, political scientist at Harvard University; and Jason Barabas, doctoral student in political science at Northwestern University.

Ranking of U.S. Presidents on
Foreign Policy