

ADAM SMITH AS
GLOBALIZATION THEORIST

ABSTRACT: *In the Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith observed that we live in a fundamentally conflictual world. Although he held that we are creatures who sympathize, he also observed that our sympathy seems to be constrained by geographical limits. Accordingly, traditional theories of cosmopolitanism were implausible; yet, as a moral philosopher, Smith attempted to reconcile his bleak description of the world with his eagerness for international peace. Smith believed that commercial intercourse among self-interested nations would emulate sympathy on a global scale, balancing national wealth and international peace without a coercive apparatus to enforce compliance with international law.*

The tension between Adam Smith's ethical and economic thought first became a "problem" for European scholarship in the closing years of the nineteenth century, when a small group of German capitalists and Marxists thinking about modernity, progress, and capitalism began to debate the extent to which Smith's two seminal books might be "reconciled."¹ The so-called "Adam Smith problem" turned on—and today still turns on—how we might reconcile the *Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759) and its emphasis on sympathy with the *Wealth of Nations* (1776)

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and its emphasis on self-interest—in other words, the extent to which the *Wealth of Nations* might have evolved from the ethical framework developed in the *Moral Sentiments*.

This paper explores that “problem” by contributing to a tradition of scholarship that tends to see the apparent tensions in Smith’s thought not as incommensurate and irreconcilable, but as key components of a larger system of moral philosophy—one in which his commercialism was contained within his ethics.² But I shall register a different kind of response to the “Adam Smith problem,” one that accepts its general contours, but is more sensitive than other responses to Smith’s thoughts about *international* commerce and ethics—a sort of “globalization” of the problem. I shall examine portions of the *Moral Sentiments* in which Smith addressed international issues—portions that have received far too little attention among political and moral theorists, which is surprising given the current turn in contemporary thought toward global and cosmopolitan themes. I am referring specifically to Smith’s vivid rejection of Stoic cosmopolitanism in Parts III, VI and IV of the *Moral Sentiments*, and his ultimate attempts in Part VI to replicate cosmopolitan ends through international commerce.

In short, I shall demonstrate that Smith’s commercial globalism was not simply a Scottish political economist’s unmitigated celebration of national self-interest (as it is too often interpreted by devotees and detractors alike), but rather a moral philosopher’s reluctant concession to living in a world resistant to cosmopolitan aspirations—a fundamentally conflictual world, a world (Smith might say) without “sympathy.” Smith wasn’t suggesting that nations were continually at war with each other. But he seemed to have adopted Hobbes’s view that conflict is properly said to exist when there is “no assurance to the contrary”:

For as the nature of Foul weather, lyeth not in a showre or two of rain, but in an intention thereto of many dayes together: So the nature of War, consisteth not in actual fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. (Hobbes [1651] 1991, 88–89.)

This Hobbesian reading of Smith will strike some as counterintuitive, given all that he said in the *Moral Sentiments* about our general tendency to sympathize with others. Indeed, he regularly condemned “Hobbes and his followers” (notably Pufendorf and Mandeville) for “deducing all our sentiments from certain refinements of self-love”—

for arguing that “man is driven to take refuge in society, not by any natural love which he bears to his own kind, but because without the assistance of others he is incapable of subsisting with ease or safety” (Smith [1759] 1982, VII.iii.I.i). Smith opened the *Moral Sentiments* by declaring that “How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it” (ibid., I.i.I.1).

Still, I would like to pursue the suggestion, woven throughout Smith’s text, that while we might for various reasons care for those in proximate and familiar relationships with us, we live in a *world* without sympathy—one to which Smith referred with trepidation as a “fatherless world” (Smith [1759] 1982, VI.ii.3.2). When we read his text with care, we discover that Smith fully embraced the insight of his teacher, David Hume, that real sympathy is possible only within narrow spatial boundaries—that, as Hume put it, “sympathy with persons remote from us is much fainter than that with persons near and contiguous” (Hume [1751] 1948, 220; for discussion see Forman-Barzilai 2000b).

This dimension of Smith’s thought is too rarely considered; but our understanding of his commercial globalism is incomplete without it. Indeed, Smith’s emphasis on international conflict, and on the absence of “any assurance to the contrary”—such as sympathy, good will, moral agreement, law, or effective coercion—was central to his attempt to discover a path toward peace. For Smith, free commercial intercourse among nations was a new mode of cosmopolitanism that promised to mitigate conflict among spatially disparate entities, and to generate a tolerable peace in the absence of better motives.

Against the Stoic Cosmopolis

We begin, then, with Smith’s rejection in the *Theory of Moral Sentiments* of the much older form of cosmopolitanism articulated by the Stoics.

The failure of Stoicism animated much of Smith’s thought about global commerce and the problem of international ethics. The influence of Stoicism on Smith’s moral and political thought is well acknowledged.³ Most scholarship has focused on the Stoic implications of Smithian “self-command,” arguably the central virtue in Smith’s moral philosophy (see notably Smith [1759] 1982, VI.iii). But here I will examine another, largely overlooked, strand of Stoicism in Smith’s moral phi-

losophy that helped situate his moral assessment of international commerce. I am referring to the Stoic idea of *oikeiōsis*, popularized by Hierocles, the first-century Stoic, and most likely made known to Smith through his reading of Cicero's *De Officiis* (Brown 1995, 95–97).

Oikeiōsis was the notion that human affection radiates outward from the self in concentric circles according to the familiarity that develops as one lives in close proximity with others over time.⁴ Imagine a dart board. According to Stoic *oikeiōsis*, the bullseye represents the self, the innermost ring represents one's family (those literally within the *oikos*), the next ring one's friends, the next one's neighbors, then one's tribe or community, then one's nation, empire, and so on; the outermost and largest ring encompasses humanity (Hierocles 1987, 57.G; for discussion see Annas 1993, 262–76; Engberg-Pedersen 1986, 175–77; Inwood 1984; Nussbaum 1994, 341–44; and Striker 1996).

