

CONNECTIONS

The Quarterly Journal

Volume V, Number 3

Winter 2006

Introduction 1
Sharyl N. Cross

Countering Ideological Support for Extremism: Challenges and Implications 3
Carlton W. Fulford, Jr.

The Question of De-legitimizing Terrorism

De-legitimizing Religion as a Source of Identity-Based Security Threats in a
Global World 7
Mustafa Aydin

Countering Ideological Support for Terrorism in Europe: Muslim Brotherhood
and Hizb ut-Tahrir—Allies or Enemies? 19
Zeyno Baran

Strategic Communication: An Integral Component of Counterinsurgency
Operations 35
Fred T. Krawchuk

“Hearts and Minds Dimension” of Countering Terrorism: Perspectives from Islam and Christianity

Reaching Out to Muslim Clerics: Can We Build Bridges and Strengthen
Moderate Voices in Islam? 51
Dalil Boubakeur

Issues of Interpreting the Koran and *Hadith* 57
Patrick Sookhdeo

The Role of Interreligious Dialogue in Addressing Ideological Support for
Terrorism: Roman Catholic Perspectives..... 83

Albert A. Agresti, S.J.

***Interdisciplinary Approaches to Countering Ideological Support
for Terrorism***

Weapons of Mass Persuasion: Communicating Against Terrorist Ideology 93

Steven R. Corman

Statistical Analysis/Psychometric Modeling: Understanding and Influencing
Societal Vulnerabilities to Terrorism..... 105

Dianne C. Barton and Patrick J. Barton

The Terrorist Threat to the World Political System..... 115

Marina M. Lebedeva

Introduction

The Winter 2006 and supplement issues of *Connections* feature a collection of presentations and articles that were prepared as part of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies' ongoing initiative to develop approaches for countering ideological support for terrorism. Through a series of conferences, courses, and research projects, the Marshall Center has sought to enlist the broadest possible participation in terms of professional experience and regional representation in order to explore the "hearts and minds" dimension of the overall global counterterrorism effort.

Officials throughout the United States Department of Defense and the broader U.S. government's interagency community have repeatedly acknowledged the central importance of the ideological aspect of the effort to counter the global terrorist threat, and have stated that winning the ideological battle is a crucial element of long-term success. At the same time, it is widely recognized that developing and coordinating effective strategies to counter ideological support for terrorist movements across different cultural and geographic contexts will continue to present daunting challenges.

Consistent with the mission of the Marshall Center, we have approached our investigation of this issue by encouraging candid discussion that we hope will enhance existing methods and capabilities to de-legitimize terrorism. We have created an international forum to promote dialogue between the defense communities of Western and Muslim countries committed to securing their societies against the threat posed by contemporary terrorist groups. This dialogue contributes to the cultivation of an international network of counterterrorism professionals, all of whom share a determination to create a more secure world.

This issue contains keynote presentations offered at both the Senior Executive Seminar (24 April–4 May 2006) and the Alumni Leadership Seminar (17–21 July 2006). We have included papers that were prepared for an OSD/SOLIC-funded conference, *Countering Ideological Support for Terrorism (CIST)/Lessons Learned and Future Policy: Interdisciplinary, Theological, and International/Regional Perspectives*, held at the Marshall Center in September 2006. The conference featured exchanges of opinions, sharing of research findings, and discussion of actual practical experience in combating extremism among more than fifty participants, representing thirty countries from North America, Europe, Russia/Eurasia, the Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia. The selected articles illustrate the broad scope and depth of discussion that took place in the conference lectures and seminars. Topics included exploring strategies for de-legitimizing terrorism; roles and responsibilities for traditional religions in promoting dialogue and conflict resolution; comparing approaches for countering religious extremist violence among several regional contexts/case studies; defining implications for international cooperation; policy; and assessment. This issue and its forthcoming supplement include studies by leading academics representing different nations and disciplines as well as perspectives from policy analysts, counterterrorism professionals, clerics, religious scholars, and leaders of both Islam and Christianity.

It is our hope that this collection will help to advance discussion—both within the United States counterterrorism community and among our partners throughout the world—concerning ways to improve global strategies to defeat the ideologies that fuel terrorist violence.

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* The views expressed in the following collection of presentations and articles are those of the speakers and authors, and do not reflect the official policy or position of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, the U.S. European Command, the U.S. Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Countering Ideological Support for Extremism: Challenges and Implications

Carlton W. Fulford, Jr. *

We cannot win the war against terrorism if we do not understand and deal with its ideological dimension. Nor can the West do this alone. Following the attacks on 11 September 2001, one of the principal questions asked in the United States about the Muslim world—one that has not yet been answered to my knowledge—is, “Why do they hate us so much?” Perhaps a relevant corollary is, “Why have we become, or allowed ourselves to become, the primary target of extremists?” Attempts to deal with this aspect of the war on terrorism have taken several names: for example, “countering ideological support for extremism” and “strategic communication.” But to my knowledge we have not yet satisfactorily understood “why they hate us so much,” and we still lack any effective strategy to deal with the issue of the ideology that motivates people to commit terrorist acts.

That is why this conference is so important. You know the tenor of public sentiment in your countries. You know how your citizens react to U.S. words and actions. We need to listen more before taking action. We also must realize that we are judged by what we do, not just by what we say.

Our military men and women have successfully pursued a dynamic response to acts of terror. Each American looks with pride at the professionalism and sacrifice of our servicemen and -women in doing what soldiers should do—killing the bad guys and winning our nation’s wars. The non-kinetic aspect of the war on terror has proven to be a much more difficult task, and is clearly one in which soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines can assist, but they cannot accomplish it alone.

Conferences like this promote knowledge and understanding, both of which are in sadly short supply. In the absence of knowledge and understanding, suspicion and misunderstanding take root. I firmly believe these two evils—suspicion and misunderstanding—are at the foundation of the hatred that exists in the Muslim world toward the West in general, and the United States in particular.

We must also admit, however, that legitimate and sometimes contradictory national interests play a role in generating these conflicts, as does the manner in which different nations pursue these interests. We must learn about each other, recognize real divergences of interests, and manage them vigorously in order to avoid further polarization of disputes. The stakes involved in this dynamic are incredibly high and, to be sure, disengagement—letting parts of this world go down their own paths, or blithely hoping that they can exist in their own isolation—is simply not a possibility. Globalization is

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here to stay. It is not going away, and we must learn how to deal with it. Many communities in our world are intricately connected, and each needs the other: for our security, our prosperity, and our future. Islamic extremists who seek to reestablish the caliphate and return to the purity of the first generation of Islam cannot succeed. Likewise, the global society in which we live has taught the United States that we cannot simply ignore the aspirations of the millions of people—most of whom are peaceable and tolerant—who make up the Muslim world. Better understanding will help, but concrete steps are more important at this stage, because Islamist extremists have focused their attention on Western “double standards,” to which we must respond through actions, not words.

Everybody can help define the actions that will be most useful in their part of the world. Since retiring from active military service, I have focused my attention on Africa—and much of this essay derives from that focus. Over 400 million Muslims live in Africa. Several African nations have Muslim populations greater than any nation in the Middle East. Most seek to live their lives with a sense of decency and dignity, though many must struggle with the basic elements of daily survival. Sufi Muslim thought has been studied, taught, and practiced for centuries in places like Timbuktu, Mali. However, political Islam—springing from the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and, more recently, from Wahabbist/Salafist teaching from the Arabian Peninsula—is spreading through the Horn and Saharan Africa.

Islam is growing rapidly in Africa. Muslim charities offer much-needed help in many areas of conflict and immense poverty. Mosques are being built and jobs are being created in South Africa. Leaders in many African nations, however, are concerned about extremist messages coming into their Muslim communities from outside Africa.

This has made Africa a frontline battlefield in the Islamist struggle. Today, progressive Muslims remain in control in most African states. Anti-Americanism is not rampant, though skepticism and a lack of trust toward the U.S. exists. In Africa, as in other places around the world, we need to understand perceptions (even though they might be false) and take appropriate steps to create understanding and foster tolerance.

Perceptions of the West

U.S. global relations, and particularly our relations with the Muslim world, cannot be understood without acknowledging the impact of both the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the conflict in Iraq. Unfortunately, these are perceived in many quarters of the world—including Africa—as evidence of U.S. imperialism and a “war on Islam.” We can point to a long history of the U.S. coming to the aid of Muslims around the world: in the Middle East, in Kuwait, in Bosnia and Kosovo, just to name a few recent examples. I personally participated in the evacuation of Yassir Arafat and the PLO from Beirut in the early 1980s, just as General Sharon was about to obliterate them. Despite these examples, most observers in the Muslim world see the U.S. as the “unconditional protector” of Israel. They also believe that the United States is the world’s one true superpower, and if it wanted to do something, whatever it might be, the U.S. could do it. Most Americans, on the other hand, acknowledge that there are limitations to U.S. power, and most see our actions as designed to defend U.S. national interests and pro-

mote freedom and democracy—which is in the best interests of everyone in the world. That is the foundation for support of our actions in Iraq.

Many communities around the world interpret U.S. actions very differently. First of all, and perhaps most importantly, they believe the U.S. could resolve the Israeli-Palestinian crisis if we tried. Similarly, although most people around the world understood our reaction to 9/11 in Afghanistan—despite questioning the proportionality—global sentiment has been generally against our actions in Iraq.

Disclosures—no matter how real or sensationalized—of U.S. torture, atrocities, lack of due process, renditions to “black site” prisons, etc., have seriously damaged the United States’ image as the shining example of a “city on a hill.” On the contrary, they have fostered the notion that the U.S. flouts international law when it suits its purposes, and is focused only on its own selfish interests. U.S. support for corrupt, authoritarian, or cruel governments and leaders further erodes the notion of the United States as a “shining example” for the rest of the world, and opens the U.S. to the criticism of operating under a double standard. Nigerian Islamists point to their nation’s endemic corruption as a result of the evils of capitalism, and condemn their corrupt political leaders as puppets of the West. When millions live on the knife’s edge of survival from one day to the next and there is no sense of hope while Western affluence appears to increase by the day, it is not difficult to offer an argument that blames their impoverished condition on Western conspiracies.

Another element of the Muslim world’s view toward the United States is cultural, rather than political or economic. U.S. popular culture is both loved and hated beyond our borders. Having lived in various parts of the world, it is interesting to observe the gap between how we see ourselves and how people in other parts of the world view us. Europeans still see us as naïve and politically immature. They recognize our strength, but still feel compelled (and entitled) to advise us on how to use that strength. In Asia and the Middle East, satellite television networks beam reruns of “Dallas” and “Baywatch” to millions of viewers, who think that these shows really represent U.S. culture. The Muslim world has the perception that the United States in particular, and the West in general, harbor societies with little attachment to religious values—Christian or otherwise—and that we are marked by a moral decay that we are spreading around the world. I read or hear little about how U.S. values served to make this nation the world’s sole superpower. The feeling is that we are a superpower because we are rich—without any discussion as to how we became rich—and that we are using our military and economic power to impose our tainted values on the rest of the world.

Finally, many citizens in Africa and the Middle East—Muslims and non-Muslims alike—think that U.S. policy toward their countries is driven overwhelmingly by one specific interest: oil, and particularly the use of oil to maintain and expand our world dominance. We can debate the validity of this perception, but we cannot afford to doubt the fact that it is a widely held belief.

These perceptions, false though they may be, are used daily to build support for jihad against the “Great Satan” as the appropriate strategy to address local conditions of economic deprivation and political marginalization in the Middle East. We must endeavor to show—and, as I said earlier, demonstrate our conviction through actions, not

only words—that these perceptions describe neither the United States of America nor the values we stand behind. We are predominantly a Christian nation, but we must demonstrate that we are tolerant of all faiths, judgmental of none, and truly believe in “one nation, under God, with liberty and justice for all.”

I will conclude with a number of recommendations for U.S. strategy and policy that I believe must be undertaken simultaneously in order to repair relations between the United States and the Muslim world, as well as to effectively counter the very real threats posed by Islamist extremism to both U.S. and global security.

First, I believe we must elevate our thinking and our actions to describe and alleviate the root causes of extremism and the permissive factors that enable terrorists to operate and mobilize support. We clearly must do all we can to disrupt terrorist operations that threaten our nation; we must kill or capture extremists perpetrating terrorist acts. But we must also guard against actions that will create further grievances that can motivate new waves of resentment and future generations of terrorists. Events that are currently unfolding in the Middle East could have grave implications for our ability to counter ideological support for extremism.

We must also carefully assess the importance and limitations of U.S. cooperation efforts with other nations in solving the challenge of Islamist extremism, many of which are at the same time part of the problem. Once we burnish our own credibility, we must set the bar high for our alliance partners. We need to take visible action that demonstrates the values of the United States. What the Western world did in Bandar Aceh or Palestine silences fanatics, and shows the world that we are a compassionate nation and we care about our fellow human beings. Our actions can produce a tangible impact on issues that matter the most in the day-to-day lives and beliefs of Muslim communities. I would propose that we take a hard look at increasing foreign development aid, especially aid that is focused on educational systems in poor or developing nations.

I believe that open and honest dialogue regarding strategic interests is much more effective than “information warfare” or “strategic communications.” To be absolutely frank, many in the world simply do not believe what the United States says any more, and when you couple this with the rhetoric of extremists who amplify issues or misrepresent what we do or say, we have a problem. We collectively must work to restore our moral values in the eyes of the world. This can be done through honest and open dialogue, which means that we listen as well as talk.

By any measure, 9/11 was a tragedy. Visiting Grosvenor Square in London and seeing the U.S. Embassy barricaded like a nineteenth-century Fort Apache is also tragic. The fact that there are men and women around the world who are convinced that their only hope is to blow themselves to pieces and take as many “infidels” with them as possible is tragic. The fact that my and your grandchildren will inherit a more dangerous world than we inhabited is tragic. The United States must rediscover its vision and communicate that vision around the world through our actions. Conferences such as this are clearly a significant step in that direction. Education, understanding, frank honesty, and tolerance will go a long way toward countering extremism and restoring peace and dignity to our troubled world.

De-legitimizing Religion as a Source of Identity-Based Security Threats in a Global World

Mustafa Aydin*

Introduction

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. Since the ancient Jewish *Zealot*, both terrorism as such and its most familiar version today, religious terrorism, have had different models, justifications, and moments of proliferation. Although we do not need to engage in a lengthy legal discussion of what constitutes terrorism, it would be useful to have a working definition. The word *terrorism* comes from the Latin *terrere* (“to cause to tremble”), and its political usage (with a decidedly positive connotation) started during the Reign of Terror in the French Revolution. *Terror* in that usage referred to an assault on civil order. Among the many different and conflicting definitions of terrorism, this paper accepts the following: *Terrorism* is violence or the threat of violence used and directed in pursuit of a political aim.¹ Although this definition is very general, any attempt to qualify it further inevitably raises issues of political conviction.²

In a similar vein, terrorist activities could be categorized in various ways. Here is one possibility:³

- *Repressive Terrorism*. Traditional forms of right-wing terrorism could be included in this category. Examples are the Ku Klux Klan, the Sicilian Mafia, the death squads of Latin American countries, and the Grey Wolves of Turkey.
- *Insurrectional Terrorism*. This category would include ethnic and national separatist movements aimed at independence. Examples are FLN-Algeria, Irgun and Stern in British Palestine, the PLO, Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, various Chechen groups, ETA in Spain, the IRA, etc.

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¹ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 15.

² For alternative definitions and a general debate on definitions of terrorism, see Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 13–45; David Rappoport, “Terrorism,” in *Routledge Encyclopedia of Government and Politics*, Vol. 2, Mary Hawkesworth and Maurice Kogan, eds. (London: Routledge, 1992); Alex P. Schmid, Albert J. Jongman, et al., *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature*, 2nd ed. (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1998), 1–38; Jessica Stern, *The Ultimate Terrorists* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 11–31.

³ From Henner Hess, “Like Zealots and Romans: Terrorism and Empire in the 21st Century,” *Crime, Law and Social Change* 39 (2003): 341–43.

- *Social-Revolutionary Terrorism*. Traditional left-wing terrorist movements might be counted in this group. Examples are GRAPO (Spain), Action Directe (France), Red Army Faction (Germany), Red Brigades (Italy), Weathermen (U.S.), and DHKP-C (Turkey).

These terrorist movements and groups have been rather local in their impacts. Their actions were caused by and restricted to primarily local (at most national) issues. They usually have targeted small numbers of victims, which were not chosen randomly. Social-revolutionary terrorists pursued progressive (albeit distorted) ideals such as progress, liberty, and equality. For insurrectional terrorists, the ideal was closer to Wilsonian self-determination.⁴ “The danger they posed as far as weapons and other potentials were concerned was not particularly frightening. They abducted and murdered important politicians, leading industrialists,” soldiers and police.⁵ Insurrectional movements did not, for the most part, kill indiscriminately and wholesale, because they were trying to win the hearts and minds of people—they had a constituency to win, so to speak.

The last decade has seen this picture change dramatically. Terrorism has become much more diversified, virulent, and dangerous. Political and ideological motivations, however far-fetched, receded and became overshadowed by repressive, fundamentalist religious ideologies, which fuel a much more lethal version of terrorism.⁶ Before 1980, the U.S. State Department’s list of international terrorist groups only occasionally listed religious groups.⁷ In contrast, when U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright listed thirty of the world’s most dangerous groups in 1998, over half were religiously oriented.⁸ Similar lists have reached similar conclusions since then: terrorist acts related to, or in the name of, religion and/or religious identities have become one of the most serious security challenges since the end of the Cold War or, as some would say, since the advent of modern, technology-driven globalization. Though most lists of terrorist organizations now include Christian, Jewish, Islamic, and various cult-related religious fundamentalist groups, in this essay our focus is on Islamic fundamentalist terrorism, which has become more prominent than other types of terrorism and now has a global reach.

Although this phenomenon reaches back to last decades of the nineteenth century, what Oliver Roy has called “neo-fundamentalism” emerged in the 1980s during the

⁴ Hess, “Like Zealots and Romans,” 345.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 346.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ In 1992, there were eleven religious terrorist groups in the lists. The 1994 report listed sixteen such groups out of the forty-nine terrorist organizations. The ratio reached sixteen out of fifty-six in 1995. Groups motivated at least in part by religion committed ten of the one hundred most lethal terrorist attacks in 1996; and the figures continued to grow. See, Bruce Hoffman, “Old Madness, New Methods; Revival of Religious Terrorism Begs for Broader U.S. Policy,” *Rand Review* 22:2 (Winter 1998/99): 3. Available at: <http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/tr.winter98.9/methods.html>.

⁸ “Global Terror,” *Los Angeles Times* (8 August 1998), A16.

Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the Iranian revolution, and resulted in the defeat and/or humiliation of two superpowers.⁹ If religion was powerful enough to defeat or thwart the world's most powerful states in two different locations, perhaps it could also offer a challenge during the era of globalization.¹⁰ Thus it is perhaps not surprising that religion should emerge as a far more common motivation for terrorism in the post-Cold War era. Old ideologies lie discredited by the twin exemplars of the collapse of the Soviet Union and communist ideology and the failures of liberal democratic capitalist states to produce economic benefits in many countries. Thus, religious ideology and its counterpart, fundamentalist extremism, offer promise for the future, and alternatives to the failures of the past.

Accordingly, this paper will look first at the growing connection between religious identities, globalization, and terrorism. Within that framework, the role of Islam will take precedence. The essay will look critically at the connection between Islam as a religion and Islam as a threat in the globalized world, where some people are driven by economic insecurity and political dislocations to turn to deeper religious and ethnic identities. Then the paper will try to clarify the differences between the new form of religious terrorism and its older, more secular predecessor. Finally, the essay will turn to the challenges we face in countering religious terrorism today and suggest a possible two-way strategy.

Identity-Based Security Threats in a Globalized World and the Role of Islam

With the spread of globalization, and since the emergence of the new type of terrorism we witnessed on 9/11, religious identities have gained renewed attention. The divisive character of many faiths and the ability of religious identities to create conflicts between groups have been studied from different perspectives. Among discussions regarding religious fundamentalism as a source of terrorism, Islam has attracted particular attention ranging from Samuel Huntington's now (in)famous work on the "clash of civilizations" to George W. Bush's flashbacks to a Western "crusade" against terrorists.¹¹ We live in a world where names like *al-Jihad*, *Islamic Jihad*, *Gamaa Islamiyya*, *Hizb-ut Tahrir*, *Army of God*, *Islamic Liberation Front*, *Armed Islamic Group*, *Hezbollah*, *Hamas*, and *Al-Qaeda*, make the headlines almost daily in connection with terrorism. Could there be a link between a religion and international terrorism?

When we consider the perpetrators and the violent events that have led to the deaths of many civilians, such as the attack on the World Trade Center in 1993, the massacre of tourists in Luxor, Egypt in 1997, the bombings of U.S. Embassies in Tan-

⁹ Oliver Roy, *L'Islam mondialisé* (Paris, Éditions du Seuil, 2002).

¹⁰ Rohan Gunaratna, "Responding to the Post 9/11 Structural and Operational Challenges of Global Jihad," *Connections: The Quarterly Journal* 4:1 (Spring 2005): 10.

¹¹ Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72:3 (Summer 1993): 22–49; and *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).

zania and Kenya in 1998, the attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. in September 2001, as well as bombings in Madrid (2004), Istanbul (2004), and London (2005), it is possible to rather unavoidably (and all too easily) establish a connection between the use of terror and Islam. Although this shallow analysis—focusing solely on the deeds of extremists, and generalizing them to the entire Islamic world—is misguided at best, it nevertheless has its attractions in many parts of the world.

Islam is sometimes used as a tool of self-identification and psychological support for extremist religious groups associated with threats directed at political, societal, economic, and human security at the national, regional, or global levels. However, it is clearly wrong to suggest that a unified, monolithic Islamic civilization is threatening the world. Accordingly, this paper looks critically at the connection between Islam as a religion and Islam as a threat in a globalized world where peoples' resort to deeper religious and ethnic identities came to the fore. It is my contention here that an "Islamic threat" based on a Huntingtonian version of a civilizational identity is a myth. Nevertheless, I also accept that some radical and extremist groups, imagining identities based on Islam as a religion, might pose threats to the security of wider international society. The dynamics of globalization that culminated in the resurgence of religion as a social and political phenomenon, along with the decline of the long-demonized communist threat with the end of the Cold War and finally the tragic events of 9/11, have led many to question Islam's relationship with terrorism threat.

From Myth to Reality: Islamic Extremism and the Terrorist Threat

When Islam as a religion lies at the heart of a group's identity, then these groups might potentially pose threats to security under certain conditions. Even though religion remains the major marker of those groups' identities, the threats associated with those groups might not result directly and solely from their religious motivations, but from a combination of social, economic, or political factors. Those groups can be *organizations*, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt or Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, or they can even be *states*, like Iran and Libya.

With the end of World War II, when the newly independent states in the Middle East (such as Egypt, Syria, and Iraq) began to adopt more secular forms of government—or abandon "Islamic principles and rule," as some would have it—Islamic identity-based organizations or parties became actors in regional and international politics. Islam was regarded by the new governing elites of the region as an "impediment to modernity, progress and development."¹² However, it was soon recognized that Western-built secular regimes often failed to provide political and economic order to these societies. In an environment of bad governance, ongoing conflicts, weak economies, and corruption, the agendas of Islamic identity-based organizations and parties shared similar goals: to achieve the rule of Islamic values in their societies. It should be noted that their intention was not necessarily or always derived from the fact that they

¹² Beverly Milton-Edwards, *Islamic Fundamentalism Since 1945* (London: Routledge, 2005), 32.

wanted to create a world living under Islamist rule; rather, their actions were a response to the corrupt and unpopular regimes in the Middle East.¹³

These Islamic identity-based groups are divided between “liberals” and “fundamentalists,” depending on how they apply core Islamic values to modern social and political life. Liberal Islamic organizations or parties, through the processes of *ijtihad* (interpretation) and *fitrah* (natural sense of right or wrong), opt for a modern way of life within the context of Islamic values—creating, for example, a society where complete gender equality prevails. Fundamentalists, on the other hand, resist modernity, restricting themselves to a literal interpretation of sacred texts.¹⁴ To the extent that these liberal or fundamentalist Islamic identity-based groups try to achieve their aims by democratic means, they can only threaten the political security of the governing regimes by challenging their authority and sovereignty. For example, many Islamist groups, “working together with secular parties and using the language of political liberalization, have pressed for political reforms that have led to the elections in Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Jordan and Kuwait and to the establishment of a consultative assembly in Saudi Arabia.”¹⁵

However, from a Western point of view, this identity-based threat directed at the political security of the governing elites has more comprehensive repercussions for Western interests. The fear is very simple: by overthrowing the states or governing regimes, these groups will destroy the *status quo* in the Middle East, and thus will jeopardize Western access to oil. In other words, with the Islamist movements gaining strength, the West fears the “transformation of old and reliable friends into more independent and less predictable nations that might make Western access to oil less secure.”¹⁶ In this sense, Islamic identity-based groups threaten the economic security of the West when they advocate the overthrow of the governing regimes in the region.

The media, as well as politicians and intellectuals, often associate these groups with radical, violent, and extremist fundamentalists who have caused hundreds of deaths in suicide-bomb attacks across the globe, including the tragic events of 11 September 2001. In this context, it is beyond any doubt that when fundamentalists resort to the use of force, terrorism, and violence rather than pursuing democratic means of change, they pose security threats as understood in the traditional sense. These radical fundamentalists aim at the “ultimate construction of a universal Islamic state,” and argue that “jihad is sanctioned by God and it is the only means to resurrect the Islamic state.”

¹³ Leon T. Hadar, “What Green Peril?” *Foreign Affairs* 72:2 (Spring 1993): 35.

¹⁴ Fundamentalism is defined as the “strict maintenance of the ancient or fundamental doctrines of any religion or ideology.” Another definition would suggest that “fundamentalism indicates a certain intellectual stance that claims to derive political principles from a timeless divine text.” It is also defined as a “rejection of modernity and its secular variant in both democratic and non-democratic societies.” For all these definitions, see Milton-Edwards, *Islamic Fundamentalism*, 3.

¹⁵ Hadar, “What Green Peril?” 3.

¹⁶ John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 241.

Their final aim is to “spread the word of Allah throughout the world.”¹⁷ The Armed Islamic Group in Algeria and Gamaa Islamiyya and Islamic Jihad in Egypt are clear examples of such violent revolutionary groups, along with Hamas and Hezbollah in Palestine and Lebanon, which also posit political dynamics in their movements alongside armed struggle. In the past five years, Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda have been perceived as representing the major threat from groups of this type. Apart from his involvement in the 9/11 attacks, bin Laden is “suspected of funding groups involved in the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, bombings in Riyadh in 1995 and of the Khobar Towers in 1996, the killing of fifty-eight tourists at Luxor as well as the [U.S. Embassy] bombings in Tanzania and Kenya.”¹⁸

In addition to organizations such as Al Qaeda or Islamic Jihad, *states* constructing their identities according to the fundamentalist version of Islam might also present this type of traditional security threat. Iran is a typical case of state-sponsored militant fundamentalism. Since Ayatollah Khomeini seized power in Iran in 1979, the presence of military Islamic fundamentalism has dramatically increased both inside and outside the Muslim world.¹⁹ Exporting the Iranian Islamic Revolution abroad was a central tenet during Khomeini’s rule, and using force as well as terrorism was a justified means toward achieving this “holy” aim.²⁰ Thus, only nine months after the Shah’s downfall, the U.S. Embassy in Tehran was occupied, and “student militants” under the watchful eyes of the Khomeini regime held fifty-two hostages for more than four hundred days.²¹ Moreover, attacks on the U.S. Marine barracks and French troops in Beirut on 23 October 1983 were also linked to Iranian-backed radical groups in Lebanon.²² State-supported violent fundamentalism was also linked to the Libyan government in the 1988 explosion of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, which killed 270 people.²³

State-based Islamic militarism is mostly associated with terrorist activities, which does not seem to differ greatly in kind from the threats posed by the Islamic identity-based fundamentalist groups.²⁴ In reality, however, the threats that those states pose are far more serious, since they have political, economic, and military powers that the

¹⁷ Hilal Khashan, “The New World Order and the Tempo of Militant Islam,” *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 24:1 (May 1997): 12 and 20.

¹⁸ Esposito, *The Islamic Threat*, 278.

¹⁹ Fereydoun Hoveyda, *The Broken Crescent: The “Threat” of Militant Islamic Fundamentalism* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), 1 and 194.

²⁰ Mohammad Mohaddessin, *Islamic Fundamentalism: The New Global Threat* (Washington D.C.: SLP, 1993), 114.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 20–22.

²² Khashan, “The New World Order and the Tempo of Militant Islam,” 7. Even though direct responsibility for the bombings remains uncertain, Hezbollah—backed by Iran and Syria—has been associated with the Beirut attacks. Though Iranian elements were not directly involved in the incident, the U.S. District Court declared in May 2003 that the Islamic Republic of Iran was responsible for the bombings, on grounds that Iran had originally founded and financed Hezbollah. See www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/05/30/iran.barracks.bombing.

²³ Hoveyda, *The Broken Crescent*, 1.

²⁴ Mohaddessin, *Islamic Fundamentalism*; and Hoveyda, *The Broken Crescent*.

smaller groups lack. When Islamist militant groups cooperate with those states, such as Islamic Jihad's cooperation with Iran, the repercussions could obviously be much more severe.

Differences between Old and New Terrorism

Some experts argue that distinguishing between different forms of terror as "old" and "new" terrorism is rather superficial, and claim that terrorism has not undergone a change substantial enough to warrant such categorization.²⁵ Many others, however, do use this contrast in an attempt to characterize a new phase of terrorism, one that is clearly linked to fundamentalist extremism.²⁶ These experts cite four interrelated features of terrorist acts of the "new" type:

- Extreme brutality
- A frequently suicidal nature
- A war-like character (whereas earlier versions of terrorism bore greater similarity to common crime)
- International and global reach, focused on a global opponent (the United States) and a global issue (establishing a caliphate-state).²⁷

Despite the problem of defining terrorism—an issue that appears to be even more difficult and contentious for the so-called "new" terrorism than the traditional type²⁸—one could cite characteristics that distinguish the new form from its precursor. In general, the organizational structure of the new terrorist groups seems to be different from the hierarchical and cellular design of the older groups. The new structure is characterized by a highly decentralized network of independent groups. Their vocabulary has become increasingly war-like, and their weaponry has become much more sophisti-

²⁵ For a good review of the arguments for and against labeling different forms of terrorism as "old" and "new," see Doron Zimmermann, *The Transformation of Terrorism; The "New Terrorism," Impact Scalability and the Dynamic of Reciprocal Threat Perception*, No 67 (Zurich: Zürcher Beiträge zur Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktforschung, 2003).

²⁶ Kushner argues that the "new terrorism" has its origins in the Iranian Revolution, after which "Iran embarked on a systematic campaign of supporting militant Islamic fundamentalist movements throughout the Muslim world." Harvey W. Kushner, "The New Terrorism" in *The Future of Terrorism: Violence in the New Millennium*, Kushner, ed. (Thousands Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1998), 10.

²⁷ Hess, "Like Zealots and Romans," 347. For Laqueur, the specificity of the new terrorism derives from three factors: 1) The advanced weaponry they own; 2) New patterns of motive and new types of political violence movements, and; 3) Increasing diffusion of their objectives. See Walter Laqueur, *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction* (London: Oxford University Press, 2001), 4–5.

²⁸ Zimmermann, *The Transformation*, 10.

cated and deadly, bordering on weapons of mass destruction.²⁹ The “new” terrorists also appear different from their predecessors in that “they are less educated, usually quite poor and frequently the victims of repression...., are possessed by religious zeal, and less sophisticated in terms of their methods.”³⁰

For terrorists motivated by religion, “violence is first and foremost a sacramental act or divine duty. Terrorism thus assumes a transcendental dimension, and its perpetrators are consequently undeterred and unrestricted by political, moral, or practical constraints.”³¹ In contrast, secular terrorists (if we can use such a term) rarely attempt indiscriminate killing on a massive scale, “even when they have the capacity to do so,” because “such tactics are inconsistent with their political aims and thus regarded as counterproductive.” They would like to have “more people watching than dead.”³² In contrast, religious terrorists carry out large-scale, indiscriminate attacks, often seeking “to eliminate broadly defined categories of enemies” in acts driven by a “morally justified” fanaticism.³³ Religion therefore serves as a legitimizing force. The intended audience of religious terrorists may or may not have human form, and their aims may or may not reflect rationality. What they aim for is favor with God and better conditions for life after death. Thus they are oblivious to the constraints of this life (from which they expect nothing), and are unmoved by and even desire the prospect of death (i.e., martyrdom) while carrying out their terrorist acts.

*How to Counter this New Type of Religious Terrorism?*³⁴

The current wave of religious terrorism presents us with three challenges. The first challenge is to simply identify the terrorists. The current amorphous and decentralized networks of terror often lack the footprints of traditional terrorist organizations, making it more difficult for intelligence, law enforcement, and other security forces to understand their intentions and capabilities and stop them before they strike.

A second challenge is to unravel the reasons why many previously peaceful religious groups and cults suddenly embark on courses of indiscriminate terrorism. More investigative, intelligence, and academic research must be done before effective deterrent measures can be considered. Although the traditional counter-terrorism approaches that emphasize police work, leadership targeting, and intelligence sharing are

²⁹ Hess, “Like Zealots and Romans”, 347–51; and Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 196. Laqueur (*The New Terrorism*, 3–4) argues that, when “seen in historical perspective,” terrorism “has seldom been more than a nuisance.... This is no longer true today. ... For the first time in history, weapons of enormous destructive power are both readily acquired and harder to track. ... In the near future it will be technologically possible to kill thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands, not to mention the toll in panic that is likely to ensue. In brief, there has been a radical transformation, if not revolution, in the character of terrorism.”

³⁰ Zimmermann, *The Transformation*, 25.

³¹ Hoffman, “Old Madness, New Methods,” 4.

³² Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 196.

³³ Hoffman, “Old Madness, New Methods,” 4–5; and Ian O. Lesser, et al., *Countering New Terrorism* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1999), vii.

³⁴ Summarized in large part from Hoffman, “Old Madness, New Methods,” 5–8.

still necessary, they have become less relevant and effective as means to combat the new terrorism.³⁵ Given the religious terrorists' fundamentally alienated world views and often extreme, resolutely uncompromising demands, strategies successfully used in the past—such as political concessions, financial rewards, amnesties, and other personal inducements—would now be not only irrelevant but impractical. Nor are military responses entirely relevant. Even if terrorist groups are militarily destroyed, their ideology may survive, and can even be strengthened by the martyrdom of its servants. Research shows that military responses, while disruptive in the short term, tend to drive terrorists underground, encourage innovation, engender public sympathy, and sometimes even build support for the underdog.

The third challenge is to overcome the profound sense of alienation and isolation of these religious movements. A bridge needs to be built between mainstream society and the extremists so that they do not feel threatened and forced to withdraw into heavily-armed compounds or to engage in preemptive acts of violence directed against what they perceive as menacing, predatory societies. Preemptive educational programs to mitigate grassroots alienation and polarization of societies are important to stop the spread of intolerant beliefs before they take hold and can be exploited by extremists.

To counter this new kind of terrorism, a two-way strategy—one that is both top-down and bottom-up—could be suggested. Working from the top down, the international community should cooperate to de-legitimize state-sponsored terrorism.³⁶ This strategy addresses a situation in which most of the “new” terrorists often appear to be the victims of oppression at the hands of either their own states or an occupier, real or imagined.

Second, collaboration among states is no longer sufficient to fight the new terrorism. What is needed is an international real-time coordination of security forces, which is hard (if not impossible) to achieve. Efforts to reinforce and broaden prohibitions against the funding of terrorist organizations must also be implemented. Lacking political and financial support from other states, terrorists would not be able to move so freely and inflict widespread damage.

