European Affairs

Summer 2005

 

Transatlantic Relations in 2020

Europeans Struggle to Win Friends and Influence People in the U.S.

 

In cooperation with the Paris-based think tank Europe 2020, The European Institute organized a wide-ranging debate on the future of Transatlantic relations over the next ten to 15 years, together with recommendations for strengthening links between the European Union and the United States. The discussion, held in Washington on April 5, 2005, took as its starting point a controversial report, EU Foreign Political Vision 2020, based on a series of seven seminars arranged by Europe 2020 in cooperation with the Foreign Ministries of France, the Netherlands, Poland, Belgium, Portugal, Britain and Finland. The exercise, entitled GlobalEurope 2020 II, was intended to gather the views of influential Europeans on Europe's future relations with the rest of the world and discuss the conclusions reached for each region with representatives of the regions concerned. The debate summarized below covers the section of the report dealing with the European Union and North America. (The report is available at http://www.europe2020.org/en/GlobalEurope/Global Europe1.htm.)

The account begins with a summary of the Six Key Ideas and Six Proposals identified by the report with regard to EU-U.S. relations in the years ahead, as the European Union endeavors to establish a common foreign policy, and continues with extracts from the debate by participants from both sides of the Atlantic. Although some Americans found much to agree with in the report, others attacked the proposals as excessively Eurocentric and inadequate to deal with the global challenges that the European Union and the United States must tackle in the 21st century. The strong reactions from many of the American panelists led to a spirited debate.

Discussants
John Van Oudenaren, Chief, European Division, Library of Congress; Klaus-Peter Gottwald, Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany; Tracy McKibben, Director, European and Eurasian Affairs, National Security Council; Shaun Donnelly, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, U.S. Department of State; Franck Biancheri, Director of Studies and Strategy,
Europe 2020; Carlos Westendorp y Cabeza, Ambassador of Spain to the United States; Karen Volker, Deputy Director, Office of European and Regional Affairs, U.S. Department of State; Daniel Hamilton, Director, Center for Transatlantic Relations, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University.

Six Key Ideas
1. Following the end of the Cold War and recent Transatlantic crises, notably over Iraq, Europeans no longer view their relations with the United States in the same way as they did in the half century following World War II. Hitherto, three historic pillars - common security challenges, common values and close economic links - have supported the Atlantic relationship. The first two are now in open crisis and the third is undergoing huge changes.

On the security front, no EU member state would have considered Iraq a threat to global peace in 2003, had it not been persuaded of the danger by the United States. The European Union considers terrorism a symptom of a wide range of global threats, while the United States sees it as a threat by itself.

As for common values, the European Union sees international law as fundamental to international relations, while the United States has recently developed the theory of preemptive war.

Trade and mutual investment remain extremely important, but there are deep running controversies over subsidies. Even more significantly, the euro is becoming a reserve currency that is challenging the dollar and limiting Washington's capacity to impose its leadership by monetary means.

2. The European Union is evolving into a political entity, making the emergence of a common foreign policy inevitable. Washington will be obliged to negotiate with the European Union as a whole, rather than with national governments. The construction period of the European Union is being succeeded by a period in which the focus will be on the management and governance of a Union of 500 million citizens and 30 nationalities.

3. The Transatlantic relationship will be of paramount importance in the 21st century, provided the European Union and Washington modify it to take account of the European Union's request for a balanced partnership. Washington will have to understand and respect these European aspirations in order to safeguard the alliance, but the necessary changes will not be easy.

4. The United States and the European Union disagree widely on the efficiency and desirability of multilateralism, and American elites no longer seem to understand Europe. America's capacity to understand the world seems to have diminished considerably in the last few decades. The U.S. rejection of multilateralism appears to be the result less of analysis than of incapacity, and of unwillingness to understand and to master the multilateral dimensions and institutions of global politics.