The Stoics constructed this concentric model for a provocative moral purpose: to argue that it was possible for people to collapse the circles inward, concentrically toward the center. They argued that through the proper use of reason, we could learn to overcome the natural pull of human affection that develops through familiarity, so that humanity writ large would ultimately make the same claims on us as the more immediate objects of our affections. Hierocles (1987, 57.G) described how the “well-tempered man” goes about “contracting” the circles, drawing them together, and thus in the same moment expanding his sympathy for those who are spatially removed:

Once these [circles] have all been surveyed, it is the task of a well-tempered man, in his proper treatment of each group, to draw the circles together somehow towards the centre, and to keep zealously transferring those from the enclosing circles into the enclosed ones. . . . It is incumbent on us to respect people from the third circle as if they were those from the second, and again to respect our other relatives as if they were those from the third circle. For although the greater distance in blood will remove some affection, we must try hard to assimilate them. The right point will be reached if, through our own initiative, we reduce the distance of the relationship with each person.

This act of “drawing the circles together” is something like collapsing a telescope. Conceptualize people in the furthestmost circle like people in the circle just inside of it; and the people in that circle like those in the circles just inside of it; and so on: and repeat the process over and over until all of humanity is nestled inside the inner circle accompany-

ing the agent himself. Once a moral agent had completed this process, the Stoics considered him a “citizen of the world,” a Cosmopolitan (Smith [1759] 1982, III.3.11).

Smith found the Stoic description of human affection persuasive—so much so that he self-consciously appropriated the concentric structure of Stoic *oikeiōsis* in his extended discussion of human benevolence in Part VI, Section ii of the *Moral Sentiments*. Chapter I examines the order in which “Individuals are recommended by Nature to our care and attention”; chapter II radiates outward to consider the order in which “Societies” are so recommended; and chapter III extends the circle of sympathy even farther to consider “Universal Benevolence.” The same concentric structure holds true for the internal organization of the chapters as well. As we might expect, Chapter I (on “Individuals”) begins, and thus Smith’s entire argument about the circles of familiarity and affection begins, with a discussion of a man’s relationship to himself. Smith ([1759] 1982, VI.ii.1.1) claimed that:

every man, as the Stoics used to say, is first and principally recommended to his own care; and every man is certainly, in every respect, fitter and abler to take care of himself than of any other person. Every man feels his own pleasures and his own pains more sensibly than those of other people.

This is a very familiar Smith. But he proceeded to extend his circles outward, justifying this arrangement not by familial ties—the “force of blood, I am afraid, exists no-where but in tragedies and romances” (ibid., VI.ii.1.11)—but by the centripetal pull of proximity and familiarity, what he referred to as “habitual sympathy” (ibid., I.ii.1.7). The circles closest in proximity and most familiar to the self were comprised of family members of various degrees, and eventually radiated outward to business colleagues and neighbors—and, in Chapter II, to cities, societies and nations. The outermost circle (in Chapter III) encompassed humanity as a whole.

Jacob Viner (1972, 80–81) once noted that for Smith “spatial distance operates to intensify psychological distance.”

The sentiments weaken progressively as one moves from one’s immediate family to one’s intimate friends, to one’s neighbors in a small community, to fellow-citizens in a great city, to members in general of one’s own country, to foreigners, to mankind taken in the large, to the inhabitants, if any, of distant planets.

This is precisely why Smith rejected Stoic cosmopolitanism. The aim of collapsing the circles toward the center, of rationally expanding our duties beyond the proximate, struck him as unrealistic. While Smith accepted the Stoics' concentric description of human affection—agreeing that we naturally care more for those with whom we are more familiar—he turned sharply from Stoicism when he insisted that rationally overcoming this natural structure, denying affect, and collapsing the circles toward the center was psychologically improbable for most moral agents. Smith could not accept the Stoic faith in the power of cool reason to overcome the heat of human experience. He argued that human “affection” is neither a consequence of accident nor a product of reason capable of being shifted from object to object at will; it is instead the result of “habitual sympathy,” which is a prephilosophical and social feeling that emerges over time in intimate contexts of human relatedness.

What is called affection, is in reality nothing but habitual sympathy. Our concern in the happiness or misery of those who are the objects of what we call our affections; our desire to promote the one, and to prevent the other; are either the actual feeling of that habitual sympathy, or the necessary consequences of that feeling. Relations being usually placed in situations which naturally create this habitual sympathy, it is expected that a suitable degree of affection should take place among them. We generally find that it actually does take place; we therefore naturally expect that it should. (Smith [1759] 1982, I.ii.1.7.)

Of course, habitual sympathy is not the only basis for affection. Smith recognized, for example, that people naturally feel attachments to those whose character is virtuous (Smith [1759] 1982, VI.ii.1.18), to those from whom they had previously experienced beneficence (*ibid.*, VI.ii.1.19), and to those whose personal condition is either exceptionally great or impoverished (*ibid.*, VI.ii.20–21). But his overriding point was that our affection is driven most powerfully by our habit of sympathizing with those who are most familiar to us. One recalls Rousseau's controversial account of familial love in the *Second Discourse*—notably his assertion that “the habit of living together gave rise to the sweetest sentiments known to man, conjugal love, and Paternal love” (Rousseau [1755] 1997, 164). Smith, similarly, illustrated the affective power of habitual sympathy by offering the example of a father and son, or a brother and sister, who have been estranged by

some accident during what would have been the formative years of their relationship; despite their ardent hopes and efforts, Smith insisted that such relatives could never recover what had been lost to them. Never could they replicate “that cordial satisfaction, that delicious sympathy, that confidential openness and ease, which naturally take place in the conversation of those who have lived long and familiarly with one another” (Smith [1759] 1982, VI.ii.1.8). This surely explains Smith’s case against sending Scottish children to boarding schools in England and on the Continent, a practice that had become fashionable among urbane eighteenth-century Scots (*ibid.*, VI.ii.1.10).

In his discussion of cosmopolitanism, Hierocles emphasized that contracting the circles required great effort, that we must “try hard” to overcome our partiality toward those who are near and to extend our affection to those who are farther removed. Smith agreed with the Stoics that contracting the circles required great exertion, great acts of self-denial aided by reason. But this is precisely why he maintained that cosmopolitanism was possible for, and therefore appropriate to, only the Stoic sage—he who lives his life in perfect *apathy*, in perfect tranquility, transparency, and happiness, consistently sacrificing his own “private, partial and selfish affections” for the greater good of the universe. The Stoic sage, Smith ([1759] 1982, VI.ii.3.3) maintained,

is at all times willing that his own private interest should be sacrificed to the public interest of his own particular order or society. He is at all times willing, too, that the interest of this order or society should be sacrificed to the greater interest of the state or sovereignty, of which it is only a subordinate part. He should, therefore, be equally willing that all those inferior interests should be sacrificed to the greater interest of the universe, to the interest of that great society of all sensible and intelligent beings, of which God himself is the immediate administrator and director. If he is deeply impressed with the habitual and thorough conviction that this benevolent and all-wise Being can admit into the system of his government, no partial evil which is not necessary for the universal good, he must consider all the misfortunes which may befall himself, his friends, his society, or his country, as necessary for the prosperity of the universe, and therefore as what he ought, not only to submit to with resignation, but as what he himself, if he had known all the connexions and dependencies of things, ought sincerely and devoutly to have wished for.

