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Map of Asia |
CIAO DATE: 03/02
Volume 2, Number 2, July 2000
Full Issue (Download the complete issue in PDF format)
Regional Overview
The geopolitical landscape in Asia has changed dramatically and permanently in the past quarter, largely as a result of two landmark events--the coming of age of Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party and the coming out of North Korea's reclusive supreme leader, Kim Jong-il. Chen Shui-bian's inauguration as Taipei's first non-Kuomintang leader does not reflect the beginning of a new era. Instead, it provides further validation of the fundamental, seemingly irreversible, change that began in 1996 with Taiwan's first truly democratic presidential election. Meanwhile, Kim Jong-il's sudden appearance in the international spotlight, first through his visit to Beijing and then as a result of his historic summit in Pyongyang with ROK President Kim Dae-jung, was even more dramatic; the so-called Dear Leader's actions necessitate a rethinking of what is and is not possible on the Peninsula and raise hopes of near-term reconciliation and eventual peaceful reunification as the world marks the 50th anniversary of the Korean War. Both events will have a profound impact on U.S. security strategy and interests and on the prospects for peace and stability in East Asia. They will also affect upcoming and future attempts at multilateral cooperation in the region.
U.S. - Japan
After a frustrating first quarter--with officials on the security side bickering over host-nation support and garbage incinerators, and officials on the economic side banging heads over internet connection fees and macroeconomic policy--the bilateral agenda seems to have stabilized in time for the July G-8 summit in Okinawa. It is not that Washington and Tokyo have made dramatic breakthroughs on any of these issues. In fact, most remain unresolved. However, there is a quiet confidence that enough can be done before the summit to establish a generally positive atmosphere. In part, this is because the Mori cabinet has survived June 25 elections and now recognizes that further intransigence on trade and security issues will only undermine the prime minister's already flagging credibility. Meanwhile, Washington has taken its measure of the Mori coalition and has lowered its expectations accordingly. Finally, in Okinawa, the prospects for a political conflagration over bases seem to have subsided. Overall, the relationship looks set for a steady course through the summit.
U.S. - China
The Clinton administration made important progress this quarter toward securing congressional support for granting permanent normal trading status to China. The House approved the trade bill by a comfortable margin and Senate approval of the legislation is expected before the August recess. In an unprecedented gesture, President Jiang Zemin telephoned President Clinton to express his gratitude for the administration's intensive effort to win congressional backing. Other accomplishments in bilateral ties were less significant and, indeed, were barely noted. For example a bilateral agreement was penned to share information and evidence related to drug smuggling and, in the military sphere, the commander in chief of the Chinese Navy made a week-long visit to the U.S. followed by a delegation headed by the Nanjing Military Region Commander. Last but not least, Secretary of State Albright made a last-minute whirlwind stop in Beijing to engage in security discussions with Chinese leaders.
U.S. - Korea
The June 13-15 inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang between South Korean President Kim Dae-jung and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il spoke to the possibility of dramatic forward progress in inter-Korean relations and advanced President Kim's commitment to end the Cold War on the Peninsula. The meeting drew unqualified support from the U.S. and other regional actors, but also raised questions as to the future of the U.S. military presence on the Peninsula. Despite official proclamations to the contrary, pre-summit reports indicated some divergence between U.S. and South Korean policymakers on agenda topics, with the U.S. (and Japan) concerned about nuclear and missile issues and South Korea keen on leading with economic cooperation and family visitations. The quarter also commemorated the 50th Anniversary of the beginning of the Korean War. Controversy over the Nogun-ri massacres and the pace of attendant investigations, the 20th Anniversary of the Kwangju massacres, protests over U.S. test ranges, the Status of Forces Agreement, and a U.S. carmaker bid for Daewoo Motor Company all reflect future challenges in managing U.S.-Korean relations.
U.S. - Russia
Following his election as President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin moved swiftly to consolidate power at home and to project an image of a revitalized Russia abroad. His team of economic advisors put together far-reaching proposals to reform the economy, while the presidential administration presented the Duma with a reorganization plan aimed at reining in the power of the governors. Ratification by the Duma of START II and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, followed in quick succession by a series of well publicized foreign visits and a summit with President Clinton in Moscow, conveyed the image of a can-do, energetic new leader. That image was undermined by the attacks on Media Most and its head, Vladimir Gusinsky, the storm of negative publicity that followed, and the continuing war in Chechnya. The West had hoped a new Russian president would commit himself to transparency in government, stronger democratic institutions, and a more vibrant civil society. Time is running out if Putin wants to convince the skeptics that there is still a chance for the triumph of hope over experience.
U.S. - ASEAN
Despite continuing public criticism of the Indonesian military's conduct in East Timor, the U.S. quietly resumed limited military-to-military contact with Indonesia during the last quarter. Indonesia also was invited as an observer to the COBRA GOLD 2000 military exercises, which were expanded from the traditional Thai-U.S. bilateral format to include the participation of Singapore as well. In the Philippines, the FBI became frustrated with the lack of a legal framework for prosecuting cybercrime during the "Love Bug" incident, while President Estrada was also called to task over Manila's inability or unwillingness to settle its hostage crisis. This latter incident has raised further questions regarding ASEAN's cohesion as well.