While the European public is enthusiastic about the Transatlantic debate, the U.S. public is rarely exposed to it. But it is indispensable that Americans appreciate the political importance of Transatlantic relations. If nothing is done to promote common understanding of the problems, the gap between the two sides of the Atlantic will widen and might become impossible to bridge in the future.

5. The Transatlantic relationship will probably be the most important factor determining EU foreign policy, but it will not be the only one. Transatlantic relations will have to be based on a common analysis of global problems and a consensus on their solutions. In addition to the differing analyses of terrorism, Europeans are greatly concerned by poverty, global warming, water and energy shortages, and other medium and long term threats that the United States does not want to address.

6. We need to agree on new rules to govern Transatlantic relations, and we shall have to educate people to play by them. The Europeans expect that their "followership" of the past will become "fellowship." That is not necessarily to deny American leadership. But the United States must understand that instead of seeking to impose its will, it should use its influence to create consensus.

Six Proposals
1. The European Union must make greater efforts to explain the European Union and discuss its policies throughout the United States. For instance, a European foundation of Transatlantic relations could be created that would allocate funds to initiatives and projects, and the existing network of European centers could be strengthened.

2. We need common tools for analyzing risks and threats and how to deal with them.

3. Before increasing U.S.-European human exchanges, we should find out what programs already exist. We can then design plans for improving relations between U.S., European and national institutions.

4. The European Union should offer programs to train U.S. leaders and opinion makers in trans-European management models, so that they can understand the complex issues of multilateralism.

5. We must agree on proposals for reforming the United Nations, first among Europeans and then at Transatlantic level. The aim should be for the European Union to speak with one voice through a single representation in all UN organizations and institutions, especially the Security Council.

6. The European Union should increase the political visibility of its representation in the United States and reduce its bureaucratic image. A good start has been made with the appointment of former Irish Prime Minister John Bruton to head the EU delegation in Washington, thus replacing a civil servant with a politician.

The Debate
John Van Oudenaren, Chief, European Division, Library of Congress

This report is an interesting mirror that reflects how Europeans, especially the rising generation, see themselves and their place in the world. The six proposals all have a kind of missionary impulse to them: Europe has the truth and here is how Americans might be brought to understand it. Of course, it is good to have more contact and dialogue, but the focus on bringing the European gospel to the unbelieving Americans risks overlooking policy differences and understating their importance.

I am not so sure, for instance, that increasing American awareness of the European Union will necessarily improve U.S.-European relations. The notion that to understand the European Union is to love it is just madness. I teach courses on the European Union at Georgetown University, and students arrive with a basic, positive proclivity toward Europe. Europe is a nice place. It is where they go for vacations. Relatives often came from there and so on. But when I start to explain European and U.S. positions on specific issues, an element of skepticism often creeps in. So I question the idea that this missionary impulse is going to create the basis for the positive partnership that the report seeks.

An awful lot of what is written about Transatlantic affairs recycles old cliches and is not very interesting. But the distinguished historian and foreign policy expert Walter Russell Mead gets to the point of the policy differences, as opposed to the missionary, public relations differences. He says the fundamental difference between the United States and the European positions is about mutual influence over each other's policies. He writes in a recent essay, "a cardinal element in the European position is that for the relationship to be satisfactory Europe, or at least a critical mass within Europe, must be able to veto American military adventures under certain circumstances. For the United States to go ahead with military action in the face of strong European opposition is unilateralism and is radically unacceptable to many European states." I think everyone would pretty much agree with that.

"On the other hand," he continues, "if European states propose some global initiative, on the international criminal court, for example, or the Kyoto protocol, the United States has no legitimate right of veto." Even if the United States simply seeks an exemption from such initiatives, it is a sign of unacceptably unilateral behavior. In other words, "Europe wants a nonreciprocal veto over American initiatives worldwide."

For Europeans, partnership often means pushing for policies they see as perfectly understandable, reasonable and multilateral. But from the point of view of any U.S. administration, the American public and the Congress that approach amounts to a sort of nonreciprocal veto.

