CIAO DATE: 02/05/08
European Affairs
Volume 8, Number 1 - Spring 2007
An Anglosphere Saga
Michael D. Mosettig
Full Text
A History of the English-Speaking Peoples Since 1900
By Andrew Roberts, HarperCollins, 736 pages
Reviewed by Michael D. Mosettig
When Winston Churchill embarked
on his now-classic four-volume
History
of the English-Speaking Peoples, one motivation
for the aristocrat whose tastes
often exceeded his income was to help
stave off his creditors. Now a young Tory
historian in Britain has created a sequel.
Author Andrew Roberts is also a man
who enjoys such fine things in life as
£100 lunches, Champagne complimentary,
at Wilton’s on Jermyn Street in London,
as an article in the
Financial Times recently noted (available online at http://www.ft.com). But even if sales from this
book bolster his bank balance, that
hardly seems to be the main reason for
his writing it.
In a string of books of history,
Roberts has made a name and a living for
himself in the culture wars inside the
United States and in the Transatlantic
context as a standard-bearer for conservatism,
the special relationship and the
superiority of the Anglophone sphere. As
if it needed further luster, his place in the
U.S. conservative pantheon gained the
ultimate recognition with an invitation to
talk with President Bush at a book club
discussion organized by Karl Rove.
To attempt to follow in Churchill’s
literary footsteps takes considerable self confidence—
the non-Anglo-Saxon
word would be chutzpah. But Roberts is
an author who thinks big thoughts at a
time when many contemporary academic
historians wander deeper into
minutiae. As that profession generally
tilts left, he swings hard right. From odes
to Kipling to denunciation of post-colonial
African governments, there is nothing
politically correct in this ardent defense
of Britain’s wars and its colonial
stewardship all over the world. Certainly,
he has produced a book that immediately
absorbs the reader as it provokes,
irritates and knocks down popular shibboleths,
all with great gusto and brio.
Here is how he starts:
“As the first rays of sunlight broke over
the Chatham Islands, 360 miles east of
New Zealand in the South Pacific, a
little before 6 a.m. on Tuesday 1 January
1901, the world entered a century
that for all its warfare and perils
would nonetheless mark the triumph
of the English-speaking peoples. Few
could have expected it at the time, but
the British Empire would wane to extinction
during that period, while the
American Republic would wax to such
hegemony that it would become the
sole global hyper-power. Assault after
assault would be made upon the English-
speaking peoples’ primacy, each of
which would be beaten off successfully,
albeit sometimes at huge and tragic
cost. Even as the twenty-first century
dawned, they would be doughtily defending
themselves still.”
For those of us who believe that
World War I was the critical event of the
twentieth century and all that followed
was sequel, the first part of this book is
particularly provocative. As Roberts reminds,
history is argumentation, and that certainly has been true of the historiography
of the First World War. For people
schooled in mid-20th-century, the prevailing
analysis from Sidney Fay’s
Origins
of the Great War through Barbara Tuchman’s
Guns of August was that the war
was the product of an accident or series
of accidents. Roberts goes with a more
modern version, advanced in David
Fromkin’s recent book,
Europe’s Last
Summer. Germany was trying to change
the balance of power in Europe. The military
circles around the Kaisers of Germany
and Austria (even if not the two
monarchs themselves) were pushing for
war. Britain had no choice but to join the
conflict, especially after the Germans invaded
Belgium on their way into France.
Roberts not only defends Britain’s
entry into the war but the tactics and
strategy of allied military leaders. He argues
they had no other choice but to
fight the kind of war they did. He acknowledges
he is running up against not
only the historical grain but contrary to
a terrible sense of carnage that must
equate, emotionally, to blundering and
class-ridden indifference by the commanding
marshals. How can he do otherwise
in a war that on one day of fighting—
July 1, 1916—at the Somme left
19,241 dead British soldiers?
He takes account of and challenges
the legacy of novelists and poets whose
narrative of the trench warfare remains
embedded in the Western consciousness.
His recitations from some lesser-known
literary works of the war, such as Frederic
Manning’s
Her Privates We, offer a
heart-rending depiction of stoicism and
courage in contrast to the despairing
cynicism that infuses the classic postwar
literature.
Yet Roberts also acknowledges how
the war led to a shift in the balance between
Britain and its dominions and former
colonies. Australia and New Zealand,
stung by their defeat under British command
at Gallipoli (at which Churchill’s
audacious plan miscarried, being weakly
executed) resolved to take more control
over their destinies, as did the Canadians
from their victories in the European land
war. The entry of new and fresh U.S.
troops in 1917-18 ended any German
Army hopes for victory and it was the
American President, Woodrow Wilson,
who dominated the peace-making
process at the Versailles conference that
led to the changing of many borders on
the European continent.