The “wise and virtuous man” therefore regards himself

not as something separated and detached, but as a citizen of the world, a member of the vast commonwealth of nature. To the interest of this great community, he ought at all times be willing that his own little interest should be sacrificed. (Ibid., III.3.11.)

Smith always expressed deep admiration for those who exhibited exceptional benevolence, especially with those who were not “peculiarly connected” ([1759] 1982, III..11). Likewise, he routinely expressed disgust with the “hard-hearted,” those who “shut their breasts against compassion, and refuse to relieve the misery of their fellow creatures” (ibid., II.ii.1.7; VI.iii.1.5). But Smith never expected that most people could ever collapse the circles and become “citizens of the world.” The vast majority cannot aspire to the “universal benevolence” of Stoic sages because most of us are incapable of achieving “perfect apathy” toward the familiar, upon which Smith believed “universal benevolence” rested. “The Stoical philosophy,” Smith wrote,

teaches us to interest ourselves earnestly and anxiously in no events, external to the good order of our own minds, to the propriety of our own choosing and rejecting, except in those which concern a department where we neither have nor ought to have any sort of management or direction, the department of the great Superintendent of the universe. By the perfect apathy which it prescribes to us, by endeavouring, not merely to moderate, but to eradicate all our private, partial, and selfish affections, by suffering us to feel for whatever can befall ourselves, our friends, our country, not even the sympathetic and reduced passions of the impartial spectator, it endeavours to render us altogether indifferent and unconcerned in the success or miscarriage of every thing which Nature has prescribed to us as the proper business and occupation of our lives. (Ibid., VI.ii.1.46.)

The perfect apathy of Stoic sages required an exquisite sensibility that eluded ordinary people, who are affectively pulled toward the proximate and given over to their own “private, partial, and selfish affections.”

To man is allotted a much humbler department, but one much more suitable to the weakness of his powers, and the narrowness of his comprehension; the care of his own happiness, of that of his family, his friends, his country. . . . (Ibid., VI.ii.3.6.)

Therefore,

By Nature the events which immediately affect that little department in which we ourselves have some little management and direction, which immediately affect ourselves, our friends, our country, are the events which interest us the most, and which chiefly excite our desires and aversions, our hopes and fears, our joys and sorrows. (Ibid., VII.ii.1.44.)

Because of man's natural affection for the familiar, Smith concluded that "the plan and system which Nature has sketched out for our conduct, seems to be altogether different from that of the Stoical philosophy" (ibid., VII.ii.1.43).

To round out our appreciation of Smith's resistance to cosmopolitan aspirations, it should be noted that he offered several corollary reasons to reject the Stoic (and, incidentally, Christian) duty of "universal benevolence." In a stunning passage, he argued that universal benevolence was bizarre, pathological, and ultimately useless. This passage is worth discussing at some length, since it represents Smith's parochialism at its most colorful and comedic:

First of all, this extreme sympathy with misfortunes which we know nothing about, seems altogether *absurd and unreasonable*. Take the whole earth at an average, for one man who suffers pain or misery, you will find twenty in prosperity and joy, or at least in tolerable circumstances. No reason, surely, can be assigned why we should rather weep with the one than rejoice with the twenty. (Smith [1759] 1982, III.3.9.)

Smith seems more than a little out of touch with the difficulties of life for so many people even in proximate England and Scotland (for a discussion of Smith's callousness in this light, see Heilbroner 1972, 41–43). Smith continued:

This artificial commiseration, besides, is not only absurd, but seems altogether *unattainable*; and those who affect this character have commonly nothing but a certain affected and sentimental sadness, which, without reaching the heart, serves only to render the countenance and conversation impertinently dismal and disagreeable.

Smith's thought here seems to be that it is emotionally unhealthy to commiserate with imagined misfortunes. There is an artificiality to universal benevolence, since it is a product of imagination; as such, it never

truly “reaches the heart.” Smith objected to “whining and melancholy moralists, who are perpetually reproaching us with our happiness, while so many of our brethren are in misery” (Smith [1759] 1982, III.3.9). “Commiseration for those miseries which we never saw, which we never heard of, but which we may be assured are at all times infesting such numbers of our fellow-creatures, ought, they think, to damp the pleasures of the fortunate, and to render a certain melancholy dejection habitual to all men.” In this passage there are distinct resonances of Hume’s discussion of “distant ages and remote countries” in the *Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals* ([1751] 1948, 211), where he claimed that “it is not conceivable how a *real* sentiment or passion can ever arise from a known *imaginary* interest; especially when our *real* interest is still kept in view.”

Finally, Smith ([1759] 1982 VI.ii.3.1) argued that

this disposition of mind, though it could be attained, would be perfectly *useless*, and could serve no other purpose than to render miserable the person who possessed it. Whatever interest we take in the fortune of those with whom we have no acquaintance or connexion, and who are placed altogether out of the sphere of our activity, can produce only anxiety to ourselves, without any manner of advantage to them. To what purpose should we trouble ourselves about the world in the moon? All men, even those at the greatest distance, are no doubt entitled to our good wishes, and our good wishes we naturally give them. But if, notwithstanding, they should be unfortunate, to give ourselves any anxiety upon that account, *seems to be no part of our duty*.

Thus, universal commiseration is not only unwarranted (because apparently few people were suffering in the eighteenth century), and pathological, but pointless, because we can do nothing about it. Smith didn’t say that we ought to wish harm to distant strangers, or that they didn’t merit our good wishes. Indeed, as he put it elsewhere:

Our good-will is circumscribed by no boundary; but may embrace the entirety of the universe. We can not form the idea of any innocent and sensible being, whose happiness we should not desire, or to whose misery, when distinctly brought home to the imagination, we should not have some degree of aversion. (Smith [1759] 1982, VI.ii.3.1.)

