European Affairs

European Affairs

Summer/Fall 2003

 

European Integration
Crisis with the U.S. Is Moving Turkey Closer to Europe
By Yalim Eralp

 

The crisis in U.S.-Turkish relations over the war in Iraq that erupted in spring 2003 has had the effect of drawing Turkey closer to the European Union. By rejecting government plans to allow the deployment of U.S. forces in Turkey for an invasion of Northern Iraq, the Turkish Parliament dealt a serious blow to the country's traditionally strong links with Washington; but it strengthened Turkey's democratic credentials in the eyes of many Europeans who had previously doubted them. The tensions with the United States have in turn helped to persuade more Turks of the value of EU membership.

Despite its roots in traditional Islamic movements, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) that came to power in November 2002 sought the best possible relations with the United States. Following the extraordinary Parliamentary revolt over Iraq, it now realizes that repairing those relations may take some time, not least because of the lack of confidence that has arisen between the military leaders of the two countries.

An immediate consequence has been that the government has focused its energy on the European Union, which has accepted Turkey's long-standing candidacy for membership but declined to set a date for opening formal entry negotiations. In order to convince the European Union that Turkey qualifies for membership, the government has vowed to meet all the Union's human rights criteria and ensure their swift application. Some of the necessary legal reforms have been introduced; others are being prepared.

It is ironic that a party with religious roots has started to champion Turkey's EU vocation, while the main opposition party, the secular People's Republican Party (PRP), a longtime supporter of EU membership, has become more doubtful about the reforms necessary to achieve it. Regardless of the political line-up, however, the attitude of the military will be important, as the European Union wants a diminution of the military's role in politics as a condition of Turkish entry.

The military is uneasy about being seen as a stumbling block to Turkey's EU membership, and has sought to rebut suggestions that it is dragging its feet. In a recent statement on the issue, Deputy Chief of Staff General Yasar Büyükanit said: "The Turkish Armed Forces want Turkey's membership in the Union. Views that have been expressed that the Army is against the Union are unjust."

Nevertheless, military leaders are afraid that the period between now and EU membership could be used by Islamist and/or Kurdish separatist movements to cause trouble. The military believes that separatists and religious agitators could intensify their activities as controls are relaxed to conform to EU political and human rights requirements.

Many Turks believe that such dangers exist, although most think that the fears are exaggerated. Turkish business and public opinion generally support government efforts to join the European Union. The military believes that once Turkey is an EU member, the dangers of separatism would become much more remote. In the past, however, military leaders have seemed to resist legislation aimed at reducing the role of the National Security Council, in which they wield significant influence. That influence is seen as excessive by the EU authorities - a view shared by the Turkish government, which seems determined to override the military's objections. This determination culminated on July 30ûinûlegislation aimed at "demilitarizing" Turkish politics and aligning Turkish practice with EU norms.

Much will depend on whether the government can convince the military that it is firmly committed to the secularist provisions of the constitution. It has not yet done so. The military in general does not trust politicians, and perhaps least of all the AKP, with its Islamist background. The AKP was founded several months before the general elections by people who had broken away from the former Islamist Welfare Party led by Necmettin Erbakan.

During its successful bid for election last fall, the AKP took care to ensure that its campaign had no religious overtones. It claimed the center of the political spectrum and said that it had "changed." In contrast to the views of Mr. Erbakan, party officials promised that they would follow Turkey's IMF stability program and make EU membership their first priority. More recently, the party has applied for admission to the European Democratic Union, a body of Christian Democratic parties.

The party's claims to have changed its spots have met with skepticism in certain segments of the Turkish intelligentsia as well as in the secular armed forces. In the words of newspaper columnist Cengiz Çandar, "it is far from certain that the AK Party can persuade Turkey's ardent secularists, including the powerful military, that it has shed its Islamist skin, that it does not have a hidden agenda,' which remains a principal concern of those circles." Despite the party's claims that it will abide by the tenets of Turkish secularism, and its self-definition as a democratic conservative party, many Turks are still bothered, for example, by the wearing of Islamic head scarves by wives of the party leaders.

Moreover, many Turks, including the military, are not sure that the European Union will agree to admit Turkey, even if it fulfills all the entry criteria. Germany, already host to 2 million Turkish immigrants, seems to have important reservations. Nevertheless, Turkey's independent attitude on Iraq was certainly appreciated in countries such as France and Germany, which opposed the war, and had expected Turkey to fall in line with the United States. Some members of the government, including Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul, believe that the Turkish position on Iraq has brought Turkey closer to the European Union. In a recent interview, Mr. Gul said of Parliament's rejection of the U.S. troop deployment, "although not planned; this event has moved Turkey closer to the Union."

Nevertheless, as Morton Abramowitz, a former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, has said: "Any Turkish government must recognize that it is not likely to get into the European Union on its own terms." The government also still has real work to do to convince certain segments of Turkish society of the need for the economic and political reforms that are essential for EU membership.

The European Union, for its part, must make further efforts to convince the Turks that it is serious about Turkish membership. Although the EU authorities have given formal assurances that they regard Turkey as an official candidate for entry, many Europeans are daunted by the rapidly growing size of Turkey (by 2015 it would be the largest EU member in terms of population), its poverty, its history of human rights abuse and the potential disruption that could be caused by the country's Islamic and Kurdish movements. EU leaders continue to make ambiguous statements about the desirability of Turkey actually becoming a member. These statements have strengthened the hands of those Turks who are skeptical of EU intentions, and have even led some to talk of an "identity crisis" over whether Turkey belongs to Europe or to Asia.

