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Some Economic Considerations in the U.S. War on Terrorism

By David Gold[*]

> *"Suicide bombing is a corporate effort."*[1]

Certainly since September 11, 2001, if not earlier, the "war" against international terrorism has become the central organizing principle of United States foreign and military policy. Like most wars, the war against international terrorism is largely defined in terms of military and political objectives, yet other considerations are also of importance. Terrorism is a complex phenomenon that is difficult to pin down. As the terrorism expert Jessica Stern has reminded us, "The student of terrorism is confronted with hundreds of definitions in the literature."[2] Many analyses of terrorism, along with the prescriptions for dealing with it, emphasize its political, social, ideological, and economic aspects, although these factors are usually given less emphasis than security factors in policy formation.

Popular discussions of the economic aspects of terrorism tend to focus on how to cut off the flow of financial resources to terrorist organizations, how to allocate budgetary resources to fighting terrorism, and whether economic deprivation fosters international terrorism. Yet the economic aspects of terrorism are far more complex. There are economic costs that are the direct result of terrorist activities, and there are a variety of costs beyond those delineated by government budgets crafted to fund a war against terrorism. The sizeable nature of these costs suggests that enhanced efforts to weaken the sources of terrorism could create substantial economic benefits.

The linkage between terrorism and poverty is too simple, and often incorrect. Instead, the links have to do with the structure of rewards and systems of incentives that evolve in many societies. And the role of economics in fighting terrorism can involve far more than trying to disrupt financial networks. Terrorism, and the measures taken to counter terrorism, both carry economic costs. Yet terrorism does have economic sources, and the attempt to offset, and even defeat, terrorism would benefit from the adoption of economic strategies.

This paper will discuss four aspects of the economics of terrorism, delineating the costs of terrorism, evaluating the costs of fighting terrorism, assessing the sources of terrorism, and presenting some alternatives in the fight against terrorism.

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[1] "Special Report: Suicide Terrorism: Martyrdom and Murder," *The Economist*, January 10, 2004.
[2] Jessica Stern, *Terror In the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill* (New York: HarperCollins, 2003), xx.

Economic Costs of Terrorism

The immediate economic costs of terrorism are fairly obvious: destruction of life and property. In the case of the September 11 attacks, while the personal costs borne by those touched by the tragedy are immense and can linger for substantial periods of time, and while the magnitude of loss measured in dollars appears huge – $33 to $36 billion in New York City, according to one authoritative estimate – the destruction of physical and human capital and related loss of output was quite small in relation to the size of the economy. Although business activity, and especially air travel, suffered setbacks, the regional and national economies appear to have recovered and are now dominated by the trends and cyclical patterns in place prior to September 2001.[3]

When terrorism persists for long periods of time, the costs can continue to mount. Countries or regions that depend heavily on tourism have been found to suffer significant economic losses from the persistence of terrorism. A study of the Basque region in Spain found a decline in per capita GDP of ten percentage points relative to a control as a result of a decline in tourism induced by a wave of terrorist violence by the separatist group ETA.[4] Declines in tourism-related spending and foreign exchange earnings as a result of terrorism have also been identified for Austria, Egypt, Greece, Israel, Italy, Kenya, and Turkey.[5] Terrorism also appears to reduce inflows of foreign direct investment.[6] With the threat of terrorism, normal business dealings and consumption activities require more time, extra security and, because they entail greater risk, often require higher compensation. Thus, terrorism can lead to a general slowdown in economic activity. The Bank of Israel estimated that the country's 2002 GDP was down by between 3 and 3.8 percent as a result of the second Palestinian Intifada, which began toward the end of 2000. The initial negative impacts on tourism, exports to the occupied territories, and construction were magnified as individuals began to translate the persistence of terrorist incidents into perceptions of a long-term decline in their income, and as a result reduced their con-

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[3] Jason Bram, James Orr, and Carol Rapaport, "Measuring the Effects of the September 11 Attack on New York City," and Jason Bram, Andrew Haughwout, and James Orr, "Has September 11 Affected New York City's Growth Potential?" *Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review* 8:2 (November 2002), www.nyfed.org/research/epr/2002.html. For additional estimates of the costs of the 9/11 attacks, see Robert Kelleher, "The Economic Costs of Terrorism," Joint Economic Committee, United States Congress, May 2002.

[4] Alberto Abadie and Javier Gardeazabal, "The Economic Costs of Conflict: A Case-Control Study for the Basque Country," National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. W8478, September 2001, www.nber.org/papers/W8478.

[5] Todd Sandler and Walter Enders, "An Economic Perspective on Transnational Terrorism," *European Journal of Political Economy*, (forthcoming), www-ref.usc.edu/~tsandler/complete-terror02.pdf; Arthur Andersen, Inc., "Tourism and Terrorism – The Road to Recovery in Egypt," December 2000, www.hotel-online.com?Trends/Andersen/2001_Egypt.html; William Wallis, "Terror Takes Toll on Kenya's Tourism Industry," *Financial Times,* December 8, 2003.

[6] Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, "Terrorism and Foreign Direct Investment in Spain and Greece," *Kyklos* 49:3 (1996): 331–52.

sumption. Thus, a wider range of economic activities became affected.[7]

Economic Costs of Fighting Terrorism

Fighting terrorism requires resources, so there is an immediate economic cost that terrorism imposes. Businesses are forced to allocate more resources to security as the threat of terrorism increases. Terrorists use violence for dramatic effect, and acts of terrorism appear to the victims to be random. Thus, societies see terrorism as an insurance problem, the rough equivalent of an "act of god." As such, there are additional costs to develop and institute appropriate insurance products. In addition, time lost due to tighter restrictions on travel, extra effort to get goods through customs, and greater difficulties for workers moving across borders are all costs borne by both business and consumers.

These extra costs are similar to a tax levied on economic activities. They require resources that can as a result not be used elsewhere. Those who supply some of the services now in demand, such as security firms, may see their activities increase, but this is at the expense of other activities that are likely to be more productive. The contribution of security spending is most clearly linked to the problems it is designed to solve: crime, terrorism, war, etc. Resolving or reducing the negative impacts of a security problem can restore a *status quo ante*, but it does not provide a continuing benefit over time.

The most visible forms of anti-terrorist expenditures are those undertaken by governments. In the United States, the homeland security function in the federal government budget has been added since September 11. While most of the activities contained within the new function were already being carried out prior to the terrorist attacks, new ones have been added, and the older ones have been given new urgency. The new Department of Homeland Security saw its budget jump from $17.5 billion in Fiscal Year (FY) 2002 to $31 billion in FY2003. Of course, spending by the Defense Department, the Justice Department, the Treasury Department, and other government agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency (whose budget is never made public), has also jumped as a result of activities undertaken in the war against terrorism.

Government spending, of course, has a demand-stimulating impact, especially when financed by deficits. Offsetting this effect is the fact that security-related outlays tend to have substantial external leakages, as illustrated by the continuing spending for the occupations and military activities in Afghanistan and Iraq. All outlays have opportunity costs, in that more spending in one area implies less spending in another. In the aggregate, increased U.S. spending on national defense and homeland security, combined with the Bush Administration's tax cutting agenda, has reduced natural spending increases in areas that are potential contributors to economic growth and national security.

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[7] Bank of Israel, "The Economy: Development and Policies," *Bank of Israel Annual Report – 2002*, July 2003, www.bankisrael.gov.il/deptdata/mehkar/doch02/eng/dochoze.htm#topart1

For example, a number of federal government civilian programs in health care and education, which are important components of human capital formation, have already had their funding growth curtailed and are slated for funding cuts in the future.[8] Moreover, there is a trickle-down effect from the administration's tax cuts. State governments use essentially the same base for income and wealth tax purposes as the federal government, leading to revenue shortfalls at the state level as the federal government cuts its tax rates. With states unable to run deficits, they are forced to cut spending. Heavy losers have been health care, education, and public safety, such as police, fire, and emergency services – the much-praised "first responders" who performed so well on September 11.[9] The combination of spending growth and tax rate cuts have led to high federal budget deficits, which have increased the likelihood of significant upward movements in interest rates. In the view of some knowledgeable observers, these developments could impose costs on the economy in the future in terms of foregone growth opportunities, especially in the context of the need to allocate greater resources to an aging population.[10]

It should not be assumed that increases in spending equate to, or even approximate, increases in effectiveness with respect to security-related problems. Specific outlays have been challenged in terms of how well they contribute to fighting terrorism, and whether their existence reduces the ability to engage in other, more effective, activities. The defense budget includes several large weapons systems, including, for example, the F-22 high-performance fighter aircraft, which was originally designed to counter expected next-generation Soviet systems. With the breakup of the Soviet Union, this threat has not materialized and is not expected to, yet the system remains in place and accounts for $72 billion in future spending commitments, not counting likely future cost growth. Indeed, the overall Bush defense program will require extensive further increases in federal spending, if current plans are carried out. With tax cuts and spending growth in other areas, this is a classic recipe for a budgetary train wreck.[11]

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[8] Richard Kogan and David Kamin, "President's Budget Contains Larger Cuts in Domestic Discretionary Programs than has Been Reported," Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, February 5, 2004, at www.cbpp.org/2-5-04bud.htm.

[9] Nicholas Johnson and Rose Ribeiro, "Severe State Fiscal Crisis May be Worsening," Center on Budget and Policy Priorities," May 9, 2003, at www.cbpp.org/5-9-03sfp2.htm. Cuts in funding for first responders have also been noted at the federal level; see Robert Block, "Police, Firefighters to Get Less," *Wall Street Journal*, February 3, 2004.

[10] See, e.g., Martin Muhleisen and Christopher M. Towe, eds., *U.S. Fiscal Policies and Priorities for Long-Run Sustainability*, Occasional Paper No. 227 (Washington, D. C.: International Monetary Fund, 2004).

[11] See Steven Kosiak, "Cost Growth in Defense Plans," Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, August 26, 2003, at www.csbaonline.org; and David Gold, "The Coming Bush Defense Budget Train Wreck in Historical Perspective," Paper presented at the New School University Study Group on the Economics of Security in a Post 9/11 World, November 14, 2003, at worldpolicy.org/projects/110503SG.html.

At the same time, a number of programs that are more directly involved with counter-terrorist activities have had trouble securing adequate funding. One is the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, popularly called Nunn-Lugar, designed to fund the securing of fissile materials within the former Soviet Union. The Bush Administration originally sought to eliminate this program, and has funded it since at levels below the minimum threshold of effectiveness. In another example, the U.S. has still not created a single database of suspected terrorists, relying instead on lists from eight different agencies. This situation has persisted for more than a decade after the first World Trade Center bombing, when the problem first received national attention, and for more than two years after 9/11, following which President Bush, on several occasions, committed the government to creating a single, usable list. On December 1, 2003, an inter-agency body, the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), was opened within the FBI to consolidate data, weed out obsolete information, and develop new technology to better identify suspected terrorists. However, the TSC suffers "from the lack of a dedicated budget" and "ongoing failures to obtain the cooperation of several agencies to share their information …." In the view of one critic, the TSC "is a hollow box."[12]

Perhaps the most prominent example is the war in Iraq, which was justified by Iraq's ongoing programs of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), in violation of United Nations sanctions; its links with major terrorist groups; and the possibility that it would, in the future, supply WMD to these terrorist groups and thereby threaten the United States and its people and vital interests.[13] The overriding theory behind these justifications was that international terrorist groups can only exist with state sponsorship, and if that sponsorship is removed or seriously threatened, terrorist groups will be far less effective. These justifications were widely debated prior to the war. In the wake of the war, however, in the absence of any Iraqi WMD and lacking any serious evidence regarding the Hussein regime's links with international terrorist organizations, it has become harder to maintain the argument that the massive amounts being spent in Iraq are effective in fighting terrorism.