Walter Russell Mead says a debate is under way in the United States about whether or not to accept this nonreciprocal veto, whether it is a reasonable request or not. Americans, he says, are still discussing the value of the mantle of legitimacy that comes from agreeing with Europe. "The Bush administration, and behind it a gradually growing proportion of the American public and foreign policy staff, believes that the mantle is worth much less than Europe wants for it. Neoconservatives argue that the value is close to zero. Many liberal internationalists are ready to pay something close to the asking price. Most American opinion is somewhere in between, with a general tendency since the Cold War to revise its value estimate slowly downward." This is a very brilliant formulation of the issue.

Now, in fairness, the report we are considering is not just a missionary effort. There is also an element of coercion or pressure. The message is that Europe has a larger population than the United States; it has the euro; it has the second biggest defense spending; everybody else in the world agrees with Europe on multilateralism and so on. The implication is that if the Americans do not see the light, they will be isolated. There are reasons to be a little bit skeptical about this. Europe has its problems; the United States has its problems. I doubt that mere pressure is going to compel Americans to accept the "nonreciprocal veto." The debate on multilateralism is growing, but I am not sure that global trends are running so strongly in Europe's favor.

As for the bureaucratic nature of the European Commission and its representation in Washington, it is wonderful that Mr. Bruton has taken charge. I wish him well. He is a genial Irish politician who can socialize with and win over American politicians and that is all to the good. But, here again, I think you have to make a distinction between substance and presentation. When the European Commission Delegation in Washington first introduced a website, for example, it listed all the issues Americans had to address to get their act together - ranging from the death penalty to violations of trade agreements.

This approach stems from an attitude toward the world that consists in telling other countries, "Here is the checklist of things that you need to do to have good relations with us." This grows naturally out of the Commission's role. Commission officials police the internal implementation of EU policies. They lay down conditions for EU entry for candidate countries. Then they come to Washington and adopt the same sort of attitude, saying, in effect, "Here are the terms - when are you Americans going to sign up to them?" And, of course, international politics just does not work that way.

Klaus-Peter Gottwald, Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany

Europeans have to see things in perspective. Whenever you look around the next corner, the temptation is to despair and wonder if we are ever going to make it. But if you look backward, you see dramatic changes and improvements in European integration over the last five years, let alone the last 50 years. That encourages me to believe that Europe is moving forward in historical terms. Short-term measures of our achievements may go up and down, but the long-term trend in European relations and in the European integration process has definitely been positive in recent decades. I see no reason why, in spite of inevitable bumps in the road, this should not continue. Even the problems we have encountered in ratifying the European constitution do not mark the end of the road.

There have also been plenty of ups and downs in the Transatlantic relationship over the last couple of years, but the overall tendency is very clear and very positive. We are now in a particularly promising mode because both sides of the Atlantic are convinced that cooperation is the only really promising way of managing the relationship - that we can fight about many issues and have substantially different views on many questions, but that we can still find ways to work things out and move forward on issues that we agree are extremely important.

That seems to me the right approach towards future cooperation between the United States and Europe. One of the most encouraging developments was President George Bush's decision early in his second term to travel not only to Europe, but to travel to Brussels, and not only to Brussels, but to the headquarters of the European Union. I cannot praise this initiative highly enough because it really marks a new step forward in the relationship.

I would also stress the obvious point that without the constant support of the United States throughout the 50-year history of European integration we would not be where we are today. We need to acknowledge the great perseverance with which the United States has always supported the European Union and European integration.

Clearly, we have to be realistic. Progress sometimes creates new problems. To the degree that the European Union becomes a more active player on the world stage, it also may increasingly find itself in different positions from the United States. So in a way the basic American encouragement of European integration is creating a partner that may have its own separate policies. What is important is that this should not
develop into an antagonistic relationship, and I see no reason why it would, because the only rational way to deal with all the international challenges that face both our continents is to stick together and to work out our differences.

