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European Affairs
Opinions
How the U.S. Could Improve its Image in Europe-wide Opinion
By Jacqueline Grapin
One of the most important changes taking place in Europe in recent years has been the birth of a European public opinion. Although this is among the continent's most spectacular developments, it is one of the least studied and most underestimated phenomena on the political scene. It is also ironic that the reasons for the emergence of this new European public opinion have nothing to do with Europe per se, and it is worth reflecting on them as Europe undergoes a new kind of identity crisis following the rejection of the proposed EU constitution in the French and Dutch referendums.
The first stirrings of Europe-wide opinion followed the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001. Across the entire continent a chill ran through the spines of all Europeans. Even the rather anti-American French newspaper Le Monde carried an editorial declaring: "We are all Americans."
In an unprecedented, collective expression of sympathy, a minute of silence was observed from the West of Ireland to the Eastern border of Poland and from the Arctic to the Mediterranean. That was an event that had never happened in thousands of years of history. And yet, as if it had already become a tradition, another Europe-wide minute of silence was held the day after the terrorist bombing of the Madrid transit system on March 11, 2004.
The second trigger for the emergence of an overall European public opinion was the war in Iraq. Although not unanimously, the vast majority of the European public was united for the first time - against the war. Europe was divided in two, not into the New and Old Europe as identified by U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, but between the Europe of the people, which was massively opposed to the war, and the Europe of the governments, which was divided. Even in countries where governments officially supported military intervention (the majority of the 25 EU member states), large sections of public opinion disagreed.
It is important to remember the sources of European public opinion in order to understand where it now stands. If European opinion is to be interpreted correctly, it must also be recognized that Europeans and Americans often have opposite perceptions of the same situation and different spontaneous reactions to it. The wave of European sympathy for the United States after 9/11, for instance, is now considered to have led to such a misunderstanding, with relatively serious consequences. Most Europeans felt so close to America in their grief that they saw the terrorist attacks as a universal crime. As a result, the United States was perceived as an integral part of a universe encompassing all peaceful nations.
It seemed natural, therefore, rapidly to activate Article 5 of the NATO Charter which stipulates that an armed attack against one or more of the Allies "shall be considered an attack against them all." From their vantage point, by contrast, U.S. leaders and a large part of the American public saw 9/11 as a unique act of modern warfare on the territory of the United States and an unprecedented demonstration of American vulnerability. To Americans, these extraordinary circumstances justified exceptional responses, with regard both to military action and to the administration of justice on terrorists.
While Europeans continue to see the United States as part of the world, the United States tends to see itself as special. This difference explains why Europeans so deeply resented Washington's disregard of their act of solidarity in NATO. Europeans found it hard to understand that the U.S. government considered the attacks a singular threat to America's national existence that had to be handled by the United States itself. Now that Europeans use this misunderstanding to explain the difficulties with Washington encountered over the last two years, they find themselves thrown off balance by the argument advanced by the second Bush Administration - that Europe is targeted by the same threat and should therefore share the burden of the war on terrorism.
"Europeans and Americans often have opposite perceptions of the same situation and different spontaneous reactions to it"
Europeans and Americans also differed in their interpretations of the rationale for President George W. Bush's trip to Europe immediately after his second inauguration. President Bush's visit, in the wake of what Washington considered successful elections in Iraq, was based on the notion that, despite some setbacks, the war in Iraq had produced good results and justified more Transatlantic cooperation, including help from the allies in reconstructing the country.
A number of Europeans, on the other hand, saw the Presidential visit as a modern version of the famous 11th century trip by King Henry IV of Germany to Canossa to beg pardon from Pope Gregory VII, an event that symbolized the submission of secular power to the Church. (In the modern version, interestingly, the deeply religious commander of the West's dominant armed forces was seen as apologizing to secular and much militarily weaker allies.) According to this interpretation, President Bush's trip reflected an acknowledgement that his previous policies had failed, with regard both to Europe and to dealing with terrorism. In fact, however, Washington was simply considering U.S. national interest from a new perspective, accepting the need to repair the Transatlantic relationship in order to generate more support for the dangerous and costly operations it was conducting in Iraq and elsewhere.
