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European Affairs
Special Report: The Rift in Transatlantic Relations
The 21st Century Requires a Global U.S.-European Partnership
By Daniel S. Hamilton
Transatlantic rows over Iraq and a host of other issues evoke the kind of raucouscelebrity slanging match normally reserved for tabloid headlines blaring acrossthe grocery store check-out counter: “Can this Marriage Be Saved???”
Having stared Transatlantic divorce in the face, however, officials on both sidesof the Atlantic are now scrambling to patch things up in the wake of U.S. andBritish military success in Iraq. But resentments linger. As the military phaseof the campaign gives way to the challenges of Iraq’s political and economicrehabilitation, how do Europeans and Americans pick up the pieces of their broaderrelationship?
ere were such bitter divisions in the first place. Iraq may have ignited the blowout,but differences on that issue alone do not explain the emotional or broad-basednature of Transatlantic recrimination and bitterness. That is because much ofthe debate both within and between Europe and America has been less about Iraqitself and more about what the Bush administration’s approach to Iraq maysay about the future behavior of the world’s only superpower. And in thisdebate, personalities, policies, catalytic events, and deeper structural changesof world politics all play a role.
There has been no lack of personalities grating on each other like chalk on ablackboard. U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s steady stream of gratuitouspublic insults of European allies needlessly alienated broad segments of Europeanopinion at a time when Washington was seeking support from European capitals forits policies. President Bush’s regular invocation of providential blessing,coupled with his self-righteous, finger-jabbing, “with us or against us”rhetoric, diverted foreign friends from concern about Baghdad to concern aboutWashington.
Europe, of course, has no shortage of quirky personalities. French President JacquesChirac, having won a second term with a comfortable majority, has shifted intoa phase of “hyper-Gaullism” that appears bent on moving beyond merecriticism of America to a true strategy of containment. Mr. Chirac has found anally in German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, who eked out reelection by cynicallycourting pacifists and East German communists at the expense of a half centuryof friendship with the United States.
Without Mr. Schröder, Chirac would have remained a somewhat lonely voice.But Mr. Schröder abandoned Germany’s traditional role of mediatingbetween Paris and Washington and tied German fortunes to Gallic ambition. Thisshift in Germany’s position then made it easier for President Vladimir Putinof Russia to join a new axis of dissent less focused on blocking Saddam Husseinthan on containing President Bush.
But highlighting the perhaps less-than-noble motives of French or German leadersdoes not explain U.S. failure to isolate them, why the United States could notget a majority in the UN Security Council for a second resolution on Iraq, orwhy the United States itself is so isolated today. The Bush administration simplydid not make the case for preemptive military intervention on its particular timetable.
Washington not only failed to persuade Russia, it failed to persuade or bribeanother critical ally, Turkey, and even failed to persuade, bribe or bully sixundecided Security Council members into voting for the resolution.
These failures, however, do not excuse the hollow posturing of many European nations.Those who argued that imminent war was not the answer were obliged to set forthan alternative plan for truly coercive inspections, backed by the United Nations.Such a plan could have involved more capable inspectors supported by troops onthe ground, extended “no-fly” and “no-drive” zones, theability to destroy facilities being sanitized or capabilities being moved –a whole variety of intermediate options short of preemptive war yet offering atough, focused way for the United Nations to disarm Iraq.
Although the Bush administration rejected out of hand some efforts in this vein,neither the Germans nor the French chose to set forth such proposals in seriousdetail. And when the French declared that they would veto any second resolution,even if there was a Security Council majority for it, the game was over.
Policy differences over a host of other issues beyond Iraq have exacerbated matters.European concerns have been fueled by the Bush administration’s refusalto participate in international agreements ranging from the International CriminalCourt and the Kyoto Protocol on climate change to a worldwide ban on antipersonnelland mines, a global treaty to protect bio-diversity, a verification mechanismfor the Biological Weapons Control Treaty, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
Europeans are critical of the Bush administration’s treatment of suspectedterrorist fighters being held at Guantanamo Bay naval station in Cuba, its pulloutfrom the Antiballistic Missile Treaty, its neglect of the Arab-Israeli peace process,and its embrace of preemptive military action as a foreign policy doctrine.