More recently, evidence has surfaced regarding Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, indicating that Pakistani scientists, perhaps with assistance from military and intelligence personnel within the government, transferred nuclear weapons technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea, countries that the

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[12] Robert Block, Gary Fields and Jo Wrighton, "U.S. 'Terror' List Still Lacking," *Wall Street Journal*, January 2, 2004.

[13] Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz presented this set of justifications in an interview with *Vanity Fair* magazine, published May 9, 2003. A transcript of the telephone interview is available on the Defense Department web site, www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030509-depsecdef0223.html. Interestingly, Wolfowitz raised and explicitly rejected what has become the most commonly voiced *ex poste* justification, the Hussein regime's "criminal treatment of the Iraqi people..., a reason to help the Iraqi people but … not a reason to put American kids' lives at risk, certainly not on the scale we did…."

United States has linked to terrorist groups in the past.[14] At the same time, Al-Qaeda and elements of the Taliban remain active in Western Pakistan and in Afghanistan, making reconstruction and political transformation in Afghanistan considerably more difficult.[15] Pakistan is considered an ally in the war against terrorism, and has received U.S. financial and political support. The need to maintain occupation and combat forces in both Afghanistan and Iraq is tying up about half of all U.S. ground forces, counting those needed for rotation and support. Another added effect is that recruitment of new forces has become more difficult. These conditions are bound to reduce the overall U.S. ability to utilize security forces in counter-terrorism activities.[16]

Economic Sources of Terrorism

Following September 11, the response of many people was to attribute the wave of violent terrorism to deficiencies in the development process, particularly the persistence of poverty in many developing countries – especially the contrast between the wealth of the few and the poverty of the many – and to the absence of effective education, widely seen as both a source of economic development and an overall "civilizing" element. Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova examined available evidence on the links between poverty and education, on the one hand, and the incidence of terrorist activities on the other, and found "little connection between poverty or education and participation in terrorism."[17] They explored data on the education and income levels of those engaged in terrorist organizations, opinion polls on attitudes toward terrorism, and data on income and poverty levels in populations where terrorism has grown. Terrorism seems unrelated to economic deprivation. Indeed, Krueger and Maleckova cite evidence that participants in terrorist organizations and terrorist activities seem to be of higher education and income status than the bulk of the populations from which they are drawn. Based on the evidence they evaluate, Krueger and Maleckova conclude that the absence of civil liberties, rather than economic deprivation, and the quality and content of education, rather than its level,

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[14] David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, "From Rogue Nuclear Programs, Web of Trails Leads to Pakistan," *New York Times*, January 4, 2004; Mark Landler and David E. Sanger, "Pakistan Chief Says it Appears Scientist Sold Nuclear Data," *New York Times,* January 24, 2004.

[15] For an example, see, Andrew Higgins, "U.S. Ambitions Run Into Reality On an Afghan Road," *Wall Street Journal*, February 6, 2004.

[16] A study from the United States Army War College makes exactly this point; see Jeffrey Record, "Bounding the Global War on Terrorism," Strategic Studies Institute, U. S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, December 2003, at www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/2003/bounding/bounding.htm

[17] Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, "Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?" *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17:4 (Fall 2003): 141. See also, Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, "Does Poverty Cause Terrorism?" *The New Republic*, June 24, 2002; and Claude Berrebi, "Evidence About the Link Between Education, Poverty and Terrorism Among Palestinians," Princeton University Industrial Relations Section Working Paper #477, September 2003, at www.princeton.edu/~cberebi/edu-pov-terror.pdf

appear more important as determinants of terrorist activity.

The data cited by Krueger and Maleckova, and the work of Krueger's student, Claude Berrebi, are wide ranging, but the interpretations may be too narrow. For example, both Eli Berman and Jessica Stern, the latter based on first-person interviews, point out that the actual terrorists are drawn from a large pool of volunteers who tend to be from the poorest segments of their societies, a point Krueger and Maleckova recognize but apparently feel is superceded by additional evidence. Stern quotes a disillusioned jihadist:

> 'Most of the people who join these groups are from the poorest classes. Eighty-five percent come from below the poverty line, twelve percent are from the middle classes, and around three percent from the rich.'[18]

Those selected for missions are likely to be those thought to be the most committed, but also the most capable of handling the complexities and difficulties that might arise, and therefore they have higher education and technical skills than most members. As Berman points out, "One would hardly expect *Al Qaeda* to send some of its thousands of semi-literate mercenaries in Afghanistan to flight school in Florida if disaffected students in Europe were available."[19]

In addition, research on terrorist groups and on other groups that use violence suggests a number of avenues where economic considerations may be important. Economics is not just about whether specific economic variables are sources of studied outcomes. It is primarily about how the inter-relations between incentives and constraints shape behavior and objectives. In this regard, two bodies of research may be useful.

One is on criminal gangs and rebel groups in civil wars, where similar patterns have been observed. In one example, Levitt and Venkatesh describe the organization of a drug dealing gang in an inner-city neighborhood.[20] Most such gangs originated as social organizations to give mostly younger people a sense of community and identity in an environment that they experienced as increasingly impersonal and hostile. With the introduction of crack cocaine in the 1980s, a product characterized by low cost, high markup, and ease of use, many

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[18] Stern, *Terror in the Name of God*, 214.

[19] Eli Berman, "Hamas, Taliban and the Jewish Underground: An Economist's View of Radical Religious Militias," National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. w10004, September 2003, 3, at www.nber.org/papers/w10004

[20] Steven D. Levitt and Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, "An Economic Analysis of a Drug-Selling Gang's Finances," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 115:3 (August 2000): 755–89. The name and location of the gang are kept anonymous, but in a companion article about a similar gang, the name is identified and the location given as Chicago. See Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh and Steven D. Levitt, "'Are We a Family or a Business?' History and Disjuncture in the Urban American Street Gang," *Theory and Society* 29:4 (August 2000): 427–62.
www.sociology.columbia.edu/people/professors/sv185/miscellaneous/family_or_business.html

gangs turned to drug dealing. The gang studied by Levitt and Venkatesh kept a detailed set of books as a management tool. Studying this material revealed a gang organized in a way similar to a franchise in a national or international retail organization. Whatever their motives for originally joining the gang, the members' prospects for economic advancement became dominant. Unlike (most) franchises in the legal world, the gang engaged in substantial expenditures related to violence, such as hiring contractors ("muscle"), purchasing weapons, and paying for funerals. Competition for markets, in this world, often involved violence.

Research on organizations engaged in civil wars has led to similar findings. A gray area in the analysis of terrorism is the fact that terrorism frequently overlaps with civil war. Some groups that practice terrorism, such as the IRA in Ireland and England, Hamas in Israel, and others, see themselves as being in revolt against an occupying power. Similarly, in civil wars, while the primary targets are opposing armies, terror against civilians has been utilized as a tactic. Groups join or instigate rebellions for a variety of reasons, but a growing body of research suggests that they increasingly continue their activities for economic gain. Paul Collier and his colleagues at the World Bank conclude that rebellions, whatever their origins, tend to persist when accompanied by low levels of economic development, a natural resource that is an easy target for predation, and a government that is not capable of protecting that resource, perhaps due to unfavorable geography.[21] Thus, state failure and the prospects for economic gain, rather than political or ideological grievance, are key elements in the persistence of rebellions. David Keen describes civil war as the continuation of economics by other means, emphasizing a country's failure to create and sustain the institutional framework for normal economic activity as a frequent cause of rebellion.[22] In this analysis, poor development plays a key role, in that it creates masses of people with few alternatives – essentially with zero opportunity costs – who become natural recruits for a rebel group. An example of these transitions is the career of Angola's Jonas Savimbi, who started out as the charismatic leader of a rebellion seeking to overthrow Portuguese colonial rule, moved to the right while gaining support from the U.S. against a Soviet-backed government, and then, after the end of the Cold War, led military attacks on the government in order to steal diamonds. At the time of his death in 2002, Savimbi was an extremely wealthy man.

A second body of research is on terrorist groups themselves. Many of these groups appear to be moving in directions similar to those observed in gangs and rebel movements. Stern describes, for example, individuals who have

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[21] Paul Collier, et al., *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2003); Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "On Economic Causes of Civil War," *Oxford Economic Papers* 50 (1998): 563–73.

[22] David Keen, *The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars*, Adelphi Paper No. 320 (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1998).

become disaffected with their organization.[23] One such individual

> is making a good salary – better than he could get in the civilian sec-
> tor…. But he sees his bosses getting rich off jihad and has come to
> feel disgusted. They have dirty offices and serve you bad food just
> to prove they have no money. But they live in mansions…. Jihadi
> organizations receive a lot of donations, and a lot of the money ends
> up going to the leaders.

Stern quotes a second disillusioned jihadi member:

> 'At first I thought [the bosses] are serving a religious cause, but now
> I feel they are running a business. They are … suppliers of human
> beings. They use poor and illiterate boys for their own private cause
> and call it jihad…. The … real methods for raising funds is smug-
> gling of goods through Afghanistan, Iran and India. This includes
> drug trafficking, in some cases to India…. The mujahideen bring
> with them many smuggled items such as cosmetics and … electron-
> ic goods from Afghanistan and Pakistan to raise funds.'

And a third:

> 'Initially I was of the view that they were doing jihad, but now I
> believe that it is a business and people are earning wealth through
> it…. I thought [the leaders] were true Muslims, but now I believe
> that they are fraud, they are selling Islam as a product….. First I was
> there for jihad, now I am there for my financial reasons.'

As Stern points out, as with any profession, there are non-pecuniary benefits:

> Not only money is important: emotional satisfaction and status are
> critical. Operatives describe the emotional satisfaction of their work,
> and the status they earn in their community. 'One becomes impor-
> tant due to his work. Successful operations make a militant famous
> and glamorous among his fellow men….'

Both Berman and Stern have studied terrorist groups that are successful because they provide services to the populations within which they reside. Hamas, for example, has become a successful social service agency, and the Taliban first achieved prominence by offering effective security on trade routes between Afghanistan and Pakistan after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union, while Pakistan-based jihadi groups have organized entire communities. These terror-ist groups become providers of local public goods, in effect filling in gaps left by the failure of governments and international organizations. Private groups that supply public goods, known as "club" goods, create mechanisms that allow them to control access to the goods and services being supplied. For Berman and others who have worked on these issues, the need to control access explains

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[23] Stern, *Terror in the Name of God*, 213–17.

the elaborate selection processes and the resort to violence on the part of terrorist groups, even when this behavior does not appear to bring them close to their stated objectives. They are, instead, devices to bind members to the group and make it difficult for them to leave, thereby providing a solution to the "free rider" problem inherent in all public goods production. When governments supply public goods, their activities are financed via taxation. Private suppliers of public goods raise funds externally via charities, appeals to a diaspora, or from various governments and international organizations.

