European Affairs

Summer 2005

 

Letter from the Editor

Listen to the People

by Reginald Dale

 

Two sharply conflicting reactions are emerging to the crisis that has shaken the European Union following the rejection of the proposed European constitutional treaty by French and Dutch voters and the acrimonious disagreement between Britain and France over future priorities for the EU budget.

The first is to interpret the defeat of the constitution as a serious setback to the project for European unification, as pursued by dedicated integrationists for the past half-century, to bemoan the stupidity of voters in not understanding that a more unified and efficient European Union is in their own interests, and to seek ways of getting the project back on track, perhaps with a new
version of the constitution, in a few year's time.

The second is to see the crisis as a chance to review the traditional model of European integration, to welcome the fact that at least some of the people of Europe have finally had a say in the matter, and to take their views into account in deciding where to go next.

Perhaps the biggest difference is that those in the first category believe the people of Europe now need to be educated as to their own best interest - that is to say a Union in which national sovereignty is progressively pooled in ever-stronger central institutions. Those in the second believe that it is Europe's leaders who need to be educated, by listening to what people actually say they want - or do not want.

In a search for middle ground, many have tried to combine elements of both camps. Some argue both that the European project as conceived by the idealists and integrationists must continue, and that it must somehow be made more attractive to the citizens of Europe. As the Union seeks solutions to its crisis, it will be important to discover whether these two aims are compatible.

It is not just the French and the Dutch who have suddenly rebelled against the integrationist creed. There is little doubt that the British, too, would have rejected the constitution in a referendum originally planned for next year. Even before the French and Dutch said "No," opinion polls suggested that negative votes were possible in Denmark, Poland, Portugal, Ireland and the Czech Republic (in some cases because of minimum turnout requirements.) Many think even the Germans might have voted "No" in a referendum, an option barred by their constitution. The fundamental point, however, is that a "Yes" was always more likely in countries where the constitution was to be ratified by Parliamentary procedures, restricting the vote to largely pro-European politicians rather than allowing the general public to have its say.

In an article in this issue, the publisher of European Affairs, Jacqueline Grapin, describes the emergence of a Europe-wide public opinion, partly as a result of the war in Iraq, which, she says, split Europe in two - the Europe of governments, many of which supported the war, and the Europe of the people, most of whom did not. A similar phenomenon can be seen in the reaction to the constitution, endorsed by all 25 EU member governments but opposed by large segments of popular opinion.

Of course, French and Dutch voters were not just rendering a verdict on a constitution that the vast majority had never read. Many naysayers mistakenly feared the constitution's implications, for instance, for immigration and for future Turkish EU membership, or voted "No" to register a protest against an unpopular leader.

Nevertheless, the voters' overall message was that the European Union and its leaders were not adequately addressing their most important concerns, particularly immigration, unemployment and the loss of jobs to foreign, low-wage competitors. For the first time ever, according to one commentator, a majority of French people felt that the European Union was part of the problem, not the solution.

The fisticuffs between Mr. Blair and French President Jacques Chirac seemed to confirm a widespread view that disagreement over the European Union's future is basically between advocates of an "Anglo-Saxon" Europe, in which the European Union would be reduced to little more than a glorified single market, and those favoring an increasingly centralized, integrated Europe, defined by Franco-German ideals of unity and solidarity.

That analysis undoubtedly contains a large amount of truth. Many French voters, in fact, seem to have rejected the constitution precisely because they considered it "too British" - meaning economically liberal and hostile to Europe's traditionally interventionist social model - whereas the British tend to regard the constitution as "too European."

But the choice is not so stark. While Britain shares some characteristics of U.S. capitalism, the British welfare state is much more like the rest of Europe. And while many Britons would prefer the European Union to be little more than a single market, others, including Mr. Blair, favor deeper political cooperation, including in defense.

Many French and German politicians, particularly among the next generation of leaders, realize they must move in the "Anglo-Saxon" direction, and make their economies and their labor markets more flexible to withstand global competition. Meanwhile, the so-called "Nordic model," which manages to combine high taxes and social solidarity with economic growth and lower unemployment, is gaining numerous converts in other countries.

Americans are also divided in their reactions, though in different ways. Some welcome the constitutional debacle as meaning the end of any attempt to build up the European Union as a counterweight to the United States. Others, however, believe the United States needs a strong, unified Europe as a partner in tackling global problems.

In truth, however, the crisis is unlikely to lead to clear cut answers. Absent a major, as yet unexpected, upheaval, the European Union will continue to muddle along, taking three steps forward, and two - or sometimes three or even four - steps back. It will not be immobilized by the crisis or turn completely inward. Diplomacy over Iran and the Middle East will continue, as will efforts to conclude the Doha round of trade talks and find common positions in the G8, the UN and other international fora.

But in many other areas, the Union will be subject to strong conflicting tensions. To the dismay of the U.S. and some EU governments, further enlargement, after the entry of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, will probably be put on hold. President Chirac is likely to continue to resist further economic liberalization and the spread of "Anglo-Saxon" influence in the Union.

The budget dispute should ultimately be susceptible to a typically messy and probably unsatisfactory compromise solution. But there will be no agreement on the Union's final political destination, and that is not at all bad. While the French and Dutch votes against the constitution embodied, they expressed no coherent opinion as to what sort of Europe they are actually for.

Europe can advance pragmatically and democratically without the need for a single, all-encompassing vision to guide its footsteps. By shining a spotlight into previously taboo areas, the crisis has hammered home an important lesson, that there is more than one way in which Europe can legitimately be constructed - an idea that has always been anathema to traditional integrationists.

All these and many other subjects are addressed in this issue of European Affairs We hope these viewpoints contribute to the wide public debate that is now indispensable, not least because the debate can hardly be organized only by EU institutions with significant vested interests. Whatever kind of European Union emerges from the crisis, it is now clearer than ever that, if it does not enjoy the support of its citizens, the European house will be built on sand.