"U.S. strategy may ironically have been undercut by the French ÔNo' to the European constitutional treaty"
Another aspect of President Bush's visit was perceived very differently on either side of the Atlantic. A good number of Europeans and Americans expressed relief at President Bush's recognition that the European Union was playing an increasing role in foreign policy - but not, however, for the same reasons. Senior European diplomats and journalists viewed Washington's acceptance of the European Union's importance as an admission of the failure of U.S. efforts during the previous two years to create divisions between France and Germany.
Some Americans, on the other hand, saw the move as an alternative policy for limiting the influence of France and Germany. The idea was that by dealing with the European Union as a whole, Washington would be lumping Paris and Berlin together in a group containing a majority of other nations more favorable to U.S. policies. If this was indeed the U.S. strategy, it has ironically been undercut by the French "No" to the European constitutional treaty, which has hampered progress toward a more closely-knit EU foreign policy.
Mr. Bush's reelection, which could have placed further strains on U.S.-European relations, did not intensify anti-American feelings in Europe. Although, in another sweeping European trend, most Europeans preferred Senator John Kerry, they did not generally blame the entire American nation for the reelection of a President whose policies they disliked. Instead, the level of negative and positive opinions of the United States stabilized at the end of 2004 and at the beginning of 2005, albeit at a very low level.
It was appreciated in Europe that many Americans voted to support the President and the troops in Iraq for patriotic reasons, without agreeing that the war was necessary. Opinion polls taken shortly after the election suggested that nearly 60 percent of Americans thought that the war was a mistake. Elections offer another example of how Americans and Europeans react differently: while many Americans support their President in difficult circumstances, even when they disapprove of some of his critical decisions, most Europeans vote against their leaders in times of trouble, in the hope of better policies to come.
As it turned out, President Bush's trip to Brussels, Mainz, and Bratislava succeeded in reversing negative trends in European public opinion. In addition to the role undoubtedly played by President Bush's visit, a favorable reaction to the Iraqi elections also helped to turn opinion around.
Nevertheless, more Europeans than Americans tend to think that elections in Iraq, where society is riddled with insecurity, corruption and other failings, do not justify the destruction and the daily dangers resulting from the U.S.-led military intervention, including having one Iraqi out of each thousand now dead. What is the point of having an elected national assembly if the country is badly damaged, society is undermined by racketeering and insecurity, and terrorism has broken out where there was none before? The chance that the European Union will evolve toward common policies favoring the active promotion of regime change through military means is close to zero. Where the United States believes in establishing democracies, Europeans believe in reforming societies.
This distinction is linked to another contrast between Americans and Europeans: differing degrees of tolerance of collateral damage and unintended consequences - a difference that can also be seen in attitudes to work and unemployment. Most Americans accept that layoffs are necessary to facilitate economic adjustment, even if millions of unemployed people suffer as a result. During the recession of the early 1980s, I remember seeing an unemployed worker in Colorado posing for a photo with the American flag on his back. He wanted to make the point that he was sacrificing himself for the general good of the nation. Unemployed people in Europe tend to hate the system they feel has wronged them, and it is general practice to blame company executives for layoffs, whatever economists might say about the expected benefits.
By the same token, Europeans, who have had more than their share of wars on their own continent, have now come to believe that anyone who starts a conflict has an obligation to foresee and assess the likely collateral damage as accurately as possible. Despite American good intentions, the European perception remains that Washington failed to conduct a proper evaluation of the collateral damage to be expected in Iraq, and that efforts to prevent it were inadequate. This notion of collateral damage, which hardly features in the American media, is omnipresent in the European press.
"Europeans believe that Washington failed to evaluate likely collateral damage in Iraq"
A survey of public opinion in France, Germany and the United States published in February 2005 by the German Marshall Fund of the United States showed that 88 percent of those polled in France and 87 percent in Germany disapproved "somewhat" or "very much" of President Bush's international policies. A majority (65 percent in France and 57 percent in Germany) thought that it was "somewhat undesirable" or "very undesirable" that the United States should exert strong leadership in world affairs. Firm support was expressed for the United Nations (70 percent in France and 76 percent in Germany, against 59 percent in the United States), in part because a large group thinks that "many global problems can't be solved by any single country."