No other EU candidate country has met such strong resistance from EU public opinion. On the contrary, the EU authorities have encouraged many other candidates in their aspirations and have sometimes even shown tolerance of what might be considered deviations from the Union's human rights criteria. EU reports, for examples, have admitted that Roma people of the Czech Republic face serious challenges. Many Turks feel that Turkey is not being treated equally with the other candidates despite the European Union's protestations that this is not so.

If Turkey were to meet all the entry criteria, and still be refused entry, the Turks and many others would conclude that they had been denied admittance because they were Muslims. That would seriously damage Turkey's long-term future relations with the European Union and help to push the Islamic world away from the West.

Even if Turkey met all the criteria, however, the long-running dispute over Cyprus could still be a major obstacle to Turkish entry if it is not soon resolved. Time is running out. Cyprus is due to join the European Union in May 2004, and it is not clear whether the UN plan for solving the Cyprus problem, sponsored by Secretary General Kofi Annan, will remain on the table after that date. Indeed Rauf Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot leader, has recently claimed that the Annan plan is no more, seriously complicating the situation for the worse.

The AKP government started in office with a radical change of approach to Cyprus, declaring that failure to solve the dispute was not in itself a solution. Former Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit believed that the Cyprus problem had already been solved by leaving the two parties at a standoff. AKP party leaders, however, initially said that this policy had achieved nothing for Turkey and had to be changed. Mr. Denktash, President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, was implicitly depicted as the stumbling block to a solution, and tension heightened between Mr. Denktash and Ankara. There was also tension between the government and the Turkish military, whose leaders dashed to Cyprus to show their support for Mr. Denktash. Despite the pressure from Ankara, Mr. Denktash refused to sign the Annan Plan.

For reasons that are still unclear, however, the AKP has gradually changed its view and now accepts the long held position of Mr. Denktash that the new Cyprus should be based on two states. Some analysts believe that Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Prime Minister, did not want to bring a proposed Cyprus solution before the Parliament so soon after it had rejected the government's resolution on the deployment of U.S. forces, fearing that another rebuff might spell the end of his political career.

Mr. Denktash has made some moves. After the Greek Cypriot government signed the EU accession protocol for Cyprus in April, he opened the border of the Turkish Cypriot part of the island so that both Greek and Turkish Cypriots can travel freely on the island - a move he had long opposed. It is believed that he acted to prevent a mass exodus from the Turkish side since many Turkish Cypriots support the Annan Plan. The Turkish Cypriots' dismal economic situation, due partly to restrictions on their trade with the Greek-speaking part of the island, has also had a telling effect. By opening the border, Mr. Denktash aims to alleviate the economic situation. Turkish Cypriots can now travel to the Greek side to find jobs, and Greek Cypriots will spend money on the Turkish side as many items are cheaper there.

Mr. Denktash's "liberalization" moves were supported by Turkey. As a result, Turkish Cypriots are again allowed to acquire passports issued by the Greek Cypriot authorities, another development to which Mr. Denktash had previously objected. Nevertheless, Mr. Denktash still wants the world to recognize the sovereignty of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (currently recognized only by Ankara). Short of that he would not be satisfied - or at least that is the impression he gives.

These initiatives by Mr. Denktash may have laid the ground for a solution. Some analysts believe that Mr. Denktash has his eye on the Turkish Cypriot elections due at the end of the year. He could be trying to find out whether the Cyprus problem is the only obstacle in the way of Turkey being granted a date for the start of formal EU entry negotiations.

The European Union will decide on whether to start negotiations with Turkey in December 2004, a date that unfortunately falls after Cyprus is due to join the Union on May 1. So, if the Turks are to endorse an agreement on Cyprus before the island joins the European Union, they will have to do so without knowing whether they will actually be rewarded with a date for their own negotiations. Many Turks think that once the Cyprus problem is solved, the European Union will turn its back on Turkey.

If the Turks were sure of the European Union's good intentions on Turkish membership, there is no doubt that they would be more flexible on Cyprus. In other words, the solution of the Cyprus problem depends on the European Union's commitment to Turkish membership, but Turkish membership may depend on the problem's prior resolution. Turkey and the European Union have gotten themselves into a classic chicken and egg dilemma.

Much will depend in the coming months on the direction of the Turkish economy and the evolution of the country's relations with the European Union. If there are positive developments on both fronts - and if the AKP succeeds in convincing secular opinion that it has really changed and does not have a "hidden agenda" - the party will be able legitimately to claim the center of Turkey's political spectrum. Such a development would not only represent a dramatic change in Turkey's political life; it could also offer a model for other countries with Muslim populations.

An important difficulty facing the government is the stance of the opposition PRP, which has recently been lukewarm toward both the reforms necessary to meet the EU criteria and the moves for a Cyprus settlement. On both issues, the views of the military and the PRP coincide. Meanwhile, the crisis of confidence between the United States and Turkey seems likely to continue, and it is no exaggeration to conclude that U.S.-Turkish relations will never be the same again.

The best possible scenario would run as follows: the economy begins to look better; the AKP convinces Turkish public opinion that it is a genuinely secular party; the European Union assures Turkey that it really favors full Turkish membership; and Turkey aggressively contributes to a solution of the Cyprus problem. If all those admittedly difficult achievements could be aligned in sequence, the negotiations for Turkish EU membership could start at the beginning of 2005, and Turkey would be out of its current crisis.

Yalim Eralp is a former Ambassador of Turkey to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and currently a commentator at CNNTURK, a news channel. He is also a freelance writer teaching Current International Issues at Kultur University in Iìstanbul.