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Foreign Affairs
Mexico at an Impasse
By M. Delal Baer
M. Delal Baer is Director of the Mexico Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and editor of The NAFTA Debate.
The Expectations Revoluations
The July 2000 defeat of Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) after more than 70 years of rule sparked a revolution in expectations. There were celebrations in the streets, glowing editorials in foreign newspapers, and expressions of undiluted optimism in investment and policy circles. Newly elected president Vicente Fox projected a triumphant image of strength and confidence that inflated hopes at home and abroad: private investment would flood in, the rule of law would prevail, the sins of the past would be punished, and the U.S.-Mexico relationship would flower. More profoundly, Mexico would elude its existential condition as an underdeveloped nation.
Three years into Mexico's democratic transition, few of these dreams have been realized. Mexican politics are more democratic but less governable and are suffering from gridlock between the executive and legislative branches. The economy is stable, but growth and competitiveness are lagging as the next generation of reforms — tax, energy, and labor — falls prey to partisan bickering in Mexico's Congress. And the friendship between Fox and President George W. Bush has cooled over differences about immigration and policy toward Iraq. Mexico shows no signs of an imminent crisis, but its triple political, economic, and diplomatic impasse is taking a toll. The price of unreasonably high expectations has been premature disillusionment. A breakthrough in at least one area must come fairly soon — lest Mexico's grand experiment with economic and political liberty fail to fulfill its potential.
Ungovernable Democracy
The principal concern of Mexico's political elite today is how to build governing majorities and achieve consensus. After three years of stalemate in Congress, there is debate over whether Mexico's political paralysis is the result of a constitutional structure that makes it inherently ungovernable or of weak leadership on the part of President Fox. The answer to this question is not insignificant. If the logjam is due to weak leadership, the presidential elections of 2006 might resolve the problem. If the logjam, however, is structural in nature, it will be much more difficult to overcome.
Fox's leadership style is unconventional and ideologically heterogeneous. Some commentators find him refreshing and authentic, whereas others complain that he has not established clear priorities or consistent legislative strategies. But whatever Fox's shortcomings, it is clear that any leader, no matter how gifted, would have struggled with the challenge of assuming the presidency at Mexico's singular moment of regime change. Fox won only 42.5 percent of the vote in the 2000 elections, and his National Action Party (PAN) controls just 30 percent of seats in the lower house of Congress (the Chamber of Deputies) and 38 percent in the Senate. In most instances of regime change, the old regime is defeated and dismantled definitively. In Mexico, the PRI was defeated but far from dismantled: it remains ensconced in Congress as a legitimate opposition party.
Many Mexicans believe that a democratic transition must include a punitive settling of accounts with the PRI. As a result, Fox has found himself on the horns of a dilemma: he needs a juicy . . .