Terrorist groups, criminal organizations, and participants in civil wars, whatever their original motives, become increasingly involved either with the business of making money or with the provision of social and economic services that governments are incapable or unwilling to provide. Researchers have identified a phenomenon of "agenda shifting." Organizations that may originally have had a political objective shift their activities towards wealth accumulation in the illegal economy – obtaining and selling drugs, diamonds, minerals, timber, guns, etc. The original rationale for moving into illegal activities is usually to raise funds for the continuation of political work. Both the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, for example, despite strong religious prohibitions against the drug trade, have used the growing and trading of opium as an important revenue source.[24] Many researchers argue, however, that wealth accumulation becomes the dominant goal and political activity becomes a justification, not an objective. In addition, the political justification permits groups to engage in various forms of fund-raising, including from private charities and individuals in Europe and North America. External fund raising is important, since it allows the organizations to be increasingly devoted to political and military-type activities that are effectively motivated by the objective of maintaining the groups' integrity.

Economic Policies to Combat Terrorism

Terrorism is a complex phenomenon, and fighting it requires a multiplicity of tools, including security (military and policing), politics and diplomacy, economic and social policy, etc. Yet frequently, it is the security aspect that is emphasized. When an act of terrorism occurs, the response of governments is usually to retaliate in kind, and then formulate a series of additional measures designed to punish and weaken the perpetrators. This punishment/deterrence formula has a number of advantages. It provides a sense of immediate gratification, as the shock of experiencing an attack is quickly followed by the satisfaction of inflicting punishment on those responsible. For a government, this conveys a sense of legitimacy, that "something" has been done to satisfy the citizenry's desire for a visible response.

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[24] Douglas Farah, "Al Qaeda Gold Moved to Sudan*," Washington Post,* September 3, 2002; Owais Tohid, "Bumper Year for Afghan Poppies," *Christian Science Monitor*, July 24, 2003; Bronwyn Curran, "Afghan Opium Trade Widens, Taliban and al-Qaeda Linked to Drugs Money," *Agence-France-Presse*, October 30, 2003.

Responding to a terrorist event after it occurs may also be justified on comparative cost grounds. The main alternative to the punishment/deterrence model is a preventive model, where the root causes of terrorism are addressed in order to limit, or possibly even prevent, its growth. But since the number of actual terrorist incidents is far less than the number of potential terrorist incidents, decisions about resource deployments are easier when security agencies concentrate on responses. A similar problem occurs in local policing, where police agencies do not have the resources to deploy personnel at all possible targets of crime. Instead, they seek to patrol or monitor those locations deemed most likely to experience crime, or locations where the consequences of crime might be greatest in terms of the value of property or the possible loss of life, and devote substantial resources to detection and apprehension once crimes are committed.

There is, however, another side to the issue of comparing strategies, that of the relative benefits. Responding in kind to terrorist incidents may be psychologically and politically satisfying, but it is not clear that it is effective. It may, of course, be hard to evaluate success, since it is difficult to measure the number and size of terrorist operations that are *not* undertaken because of effective deterrence. In one example where retaliation may have had minimal impacts, after the bombing of a Berlin discothèque in 1986, the U.S. launched an attack against targets in Libya. In the following months, the incidence of terrorist attacks against American and British targets first increased, then tapered off, and then resumed their previous pattern. It appears that the U.S. retaliation induced terrorists to move planned operations forward in time, as a response to the U.S. action, but did not reduce the total number of incidents.[25]

There are a number of economic principles that appear useful in formulating strategies to combat terrorism. One is the principle of substitution.[26] As illustrated in the Libya example mentioned above, terrorist groups behave as if they are cost-constrained, and therefore choose tactics they believe to be cost-effective. If the relative costs of one avenue of action are raised, terrorists have shown themselves willing and able to shift to other tactics, or to move to different locations or time periods. In the present context, the U.S. has expended substantial resources to improve airline safety since September 2001, but has been much slower, and has devoted far less resources, to improving shipping security. As of early 2003, only four per cent of containers arriving at U.S. ports were subject to inspection, and there have been identifiable lags in the development and application of inspection technology. This is despite the fact that terrorism

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[25] Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, "The Effectiveness of Anti-Terrorism Policies: Vector Autoregression-Intervention Analysis," *American Political Science Review* 87:4 (1993): 829–44. A similar pattern has been observed regarding Israeli retaliation against Palestinian attacks.

[26] See, e.g., Sandler and Enders, "Effectiveness of Anti-Terrorism Policies," and Jurgen Brauer, "On the Economics of Terrorism," March 12, 2002, at www.aug.edu/%7Esbajmb/.

experts have identified incoming shipping as the most likely means to be used by a terrorist group for importing WMD into the U.S., a possibility that would appear even more likely with the intensification of airport security. Cindy Williams, a former Congressional Budget Office defense budget specialist, has estimated that shifting $5 billion from the Defense Department would allow the U.S. to increase inspection of containers by a factor of ten.[27]

These examples of the under-funding of counter-terrorism activities suggest the importance of another economic principle, that of opportunity cost. While governments often treat their resources as infinitely expandable, the reality is that large increases in one set of programs often are accompanied by greater difficulties in funding other programs. In the area of security, the massive increases in offensive military operations and programs since 9/11 have not been accompanied by an equivalent growth of programs that are primarily defensive in orientation, as well as those that could be classified as preventive. In some cases, administration budget officials have acted to restrict the growth of defensive programs, on the grounds that budgetary resources are too tight. Too often, programs are approved without comparative evaluations, and those with the strongest political, institutional, and regional support have the upper hand. The result, in too many areas, is a weakening, not a strengthening, of the U.S. security posture.

A third important principle is to recognize the role of incentives. One prominent example of the failure to recognize incentives is in one of the main programs the U.S. adopted after the Cold War to deal with the potential problem of securing fissile materials. The former Soviet Union (FSU) had committed to dismantling a large number of its nuclear warheads, and the U.S. agreed to pay the FSU for the highly enriched uranium (HEU) that would be removed from the warheads, have the FSU "down blend" the HEU with newly mined uranium to create low enriched uranium (LEU), which would be suitable as nuclear fuel but was no longer suitable for the construction of nuclear weapons. The U.S. would then use the LEU for nuclear fuel.

The first Bush Administration negotiated this arrangement and established the quasi-governmental United States Enrichment Corporation as the U.S. government agent for the purchase and re-sale of the Russian LEU. But the Bush Administration committed itself to privatize the United States Enrichment Corporation, a commitment the Clinton Administration honored, despite the explicit objection of its chief economist, Joseph Stiglitz. The issue was that the privatized firm, re-named USEC, would have the wrong incentives. As a private firm, its primary responsibility was to its shareholders, not the U.S. government's national security objectives. And to meet its private objective of prof-

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[27] Cindy Williams, "Paying for the War on Terrorism: U.S. Security Choices since 9/11," Paper prepared for ECAAR panel, Allied Social Sciences Association annual meetings, January 5, 2004, at www.ecaar.org/Articles/AEA2004.htm. Al-Qaeda, of course, has utilized maritime tactics in the past, as in the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen.

itability, USEC would seek out sources of uranium at low prices; there was no guarantee that it would purchase all the LEU that the Russians had available to sell from the down-blending of HEU. Alternatively, a national security objective would have been to remove this material from weak Russian storage facilities, prevent its leakage onto the black market, and give Russia the incentive to dismantle as many nuclear warheads as possible. Meeting this objective would have required the U.S. to purchase all the HEU the Russians could provide, regardless of price.

The USEC issue is an example where the incentives appropriate for national security may be incompatible with the incentives appropriate for private efficiency.[28] It also highlights another important economic principle, that of the provision of public goods. Pure public goods cannot be supplied by private markets, even if there is a demand for the good, since there is no way to charge a price for its use, and no way to ration the good among users. National defense is the classic example of a public good, which is financed by public revenues – i.e., taxation and borrowing – since it is not possible to exclude free riders from using the services rendered. Using budgetary resources to purchase all available FSU supplies of HEU would appear to fit the definition of a public good. In addition, as Berman and others have argued, one source of the strength of terrorist groups is their ability to supply local public goods and enforce membership in the club that utilizes the good supplied. An alternative is for governments to produce and equitably distribute these public goods to all members of the community, without imposing onerous restrictions on who can participate. The public goods in question cover a range of issues – economic, social, political, and security – and would go a long way toward filling in the gaps created by the failures of previous governments.

As discussed above, there is some controversy as to the role of poverty and development failures in breeding terrorism. Not all poverty-stricken societies breed terrorists, and not all terrorists are poor or suffer from a lack of public goods, a dearth of individual opportunities, or the absence of civil liberties. Indeed, terrorism may more resemble crime, which is never fully eradicated even in wealthy societies, than it does war, in that a successful fight will reduce but not eliminate terrorism, while a successful war would likely eliminate an enemy. The examples given above are meant to suggest that applying economic principles may broaden the range of tools available for use in this particular fight.

Conclusion

Recognizing that terrorists, acting both as individuals and as groups, are eco-

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[28] See, e.g., Joseph Stiglitz, *Globalization and its Discontents* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2002) 176–78; Matthew Weinstock, "Meltdown," *Government Executive* (February 2001): 31-37, at www.govexec.com/features/0201/0201s2.htm; Richard Falkenrath, "Uranium Blues: Economic Interest vs. National Security," *Milken Institute Review* (Fourth Quarter 2000): 34-48, at www.milkeninstitute.org/publications/review/2000_12/34-48mr8.pdf.

nomic beings would add to our understanding of the phenomenon of terrorism and to the formulation of policies to combat and minimize terrorism. Treating terrorism as the product of economic deprivation is an incomplete explanation, just as treating crime as the result of poverty is unsatisfactory. Yet societies where individual opportunity and aggregate growth prospects are restricted are more likely to shift individual choices towards those that are at best antithetical to widespread growth and development, and at worst violence-prone. On the basis of this analysis, here are the essentials for policy-makers:

- First, ensuring security is essential, but with limited resources, more attention needs to be paid to the effectiveness of specific policies in terms of the objective of reducing terrorism.
- Second, the opportunity costs of security policies need to be thoroughly evaluated. This is difficult, since security policies are formulated in a highly charged political context and are supported by powerful interests. But the costs of bad choices can be very large.
- Third, policies need to address both resource gaps and governance gaps. Thus, aid and security need to be supplied together, a lesson that is being learned, hopefully, in Afghanistan.
- Finally, policies should evaluate and address incentive structures; we should not assume that all terrorists are irrational, or simply hateful. Improving the range of alternatives realistically available, including effective participation and concrete evidence that social, political, economic, and security conditions are improving – and will continue to improve – may not remove all terrorist impulses, but it is highly likely to reduce their appeal.

