Foreign Policy: Outsourcing War

Foreign Policy
Fall 1998

Outsourcing War _*

By David Shearer _**

For nearly three centuries, the accepted international norm has been that only nation-states should be permitted to fight wars. Not surprisingly, the rise of private military companies in the 1990s—and the possibility that they may view conflict as a legitimate business activity—has provoked outrage and prompted calls for them to be outlawed. The popular press has labeled these companies “mercenaries” and “dogs of war,” conjuring up images of freebooting and rampaging Rambos overthrowing weak—usually African—governments.

But is this depiction fair? Certainly, these soldiers might meet the three most widely accepted criteria defining a mercenary: They are foreign to a conflict; they are motivated chiefly by financial gain; and, in some cases, they have participated directly in combat. They differ significantly, however, from infamous characters such as the Irishman “Mad” Mike Hoare and Frenchman Bob Denard who fought in the Congo and elsewhere in the 1960s. What most sets today’s military companies apart is their approach. They have a distinct corporate character, have openly defended their usefulness and professionalism, have used internationally accepted legal and financial instruments to secure their deals, and so far have supported only recognized governments and avoided regimes unpalatable to the international community.

In the past decade, the increasing inability of weak governments to counter internal violence within their borders has created a ready market for private military forces. This demand has also been fueled by a shift in Western priorities. The strategic interests of major powers in countries such as Mozambique, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone have declined with the end of the Cold War. Western countries are more reluctant to intervene militarily in weak states, and their politicians are disinclined to explain casualties to their electorates. Likewise, the number of personnel in UN operations has fallen from a peak of 76,000 in 1994 to around 15,000 today.

Into this gap have stepped today’s private military companies. Most such enterprises hail from South Africa, the United Kingdom, the United States, and occasionally France and Israel. They all share essentially the same goals: to improve their client’s military capability, thereby allowing that client to function better in war or deter conflict more effectively. This process might involve military assessments, training, or (occasionally) weapons procurement. Direct involvement in combat is less common, although two companies, Executive Outcomes (EO) of South Africa and Sandline International of Great Britain, advertise their skills in this area.

Unlike multinational forces, such companies do not act impartially. They are hired to win a conflict—or deter it—on the client’s terms. EO and Sandline International have argued that military force has an underutilized potential to bring conflicts to a close. However, bludgeoning the other side into accepting a peace agreement runs in diametric opposition to most academic studies of conflict resolution. These studies center on consent: bringing warring sides together with the implicit assumption that each wants to negotiate an end to the war. To a large degree, the international community has responded to civil wars in this manner, especially those of limited strategic interest. Ceasefires act as holding positions; mediation seeks to bring combatants to an agreement. Peacekeepers are deployed to support this process acting=under mandates to be evenhanded and to use minimal force.

The flaw in this approach is that, according to recent empirical studies, outright victories, rather than negotiated peace settlements, have ended the greater part of the twentieth century’s internal conflicts. Combatants in Angola, Bosnia, and Sierra Leone consistently resisted a negotiated, consent-based settlement. There appeared to be little chance of a breakthrough until more coercive measures were applied.

Consequently, military companies may in fact offer new possibilities for building peace that, while not universal in applicability, can be a valid response to hasten the end to a war and limit loss of life. The United Nations and the international community might find it in their best interests to acknowledge the existence of military companies and engage them politically, rather than ignore them and hope that somehow a peace agreement will stay intact.

Direct engagement with military companies would likely expose governments and international institutions to accusations of sanctioning the use of “soldiers of fortune” to shore up the international system. Yet, this tack offers the international community greater leverage to influence the activities of companies that believe legitimacy is the key to their future growth and prosperity. In an effort to broaden their appeal, military companies have offered greater transparency. Sandline International, for example, maintains that it is prepared to place itself under the scrutiny of international monitors and accept an international regulatory framework. Engagement could also provide an opportunity to lay out a code of conduct that might incorporate more specific operational issues that arise with the work of military companies. Observation of companies to ensure they adhere to basic principles of warfare is needed, something in which the International Committee of the Red Cross could take a lead.