It is interesting to note that NATO also received a good score, although a majority of French and Germans thought that the European Union should "take a more independent approach." Sixty percent of the French and 65 percent of the Germans thought that "the United States should work more through international organizations like the UN" and "the United States should be more committed to diplomacy and not so fast to use the military in international crises."
"European opinion is being shaped by the lack of international control over America's extraordinary military might"
More recently, a survey of public opinion released by the Pew Global Attitudes Project on June 23, 2005 indicated that "anti-Americanism in Europe, the Middle East and Asia, which surged as a result of the U.S. war in Iraq, showed modest signs of abating. But the United States remained broadly disliked in most countries surveyed, and the opinion of the American people was not as positive as it once was." In addition, "there were no signs that Euro-skepticism about the European Union following the French and Dutch refusals to ratify the European constitutional treaty has fueled a desire for a closer Trans-Atlantic partnership. On the contrary, most Europeans surveyed wanted to take a more independent approach from the U.S. on security and diplomatic affairs." Roughly three-quarters of the publics in Germany (77 percent), Canada (75 percent) and France (74 percent) say President Bush's reelection has made them feel less favorable toward the United States.
As in the past, the perception that the United States conducts a unilateral foreign policy is shared across the surveyed countries. Overwhelming percentages of people in Europe and the Middle East believe that the United States does not take their countries' interests into account when making foreign policy and wish that their countries could act more independently. It is interesting, however, to note that while China is well regarded in Europe and Asia, European publics are opposed to the idea of China becoming a military rival to the U.S. while in Turkey and other predominantly Muslim countries, where antagonism toward the United States runs much deeper, most people think a Chinese challenge to American military power would be a good thing.
European opinion is obviously being shaped by the lack of international control over America's extraordinary military might, coupled with the sight of destruction and instances of cruel, perhaps illegal treatment of prisoners. The visits to Europe of President Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice have sent new signals, to which European public opinion has reacted favorably. But the nomination of John Bolton as U.S. ambassador to the UN and the appointment of Paul Wolfowitz as President of the World Bank were perceived as a countersignal. A good number of European commentators, however, have suggested that such conservative reformists might help change both the United Nations and the World Bank for the better.
Asked if the partnership between the United States and the European Union should become closer, remain about the same or whether the European Union should take a more independent approach from the United States in security and diplomatic affairs, approximately half the Americans regularly respond "become closer," while only one fourth of the French and Germans agree.
The terrorist attacks in London on July 7, 2005, however, have added to European motivations to work closely with the United States to fight terrorism. Most Europeans still perceive the war in Iraq as a mistake that generated more terrorists than security. The timely report published in London on July 18 by Chatham House on Terrorism and the UK concludes that: "A key problem with regard to implementing prevention and pursuit is that the UK government has been conducting counter-terrorism policy shoulder to shoulder with the U.S., not in the sense of being an equal decision-maker, but rather as a pillion passenger compelled to leave the steering to the ally in the driving seat.
There is no doubt that the situation over Iraq has imposed particular difficulties for the UK, and for the wider coalition against terrorism. It gave a boost to the Al Qaeda network's propaganda, recruitment and fundraising, caused a major split in the coalition, provided an ideal targeting and training area for Al Qaeda-linked terrorists, and deflected resources and assistance that could have been deployed to assist the Karzai government and to bring Bin Laden to justice. Riding pillion with a powerful ally has proved costly in terms of British and U.S. military lives, Iraqi lives, military expenditure, and the damage caused to the counter-terrorism campaign." When the British government reacted publicly to criticize the conclusions of the study, media comments all over Europe seemed to indicate that the officials who expressed the government's view were the very last group who did not believe that the war on Iraq had been counterproductive for the fight on terrorism.
