European Affairs

Summer/Fall 2003

 

The Middle East
The EU Needs to Update its Mediterranean Policy
By Philippe Lemaître

 

Can Europe contribute to the political and economic stabilization of the Middle East and beyond when its credibility has been weakened by open divisions over the war in Iraq? It is certainly true that European influence remains strong in the region, with which it has long had close political, historical, cultural and economic ties. Despite or perhaps because of America's massive involvement in the region, the Muslim elite strongly favors a European role. Europe can thus play a constructive part at a time when everyone understands the need for more creative approaches to prevent a dangerous deepening of the gulf between the West and the Arab and Muslim worlds.

For such a contribution to bear fruit, the 25 member states of the enlarged European Union must do two things: they should make an effort to achieve greater diplomatic cohesion; and they should update their policies toward the countries of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean to take better account of today's political realities.

The current situation seems propitious for action at both levels. The difficulties encountered on the ground by U.S. and British coalition forces in Iraq are making it easier for other EU governments to draw closer to the "peace camp" led by France and Germany, thus alleviating the rifts inside the Union.

At the same time, the European Union seems to have become aware of the need to manage its contractual relations with the Mediterranean countries in a less bureaucratic way. That was the gist of a recent communication from the European Commission, drawn up at the instigation of President Romano Prodi, on the new policy that the enlarged Union should adopt toward neighboring countries.

There is nothing to indicate that the splits that openly emerged in Europe on the eve of the U.S. military intervention in Iraq have disappeared. Several EU countries remain convinced that the operation is dangerous, to the extent that it fosters rather than discourages terrorism, and because they think it is wrong to try to impose democracy at the point of a gun. Others think that President George Bush is right, and believe that the top priority must be to do nothing that might compromise the Transatlantic relationship.

Even if analyses differ, however, the problems confronting the coalition in Iraq have had the result of attenuating these disagreements and making a common approach to the issue possible. Now that the military intervention has taken place, no one in Europe has an interest in seeing the coalition troops get bogged down in Iraq, and the U.S. plan to democratize the region, country by country, fail. That also applies to those who were against the war.

Europeans who virulently opposed the war must now logically support the United States for exactly the same reason: the need, at all costs, to avoid chaos, or the establishment of a new dictatorship in Iraq that could only fan the flames of the "clash of civilizations" that Europe fervently hopes to avoid.

Europeans widely share the diagnosis of President Bush's advisors: the political situation in the Middle East and relations between the Arab world and the West are in a dangerous state. The West can no longer accommodate dictatorships and corrupt regimes. It must promote democratization and greater social justice so as to reduce the frustrations that nurture Muslim fundamentalism and terrorism. As controversial as they may sometimes be in Europe, men like Paul Wolfowitz, U.S. Undersecretary of Defense, have contributed to the acceptance of this argument, previously perceived as too vague to have a concrete influence on policy.

Where Europeans disagree is over the method adopted by Washington to accelerate change. Several governments, and the great majority of public opinion, fear that a policy of force or intimidation, more or less inevitably tainted with anti-Arab connotations, will strengthen the hand of Islamic radicals rather than facilitate reforms.

The priorities of Europeans and Americans today are the same. They are to reintegrate Iraq into the community of nations by restoring calm and prosperity and to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Europeans are agreed that the stabilization of Iraq requires a much greater involvement of the United Nations. It remains to be seen how far the U.S. administration is willing to go in this direction. Nevertheless, even with a new Security Council resolution that gave them what they wanted, it is not certain that countries such as France and Germany would agree to send troops to Iraq to replace some of the coalition forces, as Washington seems to wish.

In addition to technical and budgetary problems (the French and German armies are already widely engaged in foreign theaters of operation), it is far from certain that Paris and Berlin can be convinced that it is appropriate to continue occupying Iraq, even with a mandate from the United Nations.

The Europeans, however, should be able to alleviate such sources of tension with the United States, were they to materialize, by offering, for example, to assume a greater share of the military burden in Bosnia, Kosovo or even Afghanistan (where it appears that French special forces are already opera-ting alongside the Americans, quite separately from the international forces deployed in Kabul.)

As for the role Europe will have in the reconstruction of Iraq, it seems that an agreement is in sight. As European Commissioner Chris Patten has clearly indicated, the European Union is willing to contribute, but does not want the funds it allocates to the operation to be managed by the Americans or by Iraqis closely controlled by Washington. EU officials say that progress is being made on the idea of a multilateral arrangement that would give Europe adequate guarantees on the use of the funds and the treatment of European companies.

Europeans are convinced that the peace process between Israel, its Arab neighbors and, especially, the Palestinians is essential for the pacification of the whole region, and are extremely anxious that it succeed. Even if their approach to the issue is not exactly the same as Washington's - they put more emphasis on alleged injustices done to the Palestinians - the Europeans are fervent advocates of the "road map" that they had a large part in drafting, along with Russia, the United States and the United Nations. They support the "road map's" implementation by President Bush.

The Europeans have financed the Palestinian administration in the past and are now financing the rebuilding of Palestinian infrastructures destroyed by the Israeli Army, when it reoccupied the West Bank and Gaza. While they believe they accordingly have a right to be more directly involved in implementing the "road map," they accept the reality that both Washington and Israel have vetoed the idea.

That does not stop them from speaking out, as they did, for example, in collectively refusing to isolate President Yasser Arafat as the Americans and Israelis had demanded. (Only Silvio Berlusconi, the Italian Prime Minister, thought it a good idea to consider himself exempt from this joint commitment).