China - ASEAN
China further consolidated its bilateral relations with Southeast Asia during the second quarter by signing four new long-term cooperation agreements with Myanmar, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Singapore. China also reinforced bilateral relations by exchanging high-level delegations with Singapore, the Philippines, and Myanmar, and several regional states joined with China to celebrate milestone anniversaries marking the establishment of diplomatic relations. Discussions on territorial disputes in the South China Sea continued without resolution, while Chinese and Vietnamese leaders expressed concern over the pace of negotiations over delineation of the Gulf of Tonkin. A new dimension was added to China's relations with ASEAN states--the inauguration of direct party-to-party ties between the Chinese Communist Party and governing parties in non-socialist states. China also reinforced its ideological relations with Vietnam and Laos, its military ties with Thailand, and reportedly increased its military support for Myanmar.
China - Taiwan
The tensions that followed Chen Shui-bian's election in March have eased. Since President Chen's remarkably conciliatory comments on cross-Strait relations in his inaugural address, both Taipei and Beijing appear to be groping, thus far unsuccessfully, for a formula for reopening talks. Inconsistent actions and statements from China imply considerable disagreement in Beijing on how to handle the new regime in Taipei; no decisions are expected until the summer leadership meetings in Beidaihe. In Taipei, Chen has been in a honeymoon period where his positions have enjoyed wide support. Despite its initial fears, Washington now sees Chen as a pragmatic conciliator. The Democratic Progressive Party, for its part, has undergone a remarkable transformation from its past fear of U.S. pressure to a new desire to elicit American help in initiating cross-Strait talks. A lot is riding on the effort because, if a mutually acceptable formula is not found, the debate in Beijing is likely to shift toward a more confrontational approach. This, in turn, will constrain Chen's room for compromise.
China - Korea
Beijing was the venue for many secret visits in the past quarter. ROK Minister of Culture Park Jie-won visited Beijing secretly on April 8 to make an agreement with the DPRK Asia Pacific Peace Committee's Song Ho-Gyong in preparation for the inter-Korean summit held in June in Pyongyang. Even more dramatically, DPRK leader Kim Jong-il stepped onto the world's diplomatic stage with a secret visit to Beijing at the end of May, where he was received by all the top members of the Chinese Communist Party. Supporting these developments, ROK Foreign Minister Lee Joung-binn visited Beijing for pre-summit consultations, Seoul played host to two senior PRC officials, and former ROK presidents Roh Tae-woo and Kim Young-sam visited China in June. Additionally, Seoul and Beijing staged their first major trade spat since official relations were established in 1991, with hundreds of millions of dollars worth of garlic, mobile phone, and polyethylene sales frozen by retaliatory tariffs on both sides, threatening an otherwise banner year for the Sino-South Korean economic relationship.
Japan - China
After a first quarter that featured several diplomatic flare-ups, both Tokyo and Beijing appear intent on putting the bilateral relationship on a more even keel. Foreign Ministers met to review outstanding political, economic, and security issues. The one new departure came when Foreign Minister Kono raised the possibility of Japan taking a new tack on the issue of China's military modernization, suggesting that future levels of development assistance could be linked to China's military spending. Japan also voiced increasing interest in, and concern with, the activities of PLA navy ships and research vessels in Japan's Special Economic Zone. At the political level, efforts to stabilize the relationship were most evident. Beijing's reaction to Prime Minister Mori's remarks about Japan as a "Divine Country" was markedly low-key. At the same time, Japanese speculation over the implications of Beijing's role in advancing the historic North-South summit turned quickly to recognition of China's growing influence on the Peninsula and to the future of U.S. forward-deployed forces both in Korea and in Japan.
Japan - Korea
Disappointment, hope, and uncertainty. This roller coaster of expectations best describes Japan's attitudes toward events on the Korean Peninsula this quarter. The psychic low was a result of the inauspicious start to Japan-North Korea normalization talks, followed by the hopes, expectations, and uncertainty produced by the inter-Korean summit. The trilateral policy coordination precedent set by the Perry review faced and passed important tests this quarter related to the summit. On the Japan-South Korea bilateral front, noteworthy positive steps deserve highlighting, especially because they were overshadowed by the focus on the summit. If real (rather than atmospheric) changes come to the security situation on the Peninsula pursuant to the summit, some larger questions regarding how to frame Japan-Korea relations deserve consideration.
Japan - Russia
Like Russia, Japan now finds itself with a new leader at the helm. However, in spite of the new blood at the top, political relations appear to be as stagnant as they were at the beginning of the year. It appears more and more unlikely that a peace treaty will be signed by the end of the year. The leaders of the two countries are not expected to discuss in-depth bilateral relations at the upcoming G-8 summit in Okinawa. Policymakers in Japan are instead setting their sights on the expected late summer visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin to Tokyo. Until then, little progress can be expected in political relations. Contacts at the regional level will continue to be pushed by Tokyo, and now that one of the Sakhalin energy projects has come back on-line, energy and trade relations could see a resurgence.
China - Russia
From time to time in Sino-Soviet relations, young men in the Kremlin challenged older leaders in Beijing. Now, 45 years after Khrushchev's de-Stalinization and 15 years after Gorbachev's Anew thinking," Russia's new president is reshaping his foreign policy in a remarkably realpolitik way, which may not be fully anticipated--nor welcomed--by his older Chinese counterparts. To be sure, much of Russo-Chinese relations in the second quarter was business as usual: Russian arms continued to flow to China; trade was up; vows of mutual commitment to territoriality were routinely uttered; bureaucrats frequented each other's capital. The chemistry between top leaders, however, did not seem to be an amicable mix.