European Affairs

Summer 2005

 

Homeland Security

The U.S. Cannot Defeat Terrorism Unilaterally

By John R. Dinger

 

The fundamental principle underlying all of America's worldwide efforts to detect, disrupt and defeat terrorist threats, including bioterrorism, is that it cannot be done unilaterally. The United States recognizes that success or failure depends on other nations being both willing and able to fight terrorism. The record on that score is very, very clear.

Since 9/11 there have been tremendous successes in rounding up terrorists around the world. It is commonly accepted that some 75 percent of Al Qaeda's senior leadership has been captured or killed, as well as thousands of its lower-level operatives. The general public, at least in the United States, is often unaware of the fact that, outside the war zones of Afghanistan and Iraq, local forces have achieved virtually all those successes - albeit sometimes with considerable American assistance, especially from the CIA.

It must be clearly stated that the United States has the legal right to take direct action against terrorists who pose an imminent threat to Americans, and must be prepared to do so. We also recognize, however, that such direct action will not, and most probably should not, be the solution to defeating terrorism. We realize that foreign partners acting in their own self interest will provide the key.

In that context, it is essential that foreign governments and institutions encourage their citizens to reject ter-rorism as a tool for achieving political goals. This has little - maybe nothing - to do with whether people love or hate America. It has little or nothing to do with religious views. It has little or nothing to do with political views. It has everything to do with rejecting the whole idea of murdering innocent civilians to promote a political cause.

Bioterrorism, in particular, presents four unique and frightening challenges that demonstrate just how important it is that we should not fail:

1) A biological attack would probably not respect geographic boundaries. We often hear it said that terrorists do not respect borders, and that could be especially true in the case of a contagious agent, such as smallpox or pneumonic plague.

2) The attack could well be silent, meaning that its onset may not be detected until the infection is already spreading rapidly.

3) It may be very difficult to identify, let alone apprehend, the perpetrators. The lag between an initial attack and the emergence of symptoms could give the attackers a head start that would make it very difficult to track them down.

4) It may be difficult, or even impossible, to determine whether a bioterrorist attack is intentional or not.

These four factors support the argument that bioterrorism, perhaps more than any other terrorist threat, demands an approach marked by international engagement and bridge-building between our resources.

An exercise called Atlantic Storm was conducted in January 2005 by the University of Pittsburgh and Johns Hopkins University and the transatlantic biosecurity network, in which former senior government officials from several North American and European countries were asked to consider their nations' responses to bioterrorism, including a smallpox attack in Europe.

Some of the challenges revealed by the exercise concerned the limited world supply of smallpox vaccine and how it might or might not be shared among nations, national differences in vaccination policies, the impact of our responses on relations among allied nations and the international economic disruptions that certain responses would cause. It is important that all those involved in addressing the bioterrorism issue build on work such as Atlantic Storm and many other similar ongoing efforts and cooperate to build synergies. (The Atlantic Storm website is
www.atlanticstorm.org.)

"We must learn from real world outbreaks of contagious diseases"

It is also very clear that tremendous lessons can and must be learned about responding to a bioterrorist attack from real world outbreaks of contagious diseases, such as SARS. I was the U.S. Ambassador to Mongolia in 2003, when the SARS outbreak occurred. The main gateway into Mongolia for both goods and people is through China. It was interesting to watch the fear that spread throughout Mongolia and the roles played by the various institutions, including the World Health Organization. We should apply such lessons to the fight against terrorism.

It is important, of course, that our efforts be operational, not simply theoretical. Conferences and seminars, and even tabletop exercises, must clearly be the beginning of an effort, or part of the effort - they certainly are not the end of the effort. But conferences and seminars have important roles to play in taking stock and agreeing on a common vision. They are especially important in addressing bioterrorism, and must be part of a coordinated effort to build the necessary international partnerships.

John R. Dinger is Deputy Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism at the U.S. Department of State. As a career foreign service officer, he has held a variety of foreign posts, most recently as U.S. Ambassador to Mongolia from 2000 to 2003. He also served in Johannesburg, Rio de Janeiro, London, Sapporo, Fukuoka and Tokyo, where he was Minister Counselor and Consul General. He was previously Director of the State Department's Office of Press Relations and Deputy Director of the Office of Japanese Affairs.