But even if the people suffering were far off, and we somehow learned of it and brought it home imaginatively to ourselves, such commiseration would be “perfectly useless” since the sufferers are “placed alto-

gether out of the sphere of our activity.” For Smith, benevolence without the possibility of action is a wasted emotion, and as such has little real merit. Effective actions, not good intentions, are what count.

Man . . . must not be satisfied with indolent benevolence, nor fancy himself the friend of mankind, because in his heart he wishes well to the prosperity of the world. . . . The man who has performed no single act of importance, but whose whole conversation and deportment expresses the justest, the noblest, and most generous sentiments, can be entitled to demand no very high reward, even though his inutility should be owing to nothing but the want of an opportunity to serve. (Smith 1982, II.iii.3.3.)

Obviously we cannot know whether Smith might have paid his Oxfam dues—whether he might have expanded the duty to commiserate beyond the proximate had he known of the power of the media to bring the faces of suffering people into our living rooms, or about the variable successes of international and transnational institutions like the World Health Organization, the United Nations, and what Alex de Waal (1995, 10) has memorably referred to as the “humanitarian international” of NGOs such as Amnesty International and the Red Cross.

After examining Smith’s arguments against extending ourselves beyond the proximate, we seem to be left with a strikingly callous ethics. But Smith’s commercial globalism emerged within his moral philosophy at precisely this point, to emulate the effects of sympathy on a global scale.

Smith and the Commercial Cosmopolis

More than two centuries of scholarship have been devoted to unpacking and either applying or rejecting Smith’s commercial thought in the *Wealth of Nations*. It is not my intention here to engage in that sort of activity. Instead, I am asking why Smith believed that the world was so conflictual; and how he sought to address this problem, given the various constraints that his moral philosophy revealed to him. For it turns out that accompanying Smith’s rejection of Stoic cosmopolitanism is an attempt to replicate cosmopolitan ends by means of international commerce—what I call the “commercial cosmopolis.”

I shall begin my discussion with a brief intellectual history of Smith’s thoughts on utilitarian rationality in individuals, for he employs much

of the same language when addressing the motivations of nations in the commercial cosmopolis. I shall then introduce Smith's thoughts on national self-interest and its function in the cosmopolis, relying on passages drawn from the *Moral Sentiments*, not the *Wealth of Nations*. The relation between Smith's economic thought and his moral philosophy in the international sphere—and particularly the way that the former was often invoked to compensate for deficiencies in the latter—will be revealed most vividly when we note exactly when and how Smith integrated economic themes into his treatise on morality.

Enlightened Selfishness

Enlightened self-love is the old notion that egoism can be directed through reason to selfless ends (see Hirschman 1977 and Lovejoy 1961). According to this instrumental view of society, men are naturally self-interested and appetitive, but are able through reason to ascertain and pursue future interests. Before Adam Smith, the idea was employed primarily as a substitute for religious motivation in moral thinkers as patently diverse as the French Jansenist Pierre Nicole, the British natural theologian Bishop Joseph Butler, and the German natural lawyer Samuel Pufendorf. Only later, when the eighteenth-century Englishman Bernard Mandeville popularized it, was the idea of enlightened self-love applied to commerce—and widely derided.

In his 1675 essay "Of Charity and Self-Love," Nicole ([1675] 1990, 371) observed that man is extraordinarily resistant to moral education because he "not only loves himself but loves himself beyond measure, loves only himself, and relates everything to himself." More than a century later, Mandeville ([1731] 1924, I. 41–42) noted that man is an extraordinarily "selfish and headstrong . . . Animal," and though "he may be subdued by superior Strength, it is impossible by Force alone to make him tractable. . . ."5 "Moralists and Philosophers of all Ages" attempted to persuade people "that it was more beneficial for every Body to conquer than indulge his Appetites, and much better to mind the Publick than what seemed his private Interest" (ibid, I.42). But the philosophers' attempts to persuade were always thwarted, Mandeville observed, because

whether Mankind would have ever believ'd it or not, it is not likely that any Body could have persuaded them to disapprove of their nat-

ural Inclinations, or prefer the good of others to their own, if at the same time he had not shew'd them an Equivalent to be enjoy'd as a Reward for the Violence, which by so doing they of necessity must commit upon themselves. (Ibid., I.42.)

This was where man's self-interest became a tool for a more inventive species of moralist: hence Mandeville's claim that man is "an extraordinary selfish and headstrong, *as well as cunning* Animal" (Mandeville [1731] 1924, I.42, emphasis added). Man's cunning enables him to recognize future interests, and to pursue them even at the cost of sacrificing certain immediate desires. Nicole ([1675] 1990, 376) advised that "to banish all the vices, and all the gross Disorders therein, and to make Mankind happy even in this life, there needs only instead of Charity, to give everyone a harmless self-love, which may be able to discern its true Interests, and to incline thereto by the ways which true Reason shall discover to it."⁶

Likewise, in his *Sermons* of the 1720s, the English natural theologian Bishop Joseph Butler ([1726] 1983, 65) grounded practical morality in what he called "reasonable self-love."⁷ He argued that the presence of "virtue in the world depends on its appearing to have no contrariety to private interest and self-love":

Let it be allowed, though virtue or moral rectitude does indeed consist in affection to and pursuit of what is right and good, as such, yet, that when we sit down in a cool hour, we can neither justify to ourselves this or any other pursuit till we are convinced that it will be for our happiness or at least not contrary to it. (Ibid., 56.)

But *which* future interests were compelling enough to move man against himself, to quiet his passions? Mandeville ([1731] 1924, I.51) asked: what could possibly inspire man to check himself by "crossing his Appetites and subduing his dearest Inclinations"? What "Equivalent" was "shew'd" to his self-love to justify the sacrifice? Nicole ([1675] 1990, 374) had fastened upon man's natural desire to be an object of love and esteem, an "inclination . . . so cunning and so subtle, and at the same time so pervasive, that there is no action into which it cannot creep. . . ." Man's "violent temptations" are thus "weakened and counterbalanced" in Nicole's formulation by the "fear of men's judgements" (ibid., 385–86). "Prompted by reason to seek the esteem and affection of men, self-love so perfectly imitates charity that if we consult it on how

to conduct our outward actions, it will give us the same advice as charity will and launch us on the same course" (ibid., 377).

