European Affairs

Spring 2003

 

Special Report: The Rift in Transatlantic Relations
Europeans Must Agree on How to Use Military Force
By Jan Dirk Blaauw

 

In the eyes of many Europeans the U.S. decision to use military force againstIraq without the support of some of its major allies has posed a serious threatto the international security institutions established following World War II.In the aftermath of the war in Iraq, Europeans must find a way of persuading theUnited States that institutions such as the United Nations and NATO are the rightplaces to address its future security concerns.

This was one of the main themes to emerge from a conference in Athens on Europeand the new U.S. National Security Strategy, organized on the eve of the war bythe Greek Government, which currently holds the Presidency of the European Union,and the Assembly of Western European Union (WEU).1

More than 250 European national parliamentarians, government representatives andsecurity experts attended the conference. The great majority of speakers showedunderstanding for the strong emotions felt by Americans following the terroristattacks of September 11, 2001, but they also expressed concern over certain aspectsof U.S. security policies and statements recently made by leading U.S. policy-makersabout Iraq.

The war in Iraq was seen as the first implementation of President George Bush’scontroversial National Security Strategy, published in September 2002. The comprehensivestrategy is an impressive statement of U.S. determination to defend America fromits enemies, and particularly against threats posed by international terroristnetworks such as Al Qaeda and nuclear, biological and chemical weapons of massdestruction (WMD).

The Strategy also proposes dealing with the root causes of terrorism through diplomaticinitiatives, economic aid and special support, with a particular focus on moderateMuslim countries.

Many speakers at the conference, however, were critical of what they describedas the new Strategy’s unilateral approach and its legitimization of whatappeared to be an unlimited right of intervention for the United States. This,together with Washington’s initiation of hostilities in Iraq, was widelyseen as putting the survival of the international security institutions at risk.

Although many members of international organizations for political consultationand decision-making, such as the United Nations, NATO and the European Union,had doubts about the seriousness of the threat from Iraq, the United States actedon the basis of its own assessment that the threat was serious enough to justifymilitary intervention.

Theodoros Pangalos, a former Greek Foreign Minister, said it was important forthe international community to agree on a number of points: who should lead anyjoint action in the event of a WMD threat from a state or a terrorist group, howdecisions to act should be made and who should make them, and who should implementsuch decisions.

Mr. Pangalos argued that in the absence of such an agreement, there was a riskthat the United States would impose its own form of multilateralism, meaning thatit would bypass international institutions and seek a coalition of nations willingto support what would in practice be a unilateralist policy.

Lluis Maria de Puig, a Spanish Socialist Member of Parliament said that the strategydocument called for the United States to retain its existing military supremacyover other nations and to regard the threat posed by WMD as serious enough totrigger preemptive, unilateral action. He added that the use of religious languageby President Bush and the impression given by him that America had a special missionto rid the world of evil had caused particular dismay among Europeans. Such thinkingwas especially dangerous if the mission was not so much for the United Statesto lead its allies and partners as to dominate them, he said.

While many speakers criticized the content of the Security Strategy and the wayit had been presented and implemented, Ivan Eland, Director of the Center forPeace and Liberty of the Independent Institute2 in Oakland, California, also castdoubt on its viability and potential for success. In his view, the two centraltenets of the strategy – primacy and preemption – were both counterproductiveand unsustainable. The strategy was already proving counter-productive, in thatit was accelerating the proliferation of WMD rather than slowing it down, he asserted.

Mr. Eland cited North Korea and Iran as examples of countries that were alreadystepping up their efforts to acquire WMD, so as to be able to threaten retaliationif the United States were to consider intervening in their regions. The U.S. strategywas unsustainable, he argued, because it would be too costly – and in anycase it was virtually impossible to intervene in every country working on nuclear,biological or chemical weapons programs.

Like other participants in the conference, however, I share the view that afterthe war against Iraq, there will be an historic chance to establish the basisfor a democratic government and the rule of law in that country.

As for NATO, William Hopkinson of the Royal Institute for International Affairsin London predicted that the consequences of the new U.S. strategy would be limitedas the Alliance was already “dying.” In his view, the recent Americantrend toward unilateralism and the dynamics of ever greater military superioritywould mean that in the long term no other nation would be capable of operatingalongside U.S. military forces. This would merely reinforce a process at the endof which NATO would no longer be relevant for U.S. security policy.

If the outlook for NATO appears somewhat grim, participants were not much moreoptimistic about the European Union’s attempts to establish a common EuropeanSecurity and Defense Policy (ESDP). Anatol Lieven of the Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace in Washington said that the United States had long been ambiguoustoward European efforts to develop a more independent security and defense policy.Under the current administration, that ambiguity might turn into open hostility.

Nevertheless, while it is true that many leading members of the U.S. administrationare profoundly skeptical about the seriousness of Europe’s efforts to increaseits military capabilities, we should not be too pessimistic. I am convinced thatif Europeans were to spend their limited resources in a better and more efficientway, and with a view to creating capabilities complementary to those of the UnitedStates, they could once again become viable partners.

