European Affairs

Spring 2003

 

Leader in Focus
NATO Is Strong Enough to Survive Iraq
By George Robertson

 

The crisis over Iraq is, by any standards, one of the most difficult issues with which the Transatlantic community has had to grapple in many years. It has put pressure on long-standing relations between countries, across the Atlantic and within Europe. It has caused enormous debate within venerable international organizations, such as the United Nations, the European Union, and NATO – debate that has played itself out very publicly. And it has spawned innumerable newspaper editorials claiming that the Transatlantic relationship will eventually crack under the weight of this crisis.

But it will not crack. Why? Because despite disagreements over Iraq there is broader, deeper and stronger consensus than there would seem today, within Europe and across the Atlantic, on the key security questions of the 21st century: What are the threats we face today, and will face in future? How are we to tackle them? And will we tackle them together?

Iraq was not the origin of these questions. They were put firmly on the agenda on September 11, 2001. The terrorist attacks in the United States made it brutally clear that the old ways of doing business were no longer enough. We had to face up to a new reality of murky, unclear threats, such as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. We had to learn to defend against attacks that could be launched from afar, but that strike within our societies without warning, and without mercy.

That is why, even as we responded to those attacks, in Afghanistan and around the world, the Euro-Atlantic community also began a profound dialogue on the future of security. A dialogue that took place significantly within NATO, the only organization that brings together Europe and North American countries around the same table to coordinate political approaches and facilitate security cooperation.

That dialogue and debate achieved a milestone 14 months later, in Prague. In November 2002, NATO's Heads of State and Government met at a summit meeting that will go down in history for two reasons. First, because it transformed NATO's policies, membership and partnerships to reorient the Alliance for the 21st century. And second, because it was the first major indication of the future shape of Euro-Atlantic security cooperation.

Prague demonstrated clearly that there is strong consensus, on both sides of the Atlantic, that we must tackle terrorism as a matter of priority. Prague set out, on paper and in policy, the common commitment to deter, disrupt and defend against this threat as a Transatlantic community. This is, in itself, a major reorientation of the Alliance and a clear illustration of a common approach to a new threat.

The same common approach was taken toward weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Al Qaeda demonstrated that there are those who would use these weapons without the slightest hesitation, killing however many they could. No government can responsibly ignore this threat, and no NATO government has done so. Since Prague, the Alliance is working to provide stronger protection for our populations, our critical infrastructure and our forces against any use of WMD. This is proof, again, that the consensus on new threats is broader, and more oriented toward the threats of today, than it might seem these days.

In Prague, the allies also confirmed an end to the "out-of-area" debate once and for all. From now on, NATO's forces will be mandated to go wherever they are required, and to defend against threats from wherever they may come – without being restricted to the Alliance's traditional area of operations in Europe, the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. Does that mean that NATO forces will now be roaming the world? Of course, not. But it does mean that, in the face of a clear and present danger from 21st century threats, NATO's defense must not be artificially constrained by out-dated geographic limits imposed during the Cold War.

To those who follow NATO matters, these three decisions in Prague – to focus on terrorism, to give priority to WMD defense, and to end the out-of-area debate – are a real watershed. They show that the Alliance can, and will, adapt to major changes in the international environment to remain relevant and useful. Most importantly, they prove that, although the Soviet Union is only a fading memory, both Europe and North America still share a common vision of the threats and challenges they face.

Prague also demonstrated that both sides of the Atlantic share more than a vision. They also share a pragmatic, practical desire to work together in tackling these challenges. And the summit set out a blueprint for doing so.

One major change in international security is that traditional deterrence is no longer sufficient. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 proved this beyond any doubt. To face modern threats, NATO needs a very rapid reaction capability that can move over long distances, and hit hard when it gets there.

That is the purpose of the new NATO Response Force (NRF). It is a modern capability, for today's post-Cold War requirements. But the NRF will also serve a second purpose. By engaging the Alliance as a whole in the NRF's high-end, combat missions, it will help to forestall any internal division of labor within NATO between those who do the fighting and those who clean up afterwards. Today, more than ever, that is of enormous value.

The NRF will also help to bridge the capability gap more broadly. It will be a hothouse for the most cutting edge military technology and doctrine available in NATO, shared amongst all the Allies. This will help to ensure that the smaller nations can continue to work with the bigger ones and make a real contribution to our common operations.

That same goal is behind the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC). In simple terms, all 19 Heads of State and Government made commitments in Prague to make specific improvements to their national forces, within clear time frames. These improvements will be made to the capabilities required for modern operations: long-range lift, to get to far-away crises; protection against WMD; and crucial high technology, such as precision-guided munitions, to ensure military victory and minimize unintended damage or casualties.

The aim behind the PCC is threefold. First, to address crucial shortfalls in NATO's overall military capability. Second, to make a strong political statement that NATO is adapting to deliver security where it is needed, when it is needed, and with what it takes to succeed against the threats we face today. And third, to demonstrate that the non-U.S. NATO Allies are determined to avoid a capability gap with the United States, and to ensure that they can still operate with their U.S. partner, now and into the future.

Through all these major changes, NATO's members confirmed that they share a common vision of the threats that they face, and of the capabilities they need to face them down. In Prague, they also set out a bold shared vision of the future of the Euro-Atlantic area, and how they will go about achieving that together.