Mandeville ([1731] 1924, I.42–45, 51–52) was doubtless drawing on Nicole's argument about the civilizing effects of "esteem and affection" when he emphasized the "Power" that "Flattery" and "Contempt" had upon man's natural "Pride," and the extent to which man perceived his greater interest to lie in securing that "Flattery" and averting that "Contempt" by exercising "Self-denial"—by harnessing, or at least "hiding or disguising" his natural appetites (ibid., 42–45, 51, 56). To explain motives for virtuous action among intractably appetitive creatures, Mandeville ([1731] 1924, I. 48–49) appropriated what Nicole had called *l'amour-propre éclairé*, rendering it as man's "Conquest of his own Passions out of a Rational Ambition of being good." This is what Mandeville meant when he claimed that private vices, morally unchecked but enlightened by reason, could yield public benefits. The practice of "Moral Virtue" among ordinary men could be attributed to no grander motive than this.

Little wonder so many interpreters have linked Mandeville and Smith with the idea that sociable behavior is little more than an instrument pursued by rational egoists calculating future benefit (most recently Hundert 1994 and Berry 1994). Famously, Smith ([1776] 1981, I.II.iii.28) argued in the *Wealth of Nations* that, although man was given naturally to the "passion for present enjoyment," human life wasn't fated to Hobbesian War—since the most urgent of man's passions were balanced by foresight, "a desire of bettering our condition, a desire which, though generally calm and dispassionate, comes with us from the womb, and never leaves us till we go into the grave." Like Nicole, Butler, and Mandeville, Smith ([1759] 1982, I.ii.4; III.6.6), too, believed that "self-interest," or what he called "the selfish passions," held a sort of "middle" position between man's "social" and "unsocial" passions. A "selfish" man employing his "reason" will recognize a certain "utility" in resisting his "unsocial" inclinations and, as best he can, in feigning sociable ones (ibid., IV.2.6–8; see Haakonssen 1981, 67–74, 87–89; and Raphael 1972). The butcher smiles to his customers as he envisions their next visit to buy meat. And with regard to his competitors, experience in the commercial world has taught him the norms of "fair play":

In the race for wealth, and honours, and preferments, he may run as hard as he can, and strain every nerve and every muscle, in order to

outstrip all his competitors. But if he should justle, or throw down any of them, the indulgence of the spectators is entirely at an end. It is a violation of fair play. (*Ibid.*, II.ii.2.1.)

This knowledge makes the merchant gentle, *douceur*, before customers and competitors (Hirschman 1977; see also Lovejoy 1961). That utility can socialize in this negative way, Smith ([1759] 1982, IV.2.6) argued, requires that an individual through his “reason” is “capable” of “discerning the remote consequences of his actions”—“the advantage or detriment that is likely to occur from them” in the future. If the butcher takes advantage of his customers, they will likely turn elsewhere, and tell their neighbors to turn elsewhere—which might ruin his business, shame him, starve his family, and ultimately realize the bourgeois cycle of fear that keeps him awake at night. The “prudence” of an action, therefore, represents an actor’s reasoned calculation that he best would be served by abstaining from various “immediate” impulses (not only self-interested but impulsive ones) in order to obtain a greater pleasure, or to avoid a worse pain, at a “future time” (*ibid.*, IV.2.6–8).

In his use of *prudence* here, Smith was undoubtedly influenced by the Nicole–Butler line on “enlightened” or “reasonable” self-love. Butler ([1726] 1983, 72) had defined “prudence” as the “reasonable endeavor to secure and promote” one’s own “interest and happiness” in the future. He contrasted this “cool” way of thinking from the heat of spontaneous impulse. “Imprudence” was “dissolutely to neglect” one’s “greater good in the future” for the sake of a “present and lesser gratification” *ibid.*). Smith’s description was nearly identical.

Moreover, Smith agreed with Nicole and Butler that individual utilitarian calculation sociologically *emulated* the effects of morality, permitting society to thrive in the absence of genuine love and affection among men, and without anachronistic forms of moral policing that tended to stifle modern commercial aspirations. As Nicole ([1675] 1990, 23) had observed,

However corrupt this society might be inwardly . . . outwardly nothing would be more orderly, courteous, just, peaceful, honorable, and generous; moreover, it would be an excellent thing that, everything being inspired and driven only by self-love, self-love would not show itself and that, society being entirely without charity, what one would see everywhere would be only the forms and outward marks of charity.

Indeed, one would live among self-lovers “as peacefully, safely and comfortably as if one were in a republic of saints” (ibid., 372). Similarly, Smith ([1759] 1982, II.ii.3.2) argued that,

though among the different members of society there should be no mutual love or affection, the society, though less happy and agreeable, will not be dissolved. Society may subsist among different men, as among different merchants, from a sense of its utility, without any mutual love or affection.

For Smith (ibid., II.ii.3.6–10; IV.2.3), the most rudimentary form of social existence was thus inspired not by a “natural love of society” or a “desire that the union of mankind should be preserved for its own sake,” but by an “enlightened” form of “selfishness.” As commercial men would calculate the utility of restraining the most urgent and antisocial of their passions and appetites, society would benefit through the “unintended consequences” of prudence—what Martin Hollis has called a “cunning of reason” (Hollis 1987; cf. Ignatieff 1986, 191).

International Conflict

Of course, we must be careful not to inflate the utilitarian dimension of Smith’s thought beyond proper bounds. Indeed, the whole of the *Moral Sentiments* was devoted to explaining in rich detail how man cultivates moral judgment—not merely that he employs instrumental reason to repress his selfish passions. And Smith ([1759] 1982, VII.ii.4.6) openly rejected what he called Mandeville’s “licentious” attempt to “take away altogether the distinction between vice and virtue.” But cold utility was in Smith’s text too, undeniably and very clearly, perhaps for those turned callous by commercial life, perhaps as a supplement to moral sentiment when self-love spoke too loudly—a sort of insurance policy implanted in the world by Nature through what Smith often referred to as her benevolent “œconomy.”

The same sort of idea seems to be at work when Smith voices his view of good will—and particularly the absence of it—among nations. Smith feared war and international anarchy. He often claimed that eighteenth-century international law was flawed, for it couldn’t guarantee respectful behavior among nations:

The laws of justice are seldom observed. Truth and fair dealing are almost totally disregarded. Treaties are violated; and the violation, if some advantage is gained by it, sheds scarce any dishonour upon the violator. (Smith [1759] 1982, III.3.42.)

