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Foreign Affairs
November/December 1997
Essays
With the recent spate of democratic elections throughout the Third World, statesmen and intellectuals might be tempted to declare a great victory for democracy. But from Peru to the Philippines, democratically elected regimes are routinely ignoring limits on their power and depriving citizens of basic freedoms. Zakaria calls this disturbing phenomenon illiberal democracy. While in the West democracy (i.e., free and fair elections) has gone hand in hand with constitutional liberalism (i.e., the rule of law and basic human rights), in the rest of the world, Zakaria argues, these two concepts are coming apart. Historically, constitutional government gave rise to democracy, but the reverse is not happening. Democracy without constitutional liberalism is producing powerful centralized regimes, the erosion of liberty and law, ethnic competition, conflict, and war; just look at Central Asia, Africa, and even Russia. The international community and the United States, he concludes, must end their obsession with balloting and promote the gradual liberalization of societies."Illiberal democracy is a growth industry . . . Far from being a temporary or transitional stage, it appears that many countries are settling into a form of government that mixes a substantial degree of democracy with a substantial degree of illiberalism."
"Of the countries that lie between confirmed dictatorship and consolidated democracy, 50 percent do better on political liberties than on civil ones. In other words, half of the 'democratizing' countries in the world today are illiberal democracies."
"In Central Asia, elections, even when reasonably free, as in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakstan, have resulted in strong executives, weak legislatures and judiciaries, and few civil and economic liberties. In the Islamic world, from the Palestinian Authority to Iran to Pakistan, democratization has led to an increasing role for theocratic politics, eroding long-standing traditions of secularism and tolerance. In many parts of that world, such as Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, and some of the Gulf States, were elections to be held tomorrow, the resulting regimes would almost certainly be more illiberal than the ones now in place."
"One effect of the overemphasis on pure democracy is that little effort is given to creating imaginative constitutions for transitional countries . . . This is not done by simply writing up a list of rights but by constructing a system in which government will not violate those rights."
As the great powers lose enthusiasm for addressing mass human rights abuses with large-scale armed interventions, the international community must search for less risky alternatives that accomplish more than the symbolic and generally impotent condemnations from bodies like the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. One such measure would be to monitor, counter, and block radio and television broadcasts that incite widespread violence in crisis zones around the world.
According to Radelet and Sachs, the Southeast Asian currency crises of 1997 are not a sign of the end of Asian growth but part of a recurring -- if difficult to predict -- pattern of financial instability that often accompanies rapid economic growth. As Asia becomes capitalist, it will return to the center of the world economy, where it was in the early nineteenth century. Asia's miracle transpired, they contend, not because of shrewd industrial policy or great leaps forward but because countries attracted foreign investment and moved up the development ladder one rung at a time. But ahead lies the challenge, particularly for India and China, of establishing modern governments."In a fundamental sense, the system of market capitalism, which first appeared in Western Europe, has finally become a global *and in particular, Asian* instrument of economic development."
"Asia, with 66 percent of the world's population [in 1950], had a meager 19 percent of world income, compared with 58 percent in 1820. In 1950, however, one of the great changes of modern history began, with the rapid growth of many Asian economies. By 1992, fueled by high growth rates, Asia's share of world income had risen to 33 percent.... Asia may account for 55 to 60 percent of world income in the year 2025, with the West's share falling from around 45 percent today to between 20 and 30 percent."
As the plans for European Monetary Union steam ahead, Martin Feldstein strikes an ominous note. According to him, Jean Monnet's dream that European integration would eliminate conflict may have been a delusion. France and other countries, he observes, do not share Germany's fixation on sound money*or its hegemonic vision. A European central bank would be unresponsive to local unemployment, while political union would remove competitive pressures within Europe for structural reform, prompting protectionism and conflict with the United States. A Europe of 300 million people and with an independent military might be a force for world peace, Feldstein concludes, but war is also a distinct possibility."If EMU does come into existence, as now seems increasingly likely, it will change the political character of Europe in ways that could lead to conflicts in Europe and confrontations with the United States."
"The Europeans, guided by a combination of economic self-interest, historical traditions, and national pride, may seek alliances and pursue policies that are contrary to the interests of the United States."
As the Clinton administration struggles to decide whether to impose sanctions on foreign companies that do business with Iran and Cuba, Richard Haass calls for a smarter approach. Sanctions, he observes, are a huge slice of the U.S. foreign policy pie*even cities employ them. Officials like them because they see them as cheaper and cleaner than war. But in the real world, Haass argues, they are expensive, both diplomatically and fiscally, and seldom work. At most they starve large populations while leaving hostile leaders unscathed. If foreign corporations feel they need the ayatollah's business, slapping them with third-party sanctions only alienates their governments further. According to Haass, policymakers need to think harder before they rush to push the sanctions button."With few exceptions, the growing use of economic sanctions to promote foreign policy objectives is deplorable . . . The problem with sanctions is that they frequently contribute little to American foreign policy goals while being costly and even counter-productive."
"In 1995, sanctions cost U.S. companies between $15 billion and $19 billion and affected some 200,000 workers. Secondary sanctions, leveled against third-party states that do not support a particular sanctions regime, add to this cost by jeopardizing the United States' trade relations."
Defying the conventional wisdom, Blinder, former vice chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, those who say big government is the problem have it wrong. The real problem is that government is pushed and pulled by interest groups and partisan politicking, often at the public's expense. Washington could learn from independent agencies like the Federal Reserve. Shift responsibility for things like tax policy from the politicians to the experts; besides knowing more, they work in a politics-free zone. Tossing the ball to the technocrats won't weaken democracy -- Congress can always take it back -- but it will produce better policy."Americans increasingly believe that their elected officials are playing games rather than solving problems. Political debate has too much 'spin' and too little straight talk. The system is too argumentative and tied up in partisan and procedural knots. Most important, government appears excessively beholden to those with political clout, often at the expense of the public interest."