Most prominently, the allies at the summit extended invitations to seven countries to join the Alliance. In the spring of 2004, the three Baltic countries, as well as Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria, will become NATO members. The new members will not bring spectacular capabilities. But each will add niche specialties that can make an immediate difference. Moreover, they will bring enthusiasm, a willingness to take risks if need be, and a unique appreciation of the value of a permanent Transatlantic Alliance.

There are many practical reasons why NATO's door should be kept open to new members: from promoting democratic and military reform in aspirant countries; to locking in that progress within NATO; to broadening the base of allies contributing to our common endeavors. But the political goal is equally important, and is shared by all the allies. It is to help create a Europe whole, democratic and free, from the Atlantic to the Black Sea, and from the Baltic to the Balkans. Through enlargement, we have taken a huge step closer to this goal.

We are also a big step closer to another goal shared on both sides of the Atlantic: bringing Russia into Europe as a trusting and trusted partner. Since May of last year, the NATO allies and Russia have been sitting around the same table in the NATO-Russia Council. The Russians sit as equals, working out common programs of cooperation on key 21st century security challenges that include, among many others, combating terrorism, defending against weapons of mass destruction, theater missile defense and peacekeeping.

The immediate advantage of this is clear: it engages Russia's potential in solving the security challenges we all face. But it also sends a strong political signal that Russia is willing to sit, as an equal, with much smaller countries that are newly independent. This is a powerful political message. It bodes well for Europe's future. And its success until now is due to the decision by both sides of the Atlantic to engage Russia together, through NATO.

Another area where Transatlantic consensus is achieving results is in the Balkans. Slowly but surely, Bosnia and Kosovo are moving away from war and toward self-sustaining peace and prosperity. The numbers of international soldiers required to keep the peace is consistently diminishing. In the foreseeable future, the countries of the region will formally move from disintegration to integration, by entering into Euro-Atlantic institutions as contributing, prosperous democracies that share our common values.

This is not happenstance. It is the obvious, indeed inevitable, result of a common Transatlantic approach, and a common commitment to solving security challenges. It is why NATO has always succeeded at every mission it has undertaken. And why the Alliance will continue to remain vital in bringing together the Euro-Atlantic community in future. No other approach can or will deliver such effective results.

The Balkans will also be the test bed for NATO-EU relations, another area in which a new Transatlantic consensus has emerged. By agreeing a formal basis for cooperation between NATO and the European Union in crisis management and conflict prevention, the allies have set the stage for transfering to the European Union the NATO mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. This seemingly small step could transform not only European security, but also the Transatlantic relationship.

By enabling EU-led operations to draw on NATO assets and capabilities, both sides of the Atlantic stand to gain. The European Union will have a long-sought opportunity to demonstrate its role as a serious security actor, allowing U.S. forces, in particular, to become available for other pressing tasks. This will facilitate a new, more equitable burden sharing between the United States and a more mature Europe.

Another example of equitable burden sharing is taking place now in the campaign against terrorism. In Afghanistan, NATO forces make up more than 95 percent of the peacekeeping force in Kabul. They do so with strong support from NATO. Indeed, NATO's recent decision to enhance its support to this force, by taking on the command, coordination and planning of the operation, is another indication of a strong transatlantic consensus. This enhanced NATO role will overcome the growing problem of a continual search every six months to find new lead nations. In addition, European NATO forces are taking an active role in protecting shipping in the Mediterranean against terrorist attack, and in NATO operations against Al Qaeda elements in the Balkans.

All these efforts show how strong Transatlantic cooperation remains in combating new threats. It is equally strong in maintaining NATO's most fundamental role: defending member states against attack. Upon request by Turkey, and after considerable debate in Brussels, the Alliance has provided support to help prevent and defend against any attack by Iraq. NATO Airborne Warning and Control aircraft were dispatched to help defend Turkish airspace, chem-bio protection has been offered if needed, and the Alliance is prepared to provide civil emergency protection to assist civilian populations in the case of attack.

All this clearly shows that NATO's founding charter remains as relevant today as it was when it was written in 1949. Fears that the Iraq crisis and the rapid success of U.S.-led coalition forces in the war would reinforce U.S. "unilateralism" are misplaced. On the contrary, the United States remains committed to NATO as an exceptionally effective multinational framework.

The current focus on Iraq and its political fallout may be unavoidable. After all, the crisis demonstrated that the Transatlantic community has not yet fully adjusted to the post-9/11 world. For example, the search for agreement on the urgency of the new threats, and when and how to use force against them, requires a broad debate that has only just begun. Yet the focus on Iraq obscures the fact that NATO has embarked on a process of adaptation that will help bridge the divides that the Iraq crisis has exposed.

What is crucial during such a period of transition is that we preserve and strengthen what has brought us so far, and delivered so much for our security, our prosperity and our values. That is, in a nutshell, our common Transatlantic culture of trust, cooperation and mutual support. And it is precisely in moments like these that we must work the hardest to preserve it.

The Right Honorable Lord Robertson is the Secretary General of NATO and Chairman of the North Atlantic Council. He was Secretary of Defence of the United Kingdom from 1997 to 1999, and a Member of Parliament for Hamilton and Hamilton South from 1978 to 1999. Lord Robertson has held numerous positions in government, including Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Social Services, and Opposition Spokesman, first on Scottish Affairs, then on Defence, and on Foreign Affairs.