As for “the laws of nations, or

those rules which independent states profess or pretend to think themselves bound to observe in their dealings with one another, [regard for them] is often very little more than mere pretense and profession. From the smallest interest, upon the smallest provocation, we see those rules every day, either evaded or directly violated without shame or remorse. Every nation foresees, or imagines it foresees, its own subjugation in the increasing power and aggrandizement of any of its neighbors; and the mean principle of national prejudice is often founded upon the noble one of the love of our own country. (Ibid., VI.ii.2.3.)

For this reason, all alliances and projects among “neighboring or not very distant nations” which might *appear* “benevolent”—undertaken for the “preservation either of, what is called, the balance of power, or of the general peace and tranquility of the states within the circle of their neighbors”—are actually pursued for no reason but the “interest of their respective countries” (ibid., VI.ii.2.6). Thus, a nation will readily violate its promise, whenever it believes (“upon the smallest provocation”) that such a violation better suits its present interests, “without bringing . . . any considerable dishonour upon the violator” (ibid., III.3.42).

These passages identify two problems with implementing international law in the eighteenth century, both of which Smith articulated in terms that reflect what he takes to be their moral-philosophical implications. First, there is the intransigence of national “prejudice,” which Smith characterized as a “noble love of country” that has become distorted and ugly through insular socialization within narrow spatial boundaries. Second, he noted the unavoidability of national “partiality” in the absence of an overarching, neutral power to enforce universal compliance with the “laws of nations.” Let us now consider each of these problems in detail, to get a better grasp of the bleak international setting that Smith identified and sought to remedy with his commercial cosmopolitanism.

National Prejudice

“The mean principle of national prejudice,” Smith ([1759] 1982 VI.ii.2.3) suggested, is often originally “founded upon the noble one of the love of our own country.” To call this love a “noble one” does not mean that it is benevolent, “derived from the love of mankind” (*ibid.*, VI.ii.2.3–4). On the contrary, we love our own country, according to Smith, for more or less partial reasons. He addressed two of them:

The love of our country seems, in ordinary cases, to involve in it two different principles; first a certain respect and reverence for that constitution or form of government which is actually established; and secondly, an earnest desire to render the condition of our fellow-citizens as safe, respectable, and happy as we can. He is not a citizen who is not disposed to respect the laws and to obey the civil magistrate; and he is certainly not a good citizen who does not wish to promote, by every means in his power, the welfare of the whole society of his fellow-citizens. (Smith [1759] 1982, VI.ii.2.11.)

This formulation recalls Judith Shklar’s distinction between obligation and loyalty—essentially that obligation motivates through rules, and loyalty through affect.⁸ Obligation, she wrote, refers to “rule-immersed” activity, grounded in “rule-like” principles, regardless of whether the rule following was recommended by consent, utility, natural law, or deontology (Shklar 1993, 40–41). Similarly, Smith ([1759] 1982, VI.ii.2.1) argued that the first “principle” of “love of our country” consists in obeying the law, in a “certain respect and reverence for that constitution or form of government which is actually established.” Why do people obey established law? In his *Lectures on Jurisprudence* of 1766 (1982, LJ[B]15), Smith noted a variety of reasons, all “rule-like principles” in Shklar’s sense: “Ask a common porter or day-laborer why he obeys the civil magistrate, he will tell you that it is right to do so, that he sees others do it, that he would be punished if he refused to do it, or perhaps that it is a sin against God not to do it.”

More flatly, Smith claimed in the *Moral Sentiments* that people revere their country’s constitution and laws because they provide the security and protection “of all the different orders and societies” within the nation. “All those different orders and societies are dependent upon the state to which they owe their security and protection” (Smith [1759] 1982, VI.ii.2.10). At least this holds true, Smith wrote, in “peaceable and quiet times.”

Loyalty, on the other hand, Shklar (1993, 41) argued, is “deeply affective” and not “primarily rational.” We feel loyalty, she observed, to those groups in which we have been brought up or to those closest in proximity to us—those with which we identify ourselves when asked, “Who are you?” Political loyalty in particular is “evoked” by “nations, classes, castes, ethnic groups, and parties,” she said, “and by the doctrines, causes, ideologies, or faiths that form and identify such associations” (ibid., 41). Smith’s second “principle” of love of country coincides with Shklar’s description of affective loyalty. It consists in the “earnest desire to render the condition of our fellow-citizens as safe, respectable, and as happy as we can”: “Not only we ourselves, but all the objects of our kindest affections, our children, our parents, our relations, our friends, our benefactors, all those whom we naturally love and revere the most, are commonly comprehended within it [the “state or sovereignty”]; and their prosperity and safety depend in some measure upon its prosperity and safety” (Smith [1759] 1982, VI.ii.2.2).

Shklar was troubled by the unreflective and often xenophobic tendencies of political loyalty. “No one in our horrible century,” she insisted, “can be unaware of the passion that is invested in such attachments” (Shklar 1998, 59). Smith, too, was ambivalent. Love of country, which is “noble” in its “foundations”—inspired by a genuine care and concern for those whom habit has taught us to love—is nevertheless whipped into a “mean” partiality and prejudice through a socializing process that greatly resembles Smith’s famous psychology (described in other parts of the *Moral Sentiments*) of how norms are “disciplined” through the “surveillance” of an “impartial spectator” and solidified through habit and experience into “conscience” (Forman-Barzilai 2000, 2001a, and 2001b). Just as in Smith’s moral psychology, an agent “moderates” his conduct to win the approbation of the spectators around him, the “whole ambition” of the citizen, according to Smith ([1759] 1982, III.3.41), “is to obtain the approbation of his own fellow-citizens; and as they are all animated by the same hostile passions which animate himself, he can never please them so much as by enraging and offending their enemies.”

This, of course, is an old story: citizenship galvanizes around the identification and vilification of the enemy, the outsider, the other. Smith ([1759] 1982, VI.ii.2.2) spends many pages describing the way an artificial sense of national “superiority” and “pride” emerge and are habituated through the mythic elevation of heroes, warriors, statesmen, poets, philosophers, and men of letters, who are “ranked (sometimes

most unjustly) above those of all other nations.” And just as Smith (*ibid.*, VI.ii.2.3) writes that once “hatred and dislike . . . grow upon habitual disapprobation,” we become “hardened against all sympathy” for the person who “excites so painful a passion,” taking “a malicious pleasure” in his misfortune, love of country produces a lively “prejudice” that “often disposes us to view with the most malignant jealousy and envy, the prosperity and aggrandizement of any other neighboring nation” (*ibid.*, VI.ii.2.3).

