CIAO DATE: 01/07

Connections

 

Spring-Summer 2006, Volume 5, Number 1

Full Text (PDF, 117 Pages, 908 KB)

 

• Editorial: Planning and Development of Defense Institutions in a Time of Transformation (PDF, 3 pages, 105 KB)
  Thomas-Durell Young and Todor Tagarev

  One could make a persuasive argument that all countries either are at present, or will be in the near future, undergoing some form of a process that can be described as “defense reform.” A reduction in the defense budget, as has happened in most NATO and Partnership states, or a significant change in policy direction—e.g., the Bush Administration’s “defense transformation” strategy—will result in a spate of defense reform. However, an equally persuasive argument can be made that long-standing democracies (such as those nations within the Alliance) are particularly well equipped to undertake such re-organizations, given the strength of their defense institutions. Such strength is characterized by the following qualities: a constructive, consensus-based inter-ministerial consultative process; a cadre of educated and experienced civilian defense officials within the Ministry of Defense and national defense headquarters; the presences of defense experts in key civilian ministries (most importantly, the Ministry of Finance); carefully promulgated (and vetted) laws relating to defense; and an experienced body of professional military officers, who are well versed in the realities of civilian control of the military. One should note, for example, that, based on recent experiences with defense reductions in Great Britain and the Netherlands, defense reforms can be confusing to the public and painful to execute from within the defense community, even when these advantages are present.

• DCAF’s Activities in Support of Effective and Democratically Transparent Defense Planning (PDF, 10 pages, 153 KB)
  Philipp Fluri and Eden Cole

  The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) focuses on democratic oversight of and guidance for the defense and security sector. Increasing transparency and efficiency in defense planning and spending thus do not generally fall under DCAF’s purview in the strict sense, and are addressed only within the larger context of defense institution building.

• The Art of Shaping Defense Policy: Scope, Components, Relationships (but no Algorithms) (PDF, 20 pages, 230 KB)
  Todor Tagarev

  In 1999–2000, I taught the first defense planning course at the “G.S. Rakovski” Defense and Staff College in Sofia, Bulgaria. All students were senior officers—mostly full colonels—and yet the course had to begin with a thorough explanation of what “defense planning” is and how it differs from and relates to “operational planning.” At the time, references to “planning” in regard to the military almost exclusively addressed the intended use of available forces, or what was known as “strategic and operational planning.” That is hardly surprising, because—unlike in NATO—defense policy-making and planning in the Warsaw Pact were fully centralized. The capitals, with the exception of Moscow, had either no or very limited knowledge and experience in defense policy and planning.

• Capabilities-Based Defense Planning: Techniques Applicable to NATO and Partnership for Peace Countries (PDF, 20 pages, 240 KB)
  Thomas-Durell Young

  Defense planning, even at its best, is an inexact science. Objective data that demonstrate how well (or poorly) existing and future capabilities will perform on operations as envisaged in the planning process are difficult to come by. And, despite the fact that countries are willing to spend inordinate sums on defense capabilities, the academic and professional literature that addresses defense planning qua planning is modest, in stark contrast with the literature on business planning.1 Perhaps unjustified concerns by ministries of defense over the security of information, or simply a lack of general interest by students in the field of strategic studies, have—singularly or combined—produced a rather anemic body of literature dealing with defense planning methodologies. This lack of an objective and normative body of literature on this subject should not, however, be allowed to dissuade defense officials and planners from examining extant approaches to defense planning. To be sure, the range of methodologies from which one might select may be modest; however, there are sufficient examples of successful planning systems to be studied for emulation.

• Introduction to Program-Based Defense Resource Management (PDF, 16 pages, 187 KB)
  Todor Tagarev

  The Partnership Action Plan on Defense Institution Building (PAP-DIB) supports Partner countries in developing and implementing transparent procedures for the effective allocation of defense resources. These are procedures that can allow decision makers to relate decisions on security policy, defense requirements, and resource allocation. A considerable number of NATO member countries use program-based defense resource management—some in combination with capability based planning—as one of the main tools supporting the effective implementation of their security and defense policy. Other member countries do not use the explicit term “program-based,” but nevertheless implement the same principles of transparency and accountability in their approach to defense resource management.