At Least in Fighting Terrorism, Transatlantic Cooperation Is Working

By Philippe Coessens[*]

While disagreements between the United States and the European Union on a range of global issues have recently attracted attention, cooperation between the two sides of the Atlantic on counter-terrorism has been relatively successful. There can be no doubt that this is an area in which the European Union and the United States share common goals.

It is clear that terrorism and associated problems such as drug trafficking, money laundering, illegal immigration, and organized crime are very much global issues. So the European Union's anti-terrorism efforts can be said to have had a positive impact on the world in general, and on the United States in particular. This applies not only to the Union's internal achievements but also to its efforts to strengthen cooperation with other countries and its participation in multilateral forums such as the United Nations and the Group of Eight leading industrial nations.

The European Union set to work on a new anti-terrorism initiative immediately after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, convening a special meeting of the European Council barely a week later and coming up with a comprehensive action plan to support the United States in the face of the terrorist attacks. The plan contained a series of actions aimed at enhancing police and judicial cooperation, developing international legal instruments, stepping up efforts to cut off terrorist financing worldwide (by immediately freezing assets of a substantial number of terrorist organizations), strengthening air security, and contributing to the systematic evaluation of relations with third countries in the light of their position on terrorism.

Since then, the European Union and the United States have concluded a series of important bilateral agreements on police and judicial cooperation (notably agreements between Europol and the United States reinforcing the capability of law enforcement authorities to exchange data), as well as on mutual legal assistance and extradition. These, once fully in force, will make it easier to bring to justice terrorists and other serious criminals in the jurisdictions where they are wanted.

Inside the European Union, the focus has been on judicial cooperation between member states, increased cooperation between police and intelligence

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services, border control, and measures to counter the financing of terrorism. Key achievements in these areas include agreement on a common European arrest warrant and an EU framework decision on combating terrorism, which includes a definition of terrorist offenses; a more closely coordinated scale of penalties; a common EU list of worldwide terrorist organizations; and mutual recognition of orders freezing the property of terrorists or securing evidence against them. Plans are also under way to develop more secure visas and travel documents.

None of these agreements was easy to achieve. They are, however, already having real operational effects by improving the legal framework for fighting crime and terrorism throughout the European Union. The combination of these new instruments is effectively denying safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts. In addition, the European Union has approved revised recommendations by the Financial Action Task Force aimed at stemming the flow of funds to terrorists and further cracking down on money laundering.

The Union has also been developing a multi-faceted and more coordinated approach aimed at incorporating the fight against terrorism into all aspects of its foreign policy. For example, it is conducting threat analyses of various countries and regions (Central and Latin America, South and Southeast Asia) that are leading to concrete policy recommendations.

In line with these recommendations, the European Union is launching pilot projects to help three priority countries (Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Philippines) curb terrorist financing, strengthen law enforcement, and develop more effective judicial systems. These countries and actions were chosen in consultation with the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee so as to assist their governments to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1373 of September 2001, which called for wide-ranging measures to fight terrorism.

A second important step has been the introduction of anti-crime and anti-terrorism clauses in EU trade and cooperation agreements. Such clauses require the parties to exchange information on terrorist groups and their support organizations, with a view to preventing or punishing acts of terrorism. These provisions are being gradually included in agreements with Chile, Algeria, Egypt, and Lebanon, and currently figure in difficult negotiations for agreements with Syria, Iran, and the Gulf Cooperation Council.

The Group of Eight (G8), which includes four EU member states (Britain, France, Germany, and Italy), along with representatives of the EU institutions, has also been quick to work toward implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1373. The G8 immediately recognized the need to provide technical assistance to other countries to help them to build the necessary capabilities to fulfill their obligations under the resolution.

At its latest summit meeting, in Evian in June 2003, the G8 adopted an action plan that also concentrates on outreach activities and capacity building.

The plan focuses on fighting terrorism in particular regions, such as South East and Central Asia, and in certain specific fields, such as reinforcing border security and equipping institutions to tackle money laundering and the financing of terrorist organizations.

More generally, the U.S.-EU political dialogue on the entire issue of terrorism has deepened. Justice, home affairs, and counter-terrorism officials now meet regularly, and cooperation has substantially improved since 9/11. A great deal of work is also being done on both sides of the Atlantic on measures to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their acquisition by terrorist groups, and on how to deal with so-called rogue states.

The European Union also adopted an important policy document that lays out guiding principles and a concrete plan for further counter-terrorist action at a summit meeting in Thessaloniki in June. This plan sets the course for future action so that momentum in the fight against terror will not be lost.

The verdict on all these efforts to improve transatlantic cooperation in the fight against terrorism must at this point be "so far, so good." Since 9/11, cooperation has substantially improved. Intelligence has been flowing across the Atlantic in unprecedented volumes, a number of terrorist cells have been disrupted, and many suspected terrorists are being prosecuted in different European countries.

The European Union and the United States share the same values and objectives. We are now also sharing some of the same tools available to curb terrorist activity. After all the discussions we have had about different approaches to multilateralism on either side of the Atlantic, it is striking that in this field both sides are stressing the importance of the work of the United Nations and the Counter-Terrorism Committee. That shows that – on terrorism, at least – the European Union and the United States see eye-to-eye as actors in the international community.

Terrorism Transformed: The "New Terrorism," Impact Scalability, and the Dynamic of Reciprocal Threat Perception

*By Doron Zimmermann**

> "The need to concentrate the greatest possible force and deliver a smashing blow at the decisive point will continue to clash with the need to outwit, mislead, deceive, and surprise the enemy. Victory, as always, will go to the side that best understands how to balance these two contradictory requirements, not just in the abstract but at a specific time, at a specific place, and against a specific enemy."[1]

I. Reappraising a "New" Kind of Terrorism

How new is the "New Terrorism," and does this paradigm accurately portray the effective threat of contemporaneous terrorism and the next wave of the near future? Moreover, do we need to fundamentally revise our conception of the terrorism paradigm in the light of a considerable number of analyses of contemporary terrorism that argue that "different motives, different actors, different sponsors, … and demonstrably greater lethality" exemplify this supposed new breed of political violence?[2] It is probably unwise to accept the "New Terrorism," as delineated by scholars who have announced its arrival, at face value.[3] Upon closer inspection, the so-called "New Terrorism" is not as deserving of the designation "new" as may appear to be the case on first sight. Thus, I suggest that a skeptical treatment of the "New Terrorist" paradigm is required, for a number of reasons. The most important argument militating against the received conception of the "New Terrorism" is the simple fact that it is potentially distorted, in that it almost invariably conveys an ill-defined, impressionistic image of

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[1] *Martin Van Creveld,* The Transformation of War *(New York: The Free Press, 1991), 226.*

[2] *Ian O. Lesser, "Changing Terrorism in a Changing World," in* Countering the New Terrorism, *Ian O. Lesser, et al. (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1999), 1–5; quoted passage at 1.*

[3] *For selected works propounding the appearance of the "New Terrorism," see: Harvey Kushner, "The New Terrorism," in* The Future of Terrorism: Violence in the New Millennium, *ed. Harvey Kushner (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1998); Mark Juergensmeyer, "Understanding the New Terrorism,"* Current History *(April 2000): 158–163; Walter Laqueur,* The New Terrorism. Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction *(London: Oxford University Press/Phoenix Press, 2001), especially 3-5; Bruce Hoffman,* Inside Terrorism, *(New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); Lesser, et al.,* Countering the New Terrorism.

post-Cold War political violence movements (PVMs). [4]

By way of introduction, it must be clearly understood that the mere existence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) – even the knowledge of how to construct, and the possibility of acquiring weapon-grade materials illegally in order to build, crude atomic, biological, and chemical devices – is not a new phenomenon, and by itself certainly does not justify the appellation of the "New Terrorism." The awareness among government analysts of the potential danger posed by WMD in the hands of non-state actors may be as recent as the end of the Cold War, but calling the problem novel for this reason is to confuse its appearance on the governmental radar with its actual inception, or to assume that "terrorists" are as a rule slow-witted dullards and uncreative, chronic under-achievers.

If modern history is not characterized by effective containment of destructive technologies, neither is it marked by an absence of religious fanaticism. In the light of the historical track record of religious militancy, its recent recrudescence as embodied in Islamism therefore fails to surprise those sensitive to the currents of the past. Finally, on the score of advanced organizational principles among the "New Terrorists," it remains to be said that the terrorist groups of the 1970s were exemplars of highly sophisticated organizational structures and, if anything, have proven to be resourceful, inventive, resilient, and *remarkably flexible* in the face of the combined repressive force applied by the governments they opposed.

To review additional characteristics put forward by its proponents in the media and academia, the recent and widespread description of this new breed of PVM is suggestive of terrorist groups operating free from previously valid motivational constraints, with an unprecedented potential for access to WMD and/or advanced military-grade hardware, all of which are – ostensibly – to be suddenly unleashed upon a defenseless public in the pursuit of some obscure, irrational, and utterly arcane agenda. The problem with this image of the "New Terrorism" is that it conveys an undifferentiated and *incomplete* perspective of the matter at hand. To date, one of the more convincing (and partial-

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[4] *The terminology used in this essay, specifically the term "political violence movement" (PVM), is an effort at creating a functional, and hopefully clearer, nomenclature by removing value laden, pejorative, and stigmatizing connotations inherent in the popular use of the ill-defined and instrumental term "terrorism." The term "political violence movement" subsumes religiously or politically ideologized and/or radicalized sub-state actors employing* terrorist tactics *in pursuit of their strategic (i.e. single-issue, political and/or religious) objectives. On this point, see Walter Laqueur,* The Age of Terrorism*, 149. Furthermore, David Tucker has observed: "To the extent that terrorists with religious motivations also have political and social agendas–for example the establishment of an Islamic state–they will labor under the same kinds of constraints that terrorists with political and social agendas labor under as they struggle to achieve their political goals." David Tucker, "What is New About the New Terrorism and How Dangerous is It?"* Terrorism and Political Violence *13:3 (Autumn 2001): 7.*

ly implied) explanations for the appearance and mushrooming of the "New Terrorist" paradigm is the following by Martha Crenshaw:

> Both the study of terrorism and counterterrorism policy have been event-driven. Why has the notion of a "new," dangerous, and uncontrollable terrorism become so compelling? Is the perception driven by the shock of a series of events closely related in time but not necessarily caused by the same factors? Is the perception of threat driven by public opinion, the news media, or elites in the government and scientific community?[5]

If Crenshaw's assumptions regarding the driving factors behind the "New Terrorist" paradigm are valid, which appears plausible, then the fact that research on terrorism is event-driven could conceivably give rise to a more disquieting question – namely, whether the definitional debate on terrorism is the only one suffering from likely instrumentalization by vested interests among the powers that be. Should the response be in the negative, this would also seriously call into doubt the academic quality of the paradigm, and raise the issue of whose interests it serves. More generally, to what extent can the perception of a threat be generated, induced, and manipulated? Even if terrorism by insurgents of all stamps is only partially based on the precepts of psychological warfare, it follows that the means to combat it are probably not dissimilar. Unfortunately, it lies in the nature of such questions that they are not only instrumental, but also highly political and even firmly securitized.