De-politicizing the definition of terrorism is also a crucial step. This would create objective judgments for state commitments. As it is, the old adage “one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter” continues to be true despite countless attempts to produce a workable definition of *terrorism* and *terrorists*. One attempt to define the terms can be found in the *Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism*, which says, “All cases of struggle by whatever means, including armed struggle, against foreign occupation and aggression for liberation and self-determination, in accordance with the principles of international law, shall not be regarded as a [terrorist] offense. This provision shall not apply to any act prejudicing the territorial integrity of any

³⁵ Mona Yacoubian and Paul Stares, “Rethinking War on Terror,” *USIPeace Briefing* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, September 2005), 1. Available at www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2005/0907_terror.html.

³⁶ For details, see, Steven Simon and Jeff Martini, “Terrorism: Denying Al Qaeda Its Popular Support,” *The Washington Quarterly* 28:1 (Winter 2004-05): 136–38.

Arab state.”³⁷ According to this interpretation, unless Arab League members are threatened, “liberation movements”—regardless of how they operate or who they target—would not be considered “terrorism.”

Finally, it should not be forgotten that the term *democratization* encompasses more than elections. Democracy is based on values, institutions, and the rule of law, elements that enable and further the progress of civil society.³⁸ By the same token, it is clear that democratization alone cannot solve the problem of fundamentalist terrorism; elections alone would not mean democratization. First of all, Al Qaeda and like-minded groups are not fighting for democracy in the Muslim world—they are fighting to impose their vision of an Islamic state. Moreover, terrorist organizations are not mass-based structures, and they are not organized according to democratic principles. They coalesce around strong leaders and a few dedicated followers. Most often, one would not expect that, when these groups lose elections, they would simply move into political opposition rather than pursue armed militancy.³⁹ Second, no one can predict the course a new democracy might take. The public opinion surveys and recent elections in the Arab world show that the advent of democratic elections will likely produce new Islamist governments, as was the case in Algeria in the 1990s and in Palestine, where Hamas won elections in January 2006.⁴⁰ Third, without the proper liberal political infrastructure, maturation of the political system, and development of strong-rooted secular, nationalist, liberal, and socialist political organizations, elections in most Middle Eastern states will be dominated by religious groups. This would only empower fundamentalists in many Middle Eastern Islamic countries, instead of producing democracies.

To counter terrorism, the bottom-up approach is as necessary as the top-down approach.⁴¹ In this context, terrorist groups should be denied access to their bases of popular support. Governments must be intricately connected to and truly representative of their citizens. When these conditions exist, everyone will be better represented in the system, and democracy (with the caveat above) will have a better chance to succeed. Second, because terrorism is still fundamentally a sub-national, voluntary phenomenon, perceptions must be changed at the community level to prevent terrorism. Changing perceptions would encourage the development of local institutions, particularly universal education, that promote acceptable democratic values. The survival of fundamentalist Islamist networks depends on the continuing appeal of their radical ide-

³⁷ Arab League, *The Arab Convention for Suppression of Terrorism*, adopted by the Council of Arab Ministers of the Interior and the Council of Arab Ministers of Justice, Cairo (April 1998). Available at: www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/league/terrorism98.htm.

³⁸ Moshe Yaalon, “Principles in Countering Terror Threats,” address to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy’s Intelligence Summit, Arlington, VA (19 February 2006), 6. Available at: www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC07.php?CID=282.

³⁹ Gregory F. Gause, “Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?” *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 2005): 4. Available at: www.foreignaffairs.org/20050901faessay84506/f-gregor-gause-iii/.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 12.

⁴¹ Simon and Martini, “Terrorism: Denying Al Qaeda Its Popular Support,” 138–41.

ology. In the absence of counter-propaganda, both literate and illiterate Muslims view the ideology of global jihad as compatible with Islamic theology. This needs to be countered at the local level with equally strong arguments reclaiming Islam's peaceful heritage from extremist and fundamentalist groups. Neither the Western powers nor secular Muslims can do this. The responsibility here rests with the religious leadership in the Muslim countries. The Western powers will have to confine their role to supporting already existing and growing intellectual movements that are trying to reform Muslim societies.⁴²

Curbing terrorists' access to the tools of propaganda (television, press, Internet, etc.) is vital, because propaganda plays a central role in recruiting members and generating support for terrorist organizations. Most liberal Western democracies, which have strong traditions of freedom of expression, tolerate terrorist propaganda up to the point that it becomes violent within their borders. Governments can no longer afford to permit terrorist support networks to exist on the grounds that they pose no direct, immediate threat.

Finally, the social conditions under which terrorists groups are able to flourish and which they use to exploit the frustrations of the disenfranchised should be addressed with a new level of determination. Poverty, lack of social mobility, poor educational infrastructure, and denial of basic human rights all contribute to the hopelessness that terrorists exploit. More importantly, a concerted effort must be made to solve the Muslim world's ongoing conflicts and perceived injustices. The situations in Iraq, Palestine, Kashmir, and Chechnya (to name only a few) fuel the Islamic fundamentalists' arguments. Similarly, alienation of Muslim groups within European countries and elsewhere should be addressed.

Conclusions

Since the events of September 2001, the world has witnessed the tragic character of terrorism emanating from religious fundamentalism. Even though the attacks of 9/11 were carried out by marginalized extremists, Islam, as a religion and way of life, provided the main identifier of that group's sense of self. As one scholar has observed, "Bin Laden and his followers drew on a variety of traditions within political Islam to justify their actions aimed at challenging the Western presence in the Middle East."⁴³ This suggests that Islamic identity-based security threats derive from the violent terrorist actions of radicals and extremists who construct their identities along Islamic lines. Since their identities are shaped within their understanding of so-called "Islamic traditions," they constantly refer to Islamic concepts such as "jihad" to justify their militant and terrorist actions. Although they usually corrupt and twist the meanings of such concepts, their frequent usage of Islamic terminology nevertheless encourages association of Islam with fundamentalism and even radicalism/terrorism. Thus the per-

⁴² Abdeslam M. Maghraoui, *American Foreign Policy and Islamic Renewal*, Special Report No. 164 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, July 2006), 1.

⁴³ Fred Halliday, *Islam and the Myth of Confrontation* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2003), x.

ception of many Islamic groups in the West as “bearded clerics, gun-wielding and masked supporters of Islam, arms dealers, and a secret world of covert operations and international terrorism” emerges and recreates itself with every new terrorist attack in the name of “Islam.”⁴⁴

However, equating fundamentalists with radicals and terrorists is misguided at the outset, and Islam as a religion should not be seen as a threat in itself. This was the logic that forced President Bush to apologize when he inaccurately used the word “crusade” to describe the post-9/11 anti-terrorism campaign, directly connoting a war between the forces of Christendom and Islam. Therefore, a distinction should be made between Islam as a religion and militant Islam as a threat. If this delineation is not clearly drawn, the medieval specter of the religious wars might once again haunt the international order. The “cartoon crisis” of early 2006 attests how easily ridicule can get out of hand in today’s distrustful yet interconnected world to ignite a much-dreaded clash between civilizations. In such a case, Huntington’s theory would become a sad, self-fulfilling prophecy. Clearly, there is much the world can do to prevent and curb the spread of terrorism and its effects. We need more common sense, a longer attention span, patience, and a resolute response.

⁴⁴ Milton-Edwards, *Islamic Fundamentalism Since 1945*, 9.

Countering Ideological Support for Terrorism in Europe: Muslim Brotherhood and Hizb ut-Tahrir—Allies or Enemies?

Zeyno Baran *

Since the events of 11 September 2001, Western efforts to counter ideological support for terrorism have primarily focused on defeating Al Qaeda and its violent allies. Many strategists have argued that the “Global War on Terror” or the “Long War” really is a war against “Islamist terrorism” or “(violent) jihadism.”¹ Almost all of the Sunni extremists that are members of groups falling under these rhetorical umbrellas are drawn from the conservative Wahhabi/Salafi tradition of Islam, but not all Wahhabi/Salafi individuals and organizations promote violence. Ergo, the argument goes, one can divide and conquer the enemy by strengthening those Wahhabi/Salafi groups that denounce violence, so that they would then confront their violent brethren. This thinking has led policy makers across Europe (and the United States) to conclude that groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and Hizb ut-Tahrir, which are Islamist in orientation but do not necessarily call for terrorist acts, could be “engaged” and turned into “allies” in this war.²

This paper argues against this approach, and suggests that strategies based on such a framework will certainly lead to defeat in the “war of ideas,” since they mistake the nature and ultimate goals of the enemy. The deciding factor in choosing allies in this war cannot be based on tactics—that is, on whether or not a group has chosen to pursue violent methods. Rather, it must be based on ideology, on whether a group is Islamist or not. That means, in essence, that a non-violent, British-born, seemingly successfully integrated Islamist cannot be considered an ally in this struggle. However, an ultra-conservative Muslim immigrant to Europe—one who does not even speak any Western languages, but rejects Islamist ideology—can be.

It is not possible to counter a powerful ideology without offering a better one. There is simply no easy or quick remedy to a problem (radical Jihadism) that has emerged as a combined result of decades of concerted efforts on the part of the Islamists and failed policies on the part of the Europeans. A comprehensive and long-term strategy that addresses both these challenges is needed. Therefore, this essay will

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¹ Recent books discussing jihadism include: Mary Habeck, *Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006); Efraim Karsh, *Islamic Imperialism: A History* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006); and Andrew G. Bostom, ed., *Legacy of Jihad: Islamic Holy War and the Fate of Non-Muslims* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2005).

² Based on author’s discussions with European and American government officials throughout 2006. In this context, the term *Islamist* is used to refer to groups that advocate for the use of Islam (and Sharia, or Islamic law) as the only basis for the legal and political system that governs the economic, social, and judicial mechanisms of the nation-state.

first discuss the “ideology of the enemy” by focusing on two of Europe’s strongest and fastest growing Islamist organizations: the Muslim Brotherhood and Hizb ut-Tahrir. In the second part, the article will discuss Europe’s failed integration models that created the ideological vacuum that made it possible for these Islamist groups not only to find refuge in Europe, but also to make it a stronghold of extremism.

Inability to Define the Enemy and the Threat

Even though over five years have passed since 9/11, there is still no common definition of the “enemy,” since there is still no clear understanding of who or what is being fought in this “war.” The term *Islamofascism* came close, but it only made sense to a relatively small group of academics, analysts, and policy makers that properly understood the concept.³ In the correct sense, the term refers to the advent of a totalitarian ideology seeking global domination that has cloaked itself in religious terminology (in this case, Islamic), thereby posing an even greater ideological threat to the West than atheistic communism ever did.

The inability in Western societies to define the enemy is in part due to the challenge policy makers face in disseminating their message to multiple audiences. The concept of Islamofascism resonated with those who understood how the ideologies of fascism (of which Nazism was the most virulent strain) and communism had taken such a strong hold over otherwise reasonable people that they literally cheered murderous activities as being necessary to achieving the overarching goal of each movement. Similarly, the current global challenge is a powerful ideology that has caused countless otherwise reasonable Muslims around the world to cheer acts of terrorism.

Yet, how does one communicate the nature of such an adversary to the millions of Muslims who have never studied nor had a reason to hear about the destruction caused by these other totalitarian ideologies? How many European Muslims know this history? When even secular, democratic, and largely Westernized Turks are not taught the history of World War II, thus leaving them unable to understand the dangers of the wide circulation of Hitler’s *Mein Kampf* in their country, how can one expect impoverished Muslims in the slums of Pakistan or Morocco to comprehend what “Islamofascism” means? To them, any term that combines “Islam” and “fascism” is a clear sign that their religion is being attacked, validating claims that “the war on terrorism” is indeed a euphemism for “the war on Islam.”

In fact, Islamists are constantly struggling to ensure that it is not just the poor and uneducated members of the Muslim community, but *all* of the world’s Muslims that consider their faith and identity to be under attack. They often do so by reminding their audiences of U.S. President George W. Bush’s unfortunate statement in the days after

³ President Bush first used the term on 6 October 2005 in a speech at the National Endowment for Democracy; available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/10/20051006-3.html. See also Stephen Schwartz, “What is ‘Islamofascism’?” *The Weekly Standard* (17 August 2006); available at <http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/012/593ajdua.asp>.

9/11: “This crusade, this war on terrorism, is going to take a while.”⁴ To Islamists, this was indeed a declaration that America was waging the final phase of a Western war against Islam that had begun in the medieval era. An increasing number of Muslims even believe that the United States is orchestrating the sectarian killings in Iraq, hoping that a Shiite-Sunni religious war will keep the *umma* (the global Muslim community) bogged down in internal strife. As long as this ideology continues to reach Muslim hearts and minds, there can be no end to Islamist terrorism.

There is a continuing debate within Islamist groups whether or not to utilize acts of terrorism and violence, but this is primarily a debate about *tactics*, not about *principles*. Most non-jihadi groups—such as Tablighi Jamaat, Hizb ut-Tahrir, the Muslim Brotherhood (or al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun), and Jamaat al-Islami—all claim to be non-militant, but in reality are unwilling to condemn acts of terrorism. They not only do nothing to oppose violence, they even teach, preach, and promote militant ideology. Moreover, they are neither bound by constraints of time (their view holds that they can be in this “long war” for many decades) or location (the new caliphate that is their goal can be established anywhere, including in Western Europe). Hence, many do not see a need to resort to terrorism during this “long war,” since they are not seeking to achieve short-term effects.

The Islamist threat is a result of decades of networking, infrastructure building, and intellectual and ideological preparation. These groups have spent billions of dollars in creating networks of like-minded supporters, and have worked hard at social engineering (i.e., Islamization) for nearly four decades. Their work begins with the Islamization of education (and thus of the individual), then of the family unit, and finally of society. It also includes the Islamization of history, juxtaposing the glorious past of Islam with the injustices Muslims have faced over the centuries, and stressing the ability to bring down an empire if Muslims are united (according to the Islamist explanation for the fall of the Soviet Union). Thanks to mass communication media and new technologies, Islamists are now much more effective in bombarding young Muslims with these messages. Furthermore, the Islamist revolutionary vanguard is no longer limited to the Arabic-speaking Middle Easterner; the Islamists and terrorists of today and tomorrow are the smart, tech- and-media-savvy citizens of the West.

Europe has served as a particularly fertile ground for these efforts; in fact, Western Europe today represents the ideological center of Islamism. Many of Europe’s Muslims believe that Islam is compatible with secular and liberal democracy as well as with basic civil liberties. However, the Islamists argue that Muslims must live only under Islamic laws, and push for the establishment of parallel societies—including the introduction of *sharia*, or Islamic law. These Muslims often belong to an ideological network that is using politicized Islam to drive a wedge between Muslims and non-Muslims in Europe—an effort in which they are currently succeeding.

⁴ President George W. Bush, “Remarks by the President Upon Arrival,” 16 September 2001; available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010916-2.html.

Two of these movements, the Muslim Brotherhood and Hizb ut-Tahrir, are by far the most effective groups in Islamist circles in Europe, and they continue to grow. Given the confusion many in the West have about the ideology and strategy of these two organizations, some even are trying to “engage” them and turn them into allies in countering ideological support for terrorism. The next section will review the basic key aspects of each group’s ideology before demonstrating that they are not a solution to the problem, but in fact are at its core.

The Ideology and Goals of the Muslim Brotherhood and Hizb ut-Tahrir

Those policy makers who argue that the Muslim Brotherhood is a “moderate” organization seem to disregard its ideology, history, and strategy. They even seem to disregard the Brotherhood’s own statements. The following excerpt from its “Official English Website,” www.ikhwanweb.com, is instructive:

To confront the Western and U.S. domination, the Muslim Brotherhood thinks that fighting domination requires adopting several factors, including:

1. Spreading Islamic concepts that reject submission to humiliation, and incite to fighting it, and to be on to rise to support the oppressed.
2. Reviving the will of liberation and independence in the peoples, and sowing the spirit of resistance.
3. Supporting Hamas government with all spiritual and material and with experience; to spare the Palestinian people’s need for Western countries which are biased against its freedom and interests.
4. Forming an international relation and a public opinion that fights injustice and seeks establishing rights, justice and peace in the world.
5. Activating the economic boycott against imperialist states, and also boycotting their cultural production.
6. Achieving political, economic and social internal reform, and removing the food and technological gaps with imperialist states.
7. Working on correcting the image of Islam among Westerners, and clarify the truth of our fair causes, and removing the deformed image about Islam and Muslims.
8. Spreading popular movements in Europe and South America opposing US domination.

It is true that most Ikhwanis do not directly call for terrorist acts, are open to dialogue with the West, and participate in democratic elections. Yet this is not sufficient for them to qualify as “moderate,” especially when their ideology is so extreme. As an example, their often-quoted motto declares that, “Allah is our objective, the Prophet is our leader, the Koran is our law, jihad is our way, dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope.”

The Muslim Brotherhood emerged in 1928, four years after the Ottoman caliphate was abolished. In trying to answer “what went wrong” within Islam that allowed the caliphate to fall, Sayyid Qutb—an Egyptian author and bureaucrat who was the movement’s key ideologue—was inspired by the works of the thirteenth-century thinker Ibn Taymiyya and his eighteenth-century ideological successor Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. He thus believed that the Islamic world’s decline could be reversed, but only

if a small group of “real” Muslims emulated the ways of the Prophet Muhammad and worked to replace existing governments in Muslim lands with Islamic regimes. Accordingly, followers of Qutb desire the overthrow of their current governments; once this is accomplished, they plan to declare armed jihad against non-Muslim states. They believe that it is the duty of all Muslims to bring about such change so that they can remedy the decline of Muslim societies around the world.

The Muslim Brotherhood network first came to Europe in the 1950s, following the severe crackdown against the group after its failed attempts to overthrow Middle Eastern governments. When Saudi Arabia established the Muslim World League in 1962 in order to spread the teachings of Wahhabism, funds started flowing into Brotherhood-led mosques and other *dawa* (preaching) activities. While at first Europe was seen as a base from which the group could launch its struggle against Middle Eastern regimes, it soon became another front for the spreading of Brotherhood ideology.⁵

Even more extremist than the Brotherhood is Hizb ut-Tahrir, which was created in 1953 by Taqiuddin al-Nabhani, a former Ikhwan from Jerusalem. He left the Brotherhood because he found its ideology to be too moderate, and too accommodating of the West. Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), which translates as “Party of Liberation,” seeks to “liberate” Muslims from Western influence (whether cultural, economic, political, or social) so that they are “free” to bring back Islamic rule. HT holds that Western civilization and Islam are mutually exclusive systems vying for ideological dominance within Muslim societies. The only way to reestablish the kind of Islamic society promulgated by the Prophet is to “liberate” Muslims from the thoughts, systems, and laws of *kufir* (nonbelievers), and replace the Judeo-Christian-dominated nation-state system with a borderless *umma* ruled by a new caliph. HT believes in the need for “re-education” of Muslims so that they reject previously held ideologies—whether nationalism, socialism, Western democracy and culture, etc—in favor of an Islamic one.⁶

HT’s ideology is simple, and is aimed at unifying the *umma*. Whereas many other Islamist groups insist that only their particular religious interpretation is valid, or focus on a single issue (such as Palestine or Kashmir) to the exclusion of all others, HT maintains its focus on a broader goal of uniting all Muslims under the Islamist banner. It thus emphasizes issues of more general concern, such as the so-called clash of civilizations and the injustices suffered by Muslims worldwide.

HT’s key objective, which has not changed for over half a century, is to overthrow existing governments (thus removing the artificial barriers separating Muslim states) and form a transnational Islamic state ruled by an elected caliph. To reach this goal, HT envisions a three-step social engineering process: forming small cells to patiently

⁵ For a detailed review of the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe, see Lorenzo Vidino, “Aims and Methods of Europe’s Muslim Brotherhood,” in *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, Vol. 4 (Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute, November 2006); available at www.futureofmuslimworld.com/research/pubID.55/pub_detail.asp.

⁶ Zeyno Baran, “Hizb ut-Tahrir. Islam’s Political Insurgency” (Washington, D.C.: The Nixon Center, December 2004); available at http://www.eurasianpolicy.org/files/publications/Political_Insurgency.pdf.

disseminate ideas, targeted specifically at a cadre of elites in government, military, and academic circles; widening these cells to disseminate HT's *dawa* in order to bring ideological unity to society; and finally, when a critical mass is achieved, taking revolutionary action, i.e. overthrowing the government. The caliph will then be charged with further disseminating Islamic teaching through *dawa* and militant jihad. Clearly, HT's methodology in pursuit of these goals is clandestine, as it is not possible to work openly towards the overthrow of governments.

As an organization, HT officially opposes active participation in militant jihad prior to the establishment of the caliphate. There is, however, an exception to this position: if "infidels" attack a Muslim country, then members of HT living in that country are required to resist. Since, in HT's view, no truly Muslim country exists today, HT members are thus not obligated to participate in militant jihad. However, in the context of the current global campaign of jihadist activity, there is internal disagreement over whether to maintain the traditional gradualist approach to infiltration and revolution or to embrace more activist policies. As a result, HT members have recently been allowed to wage jihad, provided that they do so as individuals rather than as group members.

The Party of Liberation views the United States as the cultural "occupying" power in the Muslim world, and hence sees the U.S. as its main enemy. This reasoning is crucial to the justification of terrorist attacks against American targets. Recent HT publications have included titles such as "Attack of the West to destroy Islam as an Ideology and System." Others promote the idea that, since the U.S. declared a "war on Islam," jihad against Americans and Jews is acceptable. These publications are read widely by HT's dispersed membership, and circulate easily via the Internet. One core book studied by recruits preparing for membership is entitled *Terrorism*, which provides a detailed justification for the use of violence. HT thus acts as an incubator for extremism, preparing future terrorists with its ideology, propaganda, and recruitment process. I have thus described it in the past as a "conveyor belt" for terrorism.

While HT and the Muslim Brotherhood diverge in their tactics, the two movements have convergent ideological and strategic aims. There are two main differences between the two groups, and these are both tactical in nature. First, in pursuit of their long-term goals, the Brotherhood works with governments, while HT seeks to overthrow them. Second, they target different sectors of society: the Brotherhood recruits at the grassroots level, while HT appeals to the intellectually curious and well educated. Given their core beliefs and objectives, and considering the global context in which they operate, it should be obvious that neither of them can become true allies of the West in the "long war" against jihadist terror.

The Threat in Europe

Both the Muslim Brotherhood and Hizb ut-Tahrir pose a serious threat to the social fabric of Europe, especially in countries with large Muslim populations. Europe's difficulty in absorbing and assimilating its Muslim populations—not just immigrants, but also those whose parents and even grandparents were born on European soil—has left many Muslims without a sense of belonging or any clear identity. Both the Muslim

Brotherhood and HT have been increasingly able to provide both; when people join these groups, they are definitively part of the *umma*.

These Islamist movements take advantage of freedoms of speech, assembly, and the like to spread hate-filled, anti-Semitic, and anti-constitutional ideas. In the process, they actively and openly create a fifth column of activists working to undermine the very systems under which the Western societies live. They are also working to create self-segregated societies, in a process that has been called “voluntary apartheid.” This process has been enthusiastically supported by the Muslim Brotherhood, whose unofficial spiritual leader Yusuf al-Qaradawi has repeatedly advised European Muslims (from his base in Qatar) that they need to create their own “Muslim ghettos” to avoid the risk of cultural assimilation. If assimilation can be avoided, *sharia* law can eventually be introduced to govern these separate societies.

Having perfected their methodology and rhetoric for the intellectual and political struggle in the West, Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Muslim Brotherhood are showing themselves to be much more effective than Western governments in the war of ideas and in the competition for the hearts and minds of Europe’s Muslims. The next generation of terrorist facilitators produced by them will accordingly be even more dangerous: smart, educated, technically skilled, comfortable operating in Western societies, and able to interact with the media.

As mentioned earlier, groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Muslim Brotherhood are engaged in a long-term social engineering project, whereby they hope to lead Muslims to reject Western norms of pluralism, individual rights, and the rule of law. It is therefore critically important to recognize that at the core of Islamist terrorism is the ideological machinery that works to promote sedition and hatred. While the West can successfully defeat active terrorists, responding effectively to threats posed by these more ideologically and socially oriented groups is far more difficult, especially if they are not directly involved in violence. If no action is taken, then Islamist networks will continue to grow across Europe.

How to Counter Islamism in Europe?

The prevailing view—that Islamists should be co-opted into existing political systems—simply will not work. The fallacy in this policy of appeasement lies in assuming that an individual or group that *sounds* moderate in fact *is* moderate. Often, Islamists are willing to make superficial concessions while continuing to hold an uncompromising worldview—one that they share with fellow Muslim audiences when they are confident that the West is not paying attention.

Islamists also cannot be weakened using a “divide and conquer” strategy. While Islamist groups do compete over Muslim recruits in Europe, and while they often bear considerable animosity towards one another, they will respond to such a strategy by uniting under the umbrella of the *umma*. This is precisely what happened when Prime Minister Tony Blair decided to proscribe HT after the 7 July 2005 bombings in London: HT reached out to the various Islamist organizations, including the Muslim Brotherhood (despite their history of differences), and urged them to stand united, or “be the next in line to be proscribed.” It is particularly unfortunate that British

Islamists succeeded in uniting, while various government entities tasked with addressing the challenge of extremism are more divided than ever before.

So what can be done? The starting point must be a broader recognition that Europe (like the U.S.) is confronting a thriving ideological movement—one that has been well-funded for decades, during which time it has established networks, mosques, schools, charities, and other organizations in pursuit of a social engineering project on a global scale. The debate on how to counter ideological support for terrorism therefore has to focus on the political insurgency inside Europe, before it becomes a violent uprising.

Once this is recognized, then European policymakers and intellectuals will start posing tougher questions to the self-declared “Muslim spokesmen,” rather than accepting their assurances of “moderation” at face value.⁷ They will also begin enforcing laws against seditious activity and hate speech. In cases in which existing laws are not applicable, then amendments will be introduced. And they will find many Muslim allies along the way—especially those who are concerned about their children being sucked into a self-destructive ideology, along with millions of secular and liberal Muslims who prefer to live their lives as individuals, rather than members of a monolithic *umma*.

While taking a firm stand against Islamists is critical in countering ideological support for terrorism, this approach will have only partial success unless Muslims in Europe genuinely want to become “Europeans,” and are welcomed as such. To win the hearts and minds of their Muslim citizens, Europe needs to become something that they want to become a part of—something more attractive to them than the *umma*.

A New Framework: Tolerant Integration

Central to the challenge posed by radicalism is the decades-long inability of European states to promote lasting integration of their Muslim citizens. European governments have so far pursued two principal approaches: *multiculturalism* and *assimilation*. On one end of the spectrum is the model of multiculturalism (pursued primarily in the Netherlands and the U.K.), which calls for embracing the cultural diversity of all the peoples of Europe, including the growing Muslim immigrant communities. Casting its net of acceptance too wide, this policy resulted in the toleration of beliefs and practices that are entirely at odds with European values, including honor killings and the preaching of hatred by imams. On the other end is the model of assimilation (adopted mainly in France), which ignores cultural and religious differences in order to forge a national identity based on common civic ideals.

Neither of these approaches, nor the intermediate approaches adopted by countries such as Denmark and Germany, has worked well. Instead, rooted as they are in a common attitude of indifference towards European Muslims, they have produced a dual sense of alienation—both secular and spiritual—that is most prevalent among second-

⁷ Martin Bright, “When Progressives Treat with Reactionaries: The British State’s Flirtation with Radical Islamism,” *Policy Exchange* (July 2006); available at www.policyexchange.org.uk/images/libimages/176.pdf.

and third-generation European Muslims.⁸

The brutal murder in November 2004 of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh and the London subway bombings in July 2005 underscored the shortcomings of the policies of multiculturalism in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, in which well-intentioned efforts to embrace immigrants' "cultural diversity" resulted in the social, economic, cultural, and political marginalization of Muslim communities. Despite official efforts to discourage discrimination, many Dutch and British Muslims felt excluded from the mainstream cultural lives of their countries due to an official doctrine that defined them in terms of their religious affiliation. And many first-generation immigrants, finding no incentives or pressures to participate as citizens, quickly reconciled themselves to their exclusive affiliation as members of an ethnic or religious community outside of the mainstream. Meanwhile, as the November 2005 outbreak of rioting throughout France has demonstrated, the official French policy of remaining largely unconcerned with the religious and cultural identities of its citizens has also failed to avert the problem of marginalization. In short, Europe's failure to integrate its Muslim communities has helped to create immigrant ghettos where poverty, unemployment, discrimination, and prejudice serve to cut off European Muslims from society as a whole. These populations then become easy prey for Islamist recruiters such as the Muslim Brotherhood or Hizb ut-Tahrir.

Islamists also take advantage of the spiritual alienation plaguing many second- and third-generation immigrants in Europe's Muslim ghettos. Angry about perceived injustices to Muslims in domestic and international politics, many of these marginalized individuals yearn for spiritual fulfillment. Yet their communities often lack imams and religious instructors of local origin, leaving these European Muslim youth susceptible to propaganda and sermons that preach a narrow and hateful strain of Islam. Indeed, Islamists have for several decades built mosques in the Muslim ghettos of European cities, and have staffed them with imams trained in the Wahhabi/Salafi schools of Islam.

The Muslim Brotherhood and HT take advantage of both kinds of alienation that lead to an identity crisis among European Muslims. They argue that, since Muslims will never be fully accepted as "European," Europe's Muslims need to be proud of their Muslim identity and do not need to integrate into the social and political life of their European nations. To immigrant populations facing social exclusion, they provide a strong sense of community through their comprehensive local networks, which form virtual parallel societies. Meanwhile, to those in search of a spiritual direction, they provide easy, straightforward answers to challenging questions—answers that invaria-

⁸ I have given several briefings to U.S. and European officials on this dual sense of alienation, and am currently working on a book that will address the issues outlined in this section. Some of these concepts have already been incorporated into U.S. Department of State official language. See, for example, Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, "Overview of Islamist Extremism in Europe," Testimony before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, D.C. (5 April 2006); available at www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/64192.htm.

bly reflect the extremism of their ideology.

In light of the clear failure of existing policies of Muslim integration, it is in the security interests both of the United States and of Europe to find viable alternatives. A more effective and durable strategy for governments would be to pursue a model of *tolerant integration*, an approach that would combine a tough approach toward radical Islamism with a soft approach to Muslims at large. Over time, this approach could lead to the development of a new school of thought, a “European Islam” that reconciles the tenets of the religion with the democratic and liberal principles of Europe. Caught between the radicalism of its own Enlightenment and the radicalism of modern Islamism, Europe desperately needs such a new approach—a “European way” by which it can encourage its 20 million Muslims to become full European citizens, while refusing to compromise its fundamental principles.

Growth of the Problem: Alienation of Muslims

As the postwar “economic miracle” reached Northern Europe in the 1950s and 60s, the rate of economic growth in Europe was vastly outstripping the rate of population increase, creating a huge demand for unskilled labor. This resulted in the “guest worker” phenomenon, whereby large numbers of workers from Mediterranean countries—notably from the least-developed parts of Turkey and Morocco—were brought to countries such as Germany and the Netherlands on temporary contracts. Accordingly, governments did not pursue a conscious integration policy, seeing the newcomers in strictly economic terms. As the Swiss author Max Frisch famously noted, “We called for workers, but we got human beings.”⁹

Although guest workers were at first expected to return to their homelands, the introduction of family reunification programs soon permitted them to build ethnically-based communities in the countries in which they worked. However, given that many Muslims were not encouraged to learn local languages or to obtain further education, over time the emerging minorities increasingly found themselves on the margins of society. Confined to poor neighborhoods, most had little choice but to remain in low-paying jobs, with little room for advancement.

Despite being born in Europe, the second and third generations remained in a similarly disadvantageous situation, with lower levels of education, higher rates of unemployment, and lower incomes than the population as a whole. This lack of opportunity was compounded by legal difficulties (unlike in the United States, citizenship in most European countries is not automatically extended to all individuals born there) as well as by discrimination and prejudice from the local populations. Furthermore, many of these immigrants lacked support networks to help them integrate into European societies. The 2005 civil unrest in France brought to light the immense frustration that had built up over decades among the disaffected minority communities living in the Paris suburbs, most of which are made up of second- or third-generation European Muslims.

⁹ Max Frisch, Introduction to Alexander J. Seiler, ed., *Siamo Italiani—die Italiener: Gespräche mit italienischer Gastarbeitern* (Zurich: E. V. Z. Verlag, 1965).

Moreover, long after they had established roots in Europe, Muslims continued to be labeled as “foreigners” by mainstream society, inhibiting the growth of a European identity and leading to a profound sense of alienation. These feelings of alienation have been a prime cause of the trend towards radicalization among European Muslims. Denied the chance to be European, many have taken pride in an identity that has given them a sense of belonging—that of a Muslim, and a member of the *umma*.

Indeed, as mentioned earlier, since the 1970s Europe has become a prime recruiting ground for Islamist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and Hizb ut-Tahrir. Unable to develop their organizations or spread their ideas in their home countries due to repressive government policies, radical imams and activists from the Middle East moved to Europe to take advantage of the permissive legal environment (especially the freedoms of speech and assembly). In mosques and schools, these ideologues recruited followers among the disaffected European Muslims. In time, these strengthened extremist groups were able to re-export their ideology back to their countries of origin. Until recently, Europeans tacitly permitted this activism; under an implicit “covenant of security,” radical Islamists based in Europe could do whatever they wished in the Muslim world, so long as they did nothing to destabilize their host nations.

Years of neglect by European governments have in turn allowed these Islamists to perfect a variety of recruitment measures. Targeting the particularly vulnerable college student population, groups like HT have been able to elude attempts by university authorities to impose oversight by registering organizations under false names and by setting up recruiting stalls outside campus grounds. They also distribute propaganda at mosques and Islamic community centers, using them as indoctrination facilities. The Internet is also used as a means of approaching the younger, technologically-literate generation of Muslims who—in the absence of any spiritual guidance from their elders—are relying upon so-called “cut-and-paste Islam,” named for the selective fashion in which radicals present certain Islamic teachings, removed from their broader religious context, as a basis for their faith.

Ultimately, it is not poverty or lack of education that leads Europe’s Muslims to extremism—rather, it is the sense of alienation, rooted in issues of secular and religious identity. Many of the radical Islamists of Europe are from educated, middle-class backgrounds (among them, the 7/7 London bombers). Most are men, although women can also become extremists, including suicide bombers; in a recent report the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) highlighted a marked rise in the number of women who are becoming radicalized.¹⁰ A notable example is that of Muriel Degauque, a 38-year-old Belgian woman from a troubled background who carried out a suicide attack against U.S. forces in Iraq. There are other European-born converts to radical Islam, such as the convicted “shoe bomber” Richard Reid, born in London to an English mother and a Jamaican father; Reid converted to Islam while in prison in his early 20s. The majority of Europe’s Muslim extremists do not have a *madrassa*

¹⁰ AIVD, “Violent Jihad in the Netherlands” (2006), 39; available at www.aivd.nl/contents/pages/65582/jihad2006en.pdf.

education or a personal stake in the conflicts of the Middle East, yet all share the same sense of being marginalized by European society.

The London subway and bus bombings conclusively demonstrated that devastating attacks can be carried out on European soil by outwardly well-integrated middle-class Muslims. They also demonstrated that Europe's future, if radical Islamism goes unchecked, may look bleak. In Britain, following the July 2005 bombings, a classified MI5 document discussed the possibility of a "home-grown Islamic insurgency" that would be followed by a serious backlash against Muslims in the U.K.¹¹ Later on, a report by the AIVD analyzed the potential for conflict involving the Muslim minority, and concluded that many of the conditions that have fostered violence in other countries are also present in the Netherlands. These conditions include the presence of a destructive, exclusive ideology within segments of the Muslim community; the widespread perception of injustice; the absence of a shared narrative between the minority and the majority; the prevalence of dehumanization of the "other"; and the mutual feelings of anger and victimization among both groups, along with the resulting desire for revenge. At the moment, the West is simply unable to handle the problem at hand.