Tracy McKibben, Director, European and Eurasian Affairs,
National Security Council

I certainly agree that we should focus on our commonalities rather than our differences, and that is certainly our current approach. But it is obviously very difficult to gauge where we shall be in 15 or 20 years, because we are actually in a very different place today than we were six months ago, for example. Nevertheless, as we continue to work on our relationship, I can only be optimistic about its future potential.

I also agree that President Bush's visit to Europe in February was clearly important in sending the message that we want to work together on the common global challenges we all face, and especially that we want to work directly with the European Union. As for differences over the kind of security threat we face, President Bush has tried to shed new light on the threat in a Transatlantic context. He has defined the threat as being more generally a threat to freedom and democracy, which is certainly important to both America and to Europe.

When we look at the issues underlying the European security strategy, it is clear that there are more common elements in what we are trying to pursue than there are differences. As we work together, we will have a profoundly positive effect on the global community. We have a shared responsibility to address the key challenges, such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the Middle East peace process and wiping out poverty and despair across the globe. Those are challenges that only can be met by cooperation between the United States and the European Union.

While the first priority of the United States after the terrorist attacks of September 11 was obviously to protect the homeland, we have also continued working to support civil society, to salvage sustainable economic development and to promote global prosperity. Our commitment to the international community has not been reduced. And we want the European Union to be a strong partner. We certainly support the evolution of the European Union from an economic grouping to a political and security entity.

As for supposed differences in American and European values, the United States also believes in the need for a multilayered approach to global problems that includes action on the economic, political and social fronts. We obviously all believe in the dignity of self-rule, justice and freedom. While there might be differences about how we tackle those issues, I think those differences will continue to shrink.

In the economic field, there is continued concern about the effect that trade disputes will have on Transatlantic relations, and we shall continue to have such disputes. But there is a clear focus now on promoting what is already a highly integrated Transatlantic economy. It is clear that our trade is so enormous that a reduction in barriers, and in restrictions on foreign direct investment, is in the interest of both the United States and Europe. With a clear goal and motivation to pursue further integration, our economic concerns will be reduced, while disputes will continue to occur. We will use the World Trade Organization to address such conflicts.

We also have a joint responsibility, as great democracies, to support democratic reformers and help to build democracy around the world. That obviously requires looking outside Europe, although that is more of a challenge for Europe than for the United States, particularly in light of the important issues now confronting the European Union. As the European Union grapples with slow economic growth and the crisis over the ratification of the constitutional treaty, and as it moves toward its goal of developing a highly competitive economy, it will obviously be tempted to focus more on its internal affairs. In the Transatlantic relationship, however, we shall need to pursue a forward and outward-looking strategy to address our common challenges, such as bringing peace to the Middle East and concluding trade negotiations under the Doha Development Agenda.

Shaun Donnelly, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, U.S. Department of State

I find little to disagree with in the major recommendations of the report, but I am disturbed by some other elements that might distract attention from these very pragmatic suggestions. I am troubled by the suggestion that "many in Washington don't feel concerned about dangers, such as poverty, epidemics, global warming and energy shortages."

We may have different approaches to these problems, but we certainly feel concerned. We are the major donor in fighting HIV/AIDS and most other epidemics. We are looking for our European friends to step up and join us. We are concerned about energy shortages. We want to work with Europe. We have differences about some of the climate and environmental issues, but we want to work constructively. It is wrong to say that somehow the United States does not care about these issues.

I am also disappointed that the report conveys the impression that Europe is always multilateral and the United States always unilateral. We may disagree on certain strategies, but whether in the WTO, the IMF, the World Bank, the United Nations or NATO, we believe we act multilaterally.