For the Europeans, Arafat has the enormous advantage of having been elected, and of still enjoying real popularity among Palestinians. The disagreement with the Americans over his status is serious and inhibits European policy initiatives. The most important thing that Europe can do, as it seems more or less united on this issue, is to make its voice heard in Washington. Europe should encourage President Bush to put pressure on the Israeli government when necessary, particularly to ease the conditions of Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza and to dismantle Israeli settlements.

On Iran, too, the Europeans are acting together, combining firmness with a readiness to engage Tehran - an approach that, while different from the tougher attitude of Washington, remains compatible with American policy.

Dealings between Europe and the United States are difficult because recent wounds have not been forgotten. Nevertheless, on the three most sensitive issues - Iraq, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Iran - the EU member countries are operating more or less in concert, opening the way for the reestablishment of better Transatlantic cooperation.

This fragile but positive progress is the fruit of a quasi-permanent dialogue that has been established between the 25 governments of the enlarged European Union. The monthly meeting of foreign ministers has evolved into an extended lunch-debate devoted almost exclusively to the Middle East and relations with the Arab and Muslim worlds. These sessions have gradually led to a rapprochement of policy positions that is restoring European credibility. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is these days beginning to move beyond empty rhetoric and become more concrete.

It would be nice if the Union's traditional Mediterranean policy, enshrined in the Barcelona Declaration of 1995, could be brought up to date in the same way. That policy edifice today looks too complicated, not very efficient and in need of reform. From its very beginnings, the European Union has had a policy of concluding trade and cooperation agreements with the countries of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean, mostly former colonies, which have traditionally formed part of Europe's sphere of influence.

The Barcelona process originated in a period of euphoria, when the hopes for Middle East peace born of the Oslo accords were still alive. The idea was to create a huge development and cooperation zone, and, especially, to promote relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors, with the benevolent support of Europe. The Barcelona Declaration encompassed all possible aspects of cooperation: political, financial, economic and cultural. But blockages in the peace process jammed the works. Some aspects of Barcelona, such as political cooperation, are no longer functioning, while the rest has become heavily bureaucratic.

The European Union's current Mediterranean policy relies on two main instruments, the first being the trade and cooperation agreements that have either been concluded or are being negotiated with each of the countries bordering the Mediterranean. (It should be noted that Cyprus, Malta and Turkey are no longer covered by the Barcelona agreements. The first two are due to join the Union in 2004, and EU leaders accepted Turkey as an official candidate for entry at their summit meeting in Helsinki in December, 1999).

The trade and cooperation agreements provide for free trade between each country and the European Union after ten years, along the same lines as the agreements that President Bush recently proposed to the countries of the region. The agreements with the European Union are gradually opening up trade, creating some difficulties for businesses on the Southern side of the Mediterranean.

Alongside the trade agreements, the European Union has accordingly set up a second instrument, a program known as MEDA that distributes between ,800 million and ,1 billion a year in financial aid for development among the participating countries. Israel, which is considered rich enough, does not receive financial aid, but a substantial amount goes to the Palestinian Authority.

This policy is undoubtedly useful, in that it has established a permanent dialogue with the Mediterranean countries and provided necessary support for European investments in the region. It has nevertheless proved disappointing. Today, one can only draw the harsh conclusion that Europe's efforts have not basically succeeded in altering behavior on the other side of the Mediterranean. The cooperation among the Southern Mediterranean countries that Barcelona was meant to promote remains non-existent. The political provisions of the Barcelona Declaration, particularly on human rights, have very often been ignored.

The Commission, which runs MEDA, defends itself by asserting that, after a difficult beginning, commitments and disbursements from the fund have now achieved a satisfactory pace - 50 percent of the credits available for 2003 were dispensed before the summer. It adds that conditions for the aid are becoming stricter, citing examples of projects that were refused in Tunisia because the government wanted to exclude representatives of civil society and exercise sole control.

These arguments are only half-satisfactory. Even within the Commission there is criticism of this routine-style Mediterranean policy that has proved largely incapable of reacting to events over the last few years, still less of anticipating the rise of militant Islam in Arab societies and the resulting difficulties for those leaders who want to introduce reforms.

In order to be in a position to facilitate such reforms, Europe must make its strategy more effective. That is the way in which Europe can make its contribution to stabilizing the region. The imminent enlargement of the European Union provides a chance to put preferential relations with neighboring countries that are not destined to become members on a more solid footing. These countries are, to the East, Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, and, to the South, all of the Mediterranean countries. In order to apply leverage, Europe must be able to offer tangible arguments in favor of political and economic liberalization, so as to counter opposition that is growing stronger inside its own borders.

Officials in Brussels know that, short of an offer of full membership, the promise of close relations with the European Union remains their strongest foreign policy card. So, they are now proposing a specific agreement to the "new neighbors," to the East and South, under which they would be treated practically as members, except for participating in the EU institutions. The plan, which needs to be further developed and defined, could be attractive if it offered real benefits for immigrants and better market access, particularly for agricultural products.

Europe will surely better serve its own interests if it devotes increased financial resources to the countries to its South, which currently receive far less than the sums devoted to helping the rehabilitation of Central and Eastern Europe. The current international situation calls for a revitalization of the European Union's Mediterranean policy. But it is a political choice that will come with a price.

Philippe Lemaître is the Brussels correspondent of European Affairs, and a member of an advisory committee appointed by the government of France to lead the debate on the future of Europe. Now retired, Mr. Lemaître was for 35 years the EU and NATO correspondent of the French daily Le Monde.