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Foreign Affairs
New Friends, New Fears in Central Asia
By Pauline Jones Luong and Erika Weinthal
Pauline Jones Luong is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University and the author of Institutional Change and Political Continuity in Post-Soviet Central Asia: Power, Perceptions, and Pacts. Erika Weinthal is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Tel Aviv University and the author of State Making and Environmental Cooperation: Linking Domestic Politics and International Politics in Central Asia.
Making New Friends
Since the states of Central Asia broke free from the collapsing Soviet Union in 1991, U.S. policy toward the region has been focused on promoting political and economic stability among Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The Clinton administration sought to achieve this goal by fostering regional cooperation, relying on multilateral institutions such as NATO's Partnership for Peace and the Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC). Some critics, however, argued instead for a realpolitik-based approach to stability that would promote Uzbekistan as a regional hegemon. This latter vision has now become reality, because the United States has needed Uzbek bases and transit links to wage the war on terrorism in neighboring Afghanistan. But the Bush administration should proceed with caution: its wartime ally may well worsen the very problems Washington needs to tackle.
To wage its war on al Qaeda and the Taliban, the United States has enlisted the support of Uzbekistan and its authoritarian ruler, Islam Karimov. This new relationship involves a direct exchange of strategic resources. Uzbekistan, which has the best transport facilities, air bases, and military capabilities in the region, has allowed the United States to station troops, airplanes, and helicopters at an Uzbek air base and to use Uzbek territory to launch offensive strikes on Afghanistan. The United States, in return, promptly inserted into the emergency appropriations bill passed by Congress in September 2001 a $25 million grant to Uzbekistan for weapons and other military purchases. Then, in January, Washington announced that Uzbekistan will receive $100 million of the $4 billion Congress has allocated for fighting terrorism. That aid is supposed to eventually extend beyond military and security purposes to help Karimov's government resuscitate its economy, which has been strangled by drought, falling cotton prices, and the lowest level of foreign investment per capita in Central Asia.
The rationale for Washington's marriage of convenience to Tashkent is clear and understandable. But inertia and the logic of events may tempt the Bush administration to let a temporary expedient grow into an enduring policy shift. This would be a mistake. Propping up Uzbekistan as a regional hegemon not only would fail to address but would actually exacerbate a key source of Central Asian instability: the domestic political repression that fosters the radicalization of Islamist movements and galvanizes popular support behind them. Moreover, viewing the Islamist threat as primarily a military problem requiring a local strongman will not mitigate the various transnational concerns — including water-sharing disputes and the flows of drugs, refugees, and weapons — that plague the region.
The Friendly Tyrant
Over the past three years, political opponents have used bombings and armed raids in an attempt to topple Karimov's government. These events have drawn widespread attention to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), an organization that advocates the use of violence to install an Islamic state. The IMU enjoyed support from the Taliban that included housing, political offices, training camps, and bases for military operations and recruitment; it also has strong ties to Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda. . . .