On the economic side, there are areas in which Europe seems to us to be acting unilaterally, for example when it adopts its own chemicals directive or sets standards for so-called geographical indications which have huge implications for the rest of the world. The same goes for the European Union's espousal of the precautionary principle, for example in food regulations, which we do not consider a scientifically well-founded solution.

The suggestion that Europeans see terrorism as a symptom, not a threat, also represents a fundamental difference. We see it as a threat. If you do not see it as a threat, then that is something that we need to keep working on. I am not saying that it is only a short term threat. It is a medium and long term threat as well - despite the comment that the United States somehow does not want to address medium and long term issues.

I was also struck by the suggestion that Europeans see a need to educate American elites to understand the complex concepts of multilateralism. This seems to suggest that there is only one legitimate view, the multilateral view - not that there are two equally valid, though different views in the United States and Europe - and that the problem is that the Americans have not yet come to understand it. We haven't quite gotten it. And it's your task to explain it again until we understand and see the one correct view. I am troubled that some of these points will cause the report to be not so well received by at least some people in the United States.

Klaus-Peter Gottwald

I find it quite interesting that Europeans today are being reproached by Americans for overly missionary zeal, whereas for so many decades it was the other way around. Until very recently, many Europeans claimed that the missionary zeal of the
Americans might sometimes be part of the problem.

It seems to me that the central problem in the relationship is not American strength, but European weakness. This is not a new discovery, but I think it needs to be repeated. The failure of Europeans in many cases to get their act together is part of the reason why we are unable to do some of the things we would like to do, while the Americans are able to act. So we Europeans have to concentrate our efforts on seeing how we can improve our way of operating.

We should look at concrete issues on which we should cooperate. Take China, for example. Neither the United States nor the Europeans have a patent recipe on how to deal with Beijing. Why shouldn't we get together and discuss it and maybe offer some strategies, instead of suspiciously reproaching each other?

Franck Biancheri, Director of Studies & Strategy, Europe 2020

The report does not claim that Europe is perfect - far from it. So there is nothing like a missionary vision here. But the report does say that over the next 15 to 20 years we face an erosion of the human basis of the Transatlantic relationship. If we go on like this, there will be fewer and fewer people on either side who are able to discuss with each other, to understand each other and to work together. In the meantime, the two sides are becoming bigger and bigger, and more and more estranged from each other in many ways.

But we can act now to prevent this, just as France and Germany did in creating the close Franco-German relationship. We need to develop strong relations among civil societies, universities and members of the younger generation - if not, we are going to end up with a shortage of capacity just to understand each other.

Over the past 40 or 50 years, the European elites were mostly trained and educated in the United States, but this is no longer the case. Ninety percent of the kind of students who used to study overseas now study in the European Union. So this
report warns that the conditions defining the Transatlantic policies of the past 50 years are changing fast, and if we do not take this into account, we shall make big mistakes.

In Europe, Transatlantic relations are no longer simply a matter for the elite. They are increasingly the concern of political parties, public opinion and the media, and the current EU-U.S. relationship is not equipped to deal with this development.

We are reaching a critical situation. Opinions of the United States in the European Union today are not very positive. As the European Union becomes more democratic, citizens will play a stronger role in shaping EU policies. If these trends in public
opinion do not change, EU leaders will not be able to resist the anti-American views of citizens, who are exerting increasing influence over their governments.

Tracy McKibben

One of the problems with this discussion is that we are talking about a report that reflected European public opinion at the time it was written. But the debate is different now from six months ago, and it will be different again in six months' time. One aspect of the Transatlantic relationship we have to deal with is the question of whether or not the focus should continue to be about Europe or about the United States and Europe looking outward to the rest of the world, such as the Middle East and Africa.

I hoped that we had moved beyond the issue of the recognition of the importance of Europe and its integration. We need more of a debate about how we are going to deal with common global challenges, which necessarily means going further than
simply focusing on Europe itself. One of our shortcomings is that we have not made the American and European publics aware of the extent of the work that we have done together. The U.S. government is now trying to use diplomacy to highlight the
successes we have had in Transatlantic cooperation.