A dimension of terrorism research that is also slighted due to the sensationalist value of terrorist attacks – as well as the mass-mediated perception of the threat represented by PVMs and governments' manic preoccupation with defensive measures at the expense of preventive endeavors – is the terrorist actor himself, his organization, his motives, and the cosmology and physical environment that spawn them. Once actor-centered and actor-related issues replace the more visually arresting blood and gore of terrorist attacks, there is very little that is authentically new in the agenda and the motivational, organizational, and even elements of the methodical aspects of the "New Terrorism."

First, the supposed novelty of the "New Terrorist" political, religious, or social program is largely dependent on the time frame involved in an analysis of terrorism, "terrorists," and terrorist acts. For what, except time and place, distinguishes the objectives (or methods) of the Sicarii of the Jewish Zealot movement from the ends pursued (and means used) more recently by supporters of the relatively obscure MAK (Maktab al-Khidamat, the Mujahedeen "Office of Services"), which subsequently gained notoriety in the guise of Al-Qaeda? In principle, and to some extent even in practice, there are similarities, for both movements stated their aim to cleanse hallowed soil of foreign desecrators by forcefully ejecting all unbelievers.

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[5] *Martha Crenshaw, "The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21st Century,"* Political Psychology *21:2 (June 2000): 415*.

In the first example, the Romans under the emperors Nero and Vespasian occupied parts of Biblical Israel, thereby provoking the second of three Jewish revolts from c. 66–73 A.D. The militant Zealot movement, whose corps of knife-wielding Sicarii publicly slaughtered legionaries and their officers in bloodcurdling and spectacular fashion, ambushed Roman patrols in the countryside, poisoned wells with rotting animal corpses and, more generally, fiercely resisted the vastly superior Roman war machine as irregular combatants using unconventional, "asymmetric" tactics. The second example concerns the Western coalition troops after the Gulf War (1990–91), who had made their presence felt in the Saudi peninsula – "the land of the two Holy Places" (Medina and Mecca) – and in due course became subject to attack by radical Islamist forces, for instance at Khobar Towers in 1998.

Neither case is illustrative of a PVM motive that is in any manner diffuse or new. Nor, for that matter, does Osama bin Laden's religio-irredentist objective of resurrecting the splendor of the Caliphate of the seventh and eighth centuries (including the reestablishment of its geographic boundaries) in place of the present regimes in the Arab world exactly serve as an illustrative example of a *revolutionary* enterprise. Judged by any standard, Bin Laden's vision of the future is *reactionary* to an extent that is rare indeed.

By extension, it could be argued that Islamism merely seeks to succeed at an undertaking in the present (i.e., uniting Islam) in pursuit of conservative ideals at which Pan-Arabism has demonstrably failed in the past in pursuit of revolutionary ideals (i.e., uniting the Arab world and freeing it from Western dominance). The point is that the ideologies employed to mobilize social forces in each of these two cases might differ (religious radicalism as opposed to secular nationalism), but the mechanism underlying both historical processes – the structural component, as it were – is essentially the same. The purpose of the movements in both cases is to rally the people around the flag by violently proposing a new social or political order by means of sabotaging and impugning the old system, and to evoke the magnificence of a bygone golden age as an emotive harbinger of a desired near future.

Conflicts of nearly infinite variety in the course of human history have at some stage in their development followed this template. But, to give an example of an increasingly probable new motive, not only for PVMs, but also for other actors in international politics, we may want to imagine that we are in the opening stages of an unfolding future drama, at the heart of which will be the long-term risks of *absolute* resource depletion. In its entire history, the human race has never had to face planetary overpopulation or resource scarcity equally affecting all parts of the globe as an existential threat.

That the goals of the "New Terrorists" are not as diffuse as they are made out to be can even be seen in instances of extreme motives. For example, in the case of apocalyptic cults with a predilection for terrorist tactics, it is possible to identify not only the motive but also the objective. If the stated motive

and/or the objective of a PVM happen to be to end the world as we know it, the trick is not to get sidetracked by debating the sanity of such a position and plan, but to take it seriously and make it part of the strategic deliberations on counter-terrorist measures. This understanding is vital if the means by which such a group attempts to bring about the end of days involve weapons of mass destruction. Today, the destruction of the world, or large parts of it, by non-state actors, for whatever reason, is no longer the exclusive preserve of science fiction; it has become an international political and security risk that will stop at no border.

Millenarian fanatics, eschatological sects, and other kinds of apocalyptical movements have been around for a long time. Their frame of reference is very different indeed from the mainstream perception of reality. But to believe that this makes them any less rational and calculating in pursuit of their goals, or any less determined to realize their objectives, is a grave mistake. The history of the past thirty-odd years bears this out and requires no further explanation. While they certainly do not abound, there have been precedents for such events, including attempted, but largely foiled or otherwise unsuccessful, mass casualty attacks by apocalyptic (and in the United States also by right-wing) groups. Second, the proposition that the "New Terrorist" groups are organized along innovative lines cannot be upheld in the face of a past record that flatly contradicts it. Even the role model of the "New Terrorist" organizations, the operationally decentralized cell structure with its independent commands that has been successfully applied in the shape of Active Service Units (or ASUs, the smallest quasi-independently operating combat unit of the Provisional Irish Republican Army) fighting against the British armed forces and intelligence services in the past three decades, is still predicated upon the principle of a traditional hierarchical military chain of command.

Louis Beam's idea of "leaderless resistance" as an organizing principle of PVMs might indeed apply to exceptions to the rule – as has been apprehended by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in relation to right-wing and extreme Christian fundamentalist groups in the United States – but it certainly does not apply to an alliance system of PVMs based on a culturally ingrained pecking order originating in a quintessentially hierarchic Islamic creed, such as Al-Qaeda. As David Tucker has shown, the "striking thing about the networked structure of the new terrorism is that it differs little from the structure of the old terrorism," and goes on to cite the well-known example of the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization), the exemplar of a terrorist umbrella organization, if there ever was one, drawing together a multiplicity of Palestinian secular political movements and their respective military wings. More generally, terrorist alliance systems in the shape of stable and ephemeral marriages of convenience, instrumental and ideological coalitions, umbrella organizations, and other forms of organizational superstructures are not at all new to PVMs.

One cluster of terrorist organizations that features complex, conflictive, hierarchical, and decentralized interrelationships, and which has been

active in the greater Middle East since the early 1980s, may here serve as a contemporaneous example. I propose it here as an alternative to the lurid conception of the ostensibly new "global terrorist network." According to the intelligence sources that are largely in line with a historically recurring terrorist-alliance thesis, it is the Islamic Republic of Iran (specifically its secret services MOIS/VEVAK, the successor to the Shah's dreaded SAVAK, and the elite Jerusalem Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, the Pasdaran), above all other actors, that is expanding its managerial and leadership role in the coordination of PVMs in the greater Middle East.

Through the good offices of Imad Fayez Mugniyah, Hezbollah's director of foreign operations, the Iran connection links Al-Qaeda to the Shi'ite militia organization Hezbollah, and – in a deadly coalition – to the predominantly Sunni Palestinian groups Harakat al-Muqwawanah al-Islamiyya (HAMAS), Jihad al Islami, and the Sunni radical group Usbat al Ansar ("Federation of Partisans") operating in southern Lebanon. The alliance of PVMs supported by Iran also gained notoriety as an accessory to the intercepted smuggling of military contraband on behalf of Yassir Arafat's Palestinian Authority (or PA, the official governing body of autonomous Palestinian territories in Gaza and the West Bank after 1993) aboard the freighter *Karine-A* in the Red Sea in January, 2002.

An alliance of sub-state actors employing terrorist tactics, supported by a state sponsor and operating out of a defined region, is not nearly as dramatic as the constantly promoted image of a global conspiratorial network, such as Al-Qaeda. But at least it exists. Conversely, even if Al-Qaeda encompasses the occidental and oriental civilizations in terms of its documented operational reach, this at best makes it a "trans-regional terrorist network" in Southeast and Central Asia, the Mediterranean (including North Africa), the greater Middle East, Western Europe, and the U.S. That is still a far cry from being an organization that is active on a truly global scale, which, in turn, indicates that the network of its deployable operatives does not (yet) span the globe.

Third, if there are indeed substantive differences between the older kind of terrorism and the "New Terrorism," they are, if anything, not qualitative, but quantitative – with exclusive reference to the dimensions of an attack and its consequences. The ability to inflict greater casualties by deploying weapons of mass destruction can be understood as constituting a quality unto itself, but, again, the point is that this is not a new phenomenon in the history of armed conflict; only the potential destructive scale of modern WMD in the hands of PVMs itself is truly unprecedented. For example, the conscious deployment of biological weapons, resulting in mass casualties, has precedents in the later Middle Ages, the Renaissance, and the Early Modern period in Europe and the Americas.

Admittedly, in the centuries prior to the twentieth century, the efficiency of non-conventional warfare and weapons, such as the premeditated spread

of endemic pathogens, was, to cite only one example, nowhere close to the ghastly death toll exacted by mustard gas over the course of the First World War. But, in essence, crudely weaponized pathogens did exist in the past, and they were deployed by a variety of actors. The "political terrorists" of the 1970s and 1980s in the West were also sensitized toward the potential uses of non-conventional weapons; those having shown an interest in chemical and biological weapons include a staggering variety of PVMs, from the Weather Underground and the Rote Armee Fraktion (Red Army Faction, or RAF) to the Covenant, Sword, and Arm of the Lord (or CSA, a paramilitary survivalist group active in the U.S.).

Therefore, the threat of "loose nukes," and the threat posed by other poorly protected non-weaponized but weapons-grade nuclear materials, has been *exacerbated* but not *initiated* by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Equally, more recent apprehensions about the deployment of radiological bombs can be traced to the growing awareness of states – and, hence, sub-state actors – of the crude weapons-potential inherent in low-enriched uranium and spent fuel, and to the knowledge of how inadequately such materials are currently protected against theft.

What does set the PVMs of the twenty-first century apart from their predecessors, I will argue, is not the threatened, or even the effective, use of radiological, biological, or chemical warfare agents. Instead, it is the scale and, more critically, the *scalability*, of conventional and unconventional mass destruction and disruption by PVMs, and how this threatened or actual use of it translates into *psychological leverage*. Put differently (and rather more pertinent to our present times), the combination of the technology to inflict mass casualties measured in the hundreds of thousands, or even in the millions, on the one hand, and the increasing likelihood of the acquisition of the means to bring about such massive destruction of life by sub-state actors on the other constitutes the only evidently innovative aspect in the development of contemporary terrorism.

This last point is especially relevant when juxtaposed with the often-repeated assertion that the objectives of the "New Terrorists" are less clearly delineated than those pursued by their predecessors. In direct contradiction to such a view, the desire and the will to hasten the coming of Armageddon exhibited by some millenarian cults (e.g. Aum Shinriko) in the age of WMD proliferation has over the course of the 1990s been transformed into a very concrete course of action in pursuit of a final objective; it therefore represents an immediate threat. Ultimately, the means and ends of even the most radical PVMs are as clear today as was the case some twenty years ago. But today's PVMs are even more dangerous than their antecedents, precisely because they have *not* changed their values – i.e., their outlook, their motives, and their interpretation of their religious, political, and social environments – in relevant ways.