Americans often retort that their European friends seem eager to lecture Americansabout U.S. failings but unwilling to spend the money necessary to make Europeantroops effective, are too absorbed with the details of deeper and wider Europeanintegration to recognize the dangers posed by terrorists wielding weapons of massdestruction, are eager to trumpet their “noble” multilateralist instinctsin contrast to America’s “base” unilateralism (except when itcomes to international rules that do not support EU preferences), and have failedto advance economic reforms that could sustain European prosperity or anchor worldgrowth in the New Economy. Some, such as former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger,accuse Europeans of using antagonism towards the United States as a way of definingtheir own identity.
These quarrels on international issues are exacerbated by a series of Transatlanticspats over such traditionally domestic issues as food safety, the death penalty,data privacy, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and a range of other civilliberties.
In and of themselves, such squabbles are also nothing new. But increasingly, thesedisputes are being viewed through different foreign policy lenses, each framedby a separate catalytic event. For most Europeans the catalytic event framingmuch of their foreign and security policy remains the fall of the Berlin Wallon November 9, 1989 and the ensuing collapse of the Soviet Union and Europeancommunism.
When the people on the streets of Central and Eastern Europe brought down theIron Curtain with their collective cry, “We want to return to Europe,”they unleashed an earthquake that is still shaking the continent and its institutions.It has given Europeans an historic opportunity to build a continent that is trulywhole, free and at peace with itself. It is a goal that Americans share. But itcontinues to absorb, almost overwhelm European energy and attention.
For most Americans, November 9 also played a catalytic role, and informed muchof U.S. foreign policy in the ensuing decade. But in American public consciousnessthe horrific events of September 11, 2001 have transformed November 9, 1989 intoa bookend to an era of transition to a new and newly dangerous century. September11 has unleashed a very fundamental debate about the nature and purpose of America’srole in the world.
In many ways, the current debate is analogous to the period of the late 1940s,when America had won a war but not defined its postwar role. In that period, thenotion of containment emerged as an organizing principle for American foreignpolicy. In many ways, the events of November 9, 1989 represented the logical conclusionto that policy. Today, the debate is how the threat of terrorism, joined to theproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, should lead the United States toreframe its foreign and security policy.
In such an open debate, some basic propositions – mainstays of U.S. foreignpolicy for 60 years – are being reexamined. And here some differences withthe containment debate of the late 1940s are instructive for Transatlantic relations.Then, Americans believed that one part of Europe was the front line and anotherpart of Europe posed grave dangers. As a consequence, the core of U.S. foreignpolicy was rooted in European stability. Today, Americans believe they themselvesare on the front line, and the danger emanates from beyond Europe. Europe, asa consequence, having already been won, is seen increasingly by some in the Bushadministration more as a platform than a partner in its new global campaign.
All these factors feed into structural dynamics that are now shaping relationsbetween Europe and the United States. Taken together, November 9 and September11 convey a single message: the future health of Transatlantic relations willbe defined less by the degree of U.S. engagement in Europe and more by the abilityof the United States and Europe to cope with the promises and dangers of globalization.
The greatest security threats to the United States and Europe today stem fromproblems that defy borders: terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of massdestruction, pandemics and environmental scarcities. They stem from challengesthat have traditionally been marginal but contentious in the Transatlantic securitydialogue: peacekeeping outside the traditional NATO area; post-conflict reconstructionand rehabilitation; rogue states, failed states and states hijacked by groupsor networks. And they come from places, such as Africa and Southwest and CentralAsia, that the Transatlantic agenda has often ignored.