Carlos Westendorp y Cabeza, Ambassador of Spain to the United States

The European Union has to know where it wants to go, which will be basically in one of two directions. Either we deepen the integration process throughout the European Union, or in a part of it, or we stop the process and stay where we are. And, of course, the bicycle theory suggests that if you stop pedaling forward, you may fall over.

Two main factors will influence the outcome - an internal factor, which is the will of the Europeans themselves, and an external factor, which is the influence of other actors in the international arena, particularly the United States.

It is very clear that global challenges need global responses. But even though they realize that, there is no consensus among the Europeans about the course that the European project should take. The problem goes beyond the current difficulties over the ratification of the EU constitutional treaty and concerns the will of the European Union to take decisions in foreign and defense policy.

The answers to international challenges are not necessarily going to be similar on both sides of the Atlantic, because the views and interests of the European Union and the United States will not necessarily coincide. Their objectives may be the same, but sometimes they will differ over the means and tactics to attain these objectives.

In the short term, however, the European Union will concentrate more on its integration process, and it is not clear that it will be able to act unanimously. The Iraq war revealed a divide between the United States and some EU members, but the rift within the European Union was even deeper. That constituted a serious warning about the future of European integration. It is unrealistic to think that we shall not face similar situations in future. So the main challenge is the internal factor - whether Europe is going to have the will to push on toward further integration.

Turning to the external factor, it is important to remember that European integration has only been possible thanks to the security net that the United States has provided through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. What would happen if the Americans were to decide to withdraw from European defense? I am not talking about the United States actually leaving NATO, but weakening its cohesion by relying on coalitions of the willing, rather than the alliance as a whole.

That would be a serious blow to European integration. The United States is still indispensable, because if the United States withdrew from European defense, the EU member states would have to react by increasing their defense budgets in an uncoordinated and ineffective manner, or by seeking bilateral special relationships with the United States. Then there would be the risk of a European Union of so-called concentric circles, or variable geometry, which would face the same kind of turbulence. That, of course, would have even more serious effects because such a Europe would not be equipped to cope with the global challenges of the future.

If it has the will, the European Union can act very efficiently in two or three areas, such as Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa. But it is absolutely necessary for the European Union and the United States to act together in other areas, such as fighting terrorism, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and dealing with new international actors like China and India.

What should we expect from Europe if the integration process stops? If the cause is a lack of internal political will, the European Union will continue under the provisions of the Treaty of Nice. With 30 members, it will be unable to take decisions jointly, and a series of ad hoc coalitions will form in different political areas. If the integration process is stopped because of the external factor, the consequences will be different. If America decided to loosen the bonds, it would probably provoke a turning inward in Europe and the nationalistic tendencies of member states would be reinforced. The enlargement process would continue, but the bonds of integration would loosen and Europe would be unable to become a relevant actor in the international sphere.

Despite all of these dangers, however, the Transatlantic relationship will still be dominant. The United States and the European Union will constitute a de facto directorate in world affairs. We represent the democratic paradigm and have the strength, the wealth, and the legitimacy to play this role.

I would add that we shall need not only a public relations operation in the United States to help Americans understand the European Union, but also a similar campaign to help Europeans understand the United States. And while Europeans may be unclear about the purpose of the European Union, Americans know what their country is about.

Karen Volker, Deputy Director, Office of European and Regional Affairs, U.S. Department of State

I do think that the United States has gained an increasing appreciation of the importance of the EU project and what it means to Europe, and that this will help the United States and Europe to communicate with each other. I think that some of the comments made by President Bush during his trip to Europe in February go a long way toward alleviating some European suspicions about American policies and intentions, which are generally unfounded but which we need to address.

The report we are discussing is absolutely right to say that the European Union should come up with a comprehensive common strategy for its relations with other countries in its neighborhood. That would make it very clear to people outside the European Union what their aspirations can be; and it would make it clear to the United States which countries we can push the European Union to accept as potential members - and which we can't.

