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Foreign Affairs
May/June 1997
Comments
The overdeveloped Western world is hearing the call of a resurgent Romanticism blending love of nature, a critique of capitalism, and hard science. The mix could prove to be potent politics.
Forty percent of the world's trade now travels by air, yet aviation is still caught in a postwar web of bilateral agreements. A new global aviation regime is the solution.
With increasing rights for women, legal reform, and a flexible interpretation of Islam, Oman is opening up, declares Sultan Qabus bin Said in an interview.
Essays
Every president since Richard Nixon has recognized that ensuring stability in the Persian Gulf is a vital U.S. interest. In its first term, the Clinton administration attempted to deal with the twin dangers of Iran and Iraq through a strategy of "dual containment" that kept both countries boxed in with economic sanctions and military monitoring. Dual containment, however, is more a slogan than a strategy, and far too blunt an instrument to serve American interests in the Middle East. The United States must employ a more nuanced approach, keeping the straitjacket on Saddam while seeking improved relations with Iran.
Economic bans and political invective against Iran have not worked. America, not the Islamic Republic, has become isolated. Meanwhile, both because sanctions are leaky and because they have pushed it to become more self-sufficient, Iran is actually doing better than many countries the United States has assisted. The sanctions also give the Islamic regime a scapegoat for its serious problems at home, merely prolonging its hold on power. The United States should abandon containment for a strategy of critical dialogue.
The basic assumptions of U.S. policy toward the Gulf demand rethinking. The Pentagon pays up to $60 billion a year to protect the import of $30 billion worth of oil that would flow anyway. Playing the role of regional hegemon ties America to troubled regimes and leaves it out on a limb, while allies sit back. Washington must hedge against inevitable political change in the region by spreading the burden and the say, reversing arms proliferation, and encouraging the Gulf states to come up with some security of their own.
Long before Hong Kong's scheduled July 1 reversion to China, the American media decided that the place was in grave danger, if not beyond salvation. The American doomsayers overlook that Hong Kong's borders, currency, and international memberships will remain intact. And although some civil liberties may be rolled back, an objective examination of China's behavior during the transition suggests that changes will be narrow rather than sweeping. Claims that post-1997 Hong Kong will cease to be the crossroads between East and West are alarmist.
The connection between American business and foreign policy is poorly thought out and mismanaged on both sides. It is, however, vital to the national interest. For most of the country's history, foreign policy has reflected an obsession with open markets for American firms. At one time, protecting the interests of a company like United Fruit was synonymous with policy toward Latin America. While those days may be gone, commercial interests must still play a central role. Herewith, a framework for the second Clinton administration to guide cooperation between the government and the business community for the benefit of both.
In one sense Russia and China pose the same problems. An international order of trade and cooperation has been established, and the two countries are in the process of joining. But their central governments are weak--Russia's military is quasi-independent of Moscow, China's factories do not heed Beijing. Humiliation over national decline prompts symbolic defiance of the United States. Ukraine and Taiwan remain dangerous flash points that call for tacit deterrence. Like adolescents, Russia and China are in a transitional stage requiring patience and guidance rather than confrontation.
In less than five years Japan will have a population profile like Florida's. Indeed, Japan's population is aging faster than that of any other country. A future with only two workers for each retiree will force radical change. It will shrink savings, turn the trade surplus to deficit, and drive more industry overseas. These demographic and economic factors will push Japan toward an increasingly independent foreign policy, causing friction with America. Tokyo and Washington must seek new arrangements cognizant of a maturing Japan.
Book Reviews
Bruce Cumings' maverick thinking on Korea is now practically mainstream. This administration, which seems to have absorbed it, just might achieve what none of its predecessors could: the reunification of Korea.War Can Change, by John Keegan
Philippe Delmas' The Rosy Future of War predicts unraveling international law and mounting strife. But with fewer real military powers out there, major wars are less likely.The Dream of Democratic Peace, by John L. Harper
Strobe Talbott's vision of promoting democracy abroad urges dangerous folly. Mutual interests, not liberal values, make reliable partners. Look at France.
Recent Books on International Relations
Francis Fukuyama on The Dictionary of Global Culture; Richard N. Cooper on The Bankers; David C. Hendrickson on Walter McDougall; Stanley Hoffmann on Saul Friedlander; Robert Legvold on David Remnick; Donald Zagoria on The Coming Conflict with China.
Letters to the Editor
Serge Schmemann and Albert L. Weeks on Russia, Ian S. Lustick on partition, and others.The Marshall Plan and Its Legacy--Special Commemorative Section
A look back at perhaps the most important foreign policy success of the postwar period. Edited by Peter Grose, with contributions by historians Diane B. Kunz and David Reynolds, a memoir by Charles P. Kindleberger, a profile of Marshall and Acheson by James Chace, and one of Will Clayton by Gregory Fossedal and Bill Mikhail. And reflections from Roy Jenkins, Walt Rostow, and Helmut Schmidt.