European Affairs

Summer/Fall 2003

 

Transatlantic Relations
U.S.-European Differences Are Many, but Manageable
By Dieter Dettke

 

For Germany, the Atlantic Alliance has always been and will continue to be a crucial security lifeline. Thanks to the leadership of the United States after World War II, the Alliance provided protection without demanding submission and today NATO is still alive, whereas the Soviet empire collapsed and the Warsaw Pact is gone.

Common values, as much as a common threat, have kept the Alliance together in the past, despite political differences and economic conflicts. As a result, Germany is now united and Europe is whole and free.

This remarkable, historically unique achievement of the West is also a solid foundation for a European-American partnership in the future, despite the deep rifts over the war in Iraq. As far as Germany is concerned, the Transatlantic relationship is not heading for separation. To be sure, we have to address a number of differences beyond the Iraq issue, but they are manageable. The long-term prospects for the Transatlantic relationship are actually quite good.

The Iraq conflict revealed that we do have a conflict of world order concepts. Europe has reached a post-national stage in its history and is quite willing to pool its potential and to live with rules that chip away at individual national sovereignty. But Europe is not an empire and still far away from common power, let alone power projection.

The American analyst Robert Kagan is right to point out the differences between European and American thinking about world order, in particular the European preference for persuasion rather than coercion. His concept of power and weakness, however, can also be misleading because it suggests a permanent divergence that is not necessarily warranted. A closer, more detailed look at European and American power reveals that Europe is not all about weakness and America is not all about strength.

Even though the United States is by far the strongest military power ever, with a global reach far beyond any empire in history, and is dominant not only politically but also culturally, the United States is no less vulnerable in economic terms than Europe or any other economic power. Whereas military power can be controlled nationally, economic power is beyond full national control. Economic power relies on markets and is, therefore, much more amorphous and less tangible than military might. In terms of power, Europe is in the same economic league as the United States.

As a result of globalization, many problems, such as the environment, drugs, crime and trafficking in persons, inevitably need international cooperation for successful solutions. Although the United States can go it alone militarily, American economic objectives are much more difficult to achieve ui-laterally.

While there is a growing European-American values gap, it is important not to dramatize the differences that exist on issues ranging from religion, patriotism, and family values to sexual orientation. The United States and Europe also differ on important political issues such as social welfare, the environment, how far homosexuality should be accepted and how minorities should be treated. In most cases, however, the differences are more of degree than of principle.

This is true even for the death penalty, which is often cited as one of the most fundamental value differences. The numbers of people in Europe and the United States who favor or reject the death penalty are not totally different. Our legal systems differ, but there is no clash of civilizations within the Atlantic Alliance, as some have claimed. In a pluralistic society value clashes are more or less a built-in phenomenon. They are normal.

There are also broad areas of agreement on fundamental common values, such as democracy, freedom, tolerance, pluralism, human rights and the equality of men and women. It is obvious that our differences emanate from a common foundation, and they should be manageable even if our interests and values sometimes collide.

From a German perspective, opposition to the war in Iraq reflects a legitimate, but limited disagreement with the United States. It is a policy issue and does not affect the German-American friendship. There are many reasons why Germany is so reluctant to use military force, the strongest being its history of warfare and militarization, and ultimately German responsibility for World War II and the Holocaust. The postwar generation in Germany thinks of any kind of war as a catastrophe.

During the last decade, Germany has come a long way from its focus on civilian power to a more active policy of engagement commensurate with the country's economic and political weight in Europe. Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, both with pacifist pasts, went to great lengths to prepare a reluctant German public opinion for the use of force in Kosovo and in Afghanistan. The country finally supported this course because in both cases fundamental values were at stake: humanitarian values in Kosovo and existential values in Afghanistan in the fight against international terrorism.

During the war in Iraq, Germany fulfilled all its commitments and obligations as a member of the Atlantic Alliance. Germany provided U.S. forces with full logistical support for their operations in Iraq, German troops helped to secure American barracks in Germany, and Germany provided Turkey with military support and aid. German support for Israel was never in question. There was public criticism of some of the Israeli government's military actions in response to Palestinian attacks, but the government's support for Israel was never in doubt.

Europe was quite willing to participate in the common task of disarming Iraq. What divided Europe into "old" and "new," as U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld suggested, was a difference of view over the concept of "coalitions of the willing," which countries such as France and Germany oppose. It would be wrong, however, to assume that this is going to divide Europe permanently.

The lesson from Europe's failure to reach a joint decision on Iraq is that European countries should not have to make a choice between their continent and the Atlantic. German foreign policy has so far always succeeded in bridging a commitment to Franco-German reconciliation and cooperation, which is essential for European integration, and Germany's Atlantic orientation. Ever since German Social Democrats added an Atlantic preamble to the Elysée Treaty of 1963, the foundation stone of the postwar Franco-German partnership, a key role for Germany has been to prevent a collision between Europe's foreign policy ambitions and American policy and interests.