More generally, I was surprised how far I disagreed with all the key ideas of the report and yet agreed with the six proposals. I would add, however, that the proposals emphasize the need to educate Americans about Europe, whereas the first half of the report suggests that there needs to be an equal emphasis on educating Europeans about American perceptions and American policy.

The United States is working with the European Union in a large number of areas, publicly and behind the scenes, despite all the differences that make their way into the headlines. This is happening most concretely in areas where even a few months ago one would not have thought that we would be working together - for instance in Iran, Lebanon, Iraq and Sudan. Even during the difficulties we experienced over the Iraq war, the United States and Europe still found a way to work together on the most important issues.

Daniel Hamilton, Director, Center for Transatlantic Relations,
Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies,
Johns Hopkins University.

I agree that there is a need for better education in the United States about the European Union and to build more personal contacts between Europeans and Americans. But I am not sure that this report will get us there. A principal problem with this
report is its primary focus on differences between "Europe" and "America," as if public and elite opinion on each side of the Atlantic were quite unified. This is simply not the case. The report ignores the huge differences that exist within the United States and Europe on most of the topics it seeks to address. The result is a rather skewed Strengthening the Transatlantic Relationship.

Yes, we are in disarray. When has this alliance ever been in array? This is a perennial debate. Merely asserting differences does not make the case for divorce. It may be more productive to look at some basic trends that are driving change. The first, of course, is the end of the Soviet threat. Unfortunately, many conclude that because this threat is gone we can afford to have more differences. I think that is a wrong conclusion, but it certainly provides a new context for the relationship.

A second major driver of change is what I and others call the two 9/11s. November 9, the day the Berlin Wall came down, is 9/11 on European calendars. The earthquake unleashed by the momentous events of that time is still shaking the continent.
Creating a Europe that is whole, free, and at peace with itself is a historic, positive opportunity - but it is immensely preoccupying when seen from abroad. We had our own 9/11. Our differences in this regard have less to do with peculiar "American" or "European" values and more to do with the fact that catalytic events in the United States have forced us to reexamine the kind of world we face. We are not conducting a good discussion across the Atlantic about how these two 9/11s have shaped perceptions and how they sometimes pull us in different directions.

Another trend, globalization, is not pulling us apart, it is bringing us together. Our societies are integrating more than ever before, and the end of the Cold War has, in fact, accelerated the trend. The deep integration of our economies and our societies, driven by strong forces of Transatlantic investment, continued to accelerate in the first four years of the Bush administration, and it will go on doing so unless there is some other major event. So while we hear assertions that we are drifting apart, there are also counterintuitive trends that are bringing us together.

Then there is the global aspect. Ninety percent of the transatlantic agenda during the Cold War consisted of the challenge of stabilizing Europe. Transatlantic relations were about the stability of the European continent. Today that does not account for 90 percent of the agenda. We each are now facing global problems beyond the European continent. The challenge is whether we can adapt our mechanisms and our way of thinking to the kind of partnership we need to adjust to that reality.

So, rather than focusing on the stability of Europe, we are facing a three-fold agenda, with each element fairly well-balanced in importance. One is still Europe, and particularly the wider Europe that is being referred to as the European Union's "neighborhood." Most of the countries in that area become really upset at being referred to as part of Europe's "neighborhood." They do not consider themselves neighbors of Europe; they think they are also Europe. And they want to rejoin this broader, wider Europe.

In fact, the earthquake triggered by the fall of the Berlin Wall continues to shake the continent today. It is not developments in Western Europe that are shaking the continent, but events in countries like Ukraine and Georgia. And I am not sure that many of my Western European colleagues comprehend what is still going on to their East.