National Insularity

Smith’s diagnosis of “national prejudice” also mirrors his idea that selfishness tends to become exaggerated and “delusive” when one reflects on one’s condition in solitude or in the presence of merely “partial” spectators—“friends,” or, in this case “fellow-citizens” who are already inclined to indulge their self-preference. Isolationism was as dangerous for a nation as solitude was for the moral agent who found himself in the grip of self-delusion—for the “partial spectator is at hand: the impartial one at a great distance” (Smith [1759] 1982, III.3.41). The insular victim of national prejudices pays little attention to what is or what might be “the sentiments which foreign nations might entertain” concerning his country’s conduct (*ibid.*, III.3.41). He simply continues on, self-justified, certain that his country does no wrong.

Smith regretted the absence of a “neutral,” “indifferent,” and “impartial” power in the international sphere, a “common superior” that might help deflate national prejudice, alleviate suspicion and pre-emptive fear among neighboring nations, and oversee and enforce universal compliance with international law (Smith [1759] 1982, III.3.42)—much as the impartial spectator in Smith’s moral psychology oversees and disciplines the conventions of sociable living within narrower boundaries:

Independent and neighboring nations, having no common superior to decide their disputes, all live in continual dread and suspicion of one another. Each sovereign, expecting little justice from his neighbors, is disposed to treat them with as little as he expects from them. (*Ibid.*, VI.ii.2.3.)

Similarly, in a lecture entitled “Of the Laws of Nations,” delivered in his jurisprudence course at the University of Glasgow in 1766, Smith

([1766] 1982, LJ (B) 339) observed that “where there is no supreme legislative power to settle differences, we may always expect uncertainty and irregularity.” Today we think of such institutions as Nuremberg, the Hague, the United Nations, and NATO. But Smith never conceived of such an intricate scheme of international cooperation. To his mind, the theoretical candidate for a “common superior” was a “neutral nation,” one that wasn’t directly involved or interested in a present conflict.

But theory failed in practice, Smith ([1759] 1982, III.3.42) noted, because these “indifferent and impartial spectators . . . are placed at so great a distance that they are almost quite out of sight.” Aside from the obvious practical barrier of language—as well the far thornier problem of how to transcend cultural prejudice (Forman-Barzilai 2000, 2001a, and 2001b)—how could a distant nation like, say, China ascertain the “minutest details” of a conflict between France and England, and render judgments that are, as Smith put it, “well informed, precise and determinate”? Intimate, detailed understanding was essential to such judgments in Smith’s moral philosophy; apparently, he didn’t think distant nations could achieve the necessary degree of intimacy.

Writing on the difficulties of international understanding in 1790, just as accounts of the French Revolution were trickling their way into the English consciousness, Smith never imagined a technological era in which massacres like My Lai, Tiananmen, and September 11 could be broadcast live in bloody, fiery technicolor to observers half a world away. He never imagined a world in which, as Pramoea Ananta Toer describes it, “the entire world can now observe the actions of any person. And people can observe the actions of the entire world” (cited in Cheah 1998, 20). In Smith’s time, distant nations were too distant for sight, too distant for a familiarity sufficient to make well-informed judgments. In our era, when “the whole world is watching,” nobody can be sure to escape spectatorial censure. But we should resist consigning Smith to irrelevancy here, for his underlying point is perfectly compatible with our new reality. In claiming that distant nations were “out of sight,” he was simply reaffirming his recognition that seeing something arouses our imagination and triggers our sympathetic self-projection into action in a way that merely thinking about it cannot. This insight remains valid. The difference is that we see *more* today, and it rouses us to indignation. Indeed, television and the Internet have mediated sight in a way that Smith could not have imagined. Technology now helps to shape and unify our collective sentiments, even from a distance.

The Invisible International Hand

Smith, however, a notorious lover of harmony and equilibrium (see notably Smith 1982, 31–105), was confronted with a jarring dilemma. In the eighteenth century, it seemed that there could be no natural sympathy among distant strangers from which to balance “national prejudice” and to cultivate a genuine and reliable good will among them. And there was no “neutral,” “indifferent” and “impartial” power to *enforce* good will among them. What was a moral philosopher to do? He could either surrender to the radical particularism and anarchy that his moral-philosophical and institutional realism suggested, or he could strive for another solution. Smith pursued the latter choice, believing he had discovered a solution in commerce—a solution I call his “commercial cosmopolitanism.”

Because truth and fairness were unlikely in international affairs—where interest ruled and no impartial spectator could oversee compliance with the “law of nations”—Smith embraced the idea that commercial intercourse among nations could mitigate aggression and cultivate international peace without affective sympathy or external coercion. Smith thought international commerce could produce cosmopolitan ends without cosmopolitan intentions, balancing national wealth with global “virtue.” Smith conceived of a new cosmopolis that could replicate the harmony born of familiarity and habitual fellow feeling, and could even replicate the effects of law and coercion, without stifling modern commercial aspirations.

Smith’s commercial cosmopolitanism relied on what we might refer to as the “unintended consequences” of national self-interest. “The love of our own nation,” Smith ([1759] 1982, VI.ii.2.3) insisted, often does, but need not, lead us “to view with the most malignant jealousy and envy, the prosperity and aggrandizement of any other neighboring nation.” On the contrary, the prosperity of others should be understood as a boon to our own prosperity. The “more enlarged and enlightened mind” feels “no aversion to the prosperity even of an old enemy”:

France and England may each of them have some reason to dread the increase of the naval and military power of the other; but for either of them to envy the internal happiness and prosperity of the other, the cultivation of its lands, the advancement of its manufactures, the increase of its commerce, the security and number of its ports and harbours, its proficiency in all the liberal arts and sciences, is surely beneath the dignity of

two such great nations. These are all real improvements in the world we live in. Mankind are benefitted, human nature is ennobled by them. (Ibid.)

