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European Affairs
Book Reviews
A Lesson in How Not to Conduct Diplomacy
Reviewed by Bailey Morris-Eck
Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations
by Stephen F. Szabo
Brookings Institution Press, 2004
195 pages
In the past two years, U.S.-German relations, and more broadly the Transatlantic partnership, have suffered probably the worst upheavals in five decades of close cooperation. Everybody has read the headlines proclaiming deep divisions in the run-up to the war in Iraq and its aftermath. Stephen Szabo's amply documented and well-written contribution is the story behind the headlines: the clash of political titans, the bad diplomacy, bad politics and bad timing that undermined half a century of well-defined national roles and more or less steady partnership.
It is still unclear how far the United States and Europe will be able to repair their damaged relations, and particularly the bitter rifts between the United States and Paris and Berlin. As Szabo points out, this is more than a game on the diplomatic chessboard, more than an exercise in patching-up and papering over differences with handshakes and polite words. Although Iraq was the flashpoint that brought matters to a boil, there was already a deep mistrust in Europe over the motivation and strategic goals of the United States.
These tensions came to a head at a time when Europe was in a "plastic" expansion phase, increasing its territory and struggling over internal governance, while seeking to exert the "soft power" of diplomacy and economic influence in counterbalance to the hard military power of the United States. Long-shared visions of Atlantic and European unity are still being severely strained by the different strategic goals of America and continental Europe.
In Szabo's book we see the recent clashes through the lens of deteriorating U.S.-German relations, which were given a push in the wrong direction at the outset by bad personal chemistry between President George W. Bush and Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder. Both took office with little knowledge of or emphasis on foreign policy, preferring to stake their leadership on domestic concerns. The lack of foreign experience explains some of the serious missteps by both sides.
During Schroeder's first visit to Washington, intended to provide a triumphal display of U.S.-German amity, the Bush Administration clumsily pulled the rug from under him, deeply embarrassing the Chancellor and his Green Party coalition partners. Thirty minutes before an Oval Office meeting between the two leaders, Condoleezza Rice, the then new U.S. National Security Advisor, announced that the Kyoto Protocol on climate control was dead. This was followed by a series of blunt statements by the U.S. team castigating multilateral initiatives in which Germany was a key partner. Bush and his "neo-conservative" advisors, who appeared to be advocating unilateralism and preemptive strikes, were almost disdainful of Schroeder's more cautious policies.
Both ideologically and personally, the two leaders were poles apart. Bush, born to privilege, prone to passionate convictions and little self-doubt, attached huge importance to personal loyalty. Schroeder, on the other hand, had clawed his way to the top from humble beginnings after his father was killed in World War II. Unlike most of the German political elite, he did not go to university but instead attended vocational school, earning his law degree at night. His politics were not ideological but coolly calculating and power-oriented. The four times married Schroeder had a reputation for changing political positions as often as he changed wives. The U.S.-German relationship might have been doomed from the beginning had it not been for the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001 and the ensuing outpouring of international support for the United States, not least in Germany.
Schroeder, like much of the rest of the world, watched the horrifying images on television and shortly afterward held a press conference to declare the "unlimited solidarity" of his government. The German people responded with an outpouring of grief and sympathy. More than a million gathered at the Brandenburg Gate to show their support for America. Schroeder visited Ground Zero in New York and met Bush in Washington for a joint press conference. The relationship had been patched up. Bush declared that "there was no more steadfast friend in the fight against terrorism" than Germany.
Schroeder put his government's future on the line, forcing a vote of confidence over German military support for the war in Afghanistan. By a very slim majority, and despite the skepticism of much of the German public, he won support to deploy more than 2,500 ground forces. This was the high point of a relationship between Berlin and Washington that would soon head south.
Sifting through the tea leaves of the failed relationship, the maneuvering over who would play what role in the war against al Qaeda, the conduct of the Afghanistan war and the run-up to Iraq, Szabo produces what is almost a primer on how not to conduct diplomacy. The Bush Administration mistrusted Germany, kept it out of the loop and failed to consult it. Schroeder wanted a place at the table, but waffled on his commitments and failed to heed the advice of his experienced foreign policy team. The end result was combustible.
In the showdown over Iraq, an embittered Schroeder, complaining of broken American promises and finding himself in deep political trouble at home, turned his back on the Bush Administration. Faltering in his bid for reelection, with his party trailing badly in the polls, he needed an issue. Suddenly he had two: deadly floods in eastern Germany and the war in Iraq. Acting out of frustration and opportunism, he pulled Russia into an anti-war coalition with France and Germany. He survived the election partly, perhaps largely, by appealing to a deep streak of anti-Americanism in the German electorate. Bush felt he had been stabbed in the back and took it personally.
Now, with the same leaders still in office, what are the future prospects for U.S.-German relations? Although some strongly believe that a change at the top would return relations to normal, Szabo is not among them. He argues persuasively that permanent damage has been done, citing opinion polls that portray Germans as despising U.S. militarism and believing that America has lost much of its moral authority to lead. Without a concerted effort by the United States to treat a unifying Europe as an equal partner, there is real danger that these two powers will pursue different strategic agendas, further upsetting the geopolitical balance on a host of international issues. That would be a tragedy because, whether or not everyone in Washington knows it, Europe still does matter to America.