A better understanding of Germany's role in Europe, particularly vis-à-vis France would have helped to avoid the kind of collision that unfolded in late January, 2003 when France, Germany and Russia, until then only loosely connected in their opposition to the war in Iraq, firmed up their opposition in view of the massive military build-up in the Gulf region. Differences over policy in Iraq are likely to persist.

In U.S. government and media circles, the concern was that during the German election campaign in the spring and summer of 2002 discussion of the Iraq issue often had anti-American overtones and led to a new wave of anti-Americanism in Germany. There is, however, no widespread anti-Americanism in Germany - only a strong anti-war sentiment.

Anti-Americanism in Germany has never been a serious or long-term problem, despite major policy differences over such issues as the Vietnam War in the 1970s and NATO's deployment of intermediate range nuclear missiles in the 1980s, when it was often difficult to distinguish between anti-Americanism and legitimate criticism of U.S. policies. Germany is still one of the most pro-American countries in Europe. Two thirds of the German population or more still say that they like Americans.

Nevertheless, this generally positive attitude toward America has undergone some dramatic changes. In the past, the vast majority of Germans believed the United States to be the most important partner for Germany. In October 2001, 58 percent of Germans saw the United States as their most important partner; that number had fallen to 47 percent by June 2003. Those thinking that France is Germany's most important partner increased from 36 percent to 43 percent.

In May 2002, as much as 88 percent of the German population still believed relations between Germany and the United States to be good, while only nine percent thought they were bad. In June 2003 a majority of Germans, 56 percent, believed relations were bad and only 39 percent thought they were good.

These trends make it all the more important not to lose sight of the real issue the West will continue to face in the future: How to deal with and ultimately defeat terrorism. Transnational catastrophic terrorism is a new threat. Terrorist attacks and mass killings by international terror networks using the language of religion for political purposes threaten the whole of Western civilization and must be resisted for existential reasons.

The existential fight against terrorism is complex and it will take a long time to free mankind of this new totalitarian threat. But we have to realize that this threat is very different from the totalitarian threat of the Cold War. The new struggle is asymmetric, and the enemy is not a state or an empire. Terror networks fight in the name of faith, attempting to entangle the West in a clash of civilizations in the desperate hope that, as a result, an energized and radical Islam will achieve its final victory.

This conflict is much more about hearts and minds than the previous one and it needs to be fought on many levels: politically, economically, culturally and, if necessary, but not predominantly, also on a military level.

To be sure, Europe shares Washington's serious concern about weapons of mass destruction. If proliferation continues and increases, European territory will be at risk, too. That is why non-nuclear European states in particular put so much emphasis on an effective non-proliferation system.

The reorientation of U.S. strategy after September 11 to allow asymmetric conflicts, including terrorist attacks, to be addressed more effectively is quite understandable. In Europe a strategic reassessment is also under way. Germany's new defense guidelines are an example of new strategic thinking beyond the Cold War and in line with the new threats, particularly asymmetric warfare like the September 11 attacks, transnational crime, drug-smuggling and trafficking in persons.

The German army now focuses on conflict prevention and crisis management in support of allies, including operations beyond NATO territory. International terrorism and weapons of mass destruction and their proliferation have become major concerns of the German armed forces. The only way to meet these challenges, according to the guidelines, is through a comprehensive security concept and a global collective security system. In fact, the German defense minister has stated that German defense now begins in the mountains of Afghanistan.

The United States is thus not alone in its strategic realignment and some of the new thinking in Europe is quite compatible with American policy. There is no way, however, that Europe will ever match U.S. defense spending dollar for dollar. Nor is that necessary. It will be more important to undertake the restructuring and transformation of military forces required by the new threats.

There is also concern in Europe, however, over the direction of the new U.S. strategic doctrine. By adopting a doctrine of preemption, rather than the traditional concept of self-defense, which relied on deterrence, America seems to be disregarding basic principles of international law. Waiting to be attacked - in the light of September 11 - is indeed bad security policy and strategy, as President Bush has said. Without changing the Charter of the United Nations, however, the doctrine of preemption would appear to create serious legal difficulties.

It would be a good idea to initiate a reform of international law as well as of the UN system so that the new threats, particularly terrorism, can be dealt with more effectively. One may safely say that prevention in general is part of the concept of self-defense. Prevention obviously involves acting to remove a clear and present danger, an example being the Israeli attack on Iraq's Osirak nuclear facility in 1981.

Preemption, however, is at best an act of putative self-defense, and may involve assuming a threat that is not even real. This is a dangerous concept, because it removes all legal hurdles in the way of waging war. Europe is not against prevention. European powers have demonstrated their willingness to act preventively, for example in Kosovo. Our differences are over preemption. It would be better not to adopt a questionable concept of putative self-defense without changing the UN Charter.