Regulation of military companies will be problematic, given the diversity of their services and the breadth of their market niche. Yet, in many respects, the private military industry is no different from any other sector in the global economy that is required to conform to codes of practice—except that in the former’s case, the risk of political instability and social mayhem is amplified if unscrupulous actors become involved.

Portrait of a Private Army

In its promotional literature, Executive Outcomes (EO) describes itself as a company with a “solid history of success,” thanks to the efforts of its “highly effective work force.” This work force is essentially a demobilized army for hire. Based in South Africa, the company was established in 1989 by Eeben Barlow and is staffed almost exclusively by veterans from the former South African Defence Force. EO claims to be able to draw on over 2,000 personnel and forces, all of whom are assembled on a contract-by-contract basis and recruited chiefly by word-of-mouth. This policy has not only ensured quality control but a preexisting military hierarchy of highly experienced troops. EO personnel have distinguished themselves from other companies by entering into combat, claiming that accompanying the clients’ troops increases their effectiveness and confidence.

EO’s first major contract was in Angola in May 1993 to rescue the Soyo oil fields in the north from the rebel National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). The Angolan government then hired over 500 personnel from September 1993 to January 1996 for an estimated $40 million a year (including weaponry) to train nearly 5,000 soldiers. EO’s arrival, coinciding with the lifting of the arms embargo on Angola, helped reverse the course of the war, and UNITA suffered significant defeats. EO’s second contract, this time with the Sierra Leonean government in May 1995, lasted 22 months and cost $35 million—about one-third of the country’s defense budget. EO, working with local civilian militias, battered the Revolutionary United Front into submission. In February 1997, EO was subcontracted to the British military company, Sandline International, to train and plan military operations against the Bougainville Resistance Army in Papua New Guinea.

EO’s military effectiveness testifies to its expertise in low-intensity conflict. It has planned its operations closely with government officials and uses government equipment, although it has arranged the purchase of weaponry. Its hallmark has been its highly mobile operations using MI–17 helicopter troop carriers, on occasion supported by MI–24 helicopter gunships and Soviet-made ground attack aircraft. But EO’s biggest strength has been its use of intelligence capabilities, particularly through the cultivation of local populations, augmented with night-sighting and radio intercept devices. Casualties have remained relatively light: EO acknowledges that 11 of its personnel died in Angola, with seven still missing, and four killed in Sierra Leone. Two others died from accident and sickness.

—D.S.

References

Anthony Mockler’s Mercenaries (London: MacDonald, 1969)

Janice Thomson’s Mercenaries, Pirates & Sovereigns: State-Building and Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern Europe (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996)

David Shearer’s Private Armies and Military Intervention, Adelphi Paper 316 (New York: International Institute for Strategic Studies, February 1998)

William Shawcross’ “In Praise of Sandline” (Spectator, August 1, 1998)

Al J. Venter’s “Market Forces: How Hired Guns Succeeded Where the United Nations Failed” (Jane’s International Defense Review, March 1, 1998)

Ken Silverstein’s “Privatizing War” (The Nation, July 28, 1997)

David Isenberg’s Soldiers of Fortune Ltd.: A Profile of Today’s Private Sector Corporate Mercenary Firms (Washington: Center for Defense Information, November 1997).

Françoise Hampson’s “Mercenaries: Diagnosis Before Prescription” (Netherlands’ Yearbook of International Law, No. 3, 1991)

Edward Kwakwa’s “The Current Status of Mercenaries in the Law of Armed Conflict” (Hastings International and Comparative Law Review, vol. 14, 1990)

Martin van Crevald’s The Transformation of War (New York: The Free Press, 1991)

Stephen John Stedman’s Peacemaking in Civil Wars: International Mediation in Zimbabwe 1974–1980 (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991)

Roy Licklider’s “The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars 1954–1993” (American Political Science Review, September 1995).

Endnotes

**: David Shearer is a research associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. He was a senior adviser to the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs in Liberia and Rwanda in 1995 and 1996. Back.