Today, with regard to the countries farther East, we are essentially at the same point that we were about 15 years ago with respect to Central and Eastern Europe. The challenge is whether we are prepared to do again together what we did then: to set out a path by which this next tier of countries can become more fully integrated into our overall community and its core institutions.

A simple neighborhood policy will not be enough, because the greatest foreign policy success in the European Union's history has been enlargement. The leverage of enlargement has created massive changes throughout the European continent, far more than a European neighborhood policy can achieve. The real challenge for the European Union is whether it is going to continue the enlargement process or build new barriers against countries that are changing the way they live.

A related issue is whether we are prepared to tackle the festering conflicts that still plague that region, which some are reluctant to do primarily because of their concerns about their relations with Moscow. Over the 15 to 20 year period we are talking about, however, we shall see the end of the post Soviet-space. While many in the West still talk about a post-Soviet space, the people in the region do not - they are trying to create their own space and join a "European space." For various reasons, many are still reluctant to engage Moscow more straightforwardly. But it cannot be in Russia's interest to have a zone of instability on its borders. We need to apply the same
argument to the regions closer to Russia that we did to the Central and Eastern European countries to justify their inclusion in NATO and the European Union.

Another aspect of the European element of the agenda is a more supportive U.S. approach to European integration. There has been a fairly ambivalent debate in the United States over the last few years about whether we really support European integration. But it is not just the fact of integration that Europeans should expect Americans to support - the question is the nature of that integration. Does it create the kind of partner we need? Does it stabilize the European continent? Does it provide a prosperous space and open markets for American goods and products? This is the kind of integration that Americans will support. If the European Union goes in that direction I hope you will find American support. If it does not, you will find concerns. I think we need to be much more straightforward on our side of the Atlantic that the right kind of deeper integration is definitely in America's interest.

The second big agenda item is beyond Europe - the global agenda. This is certainly going to be prominent in our discussions over the next 15 years. Unfortunately this is the part of the agenda on which we usually disagree with each other. These issues have been peripheral to Transatlantic relations in the past, which is why our disagreements not really caused great ruptures, but we now see how difficult it can be. There are some ways we can connect here. The Broader Middle East is really the challenge of the next Transatlantic generation. Are we going to tackle the trans-formation of that vast area together, working with the people of the region? It is the region in which unsettled conflicts really threaten Western prosperity and security, and it is unhooked from the global economy. Many millions of people there are without hope. Transformation is not just driven by idealism; we also have a hardheaded interest in engaging this region.

The conflict over the European Union's plan to lift its arms embargo against China is a classic example of how not to conduct a strategic dialogue on global issues. We have had a Transatlantic agenda for ten years now that provides for that kind of dialogue, but the forum we have set up for ourselves prevents us from having the deep discussions we need, and the rift over the arms embargo is just one consequence of that. Nor have we yet perfected our mechanisms for cooperating on issues like the Doha Development Agenda, the World Trade Organization and development aid.

The third point on the agenda is that we really need to spend more time on the relationships between our societies and our economies. Reducing Transatlantic relations to the daily agenda between Washington, Brussels and other European capitals is to miss the depth and opportunity presented by the ties between our nations. For example, business leaders and representatives of American states and European regions have created networks that ignore the issues that national capitals think are important. Wider recognition that both our societies face very similar issues would provide the Transatlantic relationship with a different and stronger human foundation than does a narrow focus on foreign policy differences.

Of course, we have some differences, but we must look at the changes in the broader world. Europe and the United States represent about 10 percent of the world's population. The other 90 percent is also globalizing and changing in the same timeframe. The United States and the European Union have the two systems that are most like each other. If we cannot come together on issues that divide us, how can we possibly deal with all the other systems that are not like ours? Either we are going to spend our time focusing on narrow differences between us or we are going to build a new way of working together to deal with the rise of China, the transformation of the Broader Middle East and a host of other global issues. That is the challenge. And we shall not rise to the challenge if we keep focusing on marginal kinds of issues rather than the really vast agenda we have in front of us.