Another even more important issue is that by adopting a policy of creating coalitions of the willing, depending on the issue, the United States is creating a dual world order, in which the United Nations, NATO and other multilateral institutions can be replaced at any moment by such ad hoc groupings.

Europeans, after many devastating conflicts, came to the conclusion that to give away the right to wage war - the right of self-defense notwithstanding - is a major step forward, and not an encroachment upon national sovereignty. By replacing permanent allies with shifting coalitions of the willing, the United States would give up an enormous amount of normative power - rule-setting capacity or soft power - for a narrow purpose.

Coalitions of the willing, whether they mean to or not, will cause existing permanent institutions to waste away. As a result, maximum flexibility for the United States would come at a high price and could also be a source of new instability.

It is not difficult to put together an agenda for Transatlantic cooperation. Indeed, several think tanks and experts in Europe and the United States have already done so. Good fields for cooperation include the Group of Eight AIDS initiative, launched in Evian in June 2003, and the whole area of energy policy, particularly renewable energy.

Another idea is to create a new architecture for the U.S.-European relationship under a new Transatlantic Charter. Architectural designs, however, should not be our first priority - there are many more urgent problems to be addressed. In addition to Iraq, a primary concern is the stability of Afghanistan, which is far from assured. It might be necessary to increase substantially the security commitment of the anti-terror coalition.

The Alliance's capabilities could also be applied to peacekeeping tasks in Iraq under a UN umbrella. Since NATO's Prague summit meeting in November 2002, an evolutionary process has been under way to strengthen the Alliance's European pillar. This process is essential if NATO is to apply its full weight in the long struggle for peace and stability in Europe and beyond. The European Union can take over a number of peacekeeping operations that no longer require the full hardware of a military alliance. It has already done so in Macedonia, and Bosnia may be next. An EU peacekeeping operation, backed by a UN mandate, was launched in the Congo this summer.

The European Union is now on the way to creating the first modern constitution providing for a confederation with strong institutions. This unique post-national effort of pooling national sovereignty is in itself an important contribution to peace and stability in Europe. The United States should recognize the enormous potential for stability and economic progress embodied in the work of the European constitutional convention and the enlargement of the European Union. Washington should heed the advice not only of Europeans, but also of many Americans, to let Europe be Europe.

In a unipolar world, talk of multipolarity can hardly be a threat to the United States. Today, multipolarity is at best an aspiration or a preference for a different world order. Whether multipolarity can create a more stable and secure world order than the present system is an open question. More importantly, a multipolar world can only be achieved through a redistribution of global power. It is not enough simply to claim that the world is multipolar - establishing multipolarity is not a question of will but of capability.

For the stability of an international system, whether multipolar or unipolar, multilateralism is a more important principle. Without multilateralism, NATO and the United Nations cannot function and a European confederation would not work. Rules are essential for stability and so are permanent alliances. The United States, as a superpower, should be interested in this, too.

In late April 2003, shortly after major military operations ended in Iraq and the transition to civilian restructuring began, the leaders of four European countries - France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg - met to consider their own situation and the state of Europe after the war. This small caucus meeting of like-minded governments, favoring deep integration including a European Security and Defense Union, was an excellent opportunity to provide the European constitutional convention with some basic concepts for deeper integration, particularly in defense.

In the United States, this meeting of four countries that had all opposed the war raised fears that they would try to design a European foreign policy based not on Atlanticism but on anti-Atlantic neo-Gaullism, leading to the abandonment of the strategic partnership with the United States. The communiqué issued at the end of the meeting, however, states quite the opposite, namely that "the Transatlantic partnership is a fundamental strategic priority for Europe," and that "this partnership is a precondition for security and world peace."

Chancellor Schröder sees the initiatives launched at the meeting not as an effort to decouple Europe from the United States, but rather as a bid to strengthen the Atlantic Alliance through a more efficient European pillar. Despite much American concern, it is safe to say that the strategic objective of the four countries is the strengthening of both the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union. Their ambitions are driven by the old two-pillar concept first suggested by President John F. Kennedy, which is not a bad concept for a strong Atlantic Alliance in the future.

The revival of the old idea of a European Security and Defense Union is hardly a strategic challenge to the United States. On the contrary, it will emphasize compatibility with NATO activities. The only new message from the four-power summit is the creation of a new joint EU military planning structure. It remains to be seen how far this idea will advance in reality. Even if it were adopted, the Transatlantic context of all European operations would be maintained. If the results of NATO's Prague summit meeting are implemented and the enlarged European Union gets a new constitution, the Alliance will be much better prepared for the future. That will be a change for the better.

Dieter Dettke has been Executive Director of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation since 1985. Previously, he was political counselor of the SPD Parliamentary Group of the German Bundestag, and served as Staff Director at the Office of the Minister of State at the German Foreign Ministry. From 1969 to 1974, he was a research associate at the German Society for Foreign Affairs in Bonn. He is a foreign and security policy specialist and has published widely on these issues.