• Twenty-First Century Defense Acquisition: Challenges and Opportunities (PDF, 10 pages, 220 KB)
  Elisabeth Wright

  This article is the first in a series that will examine the complexities associated with defense acquisition decision-making in the twenty-first century. Budget constraints, political dynamics, cooperative alliances, and changing requirements pose particular— and often unique—challenges. This series of articles is intended to offer systemic “models” for effecting good acquisition decisions, provoke new ideas, and encourage dialogue across national borders on matters of defense acquisition. This first article examines the use of a formal acquisition strategy methodology as a means of reducing uncertainty in defense acquisition decision-making and selecting the best alternative toward achieving a capability.

• Measuring Defense Reform: A Proposed Methodology to Measure Efforts to Achieve the Objectives of PAP-DIB (PDF, 4 pages, 124 KB)
  Thomas-Durell Young

  The development and continuous utilization of objective metrics to demonstrate the effectiveness of reforms instituted by countries to achieve the objectives established through the Partnership for Peace–Defense Institution Building (PAP-DIB) process should be seen as both essential and obvious. However, to date there have been only modest efforts by defense experts, as well as nations, to develop systematic and disciplined methods that ministries of defense and national defense headquarters can employ to ascertain whether the PAP-DIB reforms they are instituting are meeting their intended objectives. To be sure, PfP nations participate in the Planning and Review Process on an agreed time-table with the NATO International Staff. However, notwithstanding the usefulness of these review processes (both formal reviews and the accompanying informal dialogue with NATO officials and nations), these are essentially reviews to determine the degree to which a Partner has met the Partnership Goals it has agreed to with NATO (via the Membership Action Plan, PARP, or individual Partnership Action Plan processes). As such, these useful reviews and analyses can be more accurately assessed as constituting an important element of what should be a more comprehensive and inclusive analytical methodology.

• Achieving PAP-DIB Objective Capabilities by Transforming the Way We Think (PDF, 18 pages, 225 KB)
  Scott E. Jasper

  The terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C. on September 11, 2001 graphically illustrated the unprecedented changes taking place in today’s global security landscape. Throughout the world, but particularly in North America and Europe, nations were suddenly forced to confront the very real possibility of a devastating domestic attack by a dangerous and unpredictable enemy. In Europe, the situation rapidly evolved from potential threat to deadly crisis, as Madrid was rocked by a series of horrific train bombings in March 2004 and London’s commuter transportation network was disrupted for weeks by Islamic extremist bomb attacks in July 2005. It soon became very clear that European security strategies geared towards traditional collective territorial defense did not provide the capabilities needed to address emerging global security threats. If there were any doubts beforehand, it was clear following these developments that the status quo approach to NATO heartland security had lost its relevance. The Euro-Atlantic defense community was faced with two choices: to change or to transform. At the Istanbul Summit in 2004, Allies and Partners launched the Partnership Action Plan for Defense Institution Building (PAP-DIB), which established unified objectives for defense reform and capabilities development for collective security. 3 The achievement of PAP-DIB objective capabilities requires a transformation mindset that thinks in new ways about how to address future security risks.

• Defense Institution Building: Training in Support of Defense Planning (PDF, 13 pages, 249 KB)
  Hari Bucur-Marcu and Cătălin-Marius Târnăcop

  Training for senior officials is always a problem of high complexity, and training on defense issues is even more complex, for several reasons. Defense is becoming an increasingly specialized field, with a wide array of professional instruments, especially in the area of planning, but it lacks the concreteness of other public domains, such as health or education, as the success of good governance in national defense reveals itself only under special conditions.