Existing Approaches and Limitations

As discussed above, Europe so far has utilized two principal policy responses to immigration. The multicultural approach, used primarily in the U.K. and the Netherlands, seeks to acknowledge the cultural, ethnic, and religious diversity of a nation's citizens and allows immigrant communities to maintain their cultural affiliation and identity, while remaining free to devise their own means of integrating with mainstream society. Though attractive in principle, this model is ultimately based on a mixture of "passive tolerance" and "passive intolerance," and has failed in both of its aims: to eliminate intolerance among the indigenous population, and to achieve integration of the immigrant population. Accordingly, the two main proponents of multiculturalism are moving away from the approach. Shaken by the brutal 2004 murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh by an Islamist extremist, the Netherlands is now instead urging immigrants to adopt "Dutch values" in order to obtain residency. Similarly, the 7/7 bombings in the U.K. have led to a partial rejection of multiculturalism in that country.

Assimilation, the second approach, is usually associated with France, though it was adopted in part by countries such as Denmark, Germany, Italy, and Spain that opted for intermediate models also including elements of multiculturalism. Assimilation seeks to minimize cultural and religious differences in order to promote a unifying national identity based on common citizenship and common values. While also attractive in principle, this approach has also proven difficult to achieve in practice. Due to restrictions on the ways in which the government can classify its citizens, French authorities are not completely aware of the number of Muslims in France, and have no way of quantifying (let alone rectifying) the significant levels of economic and educational

¹¹ Raymond Whitaker and Francis Elliott, "Intelligence chiefs warn Blair of home-grown 'insurgency'," *The Independent* (7 August 2005); available at <http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/politics/article304303.ece>.

discrimination that French Muslims face. Furthermore, the government's insistence on maintaining a uniform secular civic identity led to the controversial "headscarf law" of 2004, which bans the wearing of conspicuous religious symbols in public schools (while the law applies to all conspicuous religious symbols, it was prompted by Muslim schoolgirls' desire to wear head coverings to school). Many Muslims believe, moreover, that their economic needs are being ignored as well. Frustration has therefore risen to a boiling point, as demonstrated by the widespread riots that began in the heavily Muslim suburb of Paris, Clichy-sous-Bois, in late October of 2005.

In France, the debate about the failure of assimilation has not yet begun in earnest. Unlike in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, where the prevailing model of managing immigration came under criticism as early as the 1970s, the French have continued to cherish the principles of assimilation, and have avoided expressing genuine understanding of the unique conditions faced by French Muslims. Even as news of those conditions finally began to reach the headlines in the autumn of 2005, Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy only exacerbated the situation by using the vulgarism *racaille* ("scum") to describe the crowds of immigrant youth.

However, after the riots finally ended, a consensus began emerging on the need to do a better job in addressing the socio-economic requirements of the residents of the *banlieues*. These measures, which include economic-development programs, job-creation initiatives, and improved social services, are intended to help French Muslims prosper and ultimately integrate with local economies. The question remains: will France attempt to hold on to its strict emphasis on assimilating into the national culture, or will it compromise in an effort to better integrate its Muslim population?

In general, regardless of the model of integration, European governments until recently did not recognize the need for Muslims to play a meaningful and respected role in the civic and political life of their countries of residence. Many European countries are only now beginning a painful debate over the indifference they have shown toward their Muslim communities, reflecting a deep prejudice that European values must be applied only to "native" Europeans.

Europeans have also only gradually begun to recognize and to try to reverse the trend toward spiritual alienation among Muslims. However, they are hampered by their lack of theological knowledge about Islam and a dearth of European-based theological authority to shape religious attitudes within Muslim communities. This frequently leaves Europeans incapable of distinguishing moderates from extremists who cloak themselves in tolerant rhetoric.

Ultimately, Europe needs a comprehensive new approach of "tolerant integration," one that combines necessary actions against radicalism with efforts to build trust with European Muslim communities. If European governments fail to include Muslims themselves in their efforts to contend with the problem of integration, they risk undermining the legitimacy and weakening the effectiveness of any eventual policy approach, thus allowing the dangerous sense of resentment to continue to fester in marginalized Muslim communities. Moreover, the risk of dangerous resentment extends further still; as discussed below, a failure to develop and implement an inclusive, broad-based approach will only encourage the growing trend toward a disastrous anti-

Muslim backlash in Europe. And this in turn will further validate the arguments of the Islamists that there is indeed a “war on Islam” under way in the West.

Rousing the Sleeping Giant: Promoting Integration while Preventing a Backlash

In the early 1990s, as European peoples and governments began to accept the reality of the permanent Muslim presence in Europe, many politicians and intellectuals on the right began to criticize the prevailing dogma of multiculturalism. According to these critics, the policy of multiculturalism sowed the seeds of demographic disaster. Calling attention to the dramatic increase in segregation, especially the rise of Muslim ghettos in major cities, they argued that this demographic trend posed a threat to the social fabric of their countries. To these observers, the inclusive rhetoric of multiculturalism concealed a reality of exclusion and indifference. Since most immigrants either belonged to the working class or to the ranks of the unemployed, their paths and those of Europe’s commercial, cultural, and political elites never crossed—thus allowing elites to cling to their myth of an inclusive society. However, the indigenous lower classes knew better, since it was to their neighborhoods that immigrants were flocking. While fleeing to the new suburbs, the “native” working-class Europeans brought with them their sense of fear, uneasiness, and even hatred toward the new arrivals.

Yet, in the political and cultural climate that prevailed at the time, any negative reference to immigration or immigrants was dismissed as racism, and placed outside the bounds of acceptable political discourse. As early as 1968, Enoch Powell (a leading British Conservative politician) decided that it would be a “betrayal” of his constituents to maintain his silence. In what would later be known as the “Rivers of Blood” speech, he spoke out against the dangers of continued immigration of non-white residents of Commonwealth countries to Great Britain. However, despite considerable displays of public support (ranging from a series of strikes in London’s docklands to a wave of over 100,000 letters of support), he was dismissed from his position in the shadow cabinet, and never again assumed a leadership role in politics. Over time, tension mounted between second-generation immigrants, who were not satisfied with life in segregated communities, and working-class indigenous Europeans, who saw immigrants as economic competitors determined to impose a foreign way of life on the local population. Yet the taboo against any debate that might potentially be branded as “racist” remained so pervasive that Europe’s political class did not respond to these growing tensions.

All of this changed with September 11. Suddenly, the taboos broke down, and open debates began to take place about Muslim immigration and integration. With their cultural tradition of frankness and outspokenness, the Dutch were particularly enthusiastic in beginning this discussion. Leading the newly emboldened critics of multiculturalism was the flamboyant former university professor Pim Fortuyn, who took the debate to a new level by calling Muslims part of a “fifth column” in European society. His strident anti-immigration message struck a chord among the Dutch population, including among homosexuals, who felt threatened by the increasingly vocal presence of homophobic orthodox Muslims in their midst. When Fortuyn was murdered in 2002, the debate temporarily cooled, as the suspect was an environmental activist, and not, as

some had initially feared, a Muslim fanatic. Yet, when film director Theo van Gogh was brutally murdered by a Moroccan-Dutch Muslim less than two years later, the gloves truly came off in Dutch political and social debate. With the taboos entirely effaced, all of the mainstream political parties in the Netherlands soon adopted elements of Fortuyn's platform.

While not all those concerned with the rise of Islamist radicalism were opposed to multiculturalism, support for a new approach continued to grow. Partly encouraged by American commentators, critics accused Europe not only of having forgotten its core values and principles but also of lacking the backbone to defend those principles. Throughout Europe, the tone of the debate seemed to change; indeed, had Enoch Powell delivered his speech in the United Kingdom of 2005 rather than 1968, he would not have forfeited his political career. Prominent intellectuals and politicians—such as Michel Gurfinkiel in France, and Frits Bolkestein and Ayaan Hirsi Ali in the Netherlands—argued that Europe had simply become too soft and too morally relativist to put up a credible defense against the coherent and dynamic threat of radical Islam. Representing these strong fears, former European Commissioner Bolkestein argued that “migration and demography” could make Europe part of the Arab world, causing “the relief of Vienna in 1683 [to] have been in vain.”¹²

In response to political pressure, Europe's governments finally began to adopt new policy measures, many of which centered on the theme of “toughness,” such as tighter immigration laws and increased deportations. While they were correct to point out the danger of indifference toward Europe's rising immigrant populations, advocates of these forms of toughness only partially understood the need for reform. They correctly emphasized the concept of a *Leitkultur* (dominant culture) in European societies, and the need for immigrants to adapt to it, but they neglected the need for this culture to be *inclusive*. After all, if membership in the *Leitkultur* is based solely on ethnicity, then migrants will be forever consigned to outsider status.¹³ Yet both sides of the debate saw the *Leitkultur* only in this narrow sense—as a call for a stronger ethno-national identity. Because of this rough-edged drive to assimilation, second- and third-generation immigrants are feeling pushed into a corner, potentially resulting in a new wave of Islamist radicalization.

Although the emphasis on producing frank evaluations and achieving results marks an improvement over the “anything goes” approach of multiculturalism, these new “tough” measures are too focused on short-term criminal justice measures rather than on long-term structural policies. They also foster a charged political atmosphere, in which emotional responses prevail over dispassionate analysis. In short, while there is a need to compensate for decades of a multiculturalist policy of good intentions, the

¹² “Dutch Commissioner Again Warns on Turkish EU Bid,” *Turkish Daily News* (8 September 2004); available at www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/archives.php?id=37601.

¹³ The term *Leitkultur* was first introduced by Bassam Tibi in his 1998 book entitled, *Europa ohne Identität, Die Krise der multikulturellen Gesellschaft*. Since then Tibi has published many articles and books defining the term further in an effort to suggest a more successful Muslim integration model.

new emphasis on assimilation is beginning to overcompensate for it. In fact, the pendulum has swung far to the other side, where Muslims are increasingly seen as part of a “fifth column” in European society.

Bridging the Gap

As described above, neither multiculturalism nor assimilation has succeeded in effectively integrating the Muslims of Europe. Instead, both have led to a sense of alienation and an identity crisis among second- and third-generation Muslims, who are at risk of being pulled into Islamist networks like the Muslim Brotherhood and Hizb ut-Tahrir. While governments are finally recognizing the need to develop more effective models of integration, this recognition is coming at a time when European Muslims feel increasingly distant from the social structures of their countries of residence. Moreover, some of the tough measures recently taken by European governments have only risked making the situation worse.

While it may sound obvious that there is a link between failed integration and the resulting resentment on the one hand, and radicalism and extremism on the other, it has been extremely difficult for European authorities to put this knowledge into practice by devising policies that both effectively defend the democratic order and at the same time invite Muslim communities to participate as full citizens. Every counterterrorist, anti-immigration, or strict integrationist measure, if badly presented or wrongly executed, risks further alienating Muslim communities in Europe, adding to the reservoir of anger and despair that radicalization feeds on. At the same time, too much leniency risks giving away too much public space to intolerant extremists, at a time when radical Islam is already a very powerful force. By giving ground to extremism, Europe’s core values of democracy, human rights, and respect for individual freedom of choice would be placed in great danger.

At present, Europe is in need of an approach of tolerant integration, an approach that balances firmness in the defense of the democratic order with a more serious effort at building societies in which immigrant communities can find a secure place. Moreover, Europe is in search of practical ways to nurture a new “European Islam,” a form of the religion distinct in its respect for European principles and values. In this new approach, Europe must move away from the exclusive shared narratives of its nationalist past, and allow for differences of ethnicity, religion, and outlook to be included under a broader concept of what it means to be European. It should have a firm and non-negotiable core of political and social principles, but should also feature an outer shell that is porous enough to allow “us” and “them” to come together. Although it will be a difficult balancing act to reconcile the non-negotiable with the porous, the essence of the European project has been reflected in its motto: *In Varietate Concordia* (Unity in Diversity).

In sum, a new tolerant integration model needs to include the positive aspects of the multiculturalist and assimilationist approaches, while rejecting the negative elements. In Europe, the battle for the hearts and minds of Muslims can be won and the appeal of Islamist ideology can be fought only through such a comprehensive framework.

Strategic Communication: An Integral Component of Counterinsurgency Operations

Fred T. Krawchuk *

Introduction

The tactical successes achieved by the United States and its allies in the war on terrorism will mean little if the war for the hearts and minds of citizens in the Muslim world is lost. In a global counter-insurgency campaign, the military and other U.S. government agencies not only have to battle elusive foes, but also have to work closely with their counterparts in host nations, conduct sophisticated strategic communication efforts,¹ support infrastructure development, and engage constructively with the local populace, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the media. Counter-insurgency is a separate and distinct form of warfare; it is a competition between ideologies and distinct socio-political movements.

Successful counter-insurgency operations focus on diffusing violent socio-political movements, which is best done by drawing on a full spectrum of communications methods and thoughtful actions that encompasses programs across many agencies and non-governmental entities. Efforts to win hearts and minds will be much more effective if these efforts are coordinated, or at least if they do not work at cross-purposes. Strategic communication is a critical component of such a strategy, and will be the focus of this paper.

The United States government faces a formidable challenge when it comes to strategic communication. Not everyone recognizes or fully appreciates the subtleties and complexities of strategy in today's environment. The United States defense establishment is comfortable with fighting a conventional war, and is uncomfortable with the

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¹ Strategic communication is the effective, thoughtful, and focused blending of public diplomacy, information operations, non-military U.S. international broadcasting services, and public affairs, all working in coordination and oriented towards specific audiences in support of super-ordinate goals and transmitted via timely and appropriate means. Effective strategic communication helps create the conditions, build the relationships, and mobilize the resources that allow authentic, constructive, and engaging narratives to emerge between stakeholders. Successful strategic communication requires a deep appreciation of attitudes, perceptions, and culture; a capacity to pay attention to the environment; the capability to listen closely to and engage in healthy dialogues with a variety of diverse stakeholders; access to decision-makers; and the ability to measure effects, trends, and patterns.

ambiguity of unconventional warfare. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) noted that, of 127 pacification operations in Iraq from May 2003 to May 2005, “most operations were reactive to insurgency activity—seeking to hunt down insurgents. Only six percent of operations were directed specifically to create a secure environment for the population.”² A cultural change within the various parts of the U.S. government will be required for it to be more effective at counter-insurgency operations.

This is especially true for those engaged in the strategic communication aspects of counter-insurgency campaigns. A Defense Science Board recently stated that United States’ strategic communication capability is “in crisis.”³ Then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld echoed this concern: “The standard U.S. government public affairs operation ... tends to be reactive, rather than proactive—and it still operates for the most part on an eight-hour, five-days-a-week basis, while world events, and our enemies, are operating 24/7, across every time zone. That is an unacceptably dangerous deficiency.”⁴ Given the urgency and importance of this challenge, every government agency needs to adapt to the fast-paced and complex environment of counter-insurgency and improve their respective organization’s strategic communication capabilities.

The Core Challenge of Counter-Insurgency: Values and Beliefs

Effectively dealing with counter-insurgency efforts from an ideological perspective requires new thinking and action. Winning hearts and minds is far more important than killing or capturing terrorists and insurgents. The United States has to recognize the importance of radical social movements and their ideology, and operate from this baseline.

A comprehensive approach to strategic communication recognizes that the ideology a terrorist or insurgent group espouses is a critical component of these groups. Ideology serves as a recruiting tool and galvanizes foot soldiers, financiers, logisticians, and indirect supporters. It is the lifeblood of an organization. Deep-seated values, beliefs, and norms inform perspectives, influence actions, and forge networks with like-minded individuals. Ideology provides assumptions about how the world works, shapes priorities, and offers the rationale for decisions terrorists and insurgents make.⁵

² U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2006). Available at: <http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf>.

³ Defense Science Board, *Report of the Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities* (Washington, D.C.: December 2004), 71.

⁴ Donald Rumsfeld, “New Realities in the Media Age: A Conversation with Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense,” written transcript of speech given at the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, NY (19 February 2006). Available at: http://www.cfr.org/publication/9900/new_realities_in_the_media_age.html.

⁵ Don Beck, presentation at the Spiral Dynamics Conference, Washington, D.C. (6–11 January 2006). For more information, please refer to www.spiraldynamics.net.

Before launching a strategic communication initiative, U.S. forces have to better understand ideology and the cultural terrain that the initiative will have to navigate. External approaches designed to improve local conditions in a counter-insurgency environment will fail if they do not include parallel and simultaneous engagement with how people perceive the world they inhabit. This means strategic communication professionals have to learn more deeply about the socio-economic, historical, and cultural landscape in which social and political movements live. We enjoy the benefits of many sophisticated means for disseminating our messages: Internet, DVDs, radio, TV, etc. But if we do not appreciate the complexity and richness of the values and concerns of the people with whom we are communicating, we will miss the mark.

Importance of Culture and Local Context

Counter-insurgency and strategic communication planning demand deep cultural and social knowledge of threats and local populations. The United States government lacks the right people, programs, systems, and organizations that can provide anthropological knowledge on a wide variety of cultures. Counter-insurgency efforts do not address themselves to the fixed targets of the Cold War, but too much of the U.S. military is still stuck in Cold War approaches. As a result, human factors, cultural anthropology, and other analyses of socio-cultural data are underfunded and undermanned, and have not been supported as means for developing a central resource for social, economic, and cultural analysis.⁶

The importance of gaining an understanding of the local conditions of an insurgency cannot be overestimated. Counter-insurgency planners must understand the needs of discontented groups. In addition to using military and federal agencies, strategic communication planners should employ media consultants, finance and business experts, psychologists, organizational network analysts, and scholars from a wide range of disciplines (including anthropology and religious studies) to develop a more comprehensive picture of the environment. The more insight strategic communication planners have into the causes of the insurgency, the better their capacity to effectively address those conditions. Insurgents require regional support. By understanding where and why they get their support, planners can help develop long-term strategic communication strategies that will address the insurgents' constituencies.

In order to develop sophisticated socio-cultural understanding of local and regional conditions that feed terrorist ideologies, we need to be able to establish baselines of values, attitudes, and perceptions around the world. This baseline is not static: ideologies travel, cultures shift, and socio-economic developments occur. In order to track these underlying currents, we have to develop the capacity to monitor these changes. Public-sector and private-sector actors in the U.S. should work together to develop technology to map and track human conditions. If insurance companies and economists are able to follow trends and patterns in human behavior, why not broaden these ap-

⁶ Montgomery McFate, "The Military Utility of Understanding Adversary Culture," *Joint Forces Quarterly* 38 (July 2005): 46.

proaches so that we can more holistically observe and monitor other vital shifts on a global basis? Individuals, societies, tribes, nations—all are living organisms. Like a doctor who examines a patient regularly in order to provide preventive medicine, we need better mechanisms to monitor cultural and political “vital signs” in order to prevent conflict and anticipate strategic communication needs. The use of geographic information systems (GIS) to display social, economic, health, and cultural data would help identify hot spots and anticipate opportunities, breakdowns, and conflicts. This deeper understanding of socio-economic conditions and culture will show strategic communication actors how values and beliefs shape political, economic, and social performance.⁷

In order to monitor and assess how ideology spreads, or to measure the impact of strategic communication efforts, more sophisticated systems and procedures to collect and analyze information will be required. Open-source collection and assessment mechanisms need to evolve. Systematic surveys, public opinion polls, focus group interviews, and cultural attitudinal databases are just a few examples of tools that need to be bolstered in order to establish baselines of perceptions, monitor political and social movements, and measure the impact of strategic communication plans.

This kind of analysis and feedback would also assist strategic communicators to better understand their audience, develop appropriate themes, and establish the best means of delivering their messages. The signals of violent ideological threats are always abundant and are widely recognized. Yet somehow they fail to penetrate the government’s immune system’s seemingly automatic response to reject the familiar. If strategic communication actors are to effectively deal with insurgent groups, they must be able to go beyond established ways of seeing things and be open to new possibilities without judgment. We need to sit back, listen deeply, and study the situation from many angles and ask ourselves what, fundamentally, is going on. Strategic communication players need better analytical tools to enable them to see what is happening globally and locally, and to inform their approaches to defusing hostility, improving the United States’ image abroad, and bridging gaps in dialogue.

Strategy

A successful strategic communication strategy encompasses a deep understanding of why people join terrorist or insurgency groups. People join, fund, tolerate, support, and/or encourage others to join movements due to many factors, ranging from the bottom of the hierarchy of human needs and values (safety and security) to the top (self-actualization). Some people support insurgent groups because they are afraid to do anything else, or because insurgents help them meet their basic needs, such as food or housing. When people see other sources of power and decide that these alternatives are sufficiently robust to last, people switch allegiances, because they see the direction in which the power is shifting and they do not want to be left out. Other core motivations for making such decisions include gaining and maintaining connections with clans,

⁷ Beck.

tribes, family, friends, and local communities. Some people are motivated by achievement, growth, and money, while different groups consider consensus and participation as key motivations. Some people are motivated by ideas and seek political or societal change, so they seek avenues through which to exert influence. If these people feel that they are neglected or oppressed, then they may think that political leaders do not care about them. Even if certain people do not admire insurgent leaders, their tactics, or their ideology, they may look to them for support. If people think that insurgents or terrorists are finally succeeding in getting attention for a previously neglected cause, then they may support these groups because they see them as effective. If people see insurgency movements as a way to meet their core beliefs and needs, then they may join or support them.

If we want to counteract a social movement, such as an insurgency, we need to offer alternative ideologies, improved economic opportunity or security, different channels for political influence to travel, or ways to strengthen family and clan ties outside of insurgent movements. With a better understanding of the values and concerns of affected parties, we will be better able to provide more appropriate alternatives to political violence. The strategic approach to communications, then, needs to be like that of a headquarters of a socio-political movement. We should be rallying support and matching our words with our deeds. Since this is a long-term endeavor—instead of a short campaign, ending in a vote—the “negative campaigning” approach is less likely to be successful.

Most of our energy should be devoted to building new alternatives or increasing existing alternatives. Acting like we already know the answers will not help. This approach involves offering assumptions like “They would like us if they really knew us,” “The other side is inherently wrong or immoral,” and “We are doing the right things already—we just need to get the word out better.” All of these things may, at times, be true, but they are still dangerous assumptions, and are very risky phrases to let slip into our communications. Therefore, we need to build rapport with others by listening, paying attention, and being responsive and proactive in a way that is appropriate to the socio-cultural needs of various groups.⁸

With this more holistic approach to understanding cultural landscapes and seeing insurgencies as socio-political movements, strategic communication planners can take a multifaceted approach and produce an effects-based strategy that aims to:

- Address underlying causes of the insurgency
- Dissuade the local populace from supporting the insurgency
- Create new attractors that will draw support away from the insurgency
- Discourage insurgents

⁸ Curtis Johnson, phone conversations and e-mail exchanges, January 2006. Curtis is a key leader in the Advanced Concepts Group, a think-tank at Sandia National Laboratories in New Mexico, and has been investigating various terrorism challenges, socio-political identity issues, and strategic communication.

- Tarnish the insurgents' image
- Disrupt recruitment
- Counter propaganda
- Build rapport with the local populace
- Help defeat threatening ideologies
- Reduce tensions and negative attitudes towards the United States and its allies
- Communicate themes of freedom, tolerance, justice, dignity, and opportunity, and match them with actions
- Develop and sustain the host nation's strategic communication and independent media capacities, so that a country or region with an insurgent threat can conduct these tasks successfully (ultimately, we want to communicate shared interests and concerns, not appear unilateral, and not force messages that make our allies and partners look like puppets of the U.S.)
- Develop a responsive network of key communicators and subject matter experts (U.S. and foreign) to help develop, communicate, clarify, and amplify appropriate messages rapidly and effectively
- Actively engage with journalists, writers, students, grassroots leaders, NGOs, religious leaders, academics, opinion leaders, and think-tanks (U.S. and foreign).

The United States military and other agencies must blend short-term kill-or-capture operations with host-nation capacity building and other long-term efforts to address violent social movements and their root causes. The *9/11 Commission Report* emphatically states that the United States must “help defeat an ideology, not just a group of people.”⁹ Growing anti-American and anti-Western sentiment in the Middle East and elsewhere spelled out in numerous recent polls cannot be ignored. As the government defeats insurgents on the battlefield, it must also simultaneously help prevent the spread of insurgent movements and help promote the U.S. image abroad. This would include promoting the rule of law, professional and open media, educational programs, cultural exchanges, and economic development projects.

To win the war of ideas, the United States must also confidently tell the truth, honor its words with actions, counter insurgent propaganda efforts, and communicate its messages quickly and effectively. Robert Kaplan, the author of *Imperial Grunts*, further states:

Because the battles in a counterinsurgency are small scale and often clandestine, the story line is rarely obvious. It becomes a matter of perceptions, and victory is awarded to those who weave the most compelling narrative. Truly, in the world of postmodern, 21st-century conflict, civilian and military public-affairs officers must become war fighters by another name. They must control and anticipate a whole new

⁹ *The 9/11 Commission Report* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004), 376.

storm system represented by a global media, which too often exposes embarrassing facts out of historical or philosophical context.¹⁰

The United States and her allies are in direct competition with insurgents on the battlefield and in the media. Any strategic communication strategy must consider this fact and ensure that a comprehensive strategic communication plan is integrated with the overall counter-insurgency strategy. Learning to blend information operations, public affairs, psychological operations, and public diplomacy will help coordinate themes and messages. Currently, the United States government is spending too much time trying to separate the various players involved in strategic communications, instead of synchronizing them in order to beat the insurgents to the punch. Improving interagency systems and procedures would help the United States implement necessary changes in the way it develops and communicates thoughtful and persuasive messages to the right audiences at the right time with the appropriate means.

With a more informed perspective, strategic communicators would then be better prepared to develop a more holistic strategic communication strategy. Planners of strategic communication efforts must dedicate time and resources to developing country-specific objectives, themes, messages, and effects. Part of the strategic communication strategy must also include developing overall themes to promote free and pluralistic media, high standards of journalism, rule of law, and transparency. Other efforts would include messages to reduce the motivation and legitimacy of those involved in terrorism and insurgencies as well as messages designed to build bridges for dialogue and highlight constructive activities of the United States and other countries.

The importance of identifying audiences, opinion leaders, and key communicators must also be taken into account. The U.S. Congress, the American public, opinion leaders, and foreign populations all must be considered as critical audiences. Given the anti-U.S. feelings that currently pervade the international environment, pushing a "Made in the USA" message will probably not always be the most appropriate or effective way of getting our point across. Who gets the credit for a communication should not matter; what *does* matter is whether the message is well received and helps to diminish violence. Finding mutual concerns and interests across a variety of organizations, groups, and societies is a critical step in helping to extinguish the fiery rhetoric of violent ideologies that promote killing innocent people for political gain.

Unfortunately, a cultural divide exists between the various arms of the government and the private sector involved in strategic communication. Every agency has unique interests and values, and these can be difficult to reconcile. For instance, many NGOs are not going to want to be associated with military operations, even if they were informed of them and had plans to follow in the wake of military humanitarian assistance programs. However, there has to be a way to bring together all of the groups involved so that they are publicly cooperating and supporting each other, but still retain their

¹⁰ Robert D. Kaplan, "The Real Story of Fallujah: Why Isn't the Administration Getting It Out?" *Wall Street Journal* (31 May 2004). Available at www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110005147.

own identity and pursue their individual agency goals. Leaders need to step up and speak with one voice and focus on points where information operations, public affairs, public diplomacy, and private-sector public relations converge. Given that Al Qaeda has a sophisticated and active information capability, we must overcome bureaucratic turf battles, small-mindedness, and the absence of a visible commitment that pervades strategic communication.

Within the U.S. government, improving interagency cooperation in strategic communication will require promoting and institutionalizing interagency exchanges, training, exercises, organizational design, doctrine, and asking Congress for legislation similar to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 to further help align and integrate the various parts of the government. Hiring media-savvy reporters and journalists to serve as consultants to military commanders and diplomats would also build a much-needed bridge between the government and the media.¹¹

The various professionals in the public and private sectors involved in promoting the United States' image, policies, and programs abroad must also identify super-ordinate goals that transcend other priorities and agendas. All actors must recognize and take responsibility for addressing their respective organizations' cultural differences, suspicion, territorial protection, ignorance, and stereotypes that create barriers to interagency and multinational cooperation. With that understanding, strategic communication actors will be more open to options that serve healthy super-ordinate goals in counter-insurgency. The fear of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons triggered by terrorists, or the gap between the "haves and have-nots" that sows seeds of violence are examples of concerns that strategic communication actors cannot effectively take on unilaterally. Correcting the perceptions that the United States is engaged in a global war on Islam and acts in a unilateral fashion without regard to other countries' interests will require numerous organizations within the U.S. government to better coordinate, integrate, and synchronize their themes and messages. This will require building networks with NGOs, multinational companies, and other non-U.S. voices. Fragmented, isolated, ad hoc, piecemeal, and single-agency solutions will fail to make a significant difference in winning hearts and minds. Strategic communication professionals must work together (formally and informally) to integrate, align, and synergize their efforts.

Recruiting and Selection

This transformation in strategic communication will require incentives. Governmental bureaucracies will not change unless the people working within those bureaucracies—particularly those involved in strategic communication—are rewarded for working differently. In the military, for example, if we want to see public affairs, foreign area specialists, civil affairs and information operations officers—all core players in counter-insurgency and strategic communication efforts—become truly integral to the military

¹¹ Robert D. Kaplan, *Atlantic Monthly* journalist and author of *Imperial Grunts*; personal conversation on topic of media relations during his visit to Pacific Command, Honolulu, HI, 23 February 2006.

profession, then we will need to provide them with much more attractive career tracks, including increased general and flag officer opportunities in these areas. The same applies to the Department of State (DoS). Offer better career opportunities and promotions to public diplomacy professionals, and the DoS will enjoy more successful public diplomacy initiatives and a stronger cadre of foreign service officers dedicated to strategic communication excellence. Providing rewarding career paths and opportunities for education and advancement will help attract quality people to the demanding challenges that strategic communication presents in today's information age.

Enticing incentives are imperative because the interagency challenges and unconventional threats require the right kind of people to support strategic communication in counter-insurgency campaigns. Strategic communication actors need to be intelligent, compassionate, and innovative in order to adapt to the multi-faceted and fast-moving information environment. Strategic communication planners and operators also have to be creative risk-takers who appreciate a multidisciplinary and comprehensive approach to complex problems. They cannot be protectors of the status quo or risk-averse careerists. Recruiting and selecting the right people for strategic communication requires selecting people who can perform these jobs naturally. Too much time is wasted trying to reshape people to do strategic communication jobs for which they were unsuited from the start. Combined with situations where people with strategic communication skills and talents are stuck in non-strategic communication jobs, government organizations will enjoy better success in strategic communication when they align people, form, and function in a more meaningful way. Placing talented people in a collaborative work environment led by competent innovators would help instill the more adaptive organizational culture that is needed to engage ambiguous threats via strategic communication.

Training and Development

Hiring and promoting the right people for strategic communication tasks is not enough. The U.S. government must ensure that strategic communication players have the right skills to help them perform. Because few strategic communication professionals ever experience deep cultural immersion outside of the government, they often do not develop sufficient cultural and social expertise. Strategic communication entities must support internships with cutting-edge media outlets. They have to build better bridges with academics, think-tanks, and other organizations so that strategic communication staff will be able to exchange ideas with journalists; advertising and marketing experts; TV, movie, and other media-savvy professionals; and social scientists, psychologists, cultural anthropologists, and other academics.¹²

The Olmsted Scholarship program is a flagship example of what the government can do in conjunction with foundations and academic institutions to promote cultural sensitivity and strategic communication training. The Olmsted program offers military officers a chance to study in foreign universities, immerse themselves in the local cul-

¹² McFate, "Military Utility of Understanding Adversary Culture," 46.

ture, and bring fresh and innovative perspectives back to their respective services. The United States should promote similar programs throughout the government. More importantly, the government must ensure that its agencies benefit from these experiences by placing graduates of these programs in critical positions where they can bring these unique perspectives to strategic political-military and strategic communication positions of authority. Government bureaucracies frequently practice an ineffective and cold “fill spaces with faces” mentality that does not consider a governmental employee’s talents, passions, or interests. Too often we attempt to force or shape a person to fill the job. Given the complexity and nuances of strategic communication efforts, government organizations should instead build positions around talented people to create opportunities to match what they do best.

This change will also require other new approaches to training and education. Training and development of all government professionals will require placing content addressing terrorism, irregular warfare, foreign languages, social sciences, psychology, complexity science, culture, media, and strategic communication in core curriculums of military, diplomatic, law enforcement, and intelligence training schools. These subjects are too often only electives, are underfunded and undermanned, and/or lack institutional support.

In order to learn and grow, strategic communication leaders at all levels ought to also study diverse cultural and disciplinary perspectives. Like everyone else, government officials are molded by their experiences and see the world through various filters. Complexity science and systems thinking help strategic communication actors broaden their apertures and learn to see patterns in ambiguity. Diverse social, cultural, academic, religious, and psychological perspectives can also open a strategic communication actor’s mind to new possibilities in detecting subtle shifts over time. Leaders must study a variety of cultural, psychological, and social perspectives and incorporate relevant slices of each in order to recognize changing patterns in an insurgent campaign.¹³

Successful strategic communication also requires an awareness of how others perceive us, what signals we send (intended and unintended), how we view the world, and how the world views us. This requires a high degree of cultural self-awareness and reflection. How does a strategic communication professional develop better self-awareness? Meditation, journaling, and other concentration exercises can help. Many scientific studies and well-documented experiments unquestionably demonstrate that meditation helps heighten perception and improves concentration and attention.¹⁴

Negotiation training is another active way in which strategic communication leaders can build competencies in awareness and listening. Many courses in mediation, conflict resolution, dialogue, and negotiation are available and should be part of a strategic communication leader’s professional development program. Leaders need to put this training into action by actively using a negotiation framework in their daily

¹³ Irene Sanders, “Strategic Thinking in a Complex World,” month-long course at the Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C. (May 2004).

¹⁴ See the Web site of the Mind and Life Institute, at www.mindandlife.org.

lives. By practicing looking for mutual interests and creative alternatives, leaders will hone their empathetic listening and authentic articulation skills. Practicing negotiation skills by consistently using an organized framework for simple as well as complex agreements will help strategic communication leaders become more proficient in persuasion, coordination, and dealing with obstacles.

Attitude

Sophisticated training can help broaden strategic communication professionals' attitudes and approaches to counter-insurgency. This will help them (and us) understand that we are part of the system, and thus we are part of the challenges confronted in any strategic communication effort—they cannot be separated. If we believe that strategic communication and counter-insurgency efforts are problems we have to solve “out there,” and we do not see or want to see any possible relationship between us (who are trying to solve the problem) and what the problem actually is, we will not be able to view counter-insurgency efforts accurately, in all their complexity. The environment surrounding such campaigns is highly dynamic and interdependent. Being fast and adaptable is difficult when our egocentricity and ethnocentricity get in the way of our perceptions. When we think, “Of course they will like this message, anyone (like me) would,” we unwittingly contribute to maintaining the undesired situation.

We must be careful that we do not just address the symptoms of the problems and challenges we face. Not facing the real, fundamental problem will cause it to get worse. We cannot afford to seek symptomatic solutions to the challenges of strategic communication. Quick fixes lead to unintended side effects and new problems for others, leading to more quick fixes and more side effects. We must dig deeper than the symptoms of insurgencies to address the causes and underlying conditions and address those issues directly and openly.¹⁵

Addressing these underlying conditions via strategic communication is not just about sending a message via an opinion maker, TV, blog, e-mail, radio, or Web site. Attitudes and perceptions cannot only concern strategic communication planners. The behavior of all the players in the United States government, whether in a diplomatic negotiation in Indonesia or a military operation in Iraq, also sends strong messages to their audiences. Everyone involved in counter-insurgency has to ask herself what she is doing, in her actions and messages, to potentially produce negative trends or patterns of violence. How is she contributing to those conditions? Treating people appropriately, with dignity, and showing genuine respect for local cultural norms goes a long way in winning trust and confidence. Meeting and communicating with people at a place where they are socially and culturally comfortable is essential. Each person in his respective organization needs to understand that he is responsible for the themes and messages he is sending through his words and actions and the impact they are having.