Few great goals in this world can be achieved without America. But America canachieve few of them alone. In this era of shadowy networks and bio-terrorists,failed states and recession, the only way we can share our burdens, extend ourinfluence, and achieve our goals will often be by banding together with others,particularly our core allies. We cannot handle the world entirely on our own,making every problem our problem and then sending our warriors to conduct ourforeign policy.
U.S. military capabilities are vast. But fire power is not staying power. We canwin wars without allies, but we can only secure peace with allies. It is decidedlyin American interests to seek a more effective global partnership with a Europethat can act in real-time on pressing international matters. We must develop waysto work better together in fast-breaking crises; manage our differences beforethey impair our ability to cooperate; and improve joint efforts to address emergingthreats and global issues.
Are we ready for such a partnership? Will Americans have either the patience orthe inclination, and will Europeans have either the capacity or the will, to generatethe coherence of action that will be required? These are open questions that willtest leadership on both sides of the Atlantic. Our most immediate task, of course,is reaching agreement on the role of the international community in Iraq. Thiscertainly will be difficult and contentious. But we must also frame our continuingdebate over Iraq with a wider perspective if we are to pick up the pieces of ourbroader relationship.
We should start with three other areas of endeavor. The first is to generate anew understanding of strategic stability. During the Cold War the two superpowerspreserved stability despite their animosity because they felt equally at risk.They shared the view that the prospect of suicide would deter anyone from actuallyusing weapons of mass destruction, and they were willing to negotiate certainrules of the road together and with other nations. Today, all three of these premiseshave vanished. Other nuclear powers have emerged – and their rules of theroad are unclear. Terrorists are not detered by suicide, and they are not at thenegotiating table. They have nothing to protect and nothing to lose. In short,Cold War deterrence will not work as it once did, and in some cases it will notwork at all.
A new conception of strategic stability must weave what have been separate strands– the fight against terrorism, nuclear force posture, non-proliferation anddefense efforts – into a comprehensive defense against weapons of mass destruction,as former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn has suggested. These strands must be consideredjointly, and discussion of the Bush administration’s doctrine of preemptionshould be incorporated into a broader discussion of what is likely to constitutesecurity and stability in the new century.
A second, related initiative should be to develop “Transatlantic”approaches to homeland security and societal protection. When the United Stateswas attacked, our allies immediately invoked the North Atlantic Treaty’smutual defense clause, in essence stating that the September 11 attack was anattack on a common security space – a common “homeland.” Itis unlikely that a successful effort to strengthen homeland security can be conductedin isolation from one’s allies.
A terrorist WMD attack on Europe would immediately affect American civilians,American forces, and American interests. If such an attack involved contagiousdisease, it could threaten the American homeland itself in a matter of hours.In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, it has also become very clear thatcontroling borders, operating ports, or managing airports and train stations inthe age of globalization involves a delicate balance of identifying and interceptingweapons and terrorists without excessively hindering the trade, legal migration,travel and tourism upon which European and American prosperity increasingly depends.
How should we work together across the Atlantic on homeland defense in its manycomponents? The challenges Americans are encountering in crafting effective homelandsecurity responses – due to the broad nature of the threat, the multiplicityof actors, and overlapping federal and state competencies – are even moredaunting across the Atlantic, given Europe’s multi-jurisdictional setting.European preparedness efforts are not only of immediate relevance for the safetyof millions of people, they have a direct impact on NATO’s mission and onthe anti-terrorism campaign.
They will also influence U.S.-EU relations and bilateral ties to individual countries,have important consequences for Transatlantic economic relations and intelligencecooperation, raise prospects for new avenues of cooperation with Russia, and couldprovide important comparisons for U.S. homeland security programs.
European experience can also be useful for Americans because the countries involvedare liberal democracies that, like the United States, are faced with the problemsof how to balance law enforcement and civil liberties and how to define the properrole of the armed forces in societal protection at home. Finally, efforts to protectthe U.S. homeland against cyber-attacks can hardly be conducted in isolation fromkey allies whose economies and information networks are so intertwined with ours.