Europe can provide the United States with permanent military bases in a stablemainland environment, under conditions that are far more attractive to U.S. forcesthan remote islands in the middle of the ocean. The United States has every reasonto continue to cooperate with its traditional NATO allies as part of its nationalsecurity and defense policy. One of those allies is Turkey, which has a vitalrole to play in Europe’s security and defense, despite the recent difficultiesbetween Washington and Ankara over Iraq.

Europe will be an important partner for the United States in its security dialoguewith the former Soviet Union countries, not only because of its geographical proximity,but also because of its extensive trade and financial links with Russia. As VladimirLukin, Deputy Speaker of the Russian Duma, rightly pointed out, it is in everyone’sinterests to maintain the anti-terrorist and anti-proliferation coalition, whichalready includes a number of countries that did not have a clean arms proliferationrecord in the past.

We have to accept that for the foreseeable future the United States will be veryreluctant to allow any multinational body to influence the use it makes of itsmilitary forces. But Washington might be willing to cooperate and coordinate ifthere were somebody or something to cooperate and coordinate with. One area inwhich this might be possible, despite the fact that Europe prematurely declinedU.S. offers of cooperation, is missile defense, where there is huge potentialfor a joint security effort.

What Europe is endeavoring to do in the Balkans is a first step in the right direction,with the European Union preparing to take over NATO’s peacekeeping missionsnot only in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia but perhaps also in Bosnia.

If Europe shows that it is willing and able to share the burden of guaranteeinginternational peace and security, it will gain credibility as a respectable partnerin the eyes of the United States. Europe, which has no ambition to establish acompetitive autonomous security and defense system on a par with the United States,needs to concentrate on improving its military capabilities by making more efficientuse of its financial resources.

Then, if the United States acknowledges Europe’s political will and recognizesthat its improved military capabilities make it possible for Europeans to joinAmerica in shaping a safer world and fighting international terrorism, there isa good chance that confidence will quickly be restored on both sides of the Atlantic.

Without the Americans, Europeans cannot achieve their ambitions in the Balkansor safeguard their global security interests. There is no credible European militarypresence in East Asia or the Pacific, as Mr. Lieven pointed out.

There is, however, a fundamental need for Europe to overcome its current divisionsand reach a consensus about the role the European Union should play in internationalcrises. It is only as a united group that Europeans can be a viable partner forthe United States. Any influence that countries may hope to gain by dealing withthe United States individually or in an ad hoc group will be very limited.

Above all, Europeans must agree on when and how military force may be used inthe framework of ESDP. If the United States chose not to act unilaterally, ornot at all, would Europe be ready and able to take its place?

What role can Western European Union and its member countries play in achievingthis goal? Firstly, the organization’s founding treaty contains a mutualdefense clause. I have suggested that this Treaty should be appended to the proposednew EU Constitutional Treaty in the form of a protocol. This would enable thoseEU and NATO members that so wish to express clearly their ambition to assume acommon European responsibility for security and defense policy.

Secondly, the Assembly of WEU, attended by national members of parliament from28 European countries, provides an inter-parliamentary platform for European securityand defense dialogue. In this forum, Government representatives can explain thereasons underlying their security and defense-related activities to parliamentarianswho, in their national parliaments, take decisions on defense budgets, troop deploymentsand the use of national airspace by foreign forces and who make crucial choicesconcerning arms procurement. I hope that in future we can also arrange for theEuropean Parliament to participate fully in the inter-parliamentary dialogue onEuropean security and defense issues.

Finally, WEU’s armaments cooperation branch, Western European ArmamentsGroup (WEAG), is actively pursuing a policy of funding research with a view toassuring the future of our security and defense industry. In the last six monthsalone WEAG has invested over $60 million in defense research projects. A commonapproach to security and defense in Europe and a Transatlantic security partnershiphave always been, and will continue to be, the cornerstone of Western EuropeanUnion.

1 The WEU is a treaty-based security and defense organization. Article V of its founding treaty (the modified Brussels Treaty of 1954) provides for the collective defense of its ten member states: Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. Article IV of the Treaty links WEU member countries' security to NATO. Since 2000 WEU's military crisis management activities are part of the European Union's emerging European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). The Assembly of WEU serves as an inter-parliamentary forum for discussion of ESDP questions. The WEU Presidency rotates in the same way as the Presidency of the European Union, making Greece the current President of both organizations.

2 The Independent Institute is a privately funded research body specializing in the analysis of current policy issues. It is generally critical of government intervention.

Jan Dirk Blaauw is President of the Assembly of Western European Union, the Interparliamentary European Security and Defense Assembly. He was first elected to the Dutch Parliament in 1978, where he has served as Spokesperson for the Liberal Group. He became a member of the Assembly of WEU in 1981, and has served as Chairman of the Liberal Group, Vice-President of the Assembly and Vice-Chairman of both the Defense and the Political Committees.