¹⁵ Otto Scharmer, presentation at the conference *Presencing: Collective Leadership for Profound Innovation and Change*, Boston, MA (12–16 December 2005). For more information, please refer to www.solonline.org.

In today's environment of instant global communications, everybody in an organization is a spokesperson and a communicator of an organization's values and beliefs.

To be an effective communicator requires a blend of cultural knowledge, technical skills in strategic communication, and a sincere motivation to bridge communication gaps. This requires discernment and consideration of other viewpoints, regardless of whether one agrees with them. Strategic communication planners must anticipate the tendencies of radical ideologies and learn how to minimize polarizing dynamics. This will include driving wedges between violent radicals and moderates in order to help resolve deep-seated conflicts and meet underlying needs. Strategic communication actors will have to work with their audiences and decision makers to avoid "us vs. them" rhetoric. They should also enhance the capacities of pragmatists, moderate voices, and conciliators in the region where they are working. Listening sympathetically and respectfully and echoing back concerns are essential to success. Strategic communication is not about changing other people; rather, it is about designing the conditions and mobilizing the resources that allow authentic, constructive, and engaging narratives to emerge. Sophisticated and successful strategic communication meshes intellectual capital, communications technology, and the heartfelt desire to address the underlying conditions of violence.¹⁶

As part of this attitudinal shift, U.S. government officials will also have to wrestle with their tendency to rely on technology as a "silver bullet," and their insistence on quick, kinetic results in counter-insurgency campaigns. Winning trust and confidence is a long-term process that has to be persuasively explained to foreign and domestic audiences alike. The process of change and adaptation within societies, nations, and organizations demands deep listening, discernment, and staying power. Improving economic conditions and helping societies transform and evolve requires commitment and a willingness to accept a long time horizon. We must keep the seductiveness of technology in perspective, and work towards institutionalizing the notion that the human component is the key to winning hearts and minds in counter-insurgency efforts.

Organizational Design

Donald Rumsfeld, speaking at the Council on Foreign Relations, stated that the "U.S. government still functions as a 'five-and-dime' store in an eBay world."¹⁷ Fortunately, some marketing practices of successful global companies and social movements offer ways to help move strategic communication into the twenty-first century. Many successful companies employ a sophisticated branding strategy as a central part of their business, not relegated to the margins, as strategic communication is too often within the U.S. government. Leaders of various business lines (analogous to different governmental agencies) need their own strategies to execute their functions. The strategy for building cars is very different from the strategy for selling cars, but they need to have important points of coincidence. If we are selling "driving excitement," the cars

¹⁶ Beck.

¹⁷ Rumsfeld, "New Realities in the Media Age."

had better be exciting to drive; if we are selling safety, then that had better be a different car. At the local level, freedom is needed to respond to local needs and local competition. This might include ordering the right mix of cars, pricing and advertising flexibility, service and operations flexibility, but all within the overarching marketing and branding strategy. Local businesses cannot compete if every decision has to go up to headquarters, but they have to be counted upon not to run local ads that ruin the corporate brand.

Unlike the government, businesses accomplish this without a long list of orders, edicts, procedures, and signatures. The private sector does this with a clear coordinating framework, a coherent and overarching strategy, two-way dialogue with customers, empowered local business leaders, and open and uninhibited dialogue between headquarters and field agents. The U.S. government has much to learn and apply from successful multi-national companies and Madison Avenue advertisers.¹⁸

Successful branding strategies depend on a seamless fit between form and function within an organization in order to win trust and confidence. The Washington Post newspaper, for example, employs open office spaces and a flat organization, where reporters and editors can quickly communicate with one another and get critical stories out in a timely and appropriate manner. One does not find reporters holed up in isolated cubicles. Editors are not separated by bureaucratic layers, nor do they work on different floors. They share the same well-organized space and enjoy a collaborative work environment, which promotes efficiency and speed.

Strategic communication entities and the organizations they support ought to look at their physical spaces and organization design. Do they contribute to collaboration, aid in the sharing of information, and promote agility in quickly getting appealing stories out to the right audiences in a timely manner? A carefully designed work environment is essential to a successful strategic communication organization. Pressures created by strategic communication issues tend to keep leaders in a continual “fire-fighting” mode, with little or no time for reflection or real thinking. The design of a physical workspace for a cutting-edge strategic communication entity would include space for brainstorming and scenario planning, and other spaces for project design that reflect the sensibility of the audiences the strategic communication actors want to reach. A space that includes TV, radio, video, and the latest newspapers and magazines would help stimulate people’s thinking, show them what their competitors are doing, and offer fresh ways of seeing how other organizations present themselves to their audiences.¹⁹

The government needs to make strategic communication a central, not marginal, part of its operational design. First, a Deputy National Security Advisor for strategic communication with tasking authority over departments and agencies would help quarterback strategic communication efforts. Second, reviewing strategic communication strategy in a systematic fashion (as the Department of Defense does with the

¹⁸ Personal communication with Curtis Johnson.

¹⁹ Tom Kelly, *The Ten Faces of Innovation* (New York: Doubleday, 2005).

Quarterly Defense Review) would be beneficial. This would help make strategic communication a central thread that runs through all military, economic, diplomatic, political, intelligence, financial, judicial, and law enforcement plans and policies. Third, strategic communication centers of excellence need to be established to synthesize and provide open source analysis, strategic communication products, databases, lessons learned, feedback/monitoring mechanisms, think-tank reports, academic studies, and subject matter expert exchanges.²⁰ Finally, governmental operations centers need to incorporate strategic communication as an integral part of their day-to-day business.

To reflect the importance of strategic communication, 24/7 operations centers need to display cultural and socioeconomic overlays, and employ knowledge managers adept at open source analysis. Inside these updated operations centers, planners will constantly pay attention to the media, population studies, polling, other players (threats, governments, NGOs); analyze open source information; send messages; listen for the response; send updated messages; and prepare for contingencies.

Given the around-the-clock nature of global connectivity and the rapid decision-making loops and information flows within the U.S. government, operations centers need to be fast and adaptive, making sure that each local loop is locally controlled—not turned over to a committee (a sentence of “interagency death”) or sent up the chain. Strategic communication players will also have to speed up the process of prototyping themes and messages, and must actively experiment with how they are transmitted and received. Based on a tight feedback loop, strategic communication planners will adapt accordingly, and not rely on unevaluated, canned responses. Operations centers will have to “reorient staffing, schedules, and culture to engage the full range of media that are having such an impact today” in order to incorporate strategic communication as part of its daily functions.²¹

A successful organizational design for strategic communication would support fast and uninhibited flows of information and would empower teams with the authorities, approvals, and means to quickly communicate themes and messages. Secretary Rumsfeld said, “Let there be no doubt—the longer it takes to put a strategic communications framework into place, the more we can be certain that the vacuum will be filled by the enemy and by news informers that most assuredly will not paint an accurate picture of what is actually taking place.”²² The United States government must support a holistic infrastructure to develop, produce, distribute, and disseminate strategic communication by, through, and with its interagency partners, host-nation counterparts, and private-sector venues. Too often, compartmentalization and bureaucratic layers favor the enemy and endanger the success of strategic communication. Having the means to quickly coordinate and share knowledge, databases, strategic communication products,

²⁰ Bruce Gregory, “Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication: Cultures, Firewalls, and Imported Norms,” paper presented at the American Political Science Association annual conference, Washington, D.C. (31 August 2005), 34–8.

²¹ Rumsfeld, “New Realities in the Media Age.”

²² *Ibid.*

subject matter experts, and feedback across geographical and organizational boundaries is essential to impeding insurgencies.

Conclusion²³

Insurgents remain a dangerous socio-political threat to the United States and its allies. The worldwide trend of anti-Western rhetoric and the sophistication of Al Qaeda's information war demonstrate that terrorist and insurgent groups are constantly adapting and reorganizing. Given Al Qaeda's global reach, the United States must develop a more integrated strategic communication strategy for counter-insurgency with its allies to diminish violent rhetoric, improve its image abroad, and detect, deter, and defeat this social movement at its many levels. To counter this menace, the nation must continue to develop flexible and efficient capabilities through innovative interagency strategic communication organizations.

Although it is extremely important, having the right strategy plus integrated and nimble strategic communication organizations is not sufficient if governmental leaders are unprepared to engage in actions in ambiguous environments and reorient their organizational culture to deal with insurgencies. A successful strategic communication campaign is not just about better cultural awareness or new organizations. It is also about transforming the attitudes and mind-sets of leaders so they have the capacity to take decisive yet thoughtful action against insurgents in ambiguous situations. Ideally, the U.S. government would have strategic communication professionals in place who are sensitive observers and thoughtful communicators capable of working seamlessly within military, civilian, media, and international communities.

To develop this capacity, strategic communication professionals must dedicate themselves to innovative training. In addition to traditional strategic communication technical skills, training in areas including negotiations, psychology, media relations, cultural anthropology, foreign languages, and complexity theory will become increasingly important. Like the martial arts master who deftly handles multiple attacks, the strategic communication expert, with multidisciplinary training and interagency experience, would learn to adapt to any given situation in a fast-moving and fluid environment.

To become agile and competent at strategic communication, the United States government cannot approach the task piecemeal. Improving the ability to do "hearts and minds" campaigns requires that all elements of national power have to improve their capacities for dealing with irregular warfare. Integrated and holistic strategic communication approaches to counter-insurgency will require the meshing of elements of national power in new and constructive ways.

This new attitude is imperative. An integrated and comprehensive approach to strategic communication requires a continued reorientation in the way the government plans, organizes, trains, and thinks about counter-insurgency. To be successful, the

²³ Fred Krawchuk, *Combating Terrorism: A Joint/Interagency Approach* (Washington, D.C.: AUSA, January 2005).

United States will need to devote more attention and resources to strategic communication in terms of strategy, training, and force development. Strategic communication leaders would then, through innovative training and adaptive organizations, be better able to communicate compelling messages with discernment and counter violent social movements with agility.

Reaching Out to Muslim Clerics: Can We Build Bridges and Strengthen Moderate Voices in Islam?

*Dalil Boubakeur **

On 11 September 2001, four planes were hijacked in the United States. Two would destroy buildings at the financial hub of the country in New York City, another would attack and damage the military heart in Washington, and the fourth would be brought down heroically by its passengers. The sheer scope of the destruction, and the huge numbers of victims who were killed when these attacks took place, created stupefaction and anger throughout the civilized world. This essay shall focus on a survey of the problems affecting Muslim communities around the globe, and will examine some moderate solutions that can respond to Islamic needs and concerns. This topic is closely linked to the problems of radical Islamism and international terrorism, which were so graphically displayed on September 11.

When it became apparent that Islamist networks had carried out the attacks of 9/11, new light was shed on Professor Samuel Huntington's theory, first enunciated in 1993, of the "clash of civilizations" between Islam and the Western world. Huntington believed that the world's geopolitical phenotype had radically changed. The long-standing antagonism between Eastern and Western political blocs, and between the Northern and Southern economic blocs—in other words, the confrontations between capitalism and communism and between the rich and the poor—no longer exists. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the following reunification of Germany clearly demonstrated communism's failure. Frances Fukuyama talked about these events as indicating the end of a major chapter of mankind's history. According to Huntington, the "new world order" would now face a crisis: unconventional conflicts in which political Islam would play a major role, hurling violence and aggression against both the West and the so-called moderate Muslim states. Indeed, on this one day, 11 September 2001, we can say that the face of the world changed. We must now vigorously question the political and individual strategies of both Muslims and non-Muslims, who have to ask themselves if they are capable of changing their perspectives and learning from the lessons that terrorism teaches us.

One could argue that Huntington's basic ideas are not accurate. The civilizations that he mentions have not remained static, and it is not reasonable to say that they retain the powers they once held. Mohammad Abdu and the Iranian Al-Afghani, two of the best known Muslim thinkers during the period known as *An-Nahda*, which represented a renaissance in Islam in the early twentieth century, believed that several Western intellectual developments have decisively affected other cultures. Among these de-

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velopments are the growth of democracy; the stunning progress in the natural sciences and medicine; Darwinian theories focusing on the evolution of species; and the Freudian revolution, which revealed the role of the subconscious. Indeed, ever since Copernicus, the Earth has been revealed to be a simple object in the cosmos, not the center of the universe. Darwin revealed humans as a simple point on the spectrum of the evolution of species. World civilizations are now following the Western path in many respects, and these Western concepts are becoming universal—because, according to Darwin, they are irrefutable and true. And yet certain segments of Islam (and other faiths) hold on to outmoded views of the world and attempt to refute the Darwinian concept of evolution. They also refuse to recognize the equality of women, and try to impose restrictions on female activity and achievement under the guise of religion. This illustrates, frankly, their immature and neurotic attitude toward human sexuality. Clearly, this is not a clash of civilizations, as many Muslims refuse to subscribe to such an antiquated and violent world view. Rather, we are witnessing a growing gap between the modern world in which clear-sighted Muslims live and the world of the past—a medieval world, ruled by superstition and traditional prejudice. In this outmoded world, some mendacious leaders manipulate ignorant and poorly educated people for political reasons to believe that, to restore the ascendancy of Islam, they must return to the ways of their seventh-century ancestors. The classic division of the world between *Dar al-Harab* (literally, “house of war,” a term used to refer to territory not under Muslim control) and *Dar al-Islam* feeds the anger of the jihadist movement and makes acts of violent aggression acceptable.

This conception of the division of the planet is both wrong and dangerous, and can lead to a misinterpretation of Islam. Islam forbids aggression or proselytizing through force. During his lifetime the Prophet was forced to defend the monotheistic religion of the God of Abraham, Moses, Jesus, and Islam. The Prophet was fighting against Arab tribalism and polytheism, and the early Muslims defended themselves through military force. Nevertheless, in the Arab city of Medina in 622, he promulgated a constitution that allowed Muslims, Jews, and Christians to live together in peace. Muhammad brought reconciliation and peace when he entered Mecca in 631. The Koran says in Sura 2 (*Al-Baqarah*), Verse 208: “All believers, all of you, enter in peace.” Sura 8 (*Al-Anfal*), Verse 61, states: “If they move toward peace, then bow yourself toward peace and believe in God.” And in Sura 2 (*Al-Baqarah*), Verse 143, the Koran reads, “Oh, God, you are peace and let us live in peace. He is the sovereign, the saint, the peace.”

Peace is a name of God. The word *peace* is mentioned 136 times in the Koran, while the word *Harab* (or “war”) is mentioned only six times. In this clearly articulated Islamic theological construction of *peace*, the term also means salvation. Peace is a cornerstone of belief and is linked with justice, tolerance, faith, and interreligious dialogue. Furthermore, the Koran instructs one to be fair and good to those who did not fight you for your faith or move you from your homes, and it makes clear that authentic Islam is a religion of peace, tolerance of debate, and moderation. The Arabic linguistic root “SLM” means “peace”—thus, *salaam*, or “peace.” *Salama* is to put oneself into a state of peace; *Islam* is to be confident and submit oneself to God in order to stop a conflict and be at peace. Sura 2, verse 143 of the Koran states, “We made of you a bal-

anced community so you can be the witnesses of man.” The “balanced community” is a community of Islam, and is far removed from the forms of extremist Islam that we see in some parts of the Muslim world today.

Islam was at its most prosperous and influential during its periods of moderation and open religious thought. During the era of the Abbasid Caliphate in Baghdad (the second of two major Sunni dynasties of the Arab Empires), the traditions of science and philosophy inherited from ancient Greece flourished. The House of Wisdom—a library in Abbasid-era Baghdad—flourished during the ninth century, fortified by the most rationalist of all the caliphs, Al Ma'mun. Unfortunately, the days of wise and rationalist Islam in ninth-century Baghdad and twelfth-century Andalusia were repressed by the fundamentalist reaction of the fourth school of religious law within Sunni Islam, the *Hanbali*, from which the puritanical Wahhabi form of Islam would be born in the eighteenth century in what is now Saudi Arabia. This foreclosure of critical thought had several drastic consequences, including the stagnation of classical Islam in the fourteenth century; the weakening of the creative talent of the Muslim people (which has lasted until today); and the supplanting of critical thinking by severe, traditional thought. Political problems linked to decolonization and underdevelopment and to the unending conflict between Israelis and Palestinians can be traced to this reaction as well. The shortcomings of democratization in Muslim countries and their oppressive dictatorships combine to create despair among the Muslim masses and rob the youth of the Middle East of any semblance of a promising future.

This smothering of critical thought has, among other consequences, led to the emergence of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which has put religion firmly back in power in all areas of public life. Nothing contradicts the philosophy of Islam more than this conception of politics, which creates a totalitarian regime that is intolerant of non-Muslims and threatens world peace.

Attacks in Madrid, Istanbul, Bali, London, and Sharm al-Sheikh and Dahab in Egypt followed the catastrophe 9/11. It is likely that the Al Qaeda “brand” represents a network of organizations without any centralized structure. Nevertheless, these extremist and terrorist acts have succeeded in frightening the Western world. The media, feeding the psychosis of terrorism, do not stop talking about Islamist terrorism, and it is not surprising to see Islamophobic rhetoric taking root across Europe. This rhetoric targets moderate Muslims as well as radical Islamists. It is important to distinguish between Muslims and Islamists. For the majority of Muslims, Islamist activism does not represent true Islam. The West must support Islamic moderates in Europe and encourage their integration into the modern, secular Western world. Both moderate Muslims and their Western supporters should promote influences that foster an adaptive reading of the sacred texts. On the other hand, religious symbols must be respected and understood as a foundation for moral civilization. The cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad that sparked such outrage in early 2006 cleverly exploited the legitimate emotions of believing Muslims. But today, at a time when the modern world in general is losing touch with religious faith, we must take symbols of religion seriously and foster attitudes that will respect the beliefs of the faithful.

To be frank, Islamic fundamentalism represents the failure of Muslim theologians, who are restrained by their conservatism and did not anticipate the integration of these ideas and their promotion of violence into the mainstream of Muslim belief. Despite the fact that the violence is contrary to the principles of Islam, these Muslim theologians have done nothing to prevent the distortions of Islamic ethics that allow terrorism to flourish. They have ignored murder, massacres, the persecutions of non-Muslims in some countries of Africa, intolerance, and polygamy, a practice that is practically rejected in the Koran. They refused to act against extremism and fanaticism, which violate Islam's principles of moderation and justice. This backward-looking approach, especially attractive to adherents of Wahhabi beliefs, has won many supporters in the Third World and Europe. Such converts reject progress, science, and the necessity to live in the present.

Both Western and Muslim countries that served as a base for radical Islamist terrorists and provided refuge for these people who were chased out of their own homelands—for example, the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and the FIS terrorists of Algeria—have made a grave mistake. This lax Western approach has led to a certain apathy, an inability to act in the face of a threat. Islamists have seized on the freedom to organize offered by liberal Western societies as opportunity to mobilize and to cooperatively attack the Muslim and Western states that sheltered them, states that thought they were safe because they had welcomed Islamists. This was a fatal mistake. Today, we must review these irresponsible attitudes, but we must also refrain from catapulting ourselves into a useless form of Islamophobia or some other form of unfair prejudice. Fundamentalist Muslims would simply respond in kind. Moderate Muslims must think clearly in order to find ways to protect ourselves from Islamism and fight against militancy—against Wahhabi and Salafi ideology and the theories of the Muslim Brotherhood, which are spreading to Muslims in Europe. Finally, and above all, we need to provide more opportunities to Islamic moderates and enable them to act to promote tolerance and peace.

In a world in flux, making changes will depend upon cultural cooperation, not a clash of civilizations. Substantial differences separate Islam and the West. People of good will on both sides need to work together to eliminate confusion and false alliances. Moderate Muslims need to defend the West with passion, and we need to promote tolerant Islam, which will help undermine Islamist and fundamentalist thinking. In the ideological realm, we need to promote moderation to counter fanaticism. In the more practical sphere, we need to be sure that extremists do not profit from globalization and globalized communications—violence and finance have become globalized, and provide opportunities that extremists can exploit.

Considering the West's current difficulties in relating to the Muslim world, it is clear that it needs to develop relationships and work with European Muslims to counteract Islamism's three challenges: secularism, modernity, and fundamentalism. Within Islam, we need to combat the politicization of religion. We must take up the struggle against backward-looking Islamism and archaic ideas, and to ensure that religion becomes a form of personal spirituality and conviction rather than a framework for governing a state. We also need to ensure that women take their proper place within Islam,

and that Muslim women play a prominent and constructive role in the West. We must encourage a symbolic, not literal, reading of religious texts.

Finally, Western nations need to foster fair policies that will address some of the major problems facing Muslim countries. Governments in Western states need to promote the intellectual segments of Muslim society and encourage education for all. These nations need to work together to solve festering problems in the Muslim world, such as the situation in Palestine and the issue of Iraq. The world community also needs to confront the issue of underdevelopment and the major problems of poverty and unequal distribution of resources, which affect many Muslims. As a result of this kind of inequity, the world now faces eighty conflicts that are based on religion—and often Islam is involved in these conflicts.

Finally, what should be done in Europe? The large majority of Muslims respect the laws and institutions of their European host countries. However, European Muslims and European Islam must create their own organizations and begin to represent themselves as a distinct voice within the Muslim world. The French Council of Muslim Faith is working to forge connections with French public authorities and government organizations that will give French Muslims a fruitful, peaceful, and representative relationship with the government, and will open new channels that could solve problems that French Muslims face in France.

Today, young French Muslims suffer from many social ills. These problems are not linked to Islam. We often hear that the suburbs of Paris erupted in riots and flames because of Islam. That is not true. Having visited these suburbs, it was clear that the problems are related to economic issues, to discrimination, to a lack of opportunities in training and education. We in France must work together to tackle these forms of discrimination and abolish them. This will help the Muslim community within France and within Europe—after all, with eighteen million Muslims in Europe, Islam is the second largest religion on the continent. All of us must work together to build respect and understanding and foster relationships that will strengthen our ties with each other.

Issues of Interpreting the Koran and *Hadith*

Patrick Sookhdeo *

Orthodox Classical Interpretation

Tafsir, the classical science of interpretation and explanation of the Koran, was consolidated in the tenth century. *Tafsir* accepted the Koran as the word of God revealed by divine inspiration (*wahy*) through Muhammad and divinely preserved. It is a miracle, inimitable and unique. As a divine theophany, each word is divine in and of itself, and therefore worthy of every human effort of study and contemplation. *Tafsir* proceeded through the scripture verse by verse and sometimes word by word. A symbolic and allegorical form of interpretation (*ta'wil*) was also developed to explain the inner and concealed meanings of the text. The Koran is the criterion by which everything else is to be judged.

The Koran is accepted as the primary revealed source of Islam and of Islamic law (*sharia*). Muhammad was believed to have been given the responsibility of interpreting the Koran, so his words and acts—his *sunnah*, as found in the collected traditions (*hadith*)—became the second revelatory source, expounding the Koran.

The five traditional sources for commentary on the Koran are:

1. *The Koran itself*. The Koran was accepted as the very word of God. It is authoritative when it explains itself. The Koran is free of contradiction, and apparent inconsistencies in its message are inevitably resolved through closer study of the text.
2. *Muhammad's explanations*. Muhammad was sent to explain and clarify the Koran. The accounts of Muhammad's teaching recorded in the *hadith* collections contain much *tafsir* on the Koran.
3. *The reports of the Sahaba (companions) of Muhammad*, who also interpreted and taught the Koran. Where a Koranic explanation is absent, and there is no authentic tradition from Muhammad, a consensus of the companions may be used in interpreting a certain verse.
4. *The reports of those who followed the companions*, or the successors (*tabi'un*). These individuals were taught by the companions, so their insight is next in line.
5. *Reason*. A qualified scholar's personal reasoning, or *ijtihad* (deductive logic and personal evaluation of arguments), is the final method of understanding the Koran; it exists in conjunction with the other four.

In addition, there are five subjects of classical *tafsir*:

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1. The text: ambiguity, variant readings, defective texts, and apparent contradictions in the text of the Koran. It provided detailed background information and commentary on the text rather than analysis of its inner essence.
2. Legal rulings extracted from the text.
3. Determining which *suras* and verses were Meccan and which came from the Medinan period.
4. Determining the causes of revelation (*asbab al-nuzul*) of the various passages. This is important for analogical reasoning, as the contexts must be similar.
5. Specifying the abrogated and abrogating verses (*nasikh* and *mansukh*). The principle is that chronologically later verses abrogate earlier verses that contradict them. However, there is much discussion about which verses were abrogated, the number varying according to different scholars. Some limit abrogation to verses with legal injunctions only. Abrogation is valid not only when the Koran abrogates the Koran; according to some scholars, the Koran can also abrogate *sunnah*, *sunnah* can abrogate Koran, and *sunnah* can abrogate *sunnah*.

The variety of these discussions allow for a certain spectrum for divergent thought. For instance, the verse, “Let there be no compulsion in religion” (Q 2:256) elicits six different views in *Tafsir al-Qurtubi* (d. 1273):¹

- This verse was abrogated by Muhammad himself when he forced the Arabs to adopt Islam. The supporters of abrogation see verse 9:73 (“Prophet! Strive hard [do jihad] against the unbelievers and the hypocrites”) as the abrogating verse.
- The verse is not abrogated. It refers to the people of the book who are not forced to convert to Islam if they pay the *jizya*. However, idolaters are forced to convert.
- The verse’s specific context concerns the exiled Jewish tribe of Banu Nadir. The tribe took with them adopted children of the Ansar. Those children who wanted to leave with the Jews were allowed to do so.
- Another context of revelation cites two sons of a man of the Ansar who became Christians. When the father complained about them to Muhammad, this verse was revealed, and no one was sent after them to bring them back. However, later the “no compulsion” verse was abrogated when Muhammad was ordered to fight the people of the book.
- The verse means that those who submitted through the sword should not be called “compelled” or “forced” (even though they were).
- Another context of revelation is that it concerns adult captives of the people of the book who were not compelled to become Muslims. Their children, however, were compelled. Magians too were compelled to adopt Islam.

¹ *Tafsir al-Qurtubi, Classical Commentary on the Holy Koran*, translated by Aisha Bewley, vol. 1 (London: Dar al-Taqwa, 2003), 659–61.

Important commentators and exegetes producing books of *tafsir* were al-Tabari (838-923), al-Maturidi (d. 983), al-Tha'labi (d. 1035), and al-Wahidi (1075). Later pre-modern authors of *tafsir* works were al-Zamakhshari (d. 1144), al-Razi (d. 1209), al-Baydawi (d. 1286), Ibn Kathir (d. 1373), al-Suyuti (d. 1505), al-Shawkani (d. 1839), and al-Alusi (d. 1854).

The Koran was interpreted using several methods. The first of these was also the most obvious: interpreting the Koran by the Koran. The most reliable commentary is contained in the Koran itself. The ways in which certain verses clarify others is regarded as the most significant form of commentary. The second method used of interpreting the Koran in *tafsir* is interpreting the Koran by the *sunnah*—by the Prophet's interpretations of the Koran. His comments on the Koran (as well as all he said or did) are recorded in the *hadith* collections. As mentioned above, the additional methods of interpreting the Koran involved using the sayings of Muhammad's knowledgeable companions (*sahaba*) and their successors (*tabi'un*), as recorded in the *hadith*, and using reason and *ijtihad* (*tafsir bi'l ra'y*).

The classical form of *tafsir* practiced by the exegetes mentioned above dealt with three main areas: linguistic issues, juristic issues, and theological issues. Linguistic issues involve questions of vocabulary and syntax, meanings of words and phrases, grammatical questions, issues of literal and non-literal meanings. These issues are most often addressed through interpreting the Koran by studying the Arabic language and classical poetry. As for juristic issues, the importance of law (*sharia*) meant that many Koranic scholars were preoccupied with legal issues, such as defining the commandment verses in the Koran. A distinction was made between the general and specific application of commandments. An important question was that of abrogation—the identification of abrogated and abrogating verses. A fourfold division of the meanings of the text was made into significative (*'ibara*), implicative (*ishara*), analogical (*dalala*), and assumptive (*iqtida'*). The final area of interpretation concerned theological issues. In these analyses, the problem of anthropomorphism was discussed, as was the sinlessness (*'isma*) of the prophets and the problem of free will versus predestination; reconciling the two extremes was a major preoccupation of the interpreters (*mufasssirin*).

Classifications of Hadith

The various collections of *hadith* were crucial to the science of *tafsir*. While the *hadith* collections as a whole were regarded as in some way inspired, individual *hadith* were evaluated according to their reliability and classified as sound or unsound. The principal criteria for classification were the perfection (or otherwise) of the chain of transmission; the freedom of the text from defect; and the acceptance of the text by the *Sahabah* (in the case of Sunnis), the *Tabi'un* (their followers), and their disciples.

A number of classifications of *hadith* have been made. Four types of *hadith* can be identified according to *reference to a particular authority*:

- *Qudsi* (Divine): a revelation from Allah (SWT); relayed with the words of the Prophet (PBUH).²
- *Marfu'* (elevated): a narration from the Prophet (PBUH)—e.g., I heard the Prophet (PBUH) saying...
- *Mawquf* (stopped): a narration from a companion—e.g., we were commanded to...
- *Maqtu'* (severed): a narration from a successor.

Six categories can be identified according to the links of *Isnad*—interrupted or un-interrupted:

- *Musnad* (supported): a *hadith* that is reported by a traditionalist, based on what he learned from his teacher at a time of life suitable for learning; similarly, in turn, for each teacher until the *isnad* reaches a well known companion, who in turn reports from the Prophet (PBUH).
- *Mutassil* (continuous): a *hadith* with an uninterrupted *isnad* which goes back only to a companion or successor.
- *Mursal* (hurried): if the link between the successor and the Prophet (PBUH) is missing—e.g. when a successor says, “The Prophet said...”
- *Munqati'* (broken): a *hadith* whose link anywhere before the successor—i.e., closer to the traditionalist recording the *hadith*—is missing.
- *Mu'adal* (perplexing): a *hadith* whose reporter omits two or more consecutive reporters in the *isnad*.
- *Mu'allaq* (hanging): a *hadith* whose reporter omits the whole *isnad* and quotes the Prophet (PBUH) directly—i.e., the link is missing at the beginning.

Five categories of *hadith* can be identified according to the *number of reporters* involved in each stage of *Isnad*:

- *Mutawatir* (consecutive): a *hadith* reported by such a large number of people that they cannot be expected to agree upon a lie.
- *Ahad* (isolated): a *hadith* narrated by people whose number does not reach that of the *mutawatir*.

It is further classified into:

- *Mashhur* (famous): a *hadith* reported by more than two reporters.
- *Aziz* (rare, strong): at any stage in the *isnad*, only two reporters are found to narrate the *hadith*.
- *Gharib* (strange): at some stage of the *Isnad*, only one reporter is found relating it.

² Note: *Subhanahu Wa Ta'ala*, abbreviated SWT, is a phrase of respect said after pronouncing the name of Allah. Muslims repeat the phrase “Peace be upon Him,” abbreviated PBUH, after mentioning a Prophet’s name.

Two categories of *hadith* can be identified according to the *nature of the text and isnad*:

- *Munkar* (denounced): a *hadith* reported by a weak narrator, and whose narration goes against another authentic *hadith*.
- *Mudraj* (interpolated): an addition by a reporter to the text of the *hadith* being narrated.

Four categories can be identified according to the *reliability and memory* of the reporters. This provides the final verdict on a *hadith*:

- *Sahih* (sound): Imam Al-Shafi'i states that if a *hadith* is not *mutawatir*, to be acceptable "each reporter should be trustworthy in his religion; he should be known to be truthful in his narrating, to understand what he narrates, to know how a different expression can alter the meaning, and to report the wording of the *hadith* verbatim, not only its meaning."
- *Hasan* (good): A *hadith* whose source is known and reporters are unambiguous.
- *Da'if* (weak): a *hadith* that fails to reach the status of *hasan*. Usually, the weakness is one of discontinuity in the *isnad*, in which case the *hadith* could be (according to the nature of the discontinuity) *munqati'* (broken), *mu'allaq* (hanging), *mu'dal* (perplexing), or *mursal* (hurried); or it is one of the reporters having a less than reputable character, perhaps because he told lies, made excessive mistakes, opposed the narration of more reliable sources, was involved in innovation, or had an ambiguous character.
- *Maudu'* (fabricated or forged): is a *hadith* whose text goes against the established norms of the Prophet's sayings, or its reporters include a liar. Fabricated *hadith* are also recognized by external evidence related to a discrepancy found in the dates or times of a particular incident.

Sharia and the Various Schools of Sharia

In many ways, Islam is *sharia*: the Islamic way of life, the framework of *dos* and *don'ts* within which a Muslim leads his life. It is also a marker of identity separating Muslims from non-Muslims. While *sharia* refers to God's divine law as revealed in the sacred texts, *fiqh* is the human (scholarly) understanding of the law, its elaboration and interpretation. It connotes human scholarly activity and the literature it produces. Practitioners of *fiqh*, the *fuqaha'*, try to discover and give expression to the *sharia*.³ Other legal and scholastic experts—*ulama*, *qadis*, and *muftis*—also interpret and apply the law. Legal issues are dealt with by looking at the relevant Koran and *hadith* texts filtered through the long history of legal precedents and commentaries. The full implications of *sharia* were worked out during the first two centuries of Islam. Scholars and jurists created rules from the source texts through the device of "independent reasoning"

³ John Esposito, ed., *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*, vol. 2 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 450–62.

(*ra'y*) with the Sunnah serving as the interpretive framework to the Koran. *Ra'y* was soon rejected by most and replaced by logical deduction (*qiyas*) and scholarly consensus (*ijma'*).

The various roots of Islamic law are called *usul al-fiqh*. Although *sharia* has evolved over time, the primary sources of *sharia* are the Koran and *hadith*. These are complemented when needed by a process of consensus (*ijma'*) and analogical reasoning (*qiyas*).

Schools of Law. Four Sunni orthodox schools of law (*madhahib*, singular *madhab*), named after their founders, developed and had been codified by the end of the tenth century. The Shia developed a school of their own. The founders of the schools were:

- Abu Hanifa (700–67): the Hanafi *madhab*
- Malik ibn-Anas (715–95): the Maliki *madhab*
- Muhammad ibn-Idris al-Shafi'i (767–820): the Shafi'i *madhab*
- Ahmad ibn-Hanbal (780–855): the Hanbali *madhab*
- Ja'far al-Sadiq (700–765) (the sixth Shia Imam): the Ja'fari *madhab*, the Shia Twelver school.

Other marginal schools that have survived include the Shia Zaydi (Fiver) school, limited to Yemen, and the Shia Ismaili school. A small *khariji-'Ibadi* school has also survived in Oman. Most Muslims until recently were expected to belong to one of these schools, usually the one dominant in their region.

The founders of these various schools systematized the collections of *hadith*, dividing them by subjects and interpreting their meanings as well as applying them to legal issues. The schools differ in some of the criteria they use for reaching legal decisions and in some interpretations of Koranic regulations and details of prescribed rituals, but they accept each other as orthodox.

Sharia tries to describe in detail all possible human acts, dividing them into two general categories, permissible (*halal*) and prohibited (*haram*), and subdividing them into various degrees of good or evil such as obligatory, recommended, neutral, objectionable, or forbidden. *Sharia* regulates in detail all matters of devotional life, ritual purity, marriage and inheritance, criminal offenses, commerce, and the governing of the Islamic state. It also regulates relations with non-Muslims within the Muslim state as well as with enemies outside the state.

Islamic law is usually divided into two main parts. One deals with rituals (*'ibadat*), encompassing details on ritual purity, prayer, alms, fasting, pilgrimage, and sometimes jihad. The second main part of *sharia* addresses social relations (*mu'amallat*), covering criminal law; family law (marriage, divorce, inheritance); economic law (trade and commerce, contracts); and several other topics.