A third initiative should be to develop new models of Transatlantic governance.It is fashionable to suggest that Europeans and Americans are drifting apart,no longer engaged with each other, as during the Cold War. Yet nothing could befarther from the truth. Almost every single indicator of societal interaction– whether it be flows of money, services, investments, people or ideas –underscores a startling fact: our societies are not drifting, they are colliding.The decade of the 1990s – the decade when the supposed “glue”of the Cold War dissolved – was one of the most intense periods of Transatlanticintegration in history. The advance of globalization is fastest and deepest betweenthe continents of Europe and North America.
Among the nations of the European Union, the policies of European integrationreach so deep that it is common to hear that European policies have become domesticpolicies, and that EU countries have entered a new realm of “European domesticpolicy.” This is very true, but it does not begin to capture the real dynamicof what is happening. A similar, if largely unnoticed, process has been underwayfor some time across the Atlantic. Our economies and societies have become sointertwined that in a number of specific areas Europeans and Americans have transcended“foreign” relations.
We have moved into a new arena of “Transatlantic domestic policy”– a new frontier in which specific social and economic concerns and transnationalactors often jump formal borders, override national policies, and challenge traditionalforms of governance throughout the Atlantic world. The networks of interdependencebeing created across the Atlantic have become so dense, in fact, that they haveattained a quality far different than those either continent has with any other.We have only begun to understand the many dimensions of this phenomenon.
Many of the issues confronting European and American policy makers today are thoseof “deep integration,” a new closeness that strikes at core issuesof domestic governance, and that is of a qualitatively different nature from the“shallow integration” model of the Bretton Woods-GATT system establishedat the end of World War II. Deep integration is generating new Transatlantic networksand new connections. But because it reaches into traditionally domestic areasit can also generate social dislocation, anxiety and friction, as on such issuesas food safety, competition policies, religious cults, privacy protection or thedeath penalty. Such conflicts are unlikely to endanger the relationship, and aremore a symptom that our societies are interacting so closely that many issuesare debated as quasi-domestic controversies.
Such controversies less often reflect differences in values than different perspectiveson what tradeoffs are politically or socially acceptable when these values collidewith each other. On many of these issues, in fact, differences within the UnitedStates and within Europe are more serious than those between Americans and Europeans.At the same time, European and American scientists and entrepreneurs are pushingthe frontiers of human discovery in such fields as genetics, nanotechnology andelectronic commerce where there are neither global rules nor Transatlantic mechanismsto sort out the complex legal, ethical and commercial tradeoffs posed by suchinnovation.
Neither the framework for our relationship nor the way our governments are currentlyorganized adequately captures these new realities. There is a growing mismatchbetween how leaders and specialists are trained and organized to manage Transatlanticaffairs, and what skills will be required to meet 21st century challenges. Opinionshapers need to look more closely at the intersection between deep Atlantic integrationand traditional areas of domestic regulation.
There is considerable need to work more concertedly to identify “best practices”for governance that could improve coordination and create safety valves for politicaland social pressures resulting from deep integration. In democratic societiescontroversial domestic issues are decided by elections or court rulings. Acrossthe Atlantic such quasi-domestic issues need to be managed through new forms ofTransatlantic regulatory and parliamentary consultation and coordination and moreinnovative diplomacy that takes account of the growing role of private actors.
Iraq has been a loud wake-up call to the Transatlantic partnership. The questionfacing us is whether we can respond to this tragedy by assuming the global obligationsour partnership demands – for history will ultimately judge us not onlyin terms of how well or badly we managed a particular crisis, but also how wellwe used such crises to shape our relationship for the future.
Daniel S. Hamilton is the Richard von Weizsäcker Professor and Director of the Center for Transatlantic Relations at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, and Executive Director of the American Consortium on EU Studies, the EU Center in Washington, DC. He previously served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs and as Associate Director of the U.S. State Department's Policy Planning Staff.