If we accept the proposed criticism made so far vis-à-vis the concep-

tion of the "New Terrorism," it may at first glance appear as if only the perpetrators' "tools of the trade" have undergone change – their arsenal having grown from automatic rifles, explosives, and grenades to weapons of mass destruction and conventional heavy military-grade equipment – while the terrorists themselves have remained the same.[6] Admittedly, in some instances, terrorist target selection has become bolder in the last few years, as was evidenced by the incidents of September 11, 2001. In other cases, their objectives have become more ambitious, such as the acceleration of Armageddon. These tendencies can both be at least partially explained by the circumstance that the potential to inflict a higher quantity of casualties also gives groups more leverage to realize their respective demands, or to achieve their objectives in the face of, and despite, overwhelming incumbent military superiority, as exemplified by the United States' conventional military forces.

Hence, it is a potentially costly misconception to assume that PVMs themselves are fundamentally different, that they have substantially revised their psychological make-up and reshaped their motivational landscape, or even to question the fact that they do remain organized in groups (albeit more or less immediately subject to central control), all because of the accessibility of weapons of mass destruction following the end of the Cold War and the recrudescence of religious fervor after 1979. This analysis holds true, if only because the PVMs of our own day and age remain subject to the constraints imposed by the bounds of their own rationality, whatever they may be. That a rational system of thought – including highly idiosyncratic, radical variants thereof – is also subject to change over time is not disputed here, nor is it denied that PVM decision-making processes and factors did very likely undergo some change under the influence of more readily available weapons of mass destruction.

Conversely, PVMs are indubitably products of their own environment. It follows that they are not alien to the reality we share with them, and that their reasoning is therefore also not beyond comprehension. The PVM perception of reality represents a valuable inferential basis for actor-centered analysis. While calling terrorists and their organizations "new" or irrational will not make them go away or attenuate the threat they represent, the challenge rests in second-guessing them on their own intellectual turf. This is a feasible course of action, but only if we commit resources to qualitative research with a view to achieving some measure of understanding of what makes them tick – of investigating what Martha Crenshaw referred to as an "autonomous logic that is comprehensible, however unconventional."[7] And if PVMs' motives, objectives, and *modi*

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[6] *The exclusion of scalable weapons of mass disruption, such as electronic attacks on computer networks, various types of information operations, and high-energy pulse, blast, or focal weapons, is intentional.*

[7] *Martha Crenshaw, "The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21st Century," 410; Jean-Francois Meyer, "Cults, Violence and Religious Terrorism: An International Perspective,"* Studies in Conflict and Terrorism *24 (2001): 372.*

operandi can be fathomed, then they can be defeated.

In the light of the centuries-old historical record covering both insurgent and incumbent use of terrorist tactics, the distinction between the older terrorism and the "New Terrorism" is artificial at best, and the conception itself is rendered tautological and quite probably otiose. On the one hand, this is because the differentiation it seeks to create is a matter of perspective, and in some cases, as has been pointed out previously, may serve as a definitional "Trojan Horse" to an instrumental set of values advocated by insurgents or incumbents. It is therefore potentially interest-driven, and hence not beyond suspicion. On the other hand, if we scrutinize some of the key arguments quoted in support of the "New Terrorist" thesis – i.e. the absence of clearly identifiable groups among new actors on the international stage, unclear or new motives, diffuse objectives, and a high frequency of greater lethality in recent attacks – then the attempted differentiation from earlier variants of terrorism is also not convincing on the basis of the evidence.

Aside from its evocative force, the "New Terrorism" concept does not offer any added value to the way we think about terrorism. Moreover, the circumstances that gave rise to the concept are problematic. The issue of vested interests as a driving force behind the formulation of the "New Terrorism" paradigm has also been addressed by the late Ehud Sprinzak, who bluntly contended that "the threat of superterrorism is likely to make a few defense contractors very rich and a larger number of specialists moderately rich as well as famous." To Sprinzak, "the debate [on the "New Terrorism"] boils down to money."[8]

II. The Double-Edged Nature of Impact Scalability and the Dynamic of Reciprocal Threat Perception

As shown in the preceding pages while reflecting upon the motives, objectives, organizations, and means of PVMs in the past, nothing really is *intrinsically* new about the "New Terrorism" paradigm – excepting the *consensus* among experts in the field of terrorism research that weapons of mass destruction in our day and age are more likely to be deployed by sub-state actors than in the past. Even so, the question of whether such a perspective is a mass media-driven figment of public imagination that suits certain vested political interests that have their own budgetary agendas would almost certainly further dilute the above outlined paradigmatic project and the expert consensus on the PVM-WMD threat to a merely conjectural supposition. Again, the expert assessment prevails, because weapons of mass destruction certainly *appear* to have become increasingly accessible in the post-Cold War period. On this issue, Morten Bremer Maerli asserts that "the overwhelming majority of incidents … do not reflect any significant escalation of the mass destruction threat, but rather a

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[8] *Ehud Sprinzak, "The Great Superterrorism Scare," Foreign Policy (Fall 1998): 6, 7; version cited at* www.findarticles.com/cf_0/m1181/1998_Fall/56021078/print.jhtml

growing interest in non-conventional weaponry among politically and religiously motivated groups and individuals."[9]

This is not to say that there is no substance to the fears expressed by theorists of the "New Terrorism." Even if the interest of such groups has not yet been successfully acted upon with respect to modern WMD, the threat remains. This is true in spite of massive counter-proliferation endeavors, such as the Nunn-Lugar Act, passed in the United States Congress in 1991, and due to the fact that PVMs might consider the use of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons an acceptable, or even an attractive and "prestigious" means to an end, especially in the shape of a credible threat or deterrent vis-à-vis a more potent opponent. Indeed, in the wake of the Cold War, apprehensions concerning PVM acquisition of modern WMD are not without substance. While the most recent Gulf War was fought with the objective of stripping Iraq of its alleged WMD capabilities, apprehensions are rising amid controversial reports of the successful acquisition of weaponized chemical warfare agents produced in Iraq by Al-Qaeda via Usbat-al Ansar, an affiliated Lebanese Sunni PVM.

This threat appraisal deriving from the "New Terrorism" paradigm is probably somewhat accurate, albeit with a single exception and corollary to the argument concerning weapons of mass casualty developed in this essay, and in the context of the wider debate on terrorism: PVMs' awareness of a newfound, potentially unfettered capability to size the scale of the impact of their attacks. To date, the currently feasible trinity of the convergent *will*, *ability,* and *capability* of PVMs to inflict mass casualties, bring about the destruction of entire urban areas, and occasion immeasurable trauma in the public psyche on a scale hitherto only conceivable in an armed conflict beyond the threshold of interstate war, has no parallel. Indeed, this condition constitutes a significant historical singularity. In the near future (for which the present is somewhat indicative), PVMs' capability of almost limitless "*impact scalability*" will be, and is already taking shape as, the single most important contributing factor to a radical transformation of terrorism, and indeed of warfare in general. It will give new meaning to the notion of "strategic asymmetry."

In order to better envision this idea, imagine a band of radical militants successfully forcing the most powerful nation on the planet to its knees by threatening to deploy a substantial nuclear, chemical, or biological in the wake of a number of successful minor attacks with WMD that cause mass casualties. If anything, it is this "impact scalability" at the beck and call of terrorist actors that would, and to some extent already does, make PVMs more dangerous now than ever before. Impact scalability expands the spectrum of terrorist tactics' asymmetric property in that it allows PVMs to calibrate even attacks carried out using WMD according to their requirements.

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[9] *Morten Bremer Maerli, "Relearning the ABCs: Terrorists and "Weapons of Mass Destruction,'"* Nonproliferation Review *(Summer 2000): 110 (italics mine). On this issue in regard to chemical and biological weapons, see note 17 below.*

But while the issues concerning the means – finances, logistics, weapons, etc. – have been discussed at large in the debates on the "New Terrorism" and nonproliferation, the multiple non-material factors, such as the specifics of background, environment, and other idiosyncrasies that inform the motives and the perceived reality, as well as the resulting political and strategic priorities, of PVMs currently summoning up the will to deploy weapons of mass destruction, have not yet been exhaustively investigated. And although some have ventured into this *terra incognita* of the violent PVM mindset, a not insignificant development responsible for the shaping of the terrorism risk perception has been largely neglected: the *dynamic of reciprocal threat perception* between perpetrators and victims of PVM mass casualty attacks.

The nature of the relationship between the waxing willingness of PVMs to use conventional or non-conventional mass casualty weapons and the fearful expectation of ever more destructive mass casualty attacks involving WMD, engendered by the mass media-induced "superterrorism scare" (to borrow Ehud Sprinzak's wording) in the broader public, is what makes today's PVMs more dangerous than before. The reason for this, I would argue, is banal. In an age in which the specter of "superterrorism" reigns supreme and has successfully undermined governmental and public confidence in the past decade, most PVMs very likely are under increasing pressure to reinforce the popular nightmare of mass casualty terrorism that is the obsession of Western governments, their allies, and the mass media alike.

This absurd situation prevails precisely because, in a bizarre way, the power to immobilize a powerful state by threatening to use mass casualty weapons is not only a critical asset to PVMs, but has also been at the center of public expectation for at least a decade, and is considered even more probable today. And the reservoir of public expectation/apprehension continues to grow. This condition insidiously correlates with the rising pressure on PVMs to deploy mass casualty weapons in order "comply" with public apprehensions and thus to *maintain their own credibility* vis-à-vis their audience. Conversely, PVMs are also subject to pressures building due to the opportunity presented to them by, and resulting from the impact of, the dynamic of reciprocal threat perception.

In summary, because PVMs themselves have not fundamentally changed in terms of their motives and objectives, the question of whether terrorism is more dangerous today or not has very little to do with the body of analyses that gave birth to the conception and recent rendition of the so-called New Terrorism. Instead, this critical query is intricately linked with the interdependent problems of the long-term failure of nonproliferation; the consequent increased probability that weapons of mass destruction will sooner or later come within reach of terrorist actors; the concomitant new development of PVMs adjusting their strategy and objectives to include the augmented "impact scalability" of unconventional means at their disposal; and the perceived threat

that they represent, as well as the general sense of insecurity this situation fosters. Most importantly, the danger of mass casualty terrorism in the present has become more tangible and acute because of the resulting "reciprocal dynamic of threat perception." In contrast to the mere hypothetical threat, as it is perceived by expert participants integral to this process, I propose that it is the "reciprocal dynamic of threat perception" which acts as the principal structural catalyst in the triggering of mass casualty terrorist attacks with conventional or unconventional weapons.