The category of criminal law is subdivided into laws regarding the obligations of humans towards each other (*huquq al-insan*) and laws governing human obligations toward God (*huquq Allah*), which include specific severe penalties for a number of crimes known as *hudud* (limits). *Hudud* punishments include the death penalty for apostasy and adultery as well as the amputation of limbs for theft.

Sharia is interpreted and applied by Muslim legal and scholastic experts: *ulama*, *fuqaha*, *qadis*, and *muftis*. Legal issues are handled by these experts by looking at the relevant Koran and *hadith* texts filtered through the long history of legal precedents and commentaries.

Areas of Major Differences Among the Sunni Schools. There are several areas of significant difference between the main Sunni schools of *sharia*. The most important concerns the interpretation of the Koran, especially which verses are to be regarded as abrogated by later verses, and to what extent Koran and Sunnah abrogate each other. There are also differences on the meaning and implications of certain Koranic words.

A second area of difference is around the acceptance and interpretation of *hadith*. There is wide variety of opinion on the authenticity of various *hadith*, especially those reported by a single narrator, and on their interpretation.

A third major area of disagreement deals with the status accorded to rationalist doctrines in the various schools. There was much arguing between the schools on the validity and scope of application of the methods of consensus (*ijma'*), analogy (*qiyas*), reasoning (*ra'y*), and interpretation (*ijtihad*). There are additional areas of difference on subsidiary matters that are too detailed to address here.

Characteristics of the Schools of Law

The Hanafi school accepts the four roots of law (Koran, Sunnah, *qiyas*, and *ijma'*). It emphasizes the use of analogical deduction (*qiyas*), but also adds personal opinion (*ra'y*) and the principle of selecting from several options the legal decision that would most alleviate unnecessary hardship (*istihsan*). It is criticized by the other schools for emphasizing speculative opinion at the cost of *hadith*. It generally shows more respect for personal freedom and is more liberal than the other schools. It is also milder in its treatment of non-Muslims and war captives. The most important manuals of the Hanafi schools are the *Zahir al-rawayah* by Muhammad Hasan al-Shaybani, the *Al-kafi* ("The Concise") by al-Marwazi, and the *Al-mabsut* ("The Comprehensive") by Shams al-Din al-Sarakhsi. The *Hedaya* by Burhan al-Din 'Ali al-Marghinani (d. 1196) is another famous and authoritative textbook of Hanafi law.⁴

The Maliki school is more conservative in its emphasis on *hadith*, though it adds the criterion of public interest (*maslaha*) to the four accepted roots of law as a basis for its legal judgments. It also gives greater consideration to regional customs than do the other schools. The major manual of the Maliki school is the *Al-mudawwana* ("The Enactment") by Asad al-Furat, which was later edited and arranged by Sahnun as *Al-mudawwana al-kubra*. Another important work is Khalil ibn-Isahq's *Al-mukhtassar* ("The Concise Summary of Law").

⁴ Among the English translations of such manuals are: *Al-Shafi'i's Risala: Treatise on the Foundations of Islamic Jurisprudence*, translated with an introduction, notes, and appendices by Majid Khadduri (Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society, 1987); and Burhan al-Din 'Ali al-Marginani, *The Hedaya: Commentary on the Islamic Laws*, 2 volumes, translated by Charles Hamilton (New Delhi: Kitab Bhavan, reprinted 1985).

The Shafi'i school emphasizes *qiyas* and *ijma'* and utilizes only the four roots of law in arriving at legal decisions. It rejects *istihsan* and *maslaha* as forms of interference with *sharia*. The school is more selective in its recognition of *hadith*, which it viewed as the only valid interpretation of the Koran. Al-Shafi'i propounded his teaching in the *Risala* ("The Message") and the seven-volume *Kitab al-umm* ("The Book of Essentials"). Important Shafi'i manuals are al-Nawawi's book *Minhaj-at-Talibin*, which is a standard work in Egypt, Malaysia, and Indonesia; and al-Suyuti's *Al-ashbah wa'l-naza'ir*.

The Hanbali school is the most literal and conservative of the schools, limiting the use of analogy (*qiyas*) and human reasoning, demanding that all legal decisions be based only on a literal interpretation of Koran and *hadith* and rejecting tools of adaptation such as *istihsan* and *maslaha*. Hanbalis preferred weak *hadith* to strong analogy. The works of the thirteenth-century scholar Taqi al-Din ibn-Taymiyya (d. 1327) are extensively used by Hanbalis.

The Twelver Shia school has its own distinctive collection of *hadith*. While it accepts Koran, *sunnah*, and *ijma'*, it rejects *qiyas* and replaces it with reason (*'aql*) as the fourth source of law. The *sunnah* is expanded to include the practice and sayings of the twelve Shia Imams, accepted as infallible and inspired, having the status of divine revelation. The disappearance of the last Imam in 874 was seen as an occultation (*ghayba*.) He was believed to still exist in an invisible form, and will return in visible form at the end of time as the messianic *mahdi* who will usher in a period of universal peace and justice. In the meantime, the highest Shia jurists are his representatives, and *ijma'* means the consensus of these jurists, who also have the right of ongoing *ijtihad*. An important Shia manual is *Al-kafi fi 'ilm al-din* ("The Sufficient in the Knowledge of Religion") by Muhammad ibn-Ta'qub al-Kulayni. Other important manuals were written by ibn-Babawayh (*Man la-yahdurhu al-faqih*) and al-Tusi (*Tahdhib al-ahkam* and *al-istibsar*). The most widely used manual among the Shia is *Wasa'il al-shi'a* by Hurr al'Amili (d. 1699).⁵

Disciples continued the founders' work, and over the centuries several widely accepted manuals were composed by famous masters that laid down all that was needed to be known about the law for all generations.

The development of the legal corpus in all schools depended on two principles: First is the requirement that any formulation of the law at any time must be justifiable by reference to revelation (Koran and *hadith*, i.e., Muhammad's *sunnah*). Second, participants in each tradition must remain loyal to their own tradition, taking into account the interpretive achievements of older masters. The law had to be justified by reference to the continuity and the established identity of the school. Scholars were to find their way back to the meaning of revelation only through tradition.

According to the traditional view, the canonical collections of Koran and *hadith* are equal in authority, although the Koran is superior in its nature and origins. In practice,

⁵ Andrew Rippin, *Muslims: Their Religious Beliefs and Practices*, vol. 1: *The Formative Period* (London: Routledge, 1990), 103–16; Abdulaziz Sachedina, "Shi'i Schools of Law," in *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*, vol. 2, 463–64.

however, the *hadith* collections dominated the hermeneutical process. The relationship between *hadith* and Koran was controversial. Some early jurists claimed that the *sun-nah* might abrogate the Koran; others, that the *sunnah* passed judgment on the Koran; and yet others that it clarified and explained the Koran. All agreed with the statement that, “the Book is in greater need of the *Sunnah* than the *Sunnah* is of the Book” (al-Awza’i, d. 774).⁶

Closing the Gates of Ijtihad and Taqlid. The founders of the five schools of Islamic law lived in the eighth century and the first half of the ninth century. From the tenth century onwards, scholars of the various school of law gradually reached a consensus that all essential questions of law had been comprehensively discussed and settled by the great founding scholars. By the end of the tenth century, efforts to find new interpretations of *sharia* came to an end. Later scholars were not deemed to have the necessary qualifications for independent reasoning, so all future activity had to be confined to the explanation, application, and interpretation of doctrines that had already been established. This “closing the door of *ijtihad*” opened the way for the practice of *taqlid*, the imitation of the great scholars and pious masters, which meant the unquestioning acceptance of the decisions of the established schools and authorities.⁷ Deviation from past jurists’ opinions was disapproved of and considered sinful. Since that time, the *sharia* was seen as a set of static and unchanging norms, a comprehensive code from which there can be no variation. This development created a great reluctance among the majority of Sunni Muslims to indulge in *ijtihad*.

Mernissi sees the closing of the gates of *ijtihad* as part of the process of closing Islamic orthodoxy to the possibilities of freedom of thought under the “terror of the sword.” Political rulers (caliphs) and the religious establishment stifled debate, and intellectual opposition was repressed. Dissidence henceforth was expressed by violent rebellions against totalitarian leaders, killing them and replacing them with other totalitarian leaders, not by questioning and changing the political system.⁸

The Mu’tazila Interlude—Reason as Key. The *Mu’tazila* were a rationalist school of theology who were dominant in the Abbasid Empire in the ninth century. The *Mu’tazila* used dialectic, logic, and rational argument to develop their system. *Mu’tazila* thought led to a remarkable flourishing of Islamic science and culture, and to a relaxation in relations between Muslims and non-Muslims. Their main ideas were:

- Reason is a means of knowing God
- God’s justice is God binding himself to act in accordance with his essential attributes

⁶ Esposito, ed., *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*, vol. 2, 450.

⁷ J. Schacht, “Law and Justice,” in *The Cambridge History of Islam*, Vol. 2B: *Islamic Society and Civilization*, P.M. Holt, Ann K.S. Lambton, and Bernard Lewis, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 563–64.

⁸ Fatima Mernissi, *Islam and Democracy: Fear of the Modern World* (New York: Perseus Books Group, 2002), 19–21, 34–35.

- The Koran was created in time (did not exist eternally) and is open to interpretation by human reason
- The laws of nature, created by a reasonable God, are open to human investigation and are predictable, including a clear link between cause and effect
- Man is endowed with free will and is responsible for his actions.

The Ash'arites—Without Reason. However, opposing views to those of the *Mu'tazila* gained the upper hand and finally formed what we now think of as orthodox Sunni Islamic theology. The suppression of *Mu'tazila* thought led inexorably to closing the gates of *ijtihad* when all further development of *sharia* was banned. The victorious party was the Ash'arites, who taught that:⁹

- Man cannot know God or understand Him by his reason, but must simply obey and accept God's inscrutable and arbitrary omnipotence and will.
- Divine predestination overrules man's free will, and omnipotent power is God's main attribute.
- There is no link between cause and effect, as God in every moment creates all things anew according to his will. Creation is thus unpredictable, and there is no need to study natural laws or to seek causes of perceived effects. God is not accountable even to his own self and norms.
- The Koran is uncreated and has existed with God from eternity, and as such is more an object of worship and of unquestioned obedience than of reasoned interpretations.

The *Ash'arite* victory over the *Mu'tazila* profoundly influenced the development of Islam. First, a totalitarian view of God and of His will for the world developed. Believers were expected to practice strict obedience to *sharia* and its injunctions, including jihad and the treatment of non-Muslims, which encouraged totalitarian forms of government. Second, the Islamic ruler (whether Sunni caliph or Shia imam), as God's vice-regent and delegate on earth, acts as God does: his will is to be unquestioningly obeyed, he is accountable to no human agency, only to God. Third, a fatalistic Islamic world-view developed in which the will to power remains the only absolute, because that is what God is. The believer surrenders unconditionally to God's will, including its manifestation in a tyrannical political system. Finally, a system based on unreasonable pure will to power inevitably leads to violence to solve all problems.¹⁰ Will must be imposed by force, as reason has no place in the system.

⁹ Followers of Abul Hasan 'Ali ibn Isma'il al-Ash'ari (873–935), who repudiated his *mu'tazila* beliefs, became a Hanbali Sunni, and established the *Ash'arite* theology, which became the orthodox Sunni doctrine and has dominated Sunni Islam since the tenth century.

¹⁰ Fatima Mernissi refers to Nietzsche's idea of the "will to power" as the most basic driving force in the universe and in human society, an idea picked up by Fascist and Nazi ideologues and borrowed from them by contemporary Islamists.

Classical Attitudes to and Interpretations of Jihad

Classical scholarly interpretations of violence in Islamic theology are derived from the Koran, *hadith*, and *sharia*, as well as from the normative example of Muhammad and the experiences of violent conflicts in the early history of Islam. These factors provided the theoretical framework and paradigms within which jihad and the means it may employ are discussed, interpreted, legitimated, and implemented.

Most traditional Muslim scholars asserted that all “peaceful” verses in the Koran were abrogated by the so-called “Sword Verse” (Q 9:5), which commands Muslims to fight anyone who refuses to convert to Islam. It is clear from the *hadith* that Muhammad and the first Muslims understood the term *jihad* to include physical warfare and literal killing. In the *hadith* collections, especially those of Bukhari and Muslim, military jihad takes up almost all the space of the chapters devoted to jihad. Muhammad’s military expeditions (*ghazawat*) are treated as forms of jihad, and Muhammad’s companions are seen as being very much concerned with the offensive military activities of the Muslim community.¹¹

Sharia clearly establishes jihad as one of the most basic religious duties. There is little difference between Sunni and Shia law concerning war. Linked to the concept of jihad is the division of the world into two domains: the House of Islam (*Dar al-Islam*) and the House of War (*Dar al-Harb*). Muslims are supposed to wage jihad to change the House of War (areas where non-Muslims are politically dominant) into the House of Islam, regions politically dominated by Muslims.

Some Classical and Medieval Scholars on Jihad

Shaybani (750–804), *Siyar*. *Siyar* is the branch of Islamic law concerned with international relations. The early Muslim jurists used to deal with *siyar* under the general heading of jihad. For Shaybani, the sword was a marker of the God-given Islamic government, given to deal with all possible forms of unbelief: polytheism, apostasy, People of the Book, and Muslim dissenters from Islamic orthodoxy:

Allah gave the Prophet Muhammad four swords [for fighting unbelievers]: the first against the polytheists, which Muhammad himself fought with; the second against apostates, which Caliph Abu Bakr fought with; the third against the People of the Book, which Caliph ‘Umar fought with; the fourth against dissenters which Caliph ‘Ali fought with.¹²

Abu’l-Hasan al-Mawardi (972–1058), *Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyya*. Al-Mawardi stressed both earthly and heavenly rewards as legitimate motivation for jihad warriors. He defined the enemy in a jihad as those who refuse to convert to Islam. Jihad must be fought constantly, at least once a year.

¹¹ Egdunas Racius, *The Multiple Nature of The Islamic Da’wa*, Doctoral Dissertation, The Faculty of Arts, University of Helsinki (Helsinki: Valopaino Oy, 2004), 51.

¹² Shaybani, *Kitab al-Siyar al-Kabir*, I, 14-5, quoted in Majid Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1955), 74.

Ibn Rushd (Averroes, d. 1198), *Bidayat al-Mujtahid wa Nihayat al-Muqtasid*.¹³ According to Ibn Rushd, there is a scholarly consensus that all polytheists (*mushrikun*) are to be fought and that it is permissible to enslave them—men, women, and children. Only monks are exempt from being enslaved, revealing that People of the Book are included in his definition of polytheists. There is also a consensus that it is permissible in war to kill all adult male polytheist fighters, but once taken as prisoners there is some argument as to whether they may be executed and in what circumstances.¹⁴

Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328). According to Ibn Taymiyya, the aim of jihad is to make Islam dominant in the world, and all those who oppose this purpose must be fought: “Since lawful warfare is essentially jihad, and since its aim is that the religion is God’s entirely and God’s word is uppermost, therefore according to all Muslims, those who stand in the way of this aim must be fought.”¹⁵ God has provided both Koran and sword to win the world to his religion, Islam: “There are two things which can establish and sustain religion: the Koran and the sword.”¹⁶

He advocated a permanent struggle between Islam and non-Muslims. Wherever Muslims are a weak minority, they must endeavor by all possible means to become powerful and dominate the non-Muslims.¹⁷ Ibn Taymiyya exalted military jihad as the best religious act a man can perform, better than pilgrimage, prayer, or fasting. Jihad implies “all kinds of worship, both in its inner and outer forms. More than any other act it implies love and devotion for God.”¹⁸

Ibn Naqib al-Misri (d.1368), *‘Umdat al-Salik* (“Reliance of the Traveler”). This is an important Shafi’i text. According to Ibn-Naqib al-Misri, an Egyptian Hanafi jurist, jihad is fought against Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians, and all other people—basically against all non-Muslims: “The caliph makes war upon Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians until they become Muslims or else pay the non-Muslim poll tax.... The caliph fights all other peoples until they become Muslim.”¹⁹

Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), *The Muqaddima*. The North African philosopher-historian Ibn Khaldun defined jihad as “a religious duty, because of the universalism of the [Muslim] mission and [the obligation to] convert everybody to Islam either by persuasion or force.”²⁰

¹³ Ibn Rushd, *The Distinguished Jurist’s Primer (Bidayat al-Mujtahid)*, translated by Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee, vol. 1 (Reading: Garnet Publishing, 1994), 454–87.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 455–57.

¹⁵ Ibn Taymiyya, translated in Rudolph Peters, *Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam: A Reader* (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener, 1996), 49.

¹⁶ Ibn Taymiyya, *al-Siyasa*, quoted in Qamaruddin Khan, *The Political Thought of Ibn Taymiyyah* (Delhi: Adam Publishers, 1982), 37.

¹⁷ Qamaruddin Khan, *The Political Thought of Ibn Taymiyyah*, 37–38.

¹⁸ Ibn Taymiyya, translated in Peters, *Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam*, 47–48.

¹⁹ Ahmad Ibn Naqib al-Misri, *Reliance of the Traveller: A Classic Manual of Sacred Islamic Law (‘Umdat al-Salik)*, edited and translated by Nuh Ha Mim Keller, rev. ed. (Beltsville, MD: Amana Publications, 1997), 602–3.

²⁰ Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History*, trans. Franz Rosenthal, vol. 1 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958), 473.

Sheikh Ahmad Sirhindi (1564–1624). Sirhindi argued forcibly against any accommodation with Hinduism, as Hindus were *kafirs*. He sought to revive the earlier jihadi spirit of the Islamic state, arguing that “*Shariat* can be fostered through the sword”:²¹

Kufr and Islam are opposed to each other. The progress of one is possible only at the expense of the other and co-existence between these two contradictory faiths is unthinkable. The honor of Islam lies in insulting *kufr* and *kafirs*. One who respects *kafirs*, dishonors the Muslims. ... They should be kept at an arms’ length like dogs.... The real purpose in levying *jizya* on them [the non-Muslims] is to humiliate them to such an extent that, on account of fear of *jizya*, they may not be able to dress well and to live in grandeur. They should constantly remain terrified and trembling. It is intended to hold them under contempt and to uphold the honor and might of Islam.²²

Shah Wali Allah of Delhi (1702–62). According to Shah Wali, jihad—fighting in God’s way—is the perfect implementation of *sharia*. Leaders of non-Muslim communities who refuse to accept Islam must be killed, and their followers forcibly converted to Islam.²³

It has become clear in my mind that the kingdom of heaven has predestined that *kafirs* should be reduced to a state of humiliation and treated with utter contempt. Should that repository of majesty and dauntless courage [Nizam al-Maluk] gird his loins and direct his attention to such a task he can conquer the world. Thus the faith will become more popular and his own power strengthened; a little effort will be profoundly rewarded. ... You should therefore not be negligent in fighting *jihad*. ... Oh Kings! *Mala a’la* urges you to draw swords and not put them back in their sheaths again until Allah has separated Muslims from the polytheists and the rebellious *kafirs* and the sinners are made absolutely feeble and helpless. ... We beseech you [Durrani] in the name of the Prophet to fight a jihad against the infidels of this region. This would entitle you to great rewards before God the Most High and your name would be included in the list of those who fought jihad for His sake. As far as worldly gains are concerned, incalculable booty would fall into the hands of the Islamic *ghazis* and the Muslims would be liberated from their bonds. ... Jihad should be their first priority, thereby ensuring the security of every Muslim.²⁴

²¹ Sayyid Athar Abbas Rizvi, *Muslim Revivalist Movements in Northern India in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (New Delhi: Agra University Press, 1965), 247.

²² *Ibid.*, 248–49.

²³ Sayyid Athar Abbas Rizvi, *Shah Wali-Allah and His Times* (Canberra: Ma’rifat Publishing House, 1980), 294–96, 299, 301, 305, quoted in Andrew G. Bostom, ed., *The Legacy of Jihad: Islamic Holy War and the Fate of Non-Muslims* (New York: Prometheus Books, 2005), 202–3.

²⁴ Sayyid Athar Abbas Rizvi, *Shah Wali-Allah and His Times*, 294–296, 299, 301, 305, quoted in Bostom, ed., *The Legacy of Jihad: Islamic Holy War and the Fate of Non-Muslims*, 202–3.

Modern Interpretation

Since the nineteenth century, efforts have been made to reform *sharia* by returning to the original sources and by reopening the gates of *ijtihad*. These efforts can be divided between those that would pursue modernization and liberalization to keep Islam in step with other contemporary civilizations, and those that would create a stricter, more puritanical faith completely unblemished by any outside influence.

Modern interpretation of the Koran and *hadith* is based on three interrelated principles:²⁵

- Use of scientific reason and methodology to interpret the Koran, or use of the Koran itself and rejection of extraneous material found in *hadith* and earlier commentaries
- Divesting the Koran of presumed legendary traits, fantastic stories, magic, fables, and superstitions, and focusing instead on symbolic interpretation
- Rationalizing Islamic doctrine by basing it solely or mainly on the Koran.

Some of the key characteristics of modern interpretation include:

- An emphasis on the spiritual content of the Koran
- Diminished interest in grammar, rhetoric, and theology
- Greater emphasis on modern problems in economic, social, moral, and political spheres that affect Muslims
- Use of *tafsir* as a vehicle to advance ideas in these spheres, for reform and revival
- The assumption that Koranic *suras* are unities with significant order and coherence
- Emphasis on efforts to demonstrate the harmony between science and Islam
- Rejection of *taqlid* and the reopening of the gates of *ijtihad* in order to achieve their goals. *Ijtihad* is seen as the God-given method for social and political change, and is held to be an essential element in Islamic thought to ensure Islam's vitality. The "closing of the gates" was a serious mistake, which led to the decay of Muslim civilization.²⁶

Many Muslim reformers have seen the return to the sources of Islam (Koran and *sunnah*), the downgrading of the authority of the four legal schools (*madhahib*), and the discarding of later traditions as the "golden key" that would cure Muslim societies of their backward state and political weakness vis-à-vis the West. This approach enabled scholars to select and mix from the different compendiums at will and borrow the best elements from Western cultures, setting up the good of the community (*maslaha*)

²⁵ Andrew Rippin, *Muslims: Their Religious Beliefs and Practices*, vol. 2: *The Contemporary Period* (London: Routledge, 1993), 86–97.

²⁶ Muqtedar Khan, "Who are the 'moderate' Muslims?" Islam for Today website. Available at: <http://islamfortoday.com/khan08.htm>

as the ultimate value and criterion. The reformers also rejected common law (*'adat, 'urf*) and popular Sufi practices.²⁷ Most reformers also stressed the importance of reason and differentiated between a core set of *sharia* that was unchangeable and eternal (either the part that deals with duties to God, *'ibadat*, or a core of universal values), and the larger part dealing with social relations in society, which was open to change and to adaptations to new contexts.²⁸ Many also rejected the doctrine of abrogation, replacing it by harmonizing the various contradictory Koranic passages in the light of the text's eternal universal core values.

Koranic commentaries, *tafsir*, have become a vehicle for the spread of new ideas in the Muslim world. A variety of concepts are made relevant to contemporary Muslims by trying to base them in the Koranic text. A wide variety of views on what constitutes true Islam has developed, including modernist, modernist with a universalist emphasis, radical Islamist with literary and scientific emphases, as well as neo-traditionalist with a philological emphasis. All compete for dominance in the wider Muslim world of today. Two main issues arise, however, in all of these views: the miraculous nature of the Koran and its rationality; and the difference between moral and legal obligations.²⁹

Early Reform

Sayyid Ahmed Khan in India (1817–98).³⁰ Sayyid Ahmad Khan was the first modern reformer to make a substantial impact on the Muslim world. He founded the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh, India, with the aim of producing an educated elite of Muslims able to compete successfully with Hindus for jobs in the colonial Indian administration. He believed that the only hope for Islam in the colonial world lay in modernizing Muslim institutions. Khan wrote the first modernist commentary on the Koran, the *Tafsir al-Koran*. The following points provide an overview of Khan's approach:

- The Koran, properly understood and reinterpreted by reason, would supply a guide to Islam's accommodation to Western influence and the modern world, and reconcile the contradictions between traditional Islam and modern science.³¹
- *Sunnah* should be modified by weakening the hold of *ijma'* and renewing the right of *ijtihad*.
- A fundamental distinction must be made between details of revelation (*furu'*) and the general principles underlying them (*'usul*).

²⁷ Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, trans. Carol Volk (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 32–33.

²⁸ John L. Esposito, "Contemporary Islam: Reformation or Revolution?" in *The Oxford History of Islam*, Esposito, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 683–84.

²⁹ Rippin, *Muslims: Their Religious Beliefs and Practices*, vol. 2, 97.

³⁰ Akbar Ahmed, *Living Islam* (London: BBC Books, 1993), 118, 119; Malise Ruthven, *Islam in the World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 300–2.

³¹ Rippin, *Muslims: Their Religious Beliefs and Practices*, vol. 2, 86–87.

- *Sharia* must be reinterpreted for modern contexts. Traditional *sharia* reflects the ideas and practices of the first generation of Muslims.
- All laws are subject to change according to circumstances; only the *'ibadat* (regulations governing worship and religious rituals) were perfect and immutable.

In addition to these key elements of his thought, Khan challenged orthodox interpretation on several additional points. He questioned the *sunnah* as the infallible source of law and criticized the methodology of the early *hadith* collectors, including Bukhari and Muslim, in terms similar to those put forth by the Western scholars, Goldziher and Schacht. Khan also advocated the free choice of rulings from all schools of law, instead of requiring adherence to a single school. Finally, he tried to harmonize Islamic rules with Western norms, arguing that Islam condemned slavery and that jihad was only defensive in nature.

Muhammad 'Abduh (1849–1905) and *Egyptian Reform*. 'Abduh, the grand *mufti* of Egypt, wrote a commentary, *Tafsir al-Manar*, which is marked by a rationalist spirit and provides moral direction for Muslims in the modern world. He urged a return to the sources of Koran and *sunnah* as the ultimate authority, thus denigrating the importance of the traditional legal schools. He used modern knowledge and human reason to interpret the Koran, saying that everything needed is found in the Koran and arguing that the aim of the text is to provide moral principles applicable to all times.³² In addition, he rejected rigid scholasticism and *taqlid*, and distinguished between the unchanging core of Islam and its external manifestations, which were open to change. He asserted that there was no conflict between Islam and modernity. Revelation and reason were not contradictory, but complemented each other as the two sources of Islam.

'Abduh used *Mu'tazili* rationalism and revived the earlier genre of reason-based exegesis (*tafsir bi'l-ra'y*), which had lain dormant for centuries. He hoped to reform Islam and *sharia* by discovering the real intent of its unchanging fundamental principles, as well as by selectively appropriating aspects of Western culture and practice that are not contrary to Islam. He recognized that regulations of worship (*'ibadat*) were unchangeable, but asserted that precepts on social affairs (*mu'ammalat*) were open to re-interpretation and change, with the aim of promoting the welfare of society.

He followed the Maliki principle of seeking to serve *maslaha* (public interest) in his legal rulings (*fatwas*), allowing the law to be changed according to modern requirements. 'Abduh also used the principle of *talfiq* (piecing together), whereby rulings were developed by systematically comparing the views of the four *madhabs* and selecting the ones most consonant with *maslaha* and with the universal principles of Islam.³³ He believed that Islam should attempt to control change via decisions that would be based on Islamic criteria for selecting what is good for modern life. He fought against traditional *tafsir*, arguing for the need to make Koranic commentary accessible

³² Rippin, *Muslims: Their Religious Beliefs and Practices*, vol. 2, 88–89.

³³ John J. Donohue and John L. Esposito, eds., *Islam in Transition* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 9; Esposito, *Islam: The Straight Path* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 132–34.

to all Muslims. This new commentary must be relevant to modern needs, rejecting theological speculations and detailed grammatical discussions.

Fazlur Rahman (1919–88). Rahman directed the Islamic Research Institute in Pakistan until conservative elements pressured him to leave. His book, *Major Themes of the Koran*, uses his method of interpreting the text not literally but by looking for the moral intention behind it. In order to interpret the Koran meaningfully for modern times, he believed a double movement of thought is needed. First, scholars must be able to think back and compare present situations to Koranic times. This requires an understanding the meaning of the Koran as a whole, as well as its specific tenets that are responses to the specific contextual situation of its time. Second, scholars must be able to project from Koranic times to the present, generalizing specific answers as universal and applying them to present realities and contexts.

Rahman also differentiated between *legal* and *moral* regulations, saying that legal rulings are binding primarily in their moral sense, not in their literal wording. In addition, he believed that much of classical Islamic commentary and law was wrong because the jurists had ignored the moral imperative behind the text, viewing the text as containing unchangeable, literal legal enactments. Muslims have failed to understand the true meaning of the Koran because of the traditional methods that have been used in interpreting it, which led to the creation of the traditional sciences of the Koran and the legal framework of *sharia*, and the rejection of Islamic philosophy. Buried under the debris of grammar and rhetoric and the many commentaries on commentaries on Koran and *hadith* written by scholars of the past, the Koran lost its vibrancy and revolutionary import. Finally, he believed that Muslims could free themselves from the burden of the past by studying history critically and differentiating the essentials of the faith from all unnecessary additions.³⁴

*Radical Reform: Mahmud Muhammad Taha in Sudan*³⁵

The Sudanese scholar and religious leader Dr. Mahmud Muhammad Taha made a sharp distinction between the Meccan and the Medinan parts of the Koran, which carried different messages. He called for a totally new revision of *sharia*, and was executed as an apostate by the Nimeiri regime in Sudan in 1985. The main points of his thought are as follows:

- The Meccan revelation constitutes the essential, universal, and unchangeable principles of Islam, valid for all times.
- The Medinan revelation consisted of temporal rules suitable for the context of tribal Arabia in the seventh century. The Medinan passages were concessions to the backward and barbaric society of the time, and are irrelevant to the modern age.

³⁴ Rippin, *Muslims: Their Religious Beliefs and Practices*, vol. 2, 109–11.

³⁵ Gerhard Lichtenthaler, "Muslim, Mystic and Martyr: The Vision of Mahmud Muhammad Taha and the Republican Brothers in the Sudan: Towards an Islamic Reformation?" *Islam et Societes au Sud du Sahara* 9 (November 1995).

- The Meccan revelation mandates religious freedom and equality between the sexes.
- Instead of returning to the original *sunnah* as well as to the Medinan passages, Muslims should pursue an endless evolution of *sharia* based solely on the universalist principles of the Meccan passages.
- *Ijtihad* should be based on rational thought and on mystical reflection aimed at understanding the metaphorical meanings of the Koran.

Shia Calls for Reform

Ali Shariati in Iran—Islamic Liberation Theology. Ali Shariati, the main ideologue of the Iranian Islamic revolution, developed a revolutionary Islamic ideology very different from Khomeini's traditional brand of theology.³⁶ It was rooted in Western existentialism, dialectical Marxism, and anti-imperialism as well as in reinterpreted versions of Shiite Islam and Sufism.³⁷ Shariati's thought shared many similarities with Christian Liberation Theology. He maintained that Islam is a revolutionary ideology because, from its inception, it sided with the oppressed. Muhammad had fought for social equality and surrounded himself with the deprived members of society.³⁸ Shariati's ideology's key goals were to:

- Integrate modernity with Islam, reinterpreting Islam in modern sociological categories, while recasting Western political and sociological thought into a Muslim idiom.
- Transform Islam into a mass revolutionary movement. Shariati posited an imagined early anti-clerical and revolutionary *Alawi* Shia Islam that needed to be revived in order to emancipate the masses from oppression. According to this view, Muhammad and his companions were social reformers and revolutionaries.³⁹

³⁶ Suroosh Irfani, *Revolutionary Islam In Iran* (London: Zed Books, 1983), 116; Dabashi, "Ali Shariati's Islam: Revolutionary Uses of Faith in a Post-Traditional Society," *Islamic Quarterly* 27: 4 (1983): 203.

³⁷ The Sufi strand in Shariati's thinking, including the impact of Jalal al-Din Rumi's "*Masnavi*," and Massignon's influence has been comparatively ignored by scholars, except for Ali Rahnama. In *Pioneers of Islamic Revival*, Rahnama states that, in Massignon's company, Shariati underwent a significant inner transformation. See Ali Rahnama, ed. *Pioneers of Islamic Revival* (London: Zed Books, 1994), 212, 220–21. This is further elaborated in Rahnama's *An Islamic Utopian*, where Rahnama states that Shariati, during his student days in Paris, was a research assistant to Massignon, and that Massignon became his spiritual master (*pir*). See Ali Rahnama, *An Islamic Utopian: A Political Biography of Ali Shariati* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1998), 120–23.

³⁸ Ali Shariati, *Martyrdom: Arise and Bear Witness*, trans. Ali Ghassemy (Tehran: Ministry of Islamic Guidance, 1981), 20–21.

³⁹ Ali Shariati, *What Is To Be Done: The Enlightened Thinkers and an Islamic Renaissance* (Houston: IRIS, 1986), 54.

- Encourage the understanding that Koranic texts have many possible meanings, some hidden, and some open to multiple interpretations.
- Recognize Islam's bias towards the poor based on its founding liberating document, the Koran, which states that "God is the God of the oppressed" and the "God of the deprived."⁴⁰
- Understand contemporary's Islam developmental stage as similar to that of Europe at the time of the Protestant Reformation.⁴¹ The Reformation created a paradigm shift in society, releasing vast energies that generated Europe's leap forward into modernity. Islamic societies need a similar religious reformation that will unleash similar energies, lead to "a great leap forward," and move them from passive fatalism and blind obedience to learned men and clerics (the *ulama*) to become a dynamic force in the world, reaching the level of Western societies in one generation.⁴²
- Undermine the *ulama*'s monopoly over religion by accusing them of creating a false Islam. They were reactionaries who limited themselves to "philosophy, theology, jurisprudence, conjugation, and syntax," diverting people's attention from the real causes of their misery and ignoring the core truths of Islam.⁴³

'Abdul Karim Soroush. A leading Iranian intellectual and philosopher, he further developed Shariati's ideas by adopting a view of Islam influenced by Western phenomenology and liberal Christian theology. One of his key teachings was that Islam bears many interpretations that vary with time and context. Imposing a fixed interpretation makes Islam rigid, superficial, and one-dimensional. Related to this point was his contention that God and his revelation are eternal and immutable, but religion is relative, because it exists in the realm of human understanding and language, where everything is relative. Sacred texts do not change, but their interpretations should always be in flux.

Soroush distinguished between fundamentals (*usul*) and branches (*furu'*) of Islam. He also held that traditional *fiqh* cannot provide solutions for Muslims in the modern world, and that Islam needs a new, dynamic and forward-looking *fiqh*, which will be able to address the problems of Muslims in modern contexts. The final distinguishing point of Soroush's thought is that the will of the majority must shape the ideal Islamic state, not the dictates of the *ulama*, and that there is no contradiction between Islam and the freedoms inherent in democracy.⁴⁴

⁴⁰ Ibid., 1; Shariati, *Martyrdom: Arise and Bear Witness*, 78.

⁴¹ Ali Shariati, *On the Sociology of Islam*, trans. H. Algar (Berkeley, CA: Mizan Press, 1979), 58; Shariati, *What Is To Be Done*, 18; Shariati, *Man and Islam*, trans. Marjani (Houston: FILINC, 1981), 103, 104.

⁴² Shariati, *What Is To Be Done*, 24, 25; Shariati, *Man and Islam*, 105.

⁴³ Shariati, *On the Sociology of Islam*, 109, 116–18; Shariati, *Man and Islam*, 23; Shariati, *Fatima is Fatima* (Tehran: Tahrike Tarsile Quran, 1980), 6–7.