Smith ([1759] 1982, II.ii.5.10, IV.I.1–5, IV.I.9, IV.2.12, VII.iii.1.2) attributed the unintended consequences of national self-interest to what he called an “œconomy of nature,” or sometimes a vast “machine”—a Stoic idea that everything in the world was placed as it was for a larger end, beyond the grasp of humans. “Human society,” he observed, “appears like a great, an immense machine, whose regular and harmonious movements produce a thousand agreeable effects” (ibid., VII.iii.1.2). In several places, Smith referred to this machine as “Providence” (ibid., III.5.7; VII.ii.3.15; for general discussion see Schneewind 1984; Taylor 1989, 266–84; Viner 1972). Because human life was situated in a natural order imprinted with Nature’s purpose for mankind, it worked just as mechanically and predictably as the cosmos. As the “wheels of the watch turn” when “put into motion by a spring,” as “blood circulates” and “food digests” according to an “artifice” in nature, so too are men led without intention or will to those “ends” which Nature/God had “proposed for Mankind” (ibid., II.ii.3.5; III.1.5.10).⁹ Accordingly, Smith argued that the “Author of nature” had ordained the commercial cosmopolis—that “she” had arranged things to ensure (recall the comparison to an insurance policy) that “the great society of mankind” could flourish materially in a context of peace without the slightest sacrifice by individuals or nations. Smith wrote:

That wisdom which contrived the system of human affections, as well as that of every other part of nature, seems to have judged that the interest of the great society of mankind would be best promoted by directing the principal attention of each individual to that particular portion of it, which was most within the sphere both of his abilities and of his understanding. (Ibid., VI.ii.2.4.)

From the perspective of this paper—and my claim that Smith developed a theory of commercial cosmopolitanism to overcome the deficiencies of moral philosophy on a global scale—this is the single most important passage in the *Moral Sentiments*. It links Smith’s moral-psychological rejection of Stoic cosmopolitanism (his argument about the spatial contingencies of sympathy) with his claim that mankind as a whole benefits by seizing upon these limitations, permitting people vigorously to pursue their own partial interests in the “sphere both of [their] abilities and of [their] understanding.”

Smith refused to collapse the Stoic circles here since *oikeiōsis* (familiarity) remained for him the most appropriate index of our duties. “To man is allotted a much humbler department,” he wrote, “but one much more suitable to the weakness of his powers, and the narrowness of his comprehension; the care of his own happiness, of that of his family, his friends, his country” (Smith [1759] 1982, VI.ii.3.6). Smith’s commercial cosmopolitanism leaves people to their own abilities and affections, to that which naturally most interests and directly benefits them. The good of mankind is promoted without expecting people to become something that Smith insisted they were not—and, indeed, *ought* not waste their time, their efforts, and their good spirits striving to become.

I will not pretend that Smith didn’t have very explicit (and deeply contestable) economic and political reasons for advocating international commerce. Such a claim would be absurd. And I will not apologize for those dimensions of Smith’s thought that have been dismissed (all too often correctly) as an extravagant sham. Indeed, in the last two centuries, Smith’s solution has had moments of undeniable success for many people fortunately situated—but arguably just as many dismal failures. Instead, I want to place Smith’s faith in the commercial cosmopolis within the complex of moral-philosophical dilemmas with which he was struggling—in other words, to contextualize it *within* his moral philosophy. Once this is done, his commercialism can no longer be interpreted in a vacuum—as just an Enlightenment commercialist’s blind celebration of wealth and historical progress—but must be understood as a moral philosopher’s attempt to emulate good will on a global scale, to locate a viable substitute for moral sentiment in the international sphere.

Understood in this light, Smith helped to redefine cosmopolitan thinking in the eighteenth century. For him, free commercial intercourse among nations was a new mode or expression of cosmopolitanism, one that promised to mitigate conflict among spatially disparate entities, to generate both widespread prosperity and a tolerable peace in the absence of moral agreement, good will, coercion, or oversight. One commentator has usefully called this “self-centered cosmopolitanism” (Gordon 1994, 73–76). Smith broke with Stoic morality by separating cosmopolitan teleology from human reason and intention, placing it instead in the invisible hand of national self-interest. Because of the providential strain in his thought, he never be-

lieved he had abandoned the poor to the caprice and didactic arrogance of the rich and powerful.

He believed he had placed mankind in benevolent hands.

NOTES

1. Prior to this, scholarship was devoted mainly to addressing structural tensions within the *Wealth of Nations* itself. For more on the genesis and development of the “Adam Smith Problem,” see Dickey 1986 and 1993, xxi n12; and Teichgraber 1981.
2. Notable works in this tradition are Campbell 1971; Lamb 1971; Macfie 1967; Morrow 1932; Skinner 1979; and Winch 1978. More recently see Fitzgibbons 1995, Griswold 1999, and Werhane 1991.
3. See Brown 1995; Griswold 1999, 217–27 and 317–24; Raphael and Macfie 1976; and Waszek 1984. For the Stoic influence on the Scots in general, see Stewart-Robertson 1983 and Stewart 1991. Throughout the *Moral Sentiments*, Smith regularly enlisted Stoic sources, mainly the *Discourses* of Epictetus, the *Meditations* of Marcus Aurelius, and less frequently, Cicero’s *De Officiis* and *De Finibus* and Seneca’s *Epistles*. Smith concerned himself very little with Stoic logic, physics, metaphysics, and epistemology, but concentrated on what he took, often rather selectively, to be Stoic “moral philosophy.”
4. The word *oikeiōsis* derives from the Greek root *oikos*, which referred in ancient democratic life to the private realm of the household as opposed to the public realm of the *polis*, each of which entailed a different science of management, *oikonomia* and *politika*. *Oikeiōsis* is a Stoic extrapolation from the familiarity one develops with those who inhabit the *oikos*.
5. On Mandeville’s appropriation of the Jansenist position, see Lovejoy 1961, III–IV; Dickey 1990; Horne 1981; Hundert 1994, 30–36.
6. On the theme of *l’amour-propre éclairé* in Nicole, see Bénichou 1948, 106–110; Keohane 1980, 283–311; and especially Van Kley 1987.
7. Hundert (1994, 134) reveals that Butler, in the course of his critique of Mandeville, became familiar with Jansenist moral psychology.
8. In the Spring of 1992 at the University of Wisconsin, Shklar delivered what was to be her last public lecture, entitled “Obligation, Loyalty and Exile,” which soon after appeared in *Political Theory* (Shklar 1995). She wrote one other unpublished paper on the subject in 1993, entitled “The Bonds of Exile,” which was to be the first in a series of four lectures she was preparing to deliver at Cambridge, and which is now available to us thanks to Stanley Hoffman in Shklar 1998.
9. Influenced greatly by seventeenth-century natural theology, Smith often used Nature and God interchangeably.

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