Considering the discussion so far, it would probably be more productive and sensible to refer to a recrudescence, or reanimation, of earlier types of terrorism-users (e.g., the Zealot Sicarii referred to earlier in this essay, or the Islamic sect of Assassins, who centuries ago instrumentalized premeditated, systematic murder as a means of terrorizing their enemies and of cowing their opponents into submission, even at the cost of their own lives, not unlike their modern Middle Eastern counterparts) than to portentously proclaim the advent of the "New Terrorism." The bottom line is that certain simply do not change all that much. Perpetrators still intend to generate fear by using terrorist tactics. Whether the goal is the aggravation of fear among the few or among the many is a completely different issue, one that effectively has always been constrained by the means at the actors' disposal. Only to a lesser degree has the use of terrorism been dependent upon grand strategy and optimistic operational planning. The reason for this is that PVM arsenals have hitherto proved no match for those at the disposal of their opponents.

With the advent and recent exacerbation of WMD proliferation, terrorism's fortunes may have undergone an advantageous reversal; the very circumstance of unconventional weapons accessibility could be responsible for such a development, but certainly not to the exclusion of other reasons. Now that maximum firepower in the broadest sense is no longer out of reach, motive, as opposed to hardware, may in the future assume *the* determining position in the framing of PVM strategy, and in the decision-making process concerning the deployment of mass casualty weapons.

In other words, it is not exclusively the fact that these weapons have become available that makes contemporary PVMs more dangerous; it is the realization by these movements in the past decade of what they can achieve by credibly threatening their deployment in pursuit of even the most audacious, but highly specific, objectives, such as the destruction of a state's capital, or the end of the world. More critical still is the fact that in order to achieve "WMD credentials," PVMs will almost certainly have to deploy these fearsome weapons as proof of their willingness to use them. Unpredictable "ego-trips," impulsive revenge, competitive "showing-off" – a whole range of unfathomable, diacritic, and spontaneous internal group dynamics and other inter- and intra-PVM motives also enter into this scenario as probable factors in the non-premeditated category.

The glaring asymmetry of impact scalability in the service of PVMs comes to the fore in scenarios in which the effective use of WMD is not even necessary. Because of the widespread fear of the recently perceived mass casualty terrorist threat, PVMs might not have to do their worst in order to achieve their end, always provided that the objective is not the destruction of life on this planet. Bruce Hoffman believes that

> …even the limited terrorist attack involving a chemical, biological, or radiological weapon on a deliberately small scale could therefore have disproportionately enormous consequences, generating unprecedented fear and alarm and thus serve the terrorists' purpose just as well as a larger weapon or more ambitious attack with massive casualties could.[10]

Although Hoffman's observation is highly significant in itself, it does raise some issues. To begin with, such an operational implementation of sophisticated high-tech WMD presupposes considerable expertise on the part of the deploying party, as well as the availability of advanced weapons technology in the field of delivery systems, which is indispensable to controlling the dimensions of an attack. Second, and more pertinent to the present purpose, Hoffman's observation raises the point of reciprocity in the idea of the reciprocal dynamic of threat perception. Not only does the fear of mass casualty terrorism pressure terrorists into complying with the public "standard" or "benchmark" of fear, it also maximizes the effects of the threatened or actual use of a comparatively small radiological, biological, or chemical weapon.

This dangerous dynamic therefore constitutes a development that is beyond anybody's control and threatens to continue of its own volition. Its driving forces – impelling public fears of WMD terrorism and terrorists' appraisal of the largely untouched and highly attractive leverage against governments represented by the mere threat of such weapons' destructive use – are very difficult, if not impossible, to interrupt.

A first step toward countering some of the worst effects of the dynamic of reciprocal threat perception beyond government organizations could be taken by the proactive sensitization of the mass media, and especially the broadcast media, to the destabilizing potential of the dynamic of reciprocal threat perceptions, and the curbing of economic incentives and pressures in the mass media, as well as the reduction of their adverse impact on the manner and quality of reporting among journalists. More controversially, the institution of self-censorship and the imposition of stringent restrictions on irresponsible, sensationalist reporting by leading members of the various media branches in the interest of public safety ought to be evaluated anew.

Impact scalability and the pressures on the perpetrators and victims of

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[10] *Bruce Hoffman, "New Forms of Terrorism and The Threat of Terrorist Use of Chemical, Biological, Nuclear and Radiological Weapons," in* Terrorismus als Weltweites Phänomen*, eds. Kai Hirschmann and Peter Gerhard (Berlin: Berliner Wissenschaftsverlag, 2000), 43.*

terrorism that arise from the self-sustaining dynamic of reciprocal threat perceptions ought to be high-priority issues in the field of contemporary terrorism research. In the light of purported advanced weapons research involving the development of sophisticated and controllable delivery systems for chemical and biological weapons, such as dirigibles and spatially limitable aerosols, and incrementally deployable viruses (infector and trigger viruses), work on the effects of impact scalability of terrorist attacks becomes even more pressing. Atomic weapons research, for example, has culminated in the development of precision low-yield nuclear weapons. Moreover, the proliferation problems resulting from the dissolution of the Soviet Union may here serve as an example of how advanced weapons technology, in the form of its products – the weapons – and its creators – the scientists – have in the meantime become not only accessible but available to sub-state actors. Once out of the control of the government responsible for their development, either by design or by mistake, advanced precision delivery systems would draw to WMD as vehicles to threaten mass casualty terrorism even those PVMs that have hitherto shied away from considering them as an option because of their dependency upon "constituencies." To continue this train of thought, these new users of biological and chemical weapons would likely be those with the most operational experience in applying conventional terrorist tactics and asymmetric warfare: the long-enduring, undefeated nationalist-irredentist and ethnic-separatist groups, such as the IRA or ETA.

Yet still worse is the idea that controllable delivery systems for biological and chemical weapons in the hands of PVMs would *lower* the threshold to use weapons of mass destruction in fulfillment of the "proof of concept" criteria that a terrorist group is in possession of an operational unconventional mass casualty weapon; the damage would not be as indiscriminate as with "ordinarily" deployed biological or chemical weapons. If a group actually possessed such a precision delivery system, it follows that the deterrent value represented by the risk of endangering one's own constituents would be considerably diminished.

In evident contrast to established usage in the tradition of top-down policy analysis, the twin concepts of impact scalability and the dynamic of reciprocal threat perception, previously identified as a likely catalyst for the future PVM use of unconventional mass casualty terrorism, strive to approximate the bottom-up nature of asymmetric warfare and are thus intricately linked to the terrorist actors as the *terminus a quo* of terrorism. Once the means become available to the WMD perpetrator, knowledge of his psychological individual or group profile – of the way his mind works – will become the most powerful asset in the service of those forces opposing him.

This actor-centered approach also differs from a widespread emphasis on the consequences of terrorist acts and the interpretation thereof by the mass media, or representations of PVM attacks generated in the broader context of the public discourse on the terrorist threat; it has little patience with the evanes-

cent, faceless threat encountered on the policy level. After all, just how much of Al-Qaeda has really been authored by Osama Bin Laden, Muhammed Atef, and Ayman al Zawahiri (all members of Al-Qaeda's guiding *shura* council)? And to what extent is the public perception of this organization driven by the absence of a serious antagonist to the West following the cession of Cold War tensions, Western governments' sudden awareness of new vulnerabilities, and incentive-driven reporting by the broadcast media?

III. Understanding Impact Scalability, the Dynamic of Reciprocal Threat Perception, and their Strategic Implications: The Case for an Actor-Centered Approach to Terrorism Research

I want to close this essay with a few thoughts on the manner in which we conduct research on, and how it affects our perception of, PVMs and terrorism. In an era of possible, even probable, deployment of weapons of mass destruction, the impact of which is in some manner controllable and at the disposal of sub-state actors with known terrorist track records, a stringent appraisal of the PVMs that are potential perpetrators of conventional and, especially, unconventional mass casualty attacks, is vital.

The urgency of the problem in the near future may increase dramatically, because of the impending revolution in military affairs with respect to dirigible and spatially limitable delivery systems for non-atomic weapons of mass destruction. If we consider strategic scenarios for contemporary states' foreign and security policy, one possibility that never leaves the detachedly paranoid imagination of the defense analyst is that of the sub-state actor armed with WMD provoking an international crisis by taking the offensive against a state with a scaled, surgical attack with unconventional WMD possibly on behalf, and with the clandestine support, of another state. The likely consequence of such an event is a minor to major destabilization or even disruption of the global strategic security environment.

The potential capability of PVMs to calibrate the impact of a radiological, biological, or chemical attack exacerbates this situation. It would mean that perpetrators of future terrorist acts could scale an attack to their utmost advantage in a precisely calculated way in order to provoke desired responses from states, to cow governments, and to surgically stimulate, aggravate, and exploit panic among the population.[11] The impact scalability of unconventional weapons further refined by the revolution in the field of delivery systems, once their proliferation had begun, would put a powerful "surgical" weapon within reach of PVMs around the globe that is readily translatable into considerable

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[11] *I have excepted radiological dispersion devices from the list because they are weapons of mass disruption rather than weapons of mass destruction and cannot be surgically applied by definition. This is not to suggest that they could not be instrumentalized at all in such a scenario; their value to the perpetrators could be that of a positively scaled impact. Cf. Michael A. Levi and Henry C. Kelly, "Weapons of Mass Disruption,"* Scientific American *(November 2002): 59–63.*

political capital and military leverage, since the likely opprobrium attaching to PVMs as a result of indiscriminate destruction caused by the use of WMD systems of the Cold War era and the more recent radiological dispersion devices would in such a case no longer apply in the way of a self-deterrent. PVMs that could even in a limited way influence the dynamic of reciprocal threat perception to their benefit – both public fears and the disposition of their members to deploy WMD – through the credible employment of impact scalability, would be in a position to dictate their terms to any government in the world.

The threat posed by PVMs willing to use WMD is probably even greater now and is, of course, not exclusively subject to influence by improvements in technology and delivery systems. For today, the disciplining force of the bipolar system, the oppressive awareness and brooding reality of nuclear holocaust lurking around the corner, the "red telephone" fail-safe mechanisms established following the Cuban missile crisis during the Cold War, are no more. Due to the weight currently attached to the threat scenario in private, public, and government circles of sub-state actors seeking to acquire WMD, the actual threat itself may well become a self-fulfilling prophecy according to the dictates of the dynamic of reciprocal threat perception. The more we achieve or manufacture consensus on being afraid of PVMs possibly deploying WMD – discriminately or indiscriminately – and the more we discuss and disseminate knowledge about this issue in the public domain and the corridors of power, the more we become accessories in the creation of the multilaterally perceived "merit" of the psychological potential of a weapon that can panic entire populations and hold to ransom governments; the more attractive we make the WMD option for terrorists; and the more likely the prospect of an PVM attack involving WMD becomes.

