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Foreign Affairs
January/February 1998
Essays
The risk of a catastrophic exchange of nuclear missiles has receded. But according to Betts, the chances of some use of weapons of mass destruction have risen. Chemical weapons are a lesser threat, but more likely. A vial of anthrax dispersed over Washington could kill as many as three million. Traditional deterrence will not stop a disgruntled group with no identifiable address from striking out at America. The United States must pull back from excessive foreign involvements, Betts insists, and begin a program of civil defense to reduce casualties in the event the unthinkable happens.
"The defense establishment has directed its attention mainly toward countering threats weapons of mass destruction pose to U.S. military forces operating abroad rather than to the more worrisome danger that mass destruction will occur in the United States, killing large numbers of civilians."
"Today, as the only nation acting to police areas outside its own region, the United States makes itself a target for states or groups whose aspirations are frustrated by U.S. power."
"Suppose a secretive radical Islamic group launches a biological attack, kills 100,000 people, and announces that it will do the same thing again if its terms are not met . . . In that case, it is hardly unthinkable that a panicked legal system would roll over and treat Arab-Americans as it did the Japanese-Americans who were herded into concentration camps after Pearl Harbor. Stretching limits on domestic surveillance to reduce the chances of facing such choices could be the lesser evil."
The Dayton Accord, Boyd admits, is a bold attempt to create a nation in the face of ethnic hatred and fear, and it just may succeed-but only if U.S. troops stay and the coalition overseeing the peace puts the security of Muslims, Serbs, and Croats before their integration. For now, each group feels safe only with its own kind, and their self-created partition should be allowed to stand while the trauma of war fades. Material need and the desire for profit may bring the three peoples together in time. Meanwhile, the international community must rectify the gross disparity between the reconstruction aid and military supplies flowing to the Muslims and the crumbs and punitive attitude that are the Serbs' lot.
"The United States should take the lead in correcting the grossly inequitable distribution of reconstruction aid for Bosnia (98 percent to the Muslim-Croat Federation, 2 percent to Republika Srpska), which is producing a disparity between the entities that heightens the already intense ethnic animosity in Bosnia."
"Decreased emphasis on the pursuit of popular, high-level war criminals like Karadzic and former Serb military leader Ratko Mladic is also imperative. While technically feasible and immensely satisfying in Washington and some European capitals, this policy has at least even odds of producing a backlash among Bosnian Serbs that will make them more resistant to the Dayton process and the concept of a multiethnic Bosnia. Until the Hague tribunal gains credibility as a judicial rather than a political institution, no healing will result from capturing those indicted for war crimes."
Rose observes that the only thing people seem to agree on about Bosnia is the need for an exit strategy. That concept, however, dating back only to the ignominious U.S. withdrawal from Somalia, has nothing to do with military requirements and everything to do with post-Cold War politics. Exit strategies harm a mission's chances of success, and had they been required the United States would not have defended the armistice after the Korean War, kept the peace on the Sinai Peninsula after Camp David, or undertaken NATO. The real question, according to Rose, is not when American troops will be out, but why they are going in.
"For most military interventions, to publicize whatever exit strategy one does have is to provide a how-to manual for any local actor seeking to play the spoiler. Trumpeting advance plans for withdrawal may ensure that the American public can control the actions of its government. But it does so at the expense of hampering the government's ability to respond flexibly to the situation that prompted the intervention in the first place."
As Pei sees it, critics of the Clinton administration's engagement policy toward China are largely unaware of the last two decades' profound political changes in the Middle Kingdom. Deng Xiaoping received his due for his economic reforms, but not for the kinder, gentler politics that helped reduce elite backstabbing, broaden the backgrounds and outlook of government officials, strengthen the legislature, and improve the legal system. But even if the pace picks up, Pei warns, Washington should not expect a rapid expansion of democratic participation.
"Facing the dilemma of maintaining political order while promoting economic reform, the Chinese leadership has been trying to muddle through. While proclaiming the supremacy of the Communist Party, Beijing has permitted limited institutional reforms that, if fully implemented in the future, will have a far-reaching impact on the division of power in China."
"China's legal system is likely to become a critical arena in which the Communist Party's authority can be indirectly challenged and checked before the initiation of competitive elections. Unlike a competitive election or multiparty system, which would threaten the party's rule, gradual legal reforms pose no immediate danger to the party's power and may even serve some of its short-term interests. But as legal institutions develop, Beijing's program of limited legal reform has the potential to evolve from a system of law into a rule of law."
"The Chinese leadership will continue to resist democracy . . . Beijing is more likely to push reforms that will improve China's legal and representative institutions."
Ethan A. Nadelmann, philanthropist George Soros' point man on the worldwide narcotics problem, suggests that to really win the war on drugs, policymakers should focus on the victims of substance abuse before rushing to catch the pushers.
Defying the conventional wisdom, Nadelmann argues that the "war on drugs" and its prohibitionist, punitive strategy have failed to solve America's drug problem. In fact, they bear much of the blame for drug-related crime, epidemic use of crack cocaine and the spread of aids through dirty syringes. Washington must begin developing policy that seeks first to reduce the harm drugs do users and society. Nadelmann points to successful innovations in Europe and Australia like needle exchange, addiction treatment and supervised maintenance, and decriminalization. Public health rather than politics should be paramount.
"Imagine a drug policy that starts by acknowledging that drugs are here to stay, and that we have no choice but to learn how to live with them so that they cause the least possible harm. Imagine a policy that focuses on reducing not illicit drug use per se but the crime and misery caused by both drug abuse and prohibitionist policies . . . Such a policy is possible in the United States, especially if Americans are willing to learn from the experiences of other countries where such policies are emerging."
"The Clinton administration's claims to have identified new risks of marijuana consumption-including a purported link between marijuana and violent behavior-have not withstood scrutiny. Neither Congress nor the White House seems likely to put the issue of marijuana policy before a truly independent advisory commission, given the consistency with which such commissions have reached politically unacceptable conclusions."
Asia's economies are in trouble, as a contagion of plunging currencies and economic instability has taken hold on the continent. But the miracle is not necessarily over. Asia's leaders must move beyond economic liberalization and address the deep-seated problems of the other Asia-not the rich, booming Asia, but the poor, rural, ignored one. To keep the miracle going, the entire population must be brought into the action. That will mean making difficult choices, like investing in agricultural productivity, education, and social services, but the region's leaders can't afford not to.
The Dalai Lama's international campaign against China has pushed Beijing to modernize Tibet, resulting in an influx of non-Tibetans seeking economic opportunity. If the Dalai Lama wants to preserve Tibet as a homeland, he must either acquiesce in violence by militants or compromise. He will resist either course, so the United States should facilitate negotiations. Full autonomy is out, but the Dalai Lama can obtain a greater emphasis on the Tibetan language and a larger number of positions for Tibetans in the administration.
Book Reviews
Sunil Khilnani rightly praises Nehru's idea of modern India. But his stylish book glosses over the flaws in that vision.
Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw's story of the rise and fall of government intervention in the marketplace is colorful, but they are not sure what comes next.
The newest outbreak of books on emerging diseases are little help to policymakers.
Michael Ignatieff's report on ethnic and other bitter mini-wars is evocative but only sporadically illuminating.
Foreign minister in some of the most pivotal years of the Cold War, Hans-Dietrich Genscher became a master of equivocation. Unfortunately, as an author, he still is.
William Odom's reliance on tanks and bombers is Cold War thinking. The U.S. military will need a more flexible force to meet the challenges of the future.