"The French and Dutch votes have consolidated British
and American influence in Europe"
To achieve their common goals, it will be important for the U.S. and European governments to take longer-term public opinion trends into account. In 2003, The European Institute conducted a special program on the renewal of the Transatlantic relationship that featured a study by Paul Luif, an Austrian scholar, who had analyzed the voting patterns of EU members in the UN General Assembly over a period of 20 years. Mr. Luif had also examined the positions taken by the ten countries that joined the European Union in May 2004, and compared overall European voting patterns with that of the United States.
Although EU members do not agree on everything, they appear to vote the same way on more and more issues. The new EU member countries vote differently, but their positions have for some time been drawing closer to those of the European Union. Now that they are members, their positions are likely to converge even further. Analysis of the positions of both old and new EU members shows that Europe tends to diverge from the United States.
Even as the French and the Dutch votes against the European constitutional treaty have consolidated British and American influence in Europe and strengthened the Anglo-Saxon vision of a loose confederation consisting of a large free market with little political power, it is important to remember that opinions still tend to diverge in Europe and the United States on many world
issues. Denying differences will not be enough to manage tensions in the future. New mechanisms will be needed to help Europeans and Americans understand each other, coordinate their actions and negotiate deals and compromises. And the United States needs the Europeans to find common solutions to challenges as much as the Europeans do themselves.
"The center of political gravity in Europe is far to the left of the U.S."
This is even truer considering that values are evolving in different directions in the two societies. While the United States becomes more religious, Europe is fighting a battle to remain secular, particularly against pressure from Islamic fundamentalists in several countries. The Pew public opinion survey indicates: "The biggest gap between the way Americans are seen by other Western countries, and the way they see themselves, is with respect to religion. Majorities in France and the Netherlands and pluralities in Britain and Germany see the United States as too religious.
By contrast, a 58 percent majority of Americans say their country is not religious enough. On this point, Muslims find themselves in rare agreement with the American public: majorities in Indonesia, Pakistan, Lebanon and Turkey all believe the United States is not religious enough."
There are other major, and sometimes growing, differences. In Europe, acceptance of the death penalty is much lower than in the United States, at least among the political classes, while the protection of workers and social security issues are treated with a higher sense of collective solidarity. Social concerns and aspirations for justice prevail on one side, while business considerations and economic theories seem to dominate on the other. It has been said that America is a "country of opportunity, not of guarantee," while Europe often seems to be the reverse. The center of political gravity in Europe is far to the left of that in the United States.
While unaware of the precise figures, most Europeans are deeply conscious of the mutual benefits stemming from the U.S.-EU economic partnership, which provides jobs for more than 12 million workers on each side of the Atlantic. While seeking more leverage in the partnership, Europeans know that the two regional economies are highly dependent. They also know by experience that they always end up fighting side by side with Americans when the cause is justified. This feeling of solidarity has increased in the European Union since the entry of eight Central and Eastern European countries keen to express their gratitude to the United States for facilitating their return to the free world after the Cold War.
To strengthen their cooperation, and make it more effective, Europeans and Americans should address the institutional framework of their dialogue. While NATO remains the anchor of the Transatlantic Alliance, a menage a trois among the United States, the European Union and NATO will prove a delicate endeavor, particularly if the European Union is temporarily losing part of its expected ability to agree on common policies as a result of the trials and tribulations of the EU constitution.
There is currently no grand project to review this situation, and most experienced practitioners of Transatlantic relations suggest that the best that can be achieved for the moment is to try to manage the existing institutions better. A serious study of the reasons why the Transatlantic dialogue went adrift in 2003 and 2004 might help. It would be worthwhile to review the procedures that should have been followed, as well as those to be avoided in future. In the medium term, a constructive role for think tanks would be to craft a more ambitious vision of the kind of common institutions needed to improve Transatlantic collaboration.
Meanwhile, the United States could significantly improve its image in Europe by undertaking specific initiatives such as the following:
Make more effort to explain U.S. policies to Europeans, rather than only to American voters. It would be important, for instance, for Europeans to hear confirmation that prisoners of the U.S. military or other agencies are protected by U.S. laws and the Geneva Conventions, or to know that American leaders take climate change seriously even if they do not agree with Europe on how to deal with it.