Therefore, an analysis of which PVMs are noted for a predisposition toward the use of unconventional weapons, and which are less inclined to use them, is a prerequisite for the establishment of priorities in the combating of terrorism and must serve as a road map for future policy-making in the area of national and multilateral counter-terrorism programs. Evidently, if we wish to pinpoint potential perpetrators of terrorist attacks involving WMD, there is no way around actor-centered analysis. This is especially relevant if we accept that the kind of intelligence and threat analysis that helps establish the identity of potential WMD terrorist perpetrators in the present is also critical to the overall effort of thwarting unconventional mass casualty attacks in the future.[12]

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[12] *Jean Pascal Zanders, "Assessing the Risk of Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation to Terrorists,"* Nonproliferation Review *(Fall 1999): 26, 30. Although clearly lacking actor-centered analysis as a focus in his investigation, Zanders does review the "social environment and norms" of a PVM, but focuses on the "assimilation model for studying the demand side of the proliferation process in states." States and sub-state actors usually have different priorities, and models generally disregard exceptions to the rule. Both implicit assumptions – that state and sub-state actors are comparable in relation to PVM use of WMD, and that PVM behavior per se can be modeled – ignore the established diacritic nature of PVMs at the peril of voiding their very premises. PVMs tend to be unpredictable and hence exceptions to most rules.*

Conversely, generalizing the terrorist threat by abstracting it or quantifying data on PVMs invites the likelihood of an exponential trajectory of analytical error. The nomenclature of the generalization of terrorism in the form of sweeping, impersonal categories is symptomatic of its reductionist mindset (e.g., "the global terrorist network," "Middle Eastern terrorism," terrorism as a national-level *risk*, as opposed to a documented *threat* etc.). This reductionism, in turn, constitutes an invitation to deterministic thought; and determinism, by virtue of its model-like, teleological nature, is frequently quite removed from the nuts and bolts of reality.

Too often we are removed from the field of violence. We need to interact with those who are violent. The best research on small-group political violence is undertaken by researchers who, on some level, interact with the people being researched. Sampling is important. With every research method there is the possibility that respondents will tailor what they say to the expectations of the interviewer, for any number of reasons. Immersion in the research field and regular interaction with activists often allows one to overcome problems that plague the journalist, as well as the one-shot survey approach.[13]

It is evident that the consequences deriving from an analytical mistake caused by the exclusion of the evident idiosyncratic psychological backdrop of PVM use of terrorist tactics and the diacritic property of PVM decision-making, including the situational specificity of implementing impact scalability, could be catastrophic well beyond the benchmark of destruction established on September 11. And it is important to be clear about one thing: all attacks carried out on September 11 bear the imprint of the traditional, and not the "New," terrorism. In terms of the psychological impact and the economic disruption, but not necessarily the volume of casualties caused, September 11 will almost certainly be overshadowed by a PVM attack with unconventional weapons of mass destruction. The next attack is virtually guaranteed.[14]

On a fundamental level, the ability to learn how to think the way that terrorists do is the key to any sensible analysis of the terrorist threat. There are no objective indicators in aid of an assessment of the terrorist threat. *Ex post facto* examples too numerous to be listed here illustrate the preeminence of nonlinear and non-quantifiable determinants in the decision-making processes of PVMs. Likewise, the accuracy of prognostication is dependent upon the specificity, and not any presumed objective character, of intelligence and its contextualist interpretation, which in turn rests upon a solid understanding of the subjective reality of the actors.

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[13] *Robert W. White, "Issues in the Study of Political Violence: Understanding the Motives of Participants in Small Group Political Violence,"* Terrorism and Political Violence *12:1 (Spring 2000): 100-101.*

[14] *I understand that this assessment cannot escape being integral to the process of the dynamic of reciprocal threat perception as well too, but feels that tabling the issues addressed in this work outweighs other considerations.*

The rationale behind the use of terrorism is conditioned by a multiplicity of influences, some of which are likely not to be factored in by analysts due to insufficient information or understanding. Where the determinism germane to game theory and rational choice models will almost certainly fail to adequately capture the nature of a specific PVM phenomenon, the situational experience of role-playing and other scenario techniques still has a chance to produce insight, capture unpredictable behavior, and open up new perspectives.

An understanding of the PVM mindset is the best source for inferential analysis, which is especially important and practicable, for example, in the devising of guidelines for protective measures and countermeasures. This approach promises to produce the best clues about PVM decision-making processes and the mechanisms at work in the formation of objectives. C. J. M. Drake points to the significance of understanding this key lesson of PVM analysis:

> A group's ideology is extremely important in determining target selection. It defines how the groups' members see the world around them. Events and the actions of various people – both potential targets and other actors – are interpreted in terms of the terrorists' cause… When a group takes the decision to use violence, an early step is to determine who or what will be attacked. The ideology of a terrorist group identifies the 'enemies' of the group by providing a measure against which to assess the 'goodness' or 'badness', 'innocence' or 'guilt' of people and institutions.[15]

One lesson of the attacks of September 11 is the need to move away from making assumptions about PVMs according to the dictates of the policy of the day, or on the basis of statistical evidence (that is of questionable value) on an issue that is intrinsically non-quantifiable. Countermeasures ought to follow understanding established by *qualitative*, as opposed to *quantitative*, research, and thus emphasize detailed actor-centered analysis. Terrorism is a "people business," period. In its most pronounced form, the argument raised here is to the academic sector what the increasingly urgent call for the augmentation of human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities is to the world of secret services.

Frequently, government organizations remain unreformed, despite the self-evident fact that a more successful counter-terrorism policy is to a large extent predicated upon realizing the critical need to master the analytical challenges as determined by an hitherto underrated qualitative research. Reform also hinges upon a sensitization to the inherently questionable value of abstracted risk analyses, and an appreciation of the dangerous margins of error created due to their approximate nature in their role as determinants in the policy-formation processes.

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[15] *C. J. M Drake*, Terrorists' Target Selection *(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), 23*.

We should first know who (actors, motives, and objectives) and what (organizations and capabilities) we are dealing with before jumping to conclusions, comparing and referencing fragments of information with a known, but possibly inapplicable, body of knowledge and committing resources to protect and counteract on that basis. Here introduced by way of a consultative theme, albeit sotto voce, is the warning not to make any assumptions about PVMs based on abstractions of terrorism. This is especially important, since such assumptions may enter governmental decision-making processes conducted by people with no, or only little, experience with terrorism, which in turn may translate into policy directives, gargantuan fiscal commitments, and superfluous exertions – and likely in the wrong places at the wrong time.

A case illustrative of government spending on the basis of originally quite pragmatic renditions of a perceived endemic terrorist threat that somewhere along the line became quite generalized and abstracted is that of the United States' sudden concern with its critical infrastructures. Massive government funds are being mobilized on behalf of Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) programs, which have been enacted on the legal basis of the Clinton Administration's Presidential Decision Directive Number 63 (PDD-63), signed in May 1998.

The U.S. federal government is presently confronted with the challenge of having to "minimize, with a limited amount of resources, the expected impact on the nation's critical infrastructure of any future terrorist attack."[16] In spite of the wide scope of identified critical infrastructures to be protected, the U.S. government's inquiry has noted that "there will be a need to prioritize effort, to allocate limited resources in a way that can minimize the impact of any future terrorist attacks on the nation's infrastructure…"[17] A report to Congress in August 2002 distinguished three criteria for determining allocation of federal funds in the spirit of PDD-63:

- Lack of redundancy, criticality of service provided, and robustness of a critical infrastructure;
- Cross-cutting vulnerabilities and potential solutions in infrastructures;
- Identification and determination of the quality of interdependencies between infrastructures.

About the last criteria, the authors of the report wrote: "Identifying and focusing on those assets that connect one infrastructure to another may be a cost-effective way to reduce the overall impact of an attack."[18] The irony of such a view is that, sensible though it may be with respect to cost-benefit arguments,

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[16] *John Moteff, Claudia Copeland, and John Fischer, "Critical Infrastructures: What Makes an Infrastructure Critical?"* Report for Congress by the Congressional Research Service *(Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 30 August 2002), 12.*

[17] *Ibid., 11–12.*

[18] *Ibid., p. 12.*

it implicitly *assumes* that PVMs will also recognize and identify the *same* inter-dependent infrastructures as priority targets. An error in this assessment would potentially offset any gain – financial and otherwise – in security to critical infrastructures. Significantly, the criteria established by the authors of the reports tasked with measuring the exposure and vulnerability of critical infra-structures exclude the one determining factor that could possibly allow them to assess the actual threat level and, hence, determine the degree and particular means of protection required: the terrorist actor.

A major problem with assessing vulnerabilities is that they seem to proliferate the closer one looks; threats, though dynamic and amorphous, are not as prone to spontaneously reproduce. While the definition of the former is an arbitrary exercise of questionable value whose only test is a terrorist attack, the analysis of latter constitutes a feasible enterprise with a considerable likeli-hood of situational gains and the possibility of supporting proactive intervention efforts (counter-terrorist operations).

Assessing exposure and vulnerability to terrorist attack without con-sidering the origin of the threat – i.e. the actor – is hence at best a questionable pursuit, costly to the taxpayer. A couple of years prior to the publication of this Congressional report, an expert statement to the House of Representatives' Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations expounded in no uncertain terms:

> Making decisions without commonly agreed upon threat and risk assess-ment carries the chance that important resource allocation decisions will be based on current beliefs and not on a well-grounded understanding of the problem at hand. The apparent over-reliance on worst-case scenarios shaped primarily by vulnerability assessment rather than an assessment that factors in the technical complexities, *motivations of terrorists and their patterns of behavior* seems to be precisely the sort of approach we should avoid.[19]

When reading John Parachini's critical statement, briefly reflect upon the point raised by Martha Crenshaw about how terrorism research may be event-driven and ponder Ehud Sprinzak's skeptical remarks about the "great superterrorism scare."[20] Can we, therefore, allow "current beliefs" to exacerbate an "event-driven" approach to terrorism research that, in turn, opens up the possibility of an exponential trajectory of analytical error? Can we afford to finance the pro-tection of all identifiable critical infrastructures against all and sundry, more or less probable, threats emanating from PVMs? Finally, can we allow ourselves

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[19] *Statement of John V. Parachini, Senior Associate, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, before the House Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, in* Combating Terrorism: Assessing the Threat *(20 October 1999), 9 (italics mine). The full text of the statement is available at the website of the Federation of American Scientists:* http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1999_hr/991020-test2.htm.

[20] *Crenshaw, "Psychology of Terrorism," 21; Ehud Sprinzak, "Great Superterrorism Scare," 33.*

to exclude the actor as the central piece of any threat analysis?

The unqualified answer to all these rhetorical questions is a resounding No. In the sense that it has less "ground" to cover than vulnerability and exposure analysis, actor-centered analysis is probably more efficient in the CIP context because it is geared toward the identification of the source of the threat. Common sense suggests that any CIP response must be calibrated in proportion to the effective PVM threat and relative to its target selection criteria. Defending critical infrastructures against all known factors contributing to its vulnerability renders the task of creating adequate protection virtually impossible, and thereby opens up previously nonexistent vulnerabilities. Seen this way, vulnerability analysis-based critical infrastructure protection may be instrumental in creating new vulnerabilities.

Also consider Parachini's remark on worst-case scenarios derived from vulnerability assessments as a benchmark for protective measures, and juxtapose it with the conception of impact scalability. PVMs might just succeed at destroying or impairing critical infrastructures because they decide *not* to play along with the CIP scenario "scriptwriter," who derived his or her assessment from a "vulnerability perspective," but instead "undercut" the expected intensity of an attack by selecting an atypical, hard target and attacking it with cutting-edge conventional means. Imagine that the critical infrastructure involved is a military installation, for