⁴⁴ Ruthven, *Islam in the World*, 373–74; Ali R. Abootelebi, "Islam, Islamists, and Democracy," *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 3:1 (March 1999).

Contemporary Feminine Reform: The Malaysian Sisters in Islam

“Sisters in Islam” is a group of Muslim professional women concerned by the injustice women suffer in states where *sharia* has been implemented. They claim the right to participate in the contemporary processes of reclaiming, redefining, and implementing Islam. They reject dogmatic, extremist, and intolerant forms of Islam that cannot provide solutions to the complexities of the modern world. Their tenets include:

- Belief that the Koranic universal principles of equality, justice, and freedom (including equal rights for women) override opposing rules set forth in traditional *sharia*.⁴⁵
- An opposition to continuing attempts to impose *hudud* punishments (such as the death sentence for apostasy) and traditional *sharia* law at both federal and state levels in Malaysia.
- Interpretation of the Koran on the reformist principles of stressing the eternal validity of a few fundamental universalist principles that override other verses or *hadith* that seem to contradict them, as well as on harmonization, which gives equal weight to all verses and denies the validity of the abrogation principle.
- An opposition to Islamism, which promotes an intolerant vision of an Islamic state—a dictatorial, theocratic, and inherently inequitable system that allocates different rights to men than to women, and to Muslims than to non-Muslims.⁴⁶
- Calls for the doors of *ijtihad* to be reopened.
- Recognition of the Koran as divine revelation, but interpretation of the Koran as a human effort that leads to diverse opinions. This diversity is a positive value that enables Islam to survive in a variety of cultures and societies while preserving its universalist message.
- A conviction that the interpretation of the source texts and *ijtihad* must not be left in the hands of an exclusive elite group like the ‘*ulama*, who isolate the text both from its socio-historical context and from contemporary contexts. Sisters in Islam promote lay interpretations of the Muslim scriptures, arguing that all Muslims should be involved in the discourse of what kind of Islam is right at this time. Only enlightened interpretations of Koran and *hadith* will provide solutions to the problems Muslims face today.

Islamists

Abu'l A'la Mawdudi (1903–79). Mawdudi was influenced by al-Banna, and founded the *Jama'at-i Islami* in 1941 as an elitist vanguard organization aimed at establishing an Islamic order. In his *Tafhim al-Koran* he hoped to present a unitary “Islamic mes-

⁴⁵ “About SIS: Mission,” Sisters in Islam homepage, at: www.muslimtents.com/sistersinislam/about/content1.htm.

⁴⁶ “Islam, Apostasy and PAS,” Resources @Sisters in Islam (22 July 1999). Available at: www.muslimtents.com/sistersinnislam/resources/1apostat.htm

sage” for *da'wa* purposes and to foster the complete transformation of the individual, society, and politics in line with Islamic ideology. He believed a number of factors would bring about this transformation. First, Islam, as a total ideological system, must come to dominate all areas of public life (political, societal, economic), as well as personal matters and private worship. In line with the view that Islam should control all affairs of political life is Mawdudi's teaching that the Koran is a revolutionary manifesto and a manual for Islamist activists—it is an implicitly political work.

In implementing the political and social order called for in the Koran, a highly motivated vanguard of enlightened Muslims would act as catalysts of the Islamic revolution. Once this vanguard had succeeded in creating a truly Islamic state, this state—ruled by *sharia*—will solve all problems that Muslims face worldwide. Mawdudi taught that jihad is the way to alter the ideology and social order. While embracing the classic military understanding of Islam, he also considered jihad to cover non-violent means such as campaigning for change by speech and writing.⁴⁷

Sayyid Qutb (1907–66). Sayyid Qutb was the primary ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt during the rule of President Nasser (1954–70) and is viewed as the godfather of Islamist radicalism. Qutb wrote a commentary called *Fi Zilal al-Koran* (“In the Shade of the Koran”), which is extremely popular in the contemporary Muslim world. His axiom was that Islam is a perfect system that integrates freedom, equality, and social justice and is in accord with the cosmic order and the laws of nature. He embeds his radical interpretation of Islam in the Koranic text, using Koranic stories and concepts as paradigms applicable to the modern world. Among his primary concepts are:

- Islam is a comprehensive ideology that must regulate all aspects of life by implementing *sharia* as the legal system of the state.
- Reason and public welfare are important principles of interpretation, but only within the framework of Islamic rules.
- The paganism of Muhammad's time (*jahiliyya*) is replicated in the neo-paganism of the modern secular world, both Western and Muslim. Pharaoh is the prototype of the evil dictators and tyrants of today who want to destroy Islam; Moses is the prototype of the true Muslim leader who fights to liberate his people by bringing them under the yoke of *sharia*—true worship of God.
- Strong opposition to traditional commentaries that were atomistic in their approach to the Koran. His approach is holistic, seeing the Koran as a unity that mirrors and demands the unity of the Muslim *umma*.⁴⁸
- Promotion of the Khariji doctrine of *takfir*, the process of judging Muslims—whether individuals, regimes, societies, or states—to be apostates or infidels if

⁴⁷ Sayyid Abu'l A'la Mawdudi, *Jihad fi Sabilillah [Jihad in Islam]*, trans. K. Ahmad (Birmingham, U.K.: Islamic Mission Dawah Centre, 1997), 13–15.

⁴⁸ Rippin, *Muslims: Their Religious Beliefs and Practices*, vol. 2, 91–93.

they do not wholly conform to the *sharia*. They must be fought, killed, and replaced.

- A transformation in the understanding of the *hijra* (emigration), from the traditional description of Muhammad's migration to Medina to an interpretation of the *hijra* as a distinct stage in the development of the contemporary ideal Islamic state. *Hijra* should be the response of true Muslims to the state of ignorance and immorality prevalent in society.
- Employing a term previously reserved for the paganism of pre-Islamic Arabia, he called this ignorance and immorality *jahiliyya*.⁴⁹
- Identification of all *jahili* societies as the enemy, thus supplying a specific focus for revolutionary action. *Jahiliyya* is always evil in whatever form it manifests itself, as it is always seeking to crush true Islam.
- Jihad by force must be used to annihilate *jahili* regimes and replace them with true Muslim ones.⁵⁰ He emphasized the *qital* (fighting) aspect of jihad,⁵¹ and strongly rejected any solely defensive interpretation.⁵² He saw jihad as a method for actively seeking to free all peoples on earth from non-Islamic authority.⁵³

Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab (1703–92). Al-Wahhab founded a puritanical and militant reform movement based on the Hanbali *madhab* and on ibn-Taymiyya's teachings. He linked his movement to the House of Saud, and this strictly puritanical Wahhabism remains the predominant Islamic movement within Saudi Arabia today. He considered Muslim society at the time to have reverted to paganism (*jahiliyya*), and thus revived the Khariji practice of *takfir*, in which he condemned all Muslims he disagreed with as apostates in order to justify fighting jihad against them. He rejected all innovations that occurred after the third Islamic century, and urged a return to the Koran and *sunnah* in a pious interpretative attempt (*ijtihad*) to understand and implement their fundamentals. He condemned Sufis and Shia as apostates for adopting supersti-

⁴⁹ Yvonne Y. Haddad, "Sayyid Qutb: Ideologue of Islamic Revival" in *Voices of Resurgent Islam*, John Esposito, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 85–87; Ronald Nettler, "A Modern Islamic Confession of Faith and Conception of Religion: Sayyid Qutb's Introduction to *tafsir, Fi Zilal al-Quran*," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 21:1 (1994): 102–4.

⁵⁰ Sayyid Qutb, *The Islamic Concept and its Characteristic* (Indianapolis: American Trust Publication, 1991), 12.

⁵¹ Yvonne Y. Haddad, "The Quranic Justification for an Islamic Revolution: The View of Sayyid Qutb," *Middle East Journal* 37:1 (Winter 1983): 17–18.

⁵² Nettler, "A Modern Islamic Confession of Faith," 98–102; S.M. Solihin, *Studies on Sayyid Qutb's Fi Zilal al-Quran*, unpublished thesis, Department of Theology, University of Birmingham (U.K.) (1993), 284.

⁵³ Sayyid Qutb, *Islam and Peace* (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 1988), 80–85; Sayyid Qutb, *Fi Zilal al-Quran*, vol. 3 (Beirut: Dar al-Shuruq, 1987), 1433–35; Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones* (Lahore: Qazi Publications, no date), 88–89. See also Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones (Ma'alem Fil Tariq)* (Indianapolis: American Trust Publications, 1990).

tious innovations, and urged the renewal of abandoned original model of Islam—that only principles of the Koran and *sunnah* were ultimately binding, and that decisions made by later medieval scholars lacked authority.

Salafis

The Salafis view the first three generations of Muslims (Muhammad's companions, and the two succeeding generations after them—the pious forbears, *al-salaf al-salih*) as the perfect examples of how Islam should be practiced. This principle is derived from the *hadith* of Muhammad: “The best of people is my generation, then those who come after them, then those who come after them”—i.e. the first three generations of Muslims (Bukhari 3:48:819 and 820; Muslim 31:6150 and 6151).

Islam was perfect and complete in the days of Muhammad and his companions, but a great deal of undesirable “innovation” (*bid'a*) was added to Islam afterwards. Salafism seeks to revive the original practice of Islam. Salafis are preoccupied with *hadith* as the main basis of their *fatwas*. Sound *hadith* must be distinguished from unsound ones. Some were falsely attributed to *sahaba* and *tabi'un* but cannot be traced back to them when the *isnad* is investigated. Special consideration with regard to *hadith* must be given to Jewish material (*isra'iliyat*), which was sorted and evaluated. Other material that crept in due to theological, philosophical, political, and other considerations, also needed to be re-evaluated. False *hadith* purposely introduced by the enemies of Islam must be distinguished from sound material.

Salafis are divided into three movements:

- Purists, who reject forms of political or organizational activism that divide the Muslim community and divert attention from the study of Islam and the propagation of Salafism. They see jihad in defensive terms, and accept a jihad only when led by a legal Muslim government. They argue that it is forbidden for Muslims to revolt against a Muslim government, no matter how oppressive or unjust.
- Activists, who agree with the Muslim Brotherhood and similar movements that political activism is the best method for achieving the goal of an Islamic state under *sharia*.
- Salafi-Jihadists, who advocate violence and terror and actively promote rebellion against the state and all perceived enemies of Islam. This third movement is the primary source of Islamist terrorism around the world. It emerged during the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan when jihadi, Wahhabi, Deobandi, and other groups cooperated and intermingled in their fight against the common enemy. It was strengthened during the 1991 Gulf War, when the more radical Saudi Salafis rejected reliance on U.S. troops in the Arabian Peninsula to protect Saudi Arabia from Iraqi aggression.⁵⁴

⁵⁴ Juan Jose Escobar Stemann, “Middle East Salafism’s Influence and the Radicalization of Muslim Communities in Europe,” *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 10:3 (September 2006).

Progressives

Progressives want to reform Islam by Westernizing it. They accept the separation of religion and state. They reinterpret the Koran and *hadith* according to secular and liberal Western concepts of human rights, multiculturalism, and feminism. They are also willing to use Western academic tools of textual criticism to examine the Muslim scriptures. Modernists were influential in the 1920s and 1930s and in the early days of independence in the various Muslim states. However, their freedom of expression is now firmly restricted in most Muslim states, where they are currently under tremendous pressure from Islamists and traditionalists. They face charges of apostasy and blasphemy, as well as threats of violence and death. As a result, many have emigrated to the West.

Nasr Hamid Abu-Zayd.⁵⁵ On 14 June 1995, the Appeals Court in Cairo, Egypt, ruled that Dr. Nasr Hamid Abu-Zayd, a professor of Islamic and Arabic Studies at Cairo University, was an apostate from Islam, and ordered his separation from his wife, Dr. Ibtihal Yunis, an assistant professor of French at Cairo University. Following death threats, Professor Abu-Zayd fled Egypt with his wife, and now lives in exile in Belgium.

Abu-Zayd is a liberal academic who claims to be a devout Muslim. He extended his linguistic research to the study of Islamic source texts of Koran and *hadith*. According to him, the Koran is the revelation of God's words, but it is also a cultural product and a historical phenomenon, given in a specific time and place. The historical text is subject to human understanding and interpretation. While the text is originally divine, it is also historical, and its interpretation is absolutely human. The Koran and the authentic traditions must be analyzed within the context in which they originated (similar to the Western tradition of historicist criticism). The interpretations of the first Muslim generation and of the generations that followed are not final or absolute. To understand and interpret the text today, we must use socio-historical analysis as well as modern linguistic methodologies.

Abu-Zayd championed allegorical and metaphorical readings of the texts, because they allow the reinterpretation of religious law according to its spirit rather than its letter. He urged that an analysis of the Koranic text in its contextual cultural reality must begin with empirical historical facts. Through the analysis of such facts, a scientific understanding of the Koran can be established. Interpretive diversity is necessary, and imposing uniformity leads to the degeneration of the message. Since the message of Islam is universally valid for all, diversity of interpretation is inevitable. Awareness of the difference between the Koran's fixed original contextual meaning and the changeable significance of that meaning will produce interpretations that can accommodate themselves to changing contexts.

⁵⁵ Fauzi M. Najjar, "Islamic Fundamentalism and the Intellectuals: The Case of Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 27:2 (November 2000): 177–200; Nasr Hamid Abu Zaid, "The Revival of Anti-Modernist Islamic Discourse," Nasr Abu Zaid page, at: www.pakistanidefenceforum.com/lofi/version/index.php/t11144.html.

Conclusion

Muslims operate within a long and continuous system of interpretation from which they cannot be divorced. Western attempts to reinterpret certain Islamic themes, such as violence, jihad, and terrorism are most likely to fail. Muslims react with hurt pride and scorn at any such attempts. At the most, Western governments and scholars can encourage Muslim scholars who interpret their sources in peaceful, non-violent ways.

However, it is imperative that Westerners and Muslims accept and admit that violence and jihad are part of the Muslim source texts. They cannot be wished away. At best they can be marginalized by a reinterpretation that prioritizes the peaceful parts of the source texts by various means (as do a variety of reformist and progressive scholars and movements within Islam).

Western governments have made the mistake of dealing with Islamist movements as though they are the authentic representatives of Muslim communities and of Islam in general, thus further empowering them. A better strategy would be to marginalize these groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood, *Jama'at-i-Islami*, Deoband, and the Salafis/Wahhabis, as these are the movements that take the jihad passages of the Koran most seriously. Instead, groups that follow progressive interpretations that would limit the applicability of the violent passages to the early period of Islam, and that prioritize the peaceful ones as being the universal and eternal principles of Islam, should be encouraged and supported until they become the dominant forces in the Muslim world. This might take a long time, as the radical groups still enjoy access to funding from oil-rich states and have managed to project themselves as the dominant force in contemporary Islam. Their power must be broken as the progressive forces are empowered, given greater resources, and supported to become a political force with the means to take over the leadership of global Islam as well as each individual Muslim state.

The Role of Interreligious Dialogue in Addressing Ideological Support for Terrorism: Roman Catholic Perspectives

*Albert A. Agresti, S.J. **

The roots of the Roman Catholic Church's efforts in interreligious dialogue over the past half-century rest in the work of a number of individuals, including that of the American Jesuit John Courtney Murray. Fr. Murray was among several whose views and writings on this question during the first half of the twentieth century were viewed with suspicion in some Roman Catholic circles, as they evidenced too much influence from democratic ideals and principles that were, in some cases, at odds with official Church teaching.¹ Yet, during the Second Vatican Council (or Vatican II) held between 1963 and 1965, he and others saw their once suspect opinions incorporated into official Church teaching. This is an excellent example of how culture and belief often interact to bring about something new, something positive—an example of how patient perseverance, coupled with hope, can help bring about change.

While major developments in interreligious dialogue have occurred over the past century, this is not to suggest that interactions between Roman Catholicism and non-Christian religions, and especially Islam, can only be traced to this period. It goes without saying that the West is highly indebted to many great Islamic thinkers such as Averroes (*Ibn Rushd*) and Avicenna (*Ibn Sina*)—to name only two—for their influence on and contributions to the world's knowledge in such areas as medicine, philosophy, and mathematics. Indeed, the philosophical and theological writings of St. Thomas Aquinas, one of the greatest Roman Catholic thinkers, were deeply influenced by Islamic thought.

When it came to an actual conversation or dialogue around specifically theological and religious issues, however, before the Second Vatican Council the dominant view within the Catholic tradition was that, while other religious traditions may have some element of truth to them, they were fundamentally erroneous. Consistent with this position, any notion of interreligious dialogue (not to mention religious freedom) on the part of the Catholic Church was a logical inconstancy. This view helped fuel intense missionary efforts to convert others to the Catholic faith, since all other faiths were thought to be untrue. In fairness, Roman Catholicism was not alone in this view. Although it might be articulated differently in other traditions, its effects are equally discernable. For example, the spread of Christianity, specifically Anglicanism, went hand-

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¹ Fr. Murray's writings in this area are extensive. His collection of essays published in his book, *We Hold These Truths*, offers an excellent overview of his thought. See Murray, *We Hold These Truths: Catholic Reflections on the American Proposition* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1960).

in-hand with the spread of the British Empire. Today the extensive Anglican Communion is composed of many peoples who were once a part of that far-flung empire.

Vatican II issued three documents dealing explicitly with religious pluralism.² One of these documents was the “Decree on Ecumenicism” (*Unitatis Redintegratio*, or “Restoration of Unity”). As the title suggests, this document addresses the relationship of the Roman Church with other Christian traditions. The remaining two documents are important and directly relevant to our topic. The first deals with the Church’s relationship with non-Christian religions, and the second deals with religious freedom. Indeed, these two documents may well be the most controversial of the sixteen official pronouncements issued by the Council. There were numerous arguments raised—some reasonable and others less so—for holding them in committee, watering them down, and even keeping them off the Council’s agenda (not to mention the Council floor) for discussion. It was only due to the astute diplomatic efforts of the respected Jesuit scripture scholar, Cardinal Augustin Bea, and the implicit confidence that both Pope John XXIII and Pope Paul VI had in Cardinal Bea that these documents saw the light of day.³

The first document is the “Declaration on the Relationship of the Church to Non-Christian Religions” (*Nostra Aetate*, or “In our Times”). In this document, we see a profound paradigmatic shift in the Church’s view of and approach to non-Christian religions. The Catholic Church committed itself to seeking commonalities among differing religious beliefs, recognizing that all religious traditions have much to offer, and acknowledging that the Church is called to an openness to the insights that other faiths contain: “In [the Church’s] task of fostering unity and love among men, and even among nations, she gives primary consideration in this document to what human beings have in common and to what promotes fellowship among them.”⁴ While clearly acknowledging that one should not attempt to deny or neglect differences, for to do so would be to engage in an inauthentic conversation, prime focus and attention is to be given to things that are common among religions and that have the potential to unite rather than divide. “Other religions to be found everywhere strive variously to answer the restless questions of the human heart.... The Catholic Church rejects nothing which is true and holy in these religions. She looks with sincere respect upon those teachings of conduct and life, those rules and teachings which, though differing in many particulars from what she holds and sets forth, nevertheless often reflect a ray of that Truth which enlightens all men.”⁵

This document established the context for genuine conversation between faiths within the Catholic Church, a sincere dialogue grounded in mutual respect of another’s religious beliefs and fidelity to one’s own. A specific invitation and expressed desire

² Walter Abbott, S.J., *The Documents of Vatican II* (New York: The America Press, 1966).

³ John Borelli, “Tracing the Contemporary Roots of Interreligious Dialogue,” *Jesuit Interreligious Dialogue and Relations* (October 2005). Available at: http://puffin.creighton.edu/jesuit/dialogue/documents/articles/njn_borelli_02.html.

⁴ Abbott, *The Documents of Vatican II*, 660.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 662.

for reconciliation was extended to those of the Muslim faith to whom the Church “looks with esteem.”⁶ The document stated, “Although in the course of the centuries many quarrels and hostilities have arisen between Christians and Moslems, this most sacred Synod urges all to forget the past and to strive sincerely for mutual understanding. On behalf of all mankind, let them make common cause of safeguarding and fostering social justice, moral values, peace, and freedom.”⁷

While differences do exist between Catholics and Muslims, there is much on which we agree, and much we can do together to help us achieve our common desires and goals. Interreligious dialogue was close to the hearts of both John XXIII (who had served as a diplomat in Istanbul) and Paul VI. In 1964, a year before the conclusion of the Second Vatican Council, while the draft of *Nostra Aetate* was still under consideration and had yet to be approved and promulgated by the Council, Paul VI established a special department in the Roman Curia for relations with people from other faiths. It was first called the Secretariat for Non-Christians, and was later renamed the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue. In August 1964, Paul VI issued his first encyclical, *Ecclesiam Suam* (“Paths of the Church”), in which he clearly outlined the importance of interreligious dialogue. It is reasonable to assume that Paul VI’s decision to issue this encyclical while the draft of *Nostra Aetate* was still under consideration by the Council would leave little doubt in anyone’s mind as to where he stood on the question.

The second document that is relevant to our topic is the “Declaration on Religious Freedom: On the Right of the Person and of Communities to Social and Civil Freedom in Matters Religious” (*Dignitatis Humanae*, or “The Dignity of the Human Person”). In this document, the Council explicitly acknowledged and gave positive interpretation to those elements of democratic principles that positively affect our growing awareness of the value and dignity of the human person, as well as the sacredness of a person’s conscience and his or her relationship with God. The opening sentence of Chapter One, Section Two boldly asserts: “This Vatican Council declares that the human person has a right to religious freedom.”⁸ For many of the bishops at the Council, this statement was, for all intents and purposes, a major shift in their world view. In order to explain this phenomenon, the document offers that, “in taking up the matter of religious freedom, this sacred Synod intends to develop the doctrine of recent Popes on the inviolable rights of the human person and on the constitutional order of society.”⁹

What the Council acknowledged was a simple fact. While the ultimate truth that all faiths seek may not change, human efforts to understand and articulate it are always incomplete, and so are in need of review and, at times, further development. The bishops of the Catholic Church embraced the principle that the Church’s teaching not only can evolve, but that at certain moments—prompted by and under the guidance of the Holy

⁶ Ibid., 663.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid., 678.

⁹ Ibid., 677.

Spirit—it must evolve in order to remain responsive to humanity.¹⁰ In this reference to the “constitutional order of society,” the Council embraced and carried forth John XXIII’s assertion in his encyclical *Pacem in Terris* (“Peace on Earth”)—the first papal encyclical addressed to the entire world and not just to members of the Roman Catholic Church—that the dignity of the human person requires that there must be constitutional limits to the powers of government.

The Church no longer viewed democratic principles with suspicion, but recognized the need to be both willing and able to engage in dialogue with what was clearly a significant movement in human history. Given the context in which this document was written—during the Cold War, and in the wake of World War II—there was an implicit recognition of the need to safeguard the individual within a totalitarian state. The Church, however, did not limit her concern to these states. The Council explicitly asserted the belief in the need to safeguard the individual vis-à-vis all forms of government. The premise for this is the dignity of the human person, created in the image and likeness of God.

For those interested in interreligious dialogue as a way of countering ideological support for terrorism, this dialogue must be a true and honest one. We must be ready and willing to ask ourselves, as well as our governments, our respective news media, and other information providers and image-makers a number of questions:

- What do we need in order to enable us to be receptive to hearing what others may have to say to us, how they may desire to touch our hearts and minds?
- Are we willing and able to point out these needs and insist that, when necessary, we rethink and change how we speak about those whom we wish to engage in dialogue, how they are depicted in the media, and how we choose the actions that will be the focus of our attention?
- Are we willing to hear what the other has to say with respect, to focus on what is common to us and what will help us all?
- Are we willing to enter into this conversation/dialogue ready to accept what is true in what others may want us to see? Or will we insist that this conversation, if it happens at all, be limited to all-too-predictable rhetoric and posturing?

We deceive ourselves if we think that this can be a unidirectional enterprise, that it is only the hearts and minds of others that need to be changed in an effort to counter ideological support for terrorism, that there is no need for change in our own hearts and minds. In a speech at the Oxford University’s Centre for Islamic Studies in May 2006, Cardinal Cormac Murphy-O’Connor, the Archbishop of Westminster, noted that “dialogue will be impossible as long as minds are closed, as long as adherents of either

¹⁰ Although certain Catholic teachings had evolved and developed over time, the Council explicitly and formally acknowledged this reality. See Thomas Noonan’s *A Church that Can and Cannot Change: The Development of Catholic Moral Teaching* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005) for an interesting analysis of the development of the Church’s teaching in a number of areas, e.g. slavery.

faith believe that we have nothing to learn from the other, or that the Spirit of God is not active in the whole of God's creation."¹¹ The following month, Archbishop Jozef Wesolowski, head of the Holy See's delegation to a meeting of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, cautioned that, "if interreligious and intercultural dialogue is to succeed in helping to counter prejudices in civic and political life, then the educational system and the media must avoid stereotypes, distortions, attitudes of intolerance and the frequent belittling of religion and culture."¹²

There must be recognition that Islam, like Christianity and Judaism, is not a monolithic entity. Simplistic representations of "us" and "them" are misleading and essentially harmful. As Islam spread beyond Arab lands and peoples to the Indian subcontinent, Asia and the islands of the Pacific, sub-Saharan Africa, and elsewhere, it encountered new cultures and diverse political and economic systems and began to take on subtle but important nuances. The advance of Islam, like that of Christianity, is consistent with the belief that Islam, like Christianity, is a universal religion. This common belief in their universality provides both religions with their strong missionary self-understanding, and the consequent desire to convert others. In his speech cited earlier, Cardinal Murphy-O'Connor pointed out that "our two faiths are boldly universal. This is what we have in common and that has been the source, sometimes, of our tension. But universality is what makes our dialogue imperative."¹³

While we know all too well that violence has been employed in the past in missionary efforts, we must be unequivocal in our opposition to any attempts to impose one's religious beliefs on another, most especially when such attempts include the use of violence. In a joint statement issued by the Committee for Dialogue of the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue and the Permanent Committee of Al-Azhar for Dialogue with the Monotheistic Religions in February 2002, participants agreed that "extremism, from whatever side it may come, is to be condemned as not being in conformity with the teachings of the two religions."¹⁴ At the conclusion of their meeting the following year, participants issued a statement asserting that "the sacred texts in both religions must be understood in their proper context. Isolating passages from their context and using them to legitimize violence is contrary to the spirit of our religions."¹⁵

¹¹ Cormac Murphy-O'Connor, "Catholic-Muslim Dialogue Today," speech at the Centre for Islamic Studies, Oxford University (17 May 2006). Available at: www.indcatholicnews.com/chmus239.html.

¹² Jozef Wesolowski, "The Frequent Belittling of Religion and Culture," remarks to a meeting of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in Almaty, Kazakhstan (13 June 2006). Available at: www.zenit.org/english/visualizza.phtml?sid=90883.

¹³ Murphy-O'Connor, "Catholic-Muslim Dialogue."

¹⁴ Vatican Press Office, "Interreligious Statement on Extremism," Vatican City (27 February 2002). Available at: www.zenit.org/english/war/visualizza.phtml?sid=17254.

¹⁵ Vatican Press Office, "Islamic-Catholic Statement on Terrorism and Peace," Vatican City (2 March 2003). Available at: www.zenit.org/english/visualizza.phtml?sid=32142.

In an address given in Geneva in April 2004 at the 60th session of the United Nations' Human Rights Commission, Archbishop Silvano Tomasi, the Holy See's Permanent Observer to the UN's offices in Geneva, offered that, "All religions can make a unique contribution to a peaceful living together by rejecting the violent plans and means of some of their members who cover their destructive goals under the guise of religion and by opening instead the way for interreligious dialogue."¹⁶ In his address to the United Nations General Assembly in October 2004, Archbishop Celestino Miglore, the Holy See's Permanent Observer to the United Nations, stated that "religious leaders have a special responsibility in dispelling any misuse or misrepresentation of religious beliefs and freedom. They have in their hands a powerful and enduring resource in the fight against terrorism."¹⁷

Some who read or hear these words will scoff, thinking that religion has no positive role to play in attempts to counter ideological support for terrorism. At best, such observers may feel, religion is all well and good, but it is an essentially personal or private matter, and certainly has no appropriate—let alone potentially significant—role to play in international politics. At worst, religion is one of the main reasons the world is in the mess it is today. In her recent book, *The Mighty & the Almighty: Reflections on America, God and World Affairs*, former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright takes issue with these traditional views, and outlines cogent reasons for her position that religion has already shown itself to be not only a player, but a major, positive player on the stage of international world politics.¹⁸ It may take a few decades for the dust to settle, but it will be interesting to read what future historians will have to say about the influence played by the religious faith of many of the members of the Solidarity movement and similar developments across Eastern Europe (as well as the role played by Pope John Paul II) in bringing about the dramatic political changes we saw unfold before us during the closing years of the twentieth century.

One essential element for authentic interreligious dialogue is a willingness on the part of all parties to examine uncomfortable issues. At times this may require a respectful expression of those points on which we differ, ones about which we must agree to disagree. At other times, these uncomfortable issues may be those that religious leaders must be willing to highlight, even if political leaders would rather we avoided them. For interreligious dialogue to have meaning and to be credible in the eyes of those whom we wish to influence, it must be free and not at the service of any one nation or any one political system. This dialogue must be at the service of all humanity.

¹⁶ Silvano Tomasi, "Holy See Address at U.N. on Religious Intolerance," speech delivered to the United Nations Human Rights Commission in Geneva (5 April 2004). Available at: www.zenit.org/english/visualizza.phtml?sid=51843.

¹⁷ Celestino Miglore, "Address to U.N. on Religion as a Value for Coexistence," speech delivered to the United Nations General Assembly, New York (27 October 2004). Available at: www.zenit.org/english/visualizza.phtml?sid=61065.

¹⁸ Madeleine Albright, *The Mighty and the Almighty: Reflections on America, God, and World Affairs* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2006).

In a statement issued to world leaders on 8 September 2002 in anticipation of the first anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, Pope John Paul II noted that our efforts to respond to terrorism must “undertake new and creative political, diplomatic, and economic initiatives aimed at relieving the scandalous situations of gross injustice, oppression and marginalization which continue to oppress members of the human family.”¹⁹ The Pope went on to point out that “the international community can no longer overlook the underlying causes that lead, young people especially, to despair of humanity, of life itself, of the future, and to fall prey to the temptations of violence, hatred and desire for revenge at any cost.”

Earlier the same year, the Committee for Dialogue of the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue and the Permanent Committee of Al-Azhar for Dialogue with the Monotheistic Religions had noted that “dialogue alone is not sufficient to overcome extremism; there is always need for attention to basic aspects of society: family life, education, social development, the influence of the mass media; promotion of justice and solidarity within countries and on an international scale.”²⁰ In a statement issued in January 2006, Bishop Thomas Wenski, Chair of the United States’ Conference of Catholic Bishops’ Committee on International Policy, reiterated the Conference’s belief that “terrorism cannot be fought solely, or even, principally, with military methods.”²¹ One has only to look at how quickly Hezbollah began its humanitarian efforts in Lebanon after its recent conflict with Israel. Tip O’Neill, former congressman from Massachusetts and Speaker of the House of Representatives, is known for his famous quip, “all politics is local.” Maybe there is something to be learned in this example.

It might be helpful to reflect on a number of points as we consider ways to counter ideological support for terrorism. Some of these points will appear simplistic. They are. This is not to suggest that the issues are exactly the same across societies and religious groups. They are not. However, in recognizing that Islam is not monolithic, that it is not homogenous, and that there may be similarities at play that we may have never considered, we may begin to find ways to understand and speak with one another.

We know that some Muslims want to create a world society consistent with their religious beliefs, or at least with their particular interpretation of their religion. While we object to this desire and any consequent efforts on the part of anyone to impose a world view predicated on their own religious beliefs, we must recognize that the notion of creating a society, even a world-wide society, based on religious beliefs is not unique to any one religion.

Islam is rooted in the Koran, and the importance of scripture in the Muslim faith cannot be overemphasized. Muslims believe that the Koran is the word of God as communicated through the Prophet Muhammad. This belief is similar to that of some Christians who believe that the Bible is the literally true word of God. In American

¹⁹ Pope John Paul II, Address to New British Ambassador, Castel Gandolfo, Italy (8 September 2002). Available at: www.zenit.org/english/visualizza.phtml?sid=24830.

²⁰ Vatican Press Office, “Interreligious Statement on Extremism.”

²¹ Thomas Wenski, “Toward a Responsible Transition in Iraq.” Washington, D.C. (12 January 2006). Available at: www.zenit.org/english/visualizza.phtml?sid=82689.

history, many Christians pointed to the writings of St. Paul as a justification for the existence of slavery, and argued that scripture showed that it was indeed God's will that slaves be submissive to their masters. Paul's writings, among others, were also used as a justification for the subordinate role of women to men. Yet the U.S. Declaration of Independence proclaims that "all men are created equal" and are "endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights...." One may think that that is simply the "old" American history, that we have moved beyond that. One has only to look at the current debate in the United States over the teaching of creationism, evolution, and/or the theory of "intelligent design" in public schools to realize that a literalist approach to sacred texts is not unique to any one religious group, culture, or nation. There are some Christian groups, in the United States and elsewhere, who wish to see current international and interreligious tensions intensify, especially in the Middle East, as they are convinced that this will help bring about Armageddon. Disputes about policy may often result from very strongly held differences of opinion among adherents of the same religion. Again, the notion of creating a society based on religious beliefs is not exclusive to any one religion.²²

The importance of community (the *Umma*) in Islam cannot be overemphasized. People enter into a fellowship, and this communal bond is of primary importance. I am intrigued by the analysis offered by those who see potential problems in the social drift occurring in many democratic countries towards what is often called "secular humanism." This form of secularism places *primacy* on the individual and individual rights. An important corollary to this view is the protection of those rights by the state. Some fear that the delicate balance and tension that exists, and that must always exist, between individual and communal rights are being subtly eroded.

The argument is made that secular humanism allows for—indeed, may actually facilitate—the breakdown of community. The individual is left in isolation before the state, divorced from other forms of community, for it is the relationship with the state, the protector and guarantor of individual rights, that takes precedence over other relationships. Indeed, rights may be viewed as arbitrary, to be given or taken as deemed expedient. (It is interesting to note that *Dignitatis Humanae* asserted religious freedom not as a "right," but as inherent in the *dignity* of the human person.) Such vulnerability allows for the enforcement of homogeneity, something that many ethnic, racial, and religious groups oppose for any number of reasons. Some have looked at these and similar developments as an indication of the anti-religious tendencies hidden in some understandings and expressions of secular humanism.²³ In 2001, Archbishop Renato Martino, the Permanent Observer of the Holy See to the United Nations, had already expressed deep concerns about the findings of a report prepared by the Special Rap-

²² Much has been written on the increasing role of religion in American political life. Kevin Phillips' *American Theocracy* (New York: Viking Press, 2006) is but one interesting analysis of this trend.

²³ For an interesting presentation of this view, see, among other works, Philip Jenkins' *The New Anti-Catholicism: The Last Acceptable Prejudice* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).

porteur of the Commission on Human Rights. He discerned in the report that there was an “increase of extremism affecting all religions; and the gradual shift towards non-belief within society, characterized by a growing militancy that enters into competition or conflict with religions.”²⁴

In the United States, we are in the midst of what has been dubbed the “culture wars.” If we look at some of the pivotal questions in these “wars,” they often revolve around issues of religious faith and what social relationships and social structures “should” look like. Again, such discussions provide an example of a non-Muslim society that is largely based on religious beliefs. Questions about access to and the permissibility of abortion, issues concerning research using human stem cells, and gay marriage are just a few examples of the issues that evoke strong passions on all sides. In his address to the United Nations General Assembly in October 2004 cited earlier, Archbishop Celestino Migliore, the Holy See’s Permanent Observer to the United Nations, cautioned that “a greater exercise of individual freedoms may result in greater intolerance and greater legal constraints on the public expression of people’s beliefs. The attitude of those who would like to confine religious expression to the merely private sphere ignores and denies the nature of authentic religious convictions. More often than not, what is being challenged, in effect, is the right of religious communities to participate in public, democratic debate in the way that other social forces are allowed to do.”²⁵

While secular humanism may have much to recommend it, we must recognize that it is a powerful force that seeks hegemony by marginalizing and pushing to the side all other points of view. This tendency may indeed tend to increase frustration among those who object to secular humanism but who have few, if any, ways of escaping its increasing and ever more pervasive influence. It should be evident, therefore, that people for whom faith—and the ability to live and express that faith *in community*—is essential to their self-understanding will be reluctant to adopt a democratic government that is premised on secular humanism.