For much of the rest of the century,
Roberts provides a continuous line of
narrative: war-weariness; a tendency, especially
on the intellectual left, to be beguiled
by tyrants; a seeming willingness
to let danger build beyond the breaking
point and then rescue by an Anglo-
American duo—Churchill-Roosevelt,
Thatcher-Reagan, Blair-Bush.
The author has a knack for marshalling
anecdotes and little facts to
make his big arguments. He’ll describe
how an invention such as refrigerated
shipping helped deepen the relationship
between sheep-exporting New Zealand
and sheep-consuming Britain. For him
the Anglo-Saxon model of free-market
economics combines with scientific and
technical achievements to spawn and
impose global innovation, right up to the
British subject who invented the application
that made the World Wide Web a
device of global communication for hundreds
of millions of people.
Other than totally failing to mention
the Anglican Communion, which up to
now has brought millions around the
world to the same English-language
liturgy, hymns and beliefs, little seems to
escape his writ, be it the genteel anti-
Semitism of many of the British upper
classes or the quaint description of Wallis
Simpson as “a sexually active American
divorcee.” (The word “promiscuous”
comes to mind, but may smack of lesemajeste
for the author.) And of course,
there is the development and spread of
the English language from a small
Anglo-Saxon vocabulary to the etymological
polyglot of more than half a million
words that is now on the verge of
becoming the world’s first global language.
In the process, he cannot help
himself from mocking the increasingly
futile French efforts at linguistic and cultural
protectionism against such threats
as CNN and Google with nascent innovations
such as France’s 24-hour all-new
channel and call for a European on-line
library. As if to prove the point, the
Canal 24 network offers at least a third of
its programming in English.
But even the most ardent Anglophile
might blanch at his addition of Charles
de Gaulle to a motley list of dictators
who came to power via military means.
Is it their genes, their history, the education
system or maybe something in the
water that can produce such bursts of
English animus against the French?
Yet, sometimes, even Roberts cannot
keep the narrative on a single course. For
instance, there’s that small problem of
the Irish, predominantly English-speaking
but creating their exception at several
turns in the century. Ultimately, he
dismisses them, as with this view of Irish
neutrality in World War II:
“At the very least, at a time between
1941 and 1943 when the entire English-
speaking peoples were fighting for
their existence, the Irish Government
was keeping its options resolutely
open, while pursuing the issue of partition
above the question of the survival
of Civilization itself. The idea
that a Nazi victory in the West would
lead to an extension of Irish liberty,
sovereignty and independence might
be laughable today, but a (fortunately
small) section of the Irish governing
class was so blinded by Anglophobia
that they were willing to take the risk.”
As lively and engaging as this book
is, it does raise the question of when history-
writing stops and punditry begins.
Roberts often draws parallels from the
distant past into the very contemporary
present, such as comparing Lord Salisbury
to President Bush. The biggest jaw dropper
is this description of Franklin
Roosevelt:
“His insistence on regime-change in
Germany, Austria, Italy and Japan by
installing democracy through force
rendered him the first American neoconservative.”
It could be well argued that the author
would have been better served not
writing or severely editing the penultimate
chapter of this book, meant to
bring it through the events of 2005. In
part, it carries the sense of settling scores,
primary among them Bill Clinton, Hollywood
for producing such anti-British and
anti-English films such as “Braveheart”
and the Tory cabal that pushed Margaret
Thatcher from Number 10 Downing
Street. It seems to have been written in
such haste or anger that the normally
meticulous author lapses into errors
about U.S. history. In a list of adulterous
Presidents, he includes Woodrow
Wilson, whom most historians believe
that, if he ever lusted adulterously, it was
only in his heart and long before he
reached the White House. And he omits
Wilson’s successor Warren Harding,
whose adulterous feats in White House
closets and elsewhere reached Olympian
proportions. And Richard Nixon did not
avoid impeachment proceedings, as the
author states. The House Judiciary Committee
brought impeachment charges
against him days before he resigned.
Roberts begins his book with a list of
acknowledgements that includes the
now-familiar names of many American
advocates and architects of the Iraq war
—a clue to his conclusion which, inadvertently
or otherwise, comes full circle.
In defense of the conduct and origins of
the war, he uses arguments that even the
White House has abandoned in recent
months. And as an admirer of Prime
Minister Tony Blair, Roberts does not
mention how the most promising and
dynamic of post-Thatcher prime ministers
is coming to a sad political end, and
that even the presumptive Tory leader
David Cameron is speaking of not
blindly following Washington’s lead.
Just as it has weathered previous disruptions,
such as Suez, the partnership
of English- speaking peoples and governments
may well survive Iraq and
thrive anew. But one has to wonder
about its durability if even its most ardent
and articulate proponents have difficulty
distinguishing between the legacies
of Franklin Roosevelt and the
Pentagon architects of U.S. intervention
in Iraq, Donald Rumsfeld and Douglas
Feith, both, tellingly, listed by Roberts as
sources for his book.
Michael D. Mosettig is senior
producer for foreign affairs and defense at
the News Hour with Jim Lehrer.