We know that there is and can be diversity within democratic approaches to government. For example, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution explicitly prohibits the establishment of an official or state religion. Thus, in the United States, the separation of church and state is considered an essential feature of our democratic form of government. In the United Kingdom, however, the Queen (who is also officially the head of state) is also head of the Church of England. While she has the right to appoint bishops in the Church of England, she does so in close consultation with her government’s leaders. It is reasonable to assume that these leaders are not shy in advancing favorable opinions of those candidates whose theological outlook is consistent with and supportive of their party’s economic, social, and political agenda. While the United Kingdom is a constitutional monarchy, most people would argue that

²⁴ Renato Martino, “Holy See Statement on Religious Liberty,” address to the United Nations General Assembly, New York (13 November 2001). Available at: www.zenit.org/english/visualizza.phtml?sid=12642.

²⁵ Migliore, “Address to U.N. on Religion as a Value for Coexistence.”

the British parliamentary system represents, and is consistent with, some of the oldest and most cherished principles of Western democratic government.

Democracies may do well to examine more closely, and more self-critically, the growing influence of secular humanism in their political, social, and economic thinking, and should perhaps begin to explore other avenues of thought—for example, intercultural humanism—that would allow and encourage their own further development as well as enable them to understand and promote democratic values within a variety of cultural contexts. Democratic nations might do well not to confuse a philosophical system with a political system. The former may be a way of buttressing the latter, but it need not be the only way. Conducting an examination of some of our own operative assumptions would be a good starting point in countering the ideological foundations of terrorism, and may help us in protecting our own democratic forms of government.

If we desire to convince others that democracy is indeed a better form of government than what others are offering, we must recognize the ways in which we, by our own actions, may be undermining our own efforts. In reflecting on some of the actions taken by the government of the United States in its efforts to gather information on terrorists' activities, earlier this year the United States' Conference of Catholic Bishops' Committee on International Policy stated that, "Our nation simply must live up to our own Constitution's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, and adhere to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 1984. As a world leader, our nation's adherence to international standards ought to be exemplary."²⁶ There can be no substitute for the consistency and good example of all citizens in a democracy, regardless of their station, living under the rule of law if we hope to touch the hearts and minds of others.

This paper began with a brief overview of two documents issued by the Second Vatican Council, documents that represented a major shift in perspective for many in the Roman Catholic Church. The Church continues to struggle in trying to understand the implications of this invitation to a profound transformation of our own hearts and minds as we engage in dialogue with others from different faiths. In desiring to touch the hearts and minds of others in countering ideological support for terrorism, we must remain open to the possibility that our own hearts and minds may be touched as well.

²⁶ Wenski, "Toward a Responsible Transition in Iraq."

Weapons of Mass Persuasion: Communicating Against Terrorist Ideology

Steven R. Corman *

This paper presents a communication perspective on strategies for resisting Salafist extremist ideologies such as those advocated by Al Qaeda and related groups. In such an effort, the first order of business is to define the audience for the ideology under consideration. Fortunately, Islamist extremists have a concept of their audience that can be estimated from statements in captured texts, on their Web sites, and so on. One estimate is shown in Figure 1.¹ In general, the audience lies on a continuum stretching from the extremists themselves through various kinds of Muslims to “unbelievers” in the West.

Beginning at the extremist end of the continuum, it is well known that insiders are one target of ideological messages, and indeed extremists work hard at making sure that members of extremist groups continue to think in the “proper” ways. Thus we see elaborate religio-ideological frameworks that offer rationalizations for acts of savage violence,² statements demonizing the enemy,³ and explicit efforts to limit the contact of members of terrorist cells with their host cultures. In large part because of such efforts, insiders are not good targets for our efforts to undermine extremist ideology. Like cult members, they are protected from external influence by a rigid system of ideological control, and no doubt are closely monitored by their colleagues. The group of outsiders is divided into “good guys” and “bad guys” (from the perspective of the extremist group members). The bad guys are indeed targets of extremist messages, but the purpose of these messages is to intimidate these adversaries and put them on notice, not to convert them to a new ideology.⁴ Apostates are considered lost (indeed, they are condemned) by the extremists, and the unbeliever members of other faiths are unlikely to become converts to Islam except by force.

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¹ Steven R. Corman and Jill Schifflbein, “Communication and Media Strategy in the Jihadi War of Ideas,” Report No. 0601, Consortium for Strategic Communication, Arizona State University (April 2006). Available at: www.asu.edu/clas/communication/about/csc/publications/jihad_comm_media.pdf.

² Abu Bakr Naji, *The Management of Savagery*, trans. William McCants, 2006; publisher unknown. Available at: www.ctc.usma.edu/naji.asp.

³ See the so-called “Al Qaeda Training Manual,” discovered by police during a raid on an Al Qaeda member’s home in Manchester, U.K. in 2000. Excerpts available at www.fas.org/irp/world/para/manualpart1_1.pdf.

⁴ Corman and Schifflbein, “Communication and Media Strategy,” 12.




Figure 1: Jihadi Audience Concept (from Corman and Schiffelbein, 2006)

So in fact the audience for ideological influence is a rather narrow one, consisting of “good guys” who are outside the extremist movement. They range from those who already sympathize with the extremists’ cause, to “good” Muslims who may have no particular association with the extremist ideology, to “troublemakers,” who may have committed minor crimes but remain in the good graces of conservative Islam. These are the prime targets of extremists’ attempts to offer ideological legitimization for their terrorist pursuits, and are the only people to whom it is feasible for the groups to spread their ideology. If the West is to have any success undermining extremist ideology and preventing its spread, then this must be its prime audience as well.

While this is a clearly defined audience, we must be very careful not to think of it as monolithic. This group spans almost every continent, and is divided into more than 100 religious sects. There is also a major split along lines of modernization. Indeed, many members of this potential audience for extremist Islamist ideology live in undeveloped or underdeveloped parts of the world where knowledge is strictly local. One scholar has described areas in Afghanistan where people have never traveled more than a few miles from their village, and where the inhabitants might have *heard* of the United States, but probably not Great Britain.⁵ Other members of the target audience live in major Western metropolitan centers and are subject to all the modern influences, including traditional and new media—a fact that is not lost on the extremists.⁶

In the face of such a diverse audience, the only hope is to focus on commonalities—the elements of the message that enable extremist ideology to spread to all the members of the “good-guy” outsiders, without the need to be customized for local conditions. Once that is done, future efforts can focus on adapting message content and

⁵ Rory Stewart, *The Places in Between* (New York: Harvest/Harcourt, 2006).

⁶ Jarret Brachman, “Al-Qaeda: Launching a Global Islamic Revolution” *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* (forthcoming); Corman and Schiffelbein, “Communication and Media Strategy,” 2006; Marc Lynch, “Al-Qaeda’s Media Strategies,” *The National Interest* 83 (June 2006).

delivery to specific segments of the target audience. For the present purposes, then, I examine three essential components of the process that spreads extremist ideology to the potential audience: message, agent, and system. I then outline steps that the West could take against the extremists in all three areas.

Message

Definitions of *ideology* are as varied as they are numerous.⁷ The definition I use here states that ideology consists of “the taken-for-granted assumptions about reality that influence perceptions of persons and events.”⁸ Under this definition, for a group to intentionally spread an ideology to some target audience, it must offer persuasive arguments that convince people to take on the group’s guiding beliefs. This requirement seems particularly well suited to the culture in which Islamist extremists operate. Muslim culture is first and foremost a religious culture, and in the Salafi sect of Sunni extremists it is a decidedly ground-up affair. A Sunni religious leader does not derive authority from his position in an organizational hierarchy. Instead, he rises by building a reputation—in much the same way as a secular scholar does in the West—by making arguments and interpretations of texts that people respect, believe, find useful, and repeat to others. So authority in this brand of Islam is very much a matter of public discourse, and members of the target audience are no strangers to religious dialogue and debate.

This means that, in order for Western actors to counteract Salafi extremists’ ideological influence, it must engage in argument *with* the extremists. In a previous paper, I have suggested that this effort include drawing attention to extremist actions that contradict the principles of Islam and offering an alternative narrative to the history of the Muslim people upon which the extremists rely.⁹ In this essay I argue that even more can be done by taking on the analogies that underlie extremist ideology and rhetoric.

An *analogy* is a form of argument that establishes in the audience’s mind a similarity between two things (or reminds them of this similarity if it is already established), then says that, because the target is similar to the analogue in certain ways, we can assume it is similar to the analogue in *most* ways. Communicators use analogies as a means of “extending our thoughts from things we do understand to the things we do not,” which is why they play such an important role in establishing the taken-for-granted assumptions of ideology.¹⁰

Perhaps the grandest of all Salafi extremist analogies compares the present situation in the Middle East to the Crusades. Abu Bakr Naji’s *Management of Savagery* con-

⁷ See Willard A. Mullins, “On the Concept of Ideology in Political Science,” *American Political Science Review* 66:2 (1972): 498–510.

⁸ Stanley Deetz and Astrid Kersten, “Critical Modes of Interpretive Research,” in *Organizational Communication: An Interpretive Approach*, Linda Putnam and Michael Pakanowsky, eds. (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1983), 162.

⁹ Corman and Schifflbein, “Communication and Media Strategy.”

¹⁰ A. Juthe, “Argument by Analogy,” *Argumentation* 19:1 (2005): 3.

tains extensive passages on the “lessons learned” from the Crusades.¹¹ For example, he argues that in Islamic history there are “critical periods when a caliphate falls and another is established, or during our exposure to foreign attacks, like the Tartar and Crusader attacks.”¹² He uses the Crusades analogy to defend the organizational structure used by present-day Salafi groups. In doing so, he criticizes those who misunderstand the analogy and

ignorantly think that this part of Islamic history dealing with the Crusaders was accomplished by the state uniting to command the Muslims. This is a clear mistake. The readers who carefully examine this time period see that the Muslims dealt with the matter of the Crusaders by means of small bands (*tajammu'āt saghīra*) and separate, disparate organizations.¹³

In other words, the historical situation is analogous to the present one and, because small bands defeated the old Crusaders, small bands can defeat the new Crusaders too.

This analogy is so important that it is regularly re-injected into Islamist discourse. In February 2006, Osama bin Laden said:

It is a war which is repeating (bringing back) the Crusades, similarly to the previous wars. Richard [the] Lion Heart, and Barbarossa from Germany, and Louis from France... similarly is the case today, when they all immediately went forward the day Bush lifted the cross. The Crusader nations went forward. What is the concern of the Arab nations in this Crusaders' War? They entered it openly, without disguise, in broad daylight [*safaaran, jahaaran, nahaaran*]. They have accepted to be ruled by the cross.¹⁴

Later, bin Laden explicitly drew on this analogy to frame Al Qaeda's work as a small part of the worldwide struggle between Islam and the West, as if to make his own efforts further evidence for the analogy: “Alhamdulillah... I say that the battle isn't between the al-Qai'dah Organization [*tanzeem al-Qai'dah*] and the world Crusaders. The battle is between Muslims—the people of Islam—and the world Crusaders.”¹⁵

Another popular extremist analogy compares the present situation in Iraq to the defeat of Soviet forces in Afghanistan. A person identified as “als7ab,” posting on “Usama's Memo Forum” in January 2005, also predicted that defeat in Iraq

entails catastrophic consequences for the American Empire and its allied rulers in our Islamic world. United-States witnessed the disintegration and collapse of the Soviet-Union following the latter's defeat and withdrawal from Afghanistan. Without achieving victory or expanding its influence, the Soviet-Union conceded defeat in the

¹¹ Naji, *Management of Savagery*, 2006.

¹² *Ibid.*, 12.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ Osama bin Laden, “A Discussion on the New Crusader Wars,” interview by Tayseer Allouni (21 October 2001), translated by Muawiya Ibn Abi Sufyan. Available at www.terrorisme.net/doc/qaida/001_ubl_interview_a.htm.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

war of attrition that almost depleted its resources. Two years later, the former Soviet-Union ceased to exist.¹⁶

Bin Laden, in the speech quoted above, said that, just as Allah helped Muslim fighters defeat the Soviets, He would help them defeat the Americans too.

These are only two examples, but Salafi extremist texts contain many analogies. This is no doubt in part because *kiyas*, or argument by analogy to scripture, is a well-established tradition in Islamic philosophy, and is thus a form of argumentation with which the target audience would be familiar.¹⁷ Even more important, analogies involve the audience in the persuasive process, making them powerful tools in the work of converting ideas into taken-for-granted assumptions. Once audience members accept the analogy's basic comparison, they fill in gaps in their knowledge about the target by drawing on their knowledge of the source. The audience more or less persuades itself, establishing conditions of *concertive control*.¹⁸ This self-persuasion is not just an outcome but a process that can continue long after exposure to the message, as new "unknowns" about the target are recognized. Second, because they are based on a structure of comparisons between the analogue and target, analogies are difficult to disrupt. Simple counterexamples, which are standard tactics against other kinds of arguments, are nearly irrelevant to analogies because it is similarity, not dissimilarity, that matters.¹⁹

It is possible to argue against analogies, but the choice of strategies is not straightforward. Shelley proposes a useful scheme that is based on two strategic questions: Is the basic comparison underlying the analogy valid or not? and, Is the objective to dissolve the analogy and leave nothing in its place, or to replace it with something else?²⁰ Answers to these questions yield four different strategies for arguing against the analogies, summarized in Table 1. For each strategy, the table gives an abstract version of the preferred argument and the prescribed method for making it.

Answering even these two simple questions is surprisingly difficult and complex. It is safe to say that Western governments (especially the United States under the present administration) would resist endorsing *any* beliefs or arguments of Islamist extremists, especially their key analogies. But in that case, half of the possible strategies for dealing with the analogies are taken off the table. The remaining two strategies depend

¹⁶ Alss7ab, "The Emancipation of Mankind and Nations Under the Banner of the Koran," Usama's Memo Forum (accessed 30 January 2005). This web forum is no longer in existence.

¹⁷ A.M. Maghraoui, "American Foreign Policy and Islamic Renewal," Special Report 164, United States Institute of Peace (2006). Available at: www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr164.html.

¹⁸ Philip Tompkins and George Cheney, "Communication and Unobtrusive Control in Contemporary Organizations, in *Organizational Communication: Traditional Themes and New Directions*, Robert McPhee and Philip Tompkins, eds. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1985).

¹⁹ Juthe, "Argument by Analogy," 2004.

²⁰ Cameron Shelley, "Analogy Counterarguments: A Taxonomy for Critical Thinking," *Argumentation* 18 (2004): 223–38.

Table 1: Analogy Counterarguments (adapted from Shelley, 2004)

Analogy is	Invalid		Valid	
Goal is to	Dissolve	Replace	Dissolve	Replace
Strategy	False Analogy	Misanalogy	Disanalogy	Counteranalogy
Counter-argument	The analogy seems correct on the surface, but falls apart on further examination	The analogy is wrong, and there is a different one that is right	The analogy seems to be true, yet the facts do not obey its structure	The analogy seems to be true, but there is a better analogy for explaining the same situation
Objective	Make the audience to struggle to map things that aren't similar	Create a new, more coherent analogy with a conclusion that undermines the original one	Identify characteristics that the analogue and target should share, but don't	Use a different analogue to make a claim about the target that is incompatible with the original claim

on the ability to make convincing arguments about the flaws in the analogy, and one of them also requires a well-argued alternative. Given the low credibility of the United States and other Western nations in the Muslim world at present, it would be an uphill battle to make such arguments succeed.²¹ Admitting the validity of some of the extremists' points might offer the chance to "hijack" their arguments, but if the effort were unsuccessful it could backfire and strengthen their position. Also complicating the picture is the fact that strategies seeking to replace the original analogy require an alternative that is a better analogy: If the present situation is not like the Crusades or the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, then what *is* it like? If there is no convincing answer to that question, then efforts to disrupt the analogies are further constrained.

To sum up this brief look at analogy, it is an important aspect of Salafi extremist messages, and it is a unique form of argument that cannot be refuted using conventional methods. The extremists know the power of this technique to frame the thinking of their audience and control them, so they regularly use analogies in their discourse. To interfere with the spread of their ideology, it is important to argue against these analogies, yet we cannot answer some of the basic strategic questions that would guide our response, and we lack systematic research into possibilities for countering them. Moreover, our own ideology may place constraints on our strategies for doing so. Ex-

²¹ Steven R. Corman, Aaron Hess, and Zachary S. Justus, "Credibility in the Global War on Terrorism: Strategic Principles and Research Agenda," Report No. 0603, Consortium for Strategic Communication, Arizona State University (June 2006). Available at: www.asu.edu/clas/communication/about/csc/documents/csc_credibility_gwot.pdf.

panding knowledge about extremist analogies and clarifying our own limitations in this area are keys to successful resistance efforts.

Agent

The message aspects of counter-ideology communication are important, but we must also recognize that ideologies have consequences because of the actions of individuals. When people adopt an ideology and start viewing the world through its lens, they become its *agents*. This is crucial because, without human agents to sustain and promote them, ideologies either die or lie dormant in texts.

Ideologies are spread through communicative processes, and disseminating them involves persuading people who are not believers to take up the cause. What incentives do members of the target audience have to adopt a Salafi extremist ideology? For some time, experts believed that terrorists are recruited from the ranks of those who are poor, desperate, unemployed, alienated, and/or sociopathic.²² While some undoubtedly fit this profile, subsequent research has shown that other terrorist recruits are educated, economically comfortable people who have opportunities and a chance for a normal life, but take up the extremist cause anyway.²³

A communication-based explanation that accommodates both of these cases is based on the concepts of identity and identification. An *identity* is a set of concepts that a person uses as a resource for creating a sense of self—a notion of “being somebody”—while *identification* is the act of drawing on these resources to project an image of the self to others.²⁴ For example, a profession is an identity many people have that influences how they interact with people. It is common for one’s profession to come up in interactions, even with strangers. Knowing someone’s profession allows us to fill in many blanks about them (and for them to assume that we have, in fact, filled them in), so it facilitates effective communication.²⁵

Adopting extremist ideology functions in much the same way; it provides a resource that the adopter can use to “be somebody.” A good illustration of this is the case of exiled Syrian dissident Ammar Abdulhamid. The son of famous and well-to-do parents in Syria, Abdulhamid decided as a teenager to become a radical Muslim fundamentalist. In a recent interview, here is what he had to say about his conversion:

²² Anne Speckhard, “Understanding Suicide Terrorism: Countering Human Bombs and Their Senders,” in *Topics in Terrorism: Toward a Transatlantic Consensus on the Nature of the Threat*, Vol. 1, Jason S. Purcell and Joshua D. Weintraub, eds. (Washington, D.C.: Atlantic Council Publications, 2005).

²³ Robert A. Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (New York: Random House, 2005).

²⁴ Craig R. Scott, Steven R. Corman, and George E. Cheney, “Development of a Structural Model of Identification in the Organization,” *Communication Theory* 8:3 (1998): 298–336.

²⁵ Sarah J. Tracy and Angela Trethewey, “Fracturing the Real-Self ← → Fake-Self Dichotomy: Moving Toward ‘Crystallized’ Organizational Discourses and Identities,” *Communication Theory* 15:2 (2005): 168–95.

Interviewer: “Earlier in your life, when you were in college, you had become a fundamentalist Muslim, and from what I’ve read even considered going to Afghanistan in the late ‘80s to fight the Soviets. How did you become a radical Muslim?”

Abdulhamid: “Well this is one of those things that I’ve never really understood myself, completely. However, it seems the reasons were far more psychological than ideological. I was a very introverted child, and I had my mom’s fame and my father’s fame, and sort of being under the spotlight all the time was not very comfortable for me. It brought the envy and jealousy of my peers in school, and I really never was comfortable with it. So I guess what happened is, at one point religion empowered me. Instead of saying ‘I’m shy,’ I can always say ‘I’m religious. I’m not introverted, I’m just not interested in going out and drinking and following girls.’ I wanted to, but I was simply too shy and inadequate. So I covered my teenage inadequacies with a layer of religiosity. And at the same time religion really managed to bring me out of my shell because a lot of the instruction is to actually go out and go to Mosques, and to meet with people, and to pray, and to be active. So Islamic fundamentalism actually slowly made me break my shyness, made me become more social, stand up on my own two feet, and *interact with people with much more confidence*” [emphasis added].²⁶

In other words, Abdulhamid’s fundamentalist identity facilitated effective communication about who he was. This is not an isolated case. Nada Farooq, a member of a recently broken terrorist cell in Toronto and whose first name is pronounced “Needa,” was called “Needa Shower” in high school by her classmates. She grew to hate Canada, everyone there, and Western culture in general.²⁷ There are parallels in the cases of the Jabarah brothers, also in Canada, as well as in those of John Walker Lindh and Adam Gadahn in the United States. Early evidence indicates that some of the U.K. liquid bombers apprehended in the summer of 2006 are what we might call “identity converts” (though we do not know how they were treated in school).²⁸ For Muslims with an intense need to be somebody, believe something, and prove things to the world—whatever the source of those needs—extremist ideology offers a very attractive package. The fact that it comes with the added legitimacy of being wrapped in religion is only a bonus.

This is not to argue that the ideology is *justified*, but that people who adopt it are *motivated* to do so. Althusser stated that ideology spreads through a “hailing” function, where individuals and institutions involved in promoting an ideology call on susceptible motivated individuals to accept the taken-for-granted assumptions that constitute

²⁶ Ammar Abdulhamid, Syrian dissident, interview by Terri Gross, “Fresh Air,” National Public Radio (U.S.), broadcast 1 August 2006. Available at: www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5597594.

²⁷ Omar el Akkad and Greg McArthur, “Hateful Chatter Behind The Veil,” *Ottawa Globe and Mail* (6 July 2006).

²⁸ “Papers Pore over ‘Bomb Plot,’” BBC Online (11 August 2006). Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4782397.stm.

it.²⁹ If people are *called* to extremism, it is not enough to offer them an alternative of something that is simply “not-jihad.” There must be a competing ideology that calls the individual more strongly. Indeed, we know that hailing by competing ideologies is a worry to the extremists. It is worth noting here that ideologies are rarely completely consistent or “totalizing” in their effects. Even the most radical and seemingly impenetrable ideologies may contain a variety of internal contradictions, tensions, and ruptures. These ideological ruptures may provide opportunities for Western counter-ideological efforts to highlight and exploit wedge issues *within* radical ideologies.³⁰ For instance, Osama bin Laden has complained about the risk of potential young radicals being siphoned off by more peaceful clerics: “Most unfortunately, the young people who have the ability to sacrifice for the religion are suffering by listening to and obeying Islamic clerics who refrain [from violence], even though such people must not be listened to or obeyed.”³¹

Defining a competing identity for would-be extremists is beyond the scope of this paper, and doing so is fraught with political complications. Some would undoubtedly complain that such an effort smacks of a liberal social engineering project. But if the goal is to be proactive in resisting Salafi extremist ideology, it is difficult to see any alternative to promoting some competing targets of identification or exploiting the various contradictions that exist in radical ideologies—however that might be accomplished. As long as there is a vacuum of unfulfilled needs that it can meet, extremist ideology will continue to seep in and convert a certain percentage of the Muslim population that is motivated to accept its calling.

System

Ideologies operate within social systems, and what happens in these systems has as much to do with the sustainability of any ideological project as the message or people who spread it. Yet public discourse about terrorism often ignores this fact, treating the terrorists as the only party to the conflict that has an ideology. For example, in a recent speech, United States President George Bush said: “We face an enemy that has an ideology; they believe things. The best way to describe their ideology is to relate to you the fact that they think the opposite of the way we think.”³²

It would have been more accurate for Mr. Bush to say, “Salafi ideology is the opposite of *Western ideology*.” Indeed, Salafi extremist discourse regularly draws upon

²⁹ Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” in *Literary Theory: An Anthology*, J. Rivkin and M. Ryan, eds. (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1998).

³⁰ Angela Trethewey and Karen L. Ashcraft, “Practicing Disorganization: The Development of Applied Perspectives on Living With Tension,” *Journal of Applied Communication Research* 32 (2004): 81–88.

³¹ Speech by Osama bin Laden, “Directions Regarding Methodology—Part One,” *Clear Guidance*, date unknown (late 1990s).

³² George W. Bush, Remarks by the President at Bob Corker for Senate and Tennessee Republican Party Dinner, Loews Vanderbilt Hotel, Nashville, TN (30 August 2006). Available at: www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/08/20060830-7.html.

ideological tenets of the West in justifying itself and defining its positions. Thus, when the United States publicly professes a goal of bringing democracy to the Middle East through the war in Iraq, the extremists capitalize on this claim, preaching that democracy is a form of polytheism that is against Islam: “So, the democracy is on one side a polytheism and on the other side a disbelief in Allah that contradicts with monotheism, the religion of the Messengers, and Prophets, for many reasons.”³³ When the United States paints the Al Qaeda attack on the World Trade Center as a barbaric attack on innocent people, Osama bin Laden responds:

In the case we kill their civilians, the whole world yells at us from east to west, and America would start pushing its allies and puppets. Who is the one that said that our blood isn't blood and their blood is blood? Who is the one that declared this? What about the people that have been killed in our lands for decades? More than 1,000,000 children died in Iraq and are still dying, so why don't we hear people that cry or protest or anyone who reassures or anyone who gives condolences?!?³⁴

There are many other such examples. Extremist authors regularly draw on incidents in Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib to argue that the West is an oppressive force bent on committing atrocities against Muslims. The presence of Western forces in the Arabian Peninsula is used to strengthen their Crusades analogy, which was described above. “There's no question the war in Iraq is radicalizing the people in that area,” says 9/11 Commissioner Tom Kean.³⁵ The recent partially declassified *National Intelligence Estimate* concludes that, “the Iraq conflict has become the ‘cause celebre’ for jihadists, breeding a deep resentment of U.S. involvement in the Muslim world and cultivating supporters for the global jihadist movement.”³⁶

Recently the West has presented the extremists with another strategic communication bonanza, the 2006 conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon. The United States' staunch support for Israel and perceived foot-dragging on diplomatic efforts to halt the fighting gave the jihadis fresh evidence to press claims about the wicked “Zionist-Crusader Alliance” that is seeking to dominate the Muslim world.³⁷ “Azzam the American,” the adopted name of Adam Gadahn, an alleged American-born member of Al Qaeda who has served as a spokesman to Western media for the organization, recently said

To what can we attribute the obvious ignorance of Western peoples in general toward the religion of the Muslims and its teachings? This ignorance, which causes the peo-

³³ Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, *Democracy: A Religion!*, trans. Abu Muhammad al-Maleki and Abu Sayf Muwahhid (At-Tibyaan Publications, n.d.).

³⁴ Bin Laden, “Discussion on the New Crusader Wars.”

³⁵ *ABC This Week* (10 September 2006). Available at: <http://abcnews.go.com/ThisWeek/story?id=2416319&page=3>.

³⁶ Director of National Intelligence, *Declassified Key Judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States* (Washington, D.C.: April 2006). Available at: http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/Declassified_NIE_Key_Judgments.pdf.

³⁷ Alss7ab, 2005.

ple of the West to rapturously applaud when Israel perpetrates wholesale slaughter of Muslims in Lebanon and Palestine, and leads them to give their assent to the atrocities their governments commit in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere in the Muslim world, and makes them voice their approval when their armies desecrate copies of the Koran in Guantanamo and televangelists insult our Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon Him. These events, coupled with these reactions, showcase a seething animosity and definite ignorance of the religion of Islam and the nature of its followers.... Today, the televangelists, false prophets, and charlatans prey on the gullible, and the illiterate are glorying in Israel's blood lust and excessive appetite for destruction in Lebanon and Palestine.³⁸

In example after example, Salafi extremist discourse is buttressed by actions of the West that are attributable to Western ideology. This highlights three related challenges facing any effort to resist the appeal of these extremist ideologies. First, we *believe in* our ideology in the same way that the jihadis believe in theirs. Nobody in the West is going to abandon their belief in democracy just because some extremist says it amounts to polytheism. Second, our ideology constrains the choices we are able to make in other aspects of our efforts against the jihadis. I have already noted that we may self-limit our options for resisting their key analogies. It is likewise unclear whether we would, for example, promote the study of Islam under radical clerics in order to compete with the jihadis for recruits. Third, as in the Southern Lebanon situation, our efforts to resist jihadi ideology are often constrained or compromised by other policy considerations.

There are several responses that would help Western nations face these challenges. One is to change our own identification practices, to reduce the "footprint" of our ideology in the region. The more strongly we reproduce Western ideals within the discourse of terrorism, the more opportunities we create for Salafi extremists to reproduce their viewpoint. The West would do well to change the subject from the goals of Western action in the Middle East, and instead focus on the extremists' ideology and its contradictions and limitations. With regard to its own image, the West should rely more on principles of *strategic ambiguity*, and less on classical principles of control.³⁹

A second response is to decide whether we are willing to alter our thinking or policy in exchange for more ideological leverage against the jihadis. If not, then we should accept the fact that there may not be much we can do (beyond keeping a low profile) to affect the ideological discourse, assume it will continue to convert a certain percentage of the target audience, and concentrate on other ways of dealing with the jihadi challenge. But if we are serious about changing the ideological equation, there are some

³⁸ Azzam the American, "Invitation to Islam," As-Sahab Productions (2 September 2006). Available at: www.lauramansfield.com/j/zawahiri090106.asp.

³⁹ Bud Goodall, Angela Trethewey, and Kelly McDonald, "Strategic Ambiguity, Communication, and Public Diplomacy in an Uncertain World: Principles and Practices," Report No. 0604, Consortium for Strategic Communication, Arizona State University (June 2006). Available at: www.asu.edu/clas/communication/about/csc/documents/StrategicAmbiguity-Communication.pdf.

relatively modest changes in position and policy that could help significantly. For example, we might grant some of the jihadi analogies in order to open up the associated options for counterargument.

A third potential response is to take more seriously the risk of providing support for jihadi ideology when making policy decisions. There is disregard (if not outright denial) of the positive impact of our own policy decisions on the spread of jihadi ideology. Thus these effects—which clearly do exist—are essentially unintended consequences of our policy making, as the above examples show. To seriously take these effects into account, they should be made explicit in our policy decisions. We should include a variable like “probability of supporting jihadi ideology” in our risk calculations for policy decisions.

Conclusion

The audience for the spread of Salafi extremist ideology is a relatively small population of fairly observant co-religionists in the Muslim world who are outside the extremist circle. Any Western effort to resist the spread of these ideologies must focus on this population and deal with problems of message, agent, and system. Message-related efforts should focus not only on contradictions in jihadi ideology, but also on the key analogies they use to create concertive control in their audience. Doing this requires systematic research on their ideological rhetoric and careful consideration of the options for making counterarguments.

Agent-related efforts must take account of the fact that Islamist extremism is an identity that provides people a resource for projecting an image of an effective self to the outside world. In short, it is a way of “being somebody” that apparently exerts a powerful call to Muslims from a broad range of social circumstances. Because the movement is meeting basic needs for social inclusion, an alternative of “not-jihadism” is insufficient. Alternative targets of identification must be made available and promoted, or else extremists will continue to attract converts from their target audience.

System-related efforts must come to terms with jihadis’ use of Western beliefs and actions as a resource for reproducing their own ideology. In the current environment, the West shoots itself in the foot whenever it makes its beliefs or actions prominent in the conversation in the target audience. A reduced public discourse footprint and the practice of strategic ambiguity can help lessen this effect. Going farther, modest changes in position and policy—like granting the validity of some extremist arguments or including ideology risk in policy calculations—could also deny jihadis some of their most important ideological weapons.

Statistical Analysis/Psychometric Modeling: Understanding and Influencing Societal Vulnerabilities to Terrorism

Dianne C. Barton and Patrick J. Barton *

Introduction

Qualitative analyses of historical, cultural, economic, religious, and sociological factors related to terrorism have produced powerful insights into the root causes and personal motivations of those involved. Efforts to understand and to counter ideological support for terrorism will require the insights gained from qualitative work, but could significantly benefit from the application of modern methods of statistical analysis and psychometric modeling. These models could extend the qualitative work of researchers such as Richardson,¹ Atran,² and Speckhard³ into the quantitative domain, where objective evaluation of alternative, actionable strategies is possible.

Mathematical models, often using Ajzen and Fishbein's Theory of Planned Behavior as a framework, can estimate relative strengths of association between measurable, experience-based attitudes, intention to engage in certain behaviors, and the manifest behaviors.⁴ The methods include structural, latent factor behavioral models used to quantify drivers of behavior. The behavioral models may be incorporated within dynamic simulation models to extend the scope and application of the findings into the temporal domain.

Private-sector companies have successfully applied these psychometric techniques to understand consumer psychological constructs for the purposes of finding the most highly leveraged means of inducing profit-related behavior.⁵ The underlying theories, methodologies, and tools can be applied across many cultures and to many types of businesses—ranging from business-to-consumer durable goods and telecommunications, to business-to-business financial services and raw materials.

We believe that these tools and techniques could also create a scientifically based understanding of the structure of individual decision processes (and the role of the individuals' social networks) related to participation in, or support of, terrorist activities. As is the case within the private sector, we believe that this understanding can be used

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¹ Louise Richardson, *What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat* (New York: Random House, 2006), 336.

² Scott Atran, "Genesis of Suicide Terrorism," *Science* 299 (March 2003): 1534–39.

³ Anne Speckhard and Khapta Akhmedova, "Talking to Terrorists," *Journal of Psychohistory* (Fall 2005): 125–56.

⁴ Icek Ajzen, "The Theory of Planned Behavior," *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes* 50 (1991): 179–211. (Note: Ajzen is also sometimes cited as Aizen.)

⁵ Patrick J. Barton and Bruce A. Corner, "Integrating Structural Modeling, Financial Linkages, and Initiative Development," paper presented to the American Statistical Society (Joint Statistical Meetings), Alexandria, VA (2004).

to support efforts to counter ideological support for terrorism, particularly to identify potential interventions, screen alternative initiatives, and estimate the effectiveness of proposed interventions with the population of interest.

This paper will first present a brief review of the Theory of Planned Behavior that frames the modeling approach, then will discuss the mathematical techniques used to support the scientific approach used in psychometric modeling as currently applied in the private sector. Finally, we will propose how psychometric modeling might be used as part of a research program dedicated to countering the ideological foundations of terrorism.

Theory of Planned Behavior

The Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) and related work helps explain how people's attitudes can be influenced in order to change their behavior.⁶ This theory, well substantiated with quantitative research in several domains, holds that people's intentions to engage in behaviors are central to predicting actual behavior. TPB's predecessor, Ajzen and Fishbein's similar Theory of Reasoned Action, contends that intention and, therefore, action are determined primarily by attitude. The theory holds that the strength of intention is indicated by the person's subjective probability that he will perform the behavior in question. TPB resulted from the discovery that behavior is not completely voluntary and under control.

According to TPB, action is guided by three considerations:

1. *Behavioral Beliefs*: beliefs about the likely consequences of the behavior
2. *Normative Beliefs*: beliefs about the normative expectations of others
3. *Control Beliefs*: beliefs about the presence of factors that may facilitate or impede performance of the behavior.

First, an individual must believe that the behavior will produce a desired outcome. Second, the individual must believe that the behavior fits the normative expectations of others he cares about, such as his family or social circle. Finally, "control beliefs" are perceived beliefs about the ability of the individual to perform the behavior. Control beliefs might concern internal factors such as personal skills or abilities as well as external factors about the situation or the environment. People are not likely to form a strong intention if they believe they have no power or resources to carry out the behavior, even if they have positive attitudes toward the behavior.

⁶ See I. Ajzen, "Perceived Behavioral Control, Self-efficacy, Locus of Control, and the Theory of Planned Behavior," *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 32 (2002): 665–83; I. Ajzen and M. Fishbein, "The Influence of Attitudes on Behavior," in *The Handbook of Attitudes*, D. Albarracín, B.T. Johnson, and M.P. Zanna, eds. (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2005), 73–221; and M. Fishbein and I. Ajzen, *Belief, Attitude, Intention, and Behavior: An Introduction to Theory and Research* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 480.

Framework for Business Applications

A deep vein of mathematically based research extends Fishbein and Ajzen's behavior intentions research into business applications. Using the behavioral intentions model as a theoretical framework, private-sector research firms have conducted numerous studies to identify strategies for affecting customer experiences for the purpose of influencing customer behavior. These studies can reveal non-intuitive insights about leverage points—or drivers of the behaviors of interest—and can guide resource allocation decisions around initiatives designed to enhance or suppress these behaviors.

Figure 1 represents the Theory of Planned Behavior as it is applied to business situations. Customer experiences shape attitudes, which activate emotions that strongly influence behavior. For business applications, these behaviors can generate financial results. Next, this general framework is specified in the form of a hypothesized structure of a behavioral model. The observed elements of the model, latent (unobserved) elements, and the causal relationships among the elements are drawn from a combination of general experience and qualitative research conducted with customers deemed to be representative of the study's target group. For business applications this qualitative research usually consists of in-depth, individual interviews or focus groups.

Figure 2 illustrates the general form of a typical behavioral model. Rectangles represent observed values. "Touchpoints" (sometimes called interaction areas) are points of contact between the company and its customers, and enter the model in the form of customers' overall impression of performance in each area. Depending on the company, touchpoints might include pre-sales support, product quality, warranty performance, reliability, etc. "Attributes" serve to specify customer evaluations of particular elements of the overall performance. Components of pre-sales support might include competent evaluation of the customer's needs, quality of the technical documentation, cogent answers to questions about the product, etc.

"Items," represented in Figure 2 in the column on the right, are observed indicators (scale items) of intangible, latent components of the model. While we cannot directly observe a customer's loyalty toward a company, we can recognize the behaviors and attitudes that *demonstrate* loyalty. These observations allow us to create a numerical scale for an immeasurable value, much as an individual's SAT test score, IQ, and high school grade point average could serve to "measure" the unobservable quality of "intelligence." For loyalty, scale items typically include bottom-line oriented measures such as willingness to repurchase a product, likelihood that a customer will recommend it to a friend, inclination to buy more of it, etc. Ovals represent the latent components. For customer behavior models, these typically include motivations (both rational and




Figure 1: Framework Appropriate to Business Applications




Figure 2: Hypothesized Behavioral Model

emotional), loyalty, identification with the brand or company, and expectations of the product. They represent the “Emotions” and “Behavior” components of the general structure presented in Figure 1.

The behavioral model shown in Figure 2 is a greatly simplified version compared to those usually used. Real-world models often employ more than 150 attributes, 10 touchpoints, 3-5 latent factors, and 20-30 scale items.

Instrument Design and Measurement

In the most successful studies, instruments designed to measure the model components are developed hierarchically, based on the hypothesized model structure. Measurements of overall experiences at the touchpoint level are deliberately coupled with measurements of the specific attributes, which in turn serve to refine separate aspects of each overall experience.

It is sometimes possible to estimate a model based on information gleaned from instruments or surveys not designed in this manner (for instance, from general attitudinal studies developed by the Pew Research Center,⁷ PIPA,⁸ etc.), but it is not likely that there will be a sufficient “fit” between this model and the information gathered in those surveys. The behavioral models rely on a combination of information about specific individual experiences, feelings about the experiences, and intentions seldom found in polls that focus on general opinions.

The sampling frame is designed to reflect the specific population whose behaviors are of interest. In the private sector, studies may focus on the general population of a marketplace, but much more often look at current customers, competitors’ customers,

⁷ See, for example, Pew Research Center, “The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other” (Washington, D.C.: Pew Global Attitudes Project Report, 22 June 2006).

⁸ See, for example, Program on International Policy Attitudes, “What the Iraqi Public Wants” (College Park, MD: PIPA, 2006). Available at: http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/Iraq/Iraq_Jan06_rpt.pdf.

recent defectors, potential defectors (those who experienced product quality problems, for example).

During the initial stages of developing a new model, studies usually include substantial oversampling to allow for the possibility that the target population as initially conceived really ought to be segmented because it represents two or more behaviorally distinct groups. As models become more “mature,” the sampling can usually be pared back, but it still remains targeted at the populations that are the most behaviorally interesting.

General attitudinal surveys tend to focus on entire populations or, at best, subdivisions such as registered voters or women.⁹ While these are certainly insightful and interesting, the sampling frames are typically different from those applied in the development of behavioral intentions models.

We bring up the subjects of instrument design and sampling frame only to point out that the quantitative modeling that we are describing usually relies on a customized approach, and thus can’t necessarily be grafted to existing research. Each of these topics is complex and richly developed in dozens of textbooks, so we will not pursue it further here.¹⁰

Analyzing and Fitting the Model

The data developed to support the model is analyzed using a combination of statistical techniques including structural equation modeling, linear regression, and factor score analysis. Structural equation modeling (SEM)¹¹ lies at the heart of the analytical process, and is typically conducted with the aid of statistical packages such as Lisrel or AMOS.¹² It is used to assess the validity of a theoretical model against observed data and to estimate the impact coefficients between each causally related pair of components.

The mathematics underlying SEM are not trivial, but the concepts are not difficult to understand. First, a theoretical model is developed (see discussion regarding Figure 2). One might think of our theoretical model as implying a set of causal relationships (A causes B, B causes C, etc.). The relationship between members of each pair (A/B, for instance) can be characterized by the degree to which the variability in one member corresponds to variability in the other member. This relationship is commonly quantified using a statistical measure called “covariance.” If we can quantify the variability

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ See Subir Ghosh, *Multivariate Analysis, Design of Experiments, and Survey Sampling*, in *Statistics, a Series of Textbooks and Monographs*, Vol. 159 (New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc., 1999), 698; and M.E. Thompson, *Theory of Sample Surveys*, *Monographs on Statistics and Applied Probability*, No. 74 (London: Chapman & Hall, 1997), 305.

¹¹ See Kenneth A. Bollen, *Structural Equations with Latent Variables* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1989), 528.

¹² Karl G. Jöreskog and Dag Sörbom, *LISREL 8: User’s Reference Guide* (Lincolnwood, IL: Scientific Software International, 1996), 378.

between members of every variable pair in our model, we can arrange them in a grid called a “covariance matrix” that provides a snapshot of the model structure.¹³

When we look at the observed data, we can easily apply the correct formula and calculate a covariance coefficient for each pair of variables. However, the theoretical model in Figure 2 postulates the existence of intangible latent variables, along with relationships between pairs of intangible variables. Clearly these relationships need to be estimated—and this is exactly what the SEM methodology accomplishes. More precisely, the statistical package utilizes the observed covariances (and assumptions about errors) and executes a simultaneous set of linear regressions to estimate a “best fit” solution for the entire model.

This estimated solution to our hypothesized model is then compared with the observed data using various measures of fit, parsimony, etc., to evaluate its acceptability. Technically speaking, we seek to reject the hypothesis that our model fits the data. If the fit is not acceptable, then the theoretical model or the assumptions must be reevaluated.

At the end of the process—assuming that we have accepted the model, of course—we develop estimated impact coefficients for each relationship in our hypothesized model. We can then predict, with some degree of statistical certainty and theoretical justification, to what degree variables on the model’s “left side”—that is, experiences—will influence variables on the “right side”—that is, behaviors. Alternatively, we can work backwards, beginning with behaviors, and explore the causal chain that leads to the root causes of these behaviors.

While SEM is the core methodology, in practice it is often supplemented with other techniques. Latent factor analysis is used to estimate scale validity, straight linear regression is used to link variables outside the main causal model to those within, and a variety of techniques are used to tie the behavioral outcomes to financial performance.

Application of Insights

Specific insights around behavioral intentions relating to customer behavior naturally vary from application to application, but some general phenomena may be observed. For instance, repeated studies of customer loyalty have found that emotional factors (such as trust) typically dominate rational factors (such as price or value) in predicting measurable behaviors like purchase decisions. Recent research in the durable appliance market found that emotional motivators have about twice the predictive power of rational ones. Even in relatively “hard-nosed” business-to-business sectors, such as distribution channels, where one might think that only money matters, rational and emotional factors have roughly the same predictive power. Figure 3 illustrates industry-ag-

¹³ George W. Snedecor and William G. Cochran, *Statistical Methods*, 8th ed. (Ames, IA: Iowa State Press, 1989), 503.

gregated standardized impact coefficients between rational motivation/ loyalty and emotional motivation/loyalty.¹⁴




Figure 3: Emotional versus Rational Impacts on Loyalty

These general relationships between emotional and rational motivations have proven robust over time and, when data is available, across different cultures.

For any particular study, the resulting model and parameters can be examined to identify areas in which specific initiatives might be developed to maximize the impact on the relevant behaviors. In our example, we can compare the standardized impact coefficients (β s) of the touchpoints to determine which are relatively most important by tracing each path for an individual touchpoint to loyalty. For instance, the impact of Product Quality on loyalty is simply:

$$\begin{aligned} &\text{Product Quality to Loyalty } \beta = \\ &\text{Product Quality to Rational Motivation } \beta * \text{Rational Motivation to Loyalty } \beta + \\ &\text{Product Quality to Emotional Motivation } \beta * \text{Emotional Motivation to Loyalty } \beta \end{aligned}$$

If the model solution yielded an impact of 0.20 for Product Quality and 0.40 for Relationship Management, we could say that Product Quality is twice as important, and that the same amount of change (in standardized units) in Product Quality would have twice as much of an impact on customer loyalty. This would enable us to make informed decisions about where to allocate resources in order to have the maximum impact on our target audience.

These path calculations are typically extended to evaluate the effect through the entire model of attributes (representing the experiences) to the items (representing the behaviors). This process allows us to determine which experience(s) we need to change in order to have the largest impact on the behaviors we care about.

¹⁴ L.A. Crosby and S.L. Johnson, "Understanding Customer Needs and Expectations: The First Step to Delivering a Positive Experience," paper presented to Customer Experience Management Conference, The Conference Board (2005).

The model also yields an unstandardized solution that provides the same type of impact coefficients, but is scaled to the natural units of the experiences/behaviors we have measured. For example, using these coefficients, we can quantify the effect of moving the mean of a population's experience ("Attribute A," for example) from 2.5 to 3.5 on the mean of a behavioral item ("Repurchase," for example). In a typical commercial application, external economic analysis would provide information about the relationship between repurchase behavior and profitability. When the model parameters and economic analysis are combined, it becomes possible to calculate figures of merit such as net present value or return on investment for initiatives designed to address different experiences.

Dynamic Simulation

The calculations involved in applying modeling insights to strategy development are tedious and, for most, highly uninteresting. Moreover, they yield only a static "snapshot" of the result of any initiative. To address these and other issues, the model and its parameters can be encapsulated into accessible dynamic simulation environments, sometimes with interactive, video game-style interfaces.

Dynamic models are structured to capture and reproduce the changing behavior of systems over time, and can incorporate critical operating assumptions that reflect "real world" implementation issues. Operating assumptions may include how much we expect an initiative to cost, how long it would take to launch, how long it would take to reach the intended audience, and the maximum fraction of the intended audience we could ever reach. Other assumptions might involve how our initiative would affect a "bundle" of experiences, perhaps in different touchpoint areas. For instance, if we make a product more energy efficient, our customers might perceive it as providing better value because it is less expensive to use. They might also perceive us as more socially responsible for using fewer natural resources.

Dynamic simulation models are also capable of representing the effects of both internal feedback and external forces acting on the system. As such, they can capture complex interactions, feedback loops, nonlinearities, delays, and transient responses, and can provide a framework that integrates behavioral modeling information with the environment in which it is applied. Typically, these dynamic models are utilized to structure idea building sessions, to screen large numbers of competing initiatives, to interface with management tools, and to communicate the findings of the behavioral models to non-technical audiences.

Potential Uses in Countering Ideological Support for Terrorism

In regions currently experiencing conflict, it is likely that religious passions, emotional reactions to military presence, and stress caused by daily violence are salient features of the population's psychological landscape. It is also likely that decisions to engage in many activities—e.g., demonstrations, insurgency, participation in the government, participation in the workforce—are psychologically as well as rationally motivated. If this is the case, applying behavior intentions theory and modeling could enrich the discussion of how to put information gleaned from data mining activities into context.

We suggest that psychometric modeling in conjunction with dynamic simulation could support efforts to counter ideological support for terrorism by offering:

- A method to better identify the root causes of terrorism and the relative impacts of these root causes
- A decision support tool that would estimate the effect of various interventions taken to influence the behavior of at-risk populations—i.e., intervention through media, religious leaders, peers, family, social groups, etc.
- A methodology to more rigorously collect and analyze survey data that is needed to measure the effectiveness of government interactions
- Information to support other computer simulation approaches such as network formation modeling, agent-based simulation, complex social system models, etc.
- A more robust method to measure the impact of investments in “soft power” interventions.

The results of such psychometric analysis would also be highly compatible with social analysis techniques like agent-based modeling and network analysis, and could be applied to understand both current/potential actors and participants in the social networks upon which they depend. Psychometric modeling could provide a method to quantitatively instantiate agents in complex social system models.

Conclusion

Tools and methodologies successfully employed by private-sector companies in pursuit of profit could also be employed to understand and combat insurgent and terrorist movements. These tools could provide the framework to develop theoretically based and quantitatively supported initiatives aimed at changing the experiences, and thus the behaviors, of those who engage in or support terrorist activities.

The Terrorist Threat to the World Political System

Marina M. Lebedeva *

Introduction

Terrorism as a method of political struggle has been practiced since ancient times, and in this sense it is no different today. Yet, at the turn of the twenty-first century, terrorism has assumed particularly threatening forms, sparking almost universal concern. What are the reasons behind this shift? This question is met with various ready answers. Some point to the increased scope of modern acts of terror and the internationalization of terrorism; others cite dissatisfaction among the countries of the so-called “global South” with the continuing (and in some respects broadening) rift between the “North” and “South,” which results in ever greater involvement of such countries in acts of terror. Yet other observers point out that terrorists have embraced sophisticated scientific and technological approaches, thus increasing the deadly consequences of their acts. For the most part, these factors contribute to the *threat* of terrorism. Yet the main reason that terrorism is especially dangerous today is the fact that, during a period of crisis within the world political system, an alternative project, or *ideology*, is being promoted. A number of organizations are attempting to bring this system to life by terrorist means.

The Westphalian Political System: Its Evolution and Crisis

The world’s political system, known as the Westphalian or state-centered system, began to take shape in Europe over 350 years ago in the wake of the Thirty Years’ War, which for various reasons (religious, dynastical, territorial, etc.) engulfed a large part of Europe. The signing of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 became a milestone event in historical development, heralding the formation of a political system that eventually spread on a global scale. At the core of this system was the idea of state sovereignty, which was a major social innovation of the time, making it possible to overcome the countless confessional, territorial, ethnic, and other conflicts that tore Europe apart in the mid-seventeenth century.

We should understand that those who searched for solutions to these conflicts proceeded based on the interests of the conflicting sides, and not on the basis of their values. The French researcher Jean-Marie Guehenno writes that the creators of the Peace of Westphalia understood only too well that the world order they had shaped could not be built on values, and in particular religious values, which are nonnegotiable and not

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subject to concession. For this very reason the nation-state model of the world was founded on national interests, an area in which compromise solutions can be found.¹

We may joke, paraphrasing the witticism of George Orwell, that all countries are no doubt equal, but some are more equal than others. Nonetheless, in legal terms the doctrine of national sovereignty equalized all countries, regardless of their different characteristics (form of government, territory, military and economic power, etc.), making it possible to lay the foundations of international law. To use a mathematical metaphor, national sovereignty became a “common denominator” of sorts for numerous and diverse actors, making it possible to regulate their activity inside and outside the borders of nation-states, whereas the state itself became a kind of basic structural unit of the political system.

Clearly, the emergence of the doctrine of state sovereignty did not prevent countless violations of sovereignty that led to numerous wars, including two World Wars. However, these were violations of international law—i.e., violations of the rules of international interaction. Further, it is noteworthy that, while wars were unleashed by one country with the intent of occupying the territory of other countries, the nation-state system *as such* was not challenged. In fact, despite the occurrence of two devastating World Wars in the twentieth century, carried out by traditional state actors, the political system of the world remained unchallenged.

The Westphalia model was not static during the centuries that followed its appearance. It developed, transformed, and expanded, spreading to an ever-increasing number of countries. It was a Western project in the sense that its conception originated in Western Europe. From there it spread to other continents, through both the diffusion of ideas and colonial conquests.

The logical climax of the Westphalian system occurred toward the end of the twentieth century. The colonial system collapsed, and the world found itself made up almost entirely of independent states. In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, the United States came to symbolize this outcome as the world’s undisputed leader in the political and economic arena and in the sphere of mass culture.²

While these epochal shifts were taking place, other actors developed and began to actively function within the nation-state model: intergovernmental organizations, international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and movements, transnational corporations, intrastate regions and megalopolises, and other transnational actors. While such entities had existed earlier, the scope of their activities in the international arena is fundamentally new, and on a number of issues they have started to interact on a level commensurate with governments. The breakthroughs in communication and information technologies in the late twentieth century further intensified various actors’ transnational activities. As a result, the borders of nation-states have become to a significant degree transparent, which has hastened the processes of globalization.

¹ Jean-Marie Guehenno, “Globalization and the International System,” *Journal of Democracy* 10:1 (January 1999): 22–35.

² Joseph Nye, *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

Moreover, with the turn of the new millennium, the state itself has experienced major changes. While integration processes have intensified in some regions (the best example being the European Union), other regions have experienced disintegration, while still others have seen the emergence of failed states unable to control their own territories. Finally, we have witnessed the emergence of states that attempt to threaten their neighbors in one way or another, bringing down on themselves consequences that are not easily predictable in the environment of globalization. All of these results have eroded the state-centered political system of the world.

It is worth noting the general background of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, when the world political system came face to face with these challenges. Perhaps above all others, a major continuing problem has been the rift between the North and South. Several developments—including the fact that some states (primarily new industrial states) are now successfully competing in the socioeconomic sphere, and that zones of the “South” have developed in the North and zones of the “North” have developed in the South—are not helping the problem. Instead, the emergence of more successful states has tended to evoke a response of hatred. In the late autumn of 2005, disturbances organized by immigrants from African and Asian countries in the suburbs of French and other European cities provided a vivid example of the kind of social resentment that can result when globalization places new neighbors uneasily together.

The crisis of the modern world political system is partially due to the scientific and technical revolution, which, as James Rosenau has argued, unleashed the process of globalization, making national borders transparent and simplifying interaction among various actors. However, the origins of the crisis have other roots as well. The products of the scientific and technical revolution have enabled a small group of people to cause tremendous damage, something that only states were able to do in the past, thereby bringing science-fiction scenarios to life.

All of this is happening against the backdrop of a paradoxical situation. On the one hand, growing interdependence has become possible, owing to the development of modern communication, information, and other technologies. On the other hand, the same technologies enable certain organizations or structures (including governments) to operate autonomously for extended periods of time. This is accomplished by various means, such as using network connections outside of the organization that can provide members with a supply of the needed resources, funding, information, and (in some cases) weapons. Another method is to create a product to substitute for an unavailable product, using scientific and technical innovations (for example, during the apartheid era, South Africa developed technologies to produce gasoline by processing coal). Under such conditions, isolating terrorist formations and preventing them from developing certain resources can be extremely difficult.

Alternative Projects

In the current geopolitical climate, organizations like Al Qaeda propose an alternative to political and social relations *in the world* (not just in the region—in this case, the

Middle East), an alternative founded on the norms of Islam. This is most often emphasized in U.S. literature, but has recently been mentioned by Russian researchers as well.³ A. Malashenko, for example, writes: “The Islamic alternative in its broad sense represents a collective response of Islamdom to the external challenge.”⁴

The very fact that this alternative is not accepted by the majority of the planet’s population (by all estimates, the number of Islamic followers is significantly smaller than 50 percent of the global population) is no doubt seen as a challenge to spread the message to the rest of the world by those who espouse it. Yet it does not represent a global threat unless terrorist methods are employed.

Of course, alternatives to the nation-state model, each with its own approach to political organization, had existed before. While there is nothing new about a global scheme of world order, the Islamist response does have some unique characteristics. Yet it is important to keep in mind that it is not unprecedented; parallels between ideologies, faiths, and values were drawn a long time ago.

For instance, communism in its original Marxist sense was an alternative proposal to create new political relations based on a new structural unit—the class—and consequently a new political system. Interestingly, communism also emerged during a time of a crisis, when capital largely completed its “reclamation” of the territorial space of the nation-state and started to move *en masse* beyond its borders. However, in the course of the practical implementation of communism in the Soviet Union and subsequently in other countries, the idea of a global transformation of sociopolitical relations was relegated to an indefinite future, and efforts focused on the level of the nation-state. Furthermore, the nation-state itself as the main structural unit of the political system of the world not only survived, but even started to strengthen.

Another important aspect is that terrorism was never used as the prime method of implementing communism. Various leftist extremist organizations (the Red Brigades in Italy, the Red Army Faction in Germany, the Tupac Amaru and the Shining Path in Peru, to name only a few) acted locally and nationally, and during the Cold War they did not act as “representatives” of the Socialist bloc. More importantly, many of them perceived the leaders of both blocs—the United States and the Soviet Union—as their enemies. While members of such organizations considered it their calling to affect world events, they paid little attention to the ideological aspect of their activity, i.e. the transformation of political relations.⁵

An attempt, albeit an amorphous one, to realize an alternative to the nation-state formulation was made by the Japanese religious sect Aum Shinrikyo. The sect, through terrorist means, sought to bring about the end of the world, thereby ensuring their own salvation. They did not offer any alternative principles for organizing sociopolitical ties and relations, but simply sought to destroy existing relations, which is why such

³ See, for example, Zeyno Baran, “Fighting the War of Ideas,” *Foreign Affairs* 84:6 (November/ December 2005).

⁴ A. Malashenko, *Islamskaya alternativa i islamistskiy proekt* (Moscow: Ves mir, 2006), 66.

⁵ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).

doomsday efforts can be called “attempts” at transforming political relations only with reservations.

The example of Aum Shinrikyo is significant from both political and psychological viewpoints. It points to dissatisfaction with the existing political system of the world and a readiness to destroy it by terrorist means, including the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); the group carried out attacks using sarin gas in the Tokyo subway in 1995. This is the first and so far only time that a terrorist organization has used WMD. It clearly shows that the problem of terrorism is compounded by the problem of relatively portable and accessible weapons of fearsome destructive power and lethality.

Another point central to understanding the phenomenon of global terrorism is that Aum Shinrikyo managed to attract a large following in different countries over a relatively short period of time. In some countries, it reached all the way to the governmental level. This illustrates how easily a terrorist organization can attract followers.

Finally, perhaps the most significant point is that Aum Shinrikyo emerged in a culture that is not related to the Arabic or Muslim world. This indicates that the problems driving dissatisfaction with the state-centered global political order stem primarily not from Arab or Muslim culture, as it would sometimes appear, but from the existing political system of the world.

Thus, truly global terrorist movements, as personified by Al Qaeda, have the following characteristics:

- They attempt to implement their alternative to the world political system through terrorist means. During a crisis in the existing world system, Al Qaeda proposes to replace the current system with “an alternative version of social—and hence government—order founded on the laws of the Sharia, social justice, with a strong ruler.”⁶
- They take advantage of a fundamentally new stage in scientific and technical progress, which enables individuals or small groups to exert powerful influence on the world, and which also enables them to operate comparatively autonomously despite the ongoing processes of globalization.
- Global terrorist organizations can draw upon a deep pool of individuals alienated from modern sociopolitical relations and easily recruit new generations of terrorists.
- The proposed sociopolitical system is founded on Islamic values and on relations that not only correspond to Islam, but which, more significantly, are already partially realized on at least two of the four levels singled out by Malashenko: the local and the national.⁷ Therefore, the global system being implemented has a quite specific and already “verified” nature.
- The Islamist alternative to the global political system originated in a very complex region riddled with discord. These conflicts include the Israeli-Palestinian,

⁶ Malashenko, *Islamskaya alternativa i islamistskiy proekt*, 48.

⁷ Ibid.

Iraqi, and Afghan conflicts, along with numerous disputes in the Caucasus, which is not far removed from the Middle East and is related in confessional terms, to name just a few. The Islamic alternative provides a fundamentally new ideological basis for all of these conflicts, transforming isolated struggles into “civilizational” conflicts and rapidly expanding the social base of support for this alternative.

By placing terrorism aimed at achieving an alternative to the world order in a separate category, I emphasize that we are not speaking of terrorism as a *method*. The method of terrorism—that is, the use of violence against non-combatants to achieve political or social ends—is absolutely unacceptable and has no political, legal, moral, or other justification, regardless of the intents and purposes for which it is used. Nonetheless, it is extremely important to understand what lies behind the method itself—the aims, values, conceptions of political world order: in short, the *ideology*—in order to effectively counter terrorism.

To illustrate the need to analyze the values behind terrorism, let us consider the example of the most dangerous scenario of events, the possibility of terrorists using WMD. According to most specialists, if terrorists resort to WMD, these will most probably be chemical weapons because of their greater availability from a technical standpoint and their relative ease of application.⁸ Incidentally, the only case of WMD being used by terrorists—the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo attack in the Tokyo subway—fully confirms this assumption.

However, the logic behind different terrorist groups’ actions may be totally different, depending on their values, ideology, and possible aims. For a terrorist organization such as Al Qaeda that proposes an alternative to the global order, it is of primary importance to demonstrate its power and ability to influence the Western world and its infrastructure. On 11 September 2001 terrorists attacked symbols of Western economic and military might—the World Trade Center and the Pentagon—but they also did so with symbolic tools—ordinary passenger aircraft used as weapons. They targeted the transport infrastructure in Madrid (rail transport) on 11 March 2004; in London (urban mass transit) on 7 July 2005; and again in London, when authorities averted another possible terrorist attack (air transport) on 9 August 2006.

In a situation where terrorists might resort to WMD, choosing nuclear weapons—in particular the so-called “dirty bomb” option—would be a psychological victory for terrorists, because it would show that they had joined the “nuclear club,” which is open only to a few select countries. For the mass consciousness it is not important whether the nuclear weapon is technologically advanced or quite primitive. What matters is the very fact that nuclear weapons will have been used as a means of demonstrating power by a non-state group.

⁸ See, for example, V. Orlov and A. Khlopkov, “Na povestke dnya – superterrorism,” *Nezavisimoye Voennoe Obozrenie* (21 September 2001).

Counterterrorism: New Approaches

How should the struggle against terrorism be shaped? Currently, the struggle is primarily targeted against the terrorist method itself. Various strategies have been employed, ranging from military and legal measures to psychological influence. While acknowledging the significance of these measures, one must admit that they are hardly sufficient.

Terrorism is a political phenomenon. Consequently, until the political problems that give rise to contemporary global terrorism are resolved, the struggle against it will not be successful. Although the different conditions that breed support for terrorism are taken into account when developing counterterrorism measures (such as eliminating significant social inequality, including the imbalance between the North and the South), the goal of building a world political system that would be more responsive to present-day realities is almost entirely excluded from the set of challenges analyzed as part of counterterrorist measures. This is partly because issues connected with the formation of the world political system cannot be resolved overnight, but it is also because terrorist activity requires an immediate response. Nonetheless, political considerations should play an essential role in the comprehensive struggle against terrorism, especially considering the political nature of the phenomenon of terrorism. It is around this understanding that nations must build their military, psychological, economic, and other strategies of fighting terrorism.

The world now faces a situation similar to the one that Europe faced in 1648. At that time, the invention of the principle of national sovereignty made it possible to defuse numerous conflicts (ethnic, religious, etc.) that were tearing the continent apart. However, the world now faces a far more complex task. First, the political system must be built on a completely different scale. This pertains both to modern geographical parameters (with the geography in question no longer being limited to the European continent, as was the case in the seventeenth century) and to the far greater number of actors. Second, modern actors differ along a much greater number of vectors: interests, aims, resources, the ability to influence the political development of the world, principles of internal organization, etc. It is very difficult to find a common denominator in this situation.

Attempts to define a new standard unit were made in the process known as Westernization. Thomas Friedman sees the attributes of a single (global) world order in the Western models of daily life, common to nearly all countries: the Internet, fax, cellular communication, etc.⁹ Francis Fukuyama, on the other hand, primarily sees these common denominators as residing in Western democratic values.¹⁰

⁹ Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1999); Friedman, *The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005).

¹⁰ Francis Fukuyama, "The End of the History?" *The National Interest* (Summer 1989): 3–18; Fukuyama, "Second Thoughts. The Last Man in a Bottle," *The National Interest* (Summer 1999): 16–33.

Attempts to intensify Westernization have met with failure. Moreover, they often provoke rejection of Western civilization as a whole, or produce a distorted interpretation of the ideals of Western culture.¹¹ This results in various expressions of resistance to Westernization.

The difficulties encountered in efforts to bring the world political system into closer harmony with modern realities often discourage actors from attempting any changes. Psychologically, it is easy to understand those who support the preservation of the status quo. After all, this system worked in the past. In the short term, a strategy to preserve the existing political system is obviously possible. However, it is clear that various forceful attempts to change the world political system will be made, including those carried out by terrorists. Thus, the task of a calculated construction of a new world political system (or modifying the existing system) that better reflects present-day realities remains on the agenda.

While pursuing this task (which has no quick solutions), it is important to actively involve various transnational actors in the fight against terrorism. Today, international collaboration against terrorism is restricted to intergovernmental cooperation within bilateral and multilateral frameworks, and to cooperation at the level of international organizations such as the United Nations. While acknowledging the significance and precedence of such cooperation in the antiterrorist struggle, it is hardly justifiable to ignore the potential of other transnational actors.

Transnational actors, which originated at the heart of the state-centered political system, generally act in accordance with the model's principles. For this reason, transnational actors are interested in a gradual, evolutionary transformation of the modern world political system, not in its extinction. Moreover, acts and threats of terrorism cause material and financial losses, and introduce an element of instability. These factors complicate the operations of transnational actors, which rely on predictability across national boundaries. It was not by chance that speakers during the July 2006 G8 Summit in St. Petersburg underscored the need to involve business in the fight against terrorism.¹²

It is noteworthy that multilateral and multilevel cooperation in the international arena has become widespread around the turn of the millennium. It is most discernible in the environmental sphere. For instance, representatives of NGOs and business joined governmental representatives to attend the World Summit on Sustainable Development hosted in Johannesburg in 2002.¹³ Similar processes, which involve many countries and actors in the resolution of problems, have been observed lately in other spheres. For example, the 2005 Tunis Summit on the Information Society drew more

¹¹ See, for example, A.P. Tsygankov, *Whose World Order? Russia's Perception of American Ideas after the Cold War* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004).

¹² "G8 Summit Declaration on Counter-Terrorism," St. Petersburg (16 July 2006). Available at: <http://en.g8russia.ru/docs>.

¹³ M.M. Lebedeva, "Ekologicheskie problemy v mezhdunarodnikh otnosheniyakh," in *Sovremennye mezhdunarodnie otnosheniya i mirovaya politika*, A.V. Torkunova, ed. (Moscow: Prosveshchenie, 2004), 366–80.

than 11,000 participants representing governmental structures, business communities, and civil society institutions from 175 countries, as well as a number of international organizations.

Finally, another readily available example may be found in a sphere closely related to terrorism: conflict management. In this field, nongovernmental organizations and members of the academic community operate alongside governments and intergovernmental organizations. Unlike official diplomacy, which is carried out by representatives of intergovernmental organizations and state governments, non-official diplomacy (also called “second track diplomacy”)¹⁴ enables attention to concentrate on the community level in order to reveal the problems underlying a conflict and to gather the needed information. At the same time, representatives of non-official diplomacy are often unable to understand the general picture clearly, and sometimes lack sufficient professional training.¹⁵ This requires that mechanisms of official and non-official diplomacy cooperate in what has become known as “multi-track diplomacy”¹⁶ or “multilevel diplomacy.”¹⁷

Terrorism is directly linked with security issues, the most sensitive area of interest for any state. Nonetheless, it is assumed that multilevel and multilateral cooperation to counter terrorism is possible, including in the sphere of ideological resistance.

Today, network-based terrorism can easily cross the transparent borders of nation-states. States alone will not be able to create effective barriers to the actions of such terrorist groups; the involvement of other actors is critical. Various programs should be developed to counter terrorism in the ideological sphere (depending on the region, on the people targeted by the program, etc.). Obviously, this will require the cooperation of academic communities in numerous countries as well as representatives of various religious faiths. On a practical level, programs may be implemented by NGOs and representatives of municipal authorities. These same structures may be helpful in terms of collecting feedback, particularly in reporting on the weaknesses of the programs and matters that require special attention. Business structures may provide targeted funding to develop and implement these programs.

¹⁴ See V. Volkan, J. Montville, and D. Julius, eds., *The Psychodynamics of International Relationships. Vol. II: Unofficial Diplomacy at Work* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 1991).

¹⁵ See A.S. Natsios, “An NGO Perspective,” in *Peacemaking in International Conflicts: Methods and Techniques*, I.W. Zartman and J.L. Rasmussen, eds. (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1997); P. Aall, “Nongovernmental Organizations and Peacemaking,” in *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict*, Ch.A. Crocker and F.O. Hampson with P. Aall, eds. (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996).

¹⁶ L. Diamond and J. McDonald, *Multi-Track Diplomacy: A System Approach to Peace*, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, 1993).

¹⁷ J.L. Rasmussen, “Peacemaking in the Twenty-First Century: New Rules, New Roles, New Actors,” in *Peacemaking in International Conflicts: Methods and Techniques*, I.W. Zartman and J.L. Rasmussen, eds. (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1997).

Conclusion

The crisis of Westphalian political order and the lack of a dialogue about a replacement system leads to active operation of extremist and terrorist groups. A struggle against terrorism can be efficient and successful only if attempts are made to frame another political system based on multinational, multilevel dialogue. Such a dialogue will bring no quick solutions, however. Dialogue always requires much patience and time and, according to Mikhail Bakhtin, it creates not just new relations between parties, but also leads to the development of new parties.¹⁸ At the same time, efforts to maintain the current political system as monolithic and absolute, without any alterations to account for fundamental changes in the global system, will lead only to disappointment, frustration, and further extremist and terrorist action.

So, to develop new, alternative approaches to counter terrorism, the first step should be to establish a long-term dialogue—a network of negotiations, with a wide range of actors—to elaborate principles of the new political system. The second step is to broaden international cooperation in the anti-terrorism struggle. Not only states and intergovernmental organizations should be involved in counter terrorism, but also NGOs, business structures, and academic societies, which have valuable perspectives to offer and important roles to play.

In other words, contemporary efforts to counter terrorism require a comprehensive program that includes a wide variety of actors on a global scale. While this program could be coordinated in a manner similar to the global effort to decode the human genome, it will be a more complex effort in terms of the number of participants it involves, the variety of these participants, and numerous other parameters. Already elements of such multilevel and multilateral cooperation exist. However, this cooperation will become more effective if this activity becomes comprehensive in nature, and if participants begin an honest discussion of global problems and how they could be solved.

¹⁸ Mikhail Bakhtin, *Problemy poetiki Dostoevskogo* (Moscow: Khudozhestvennaya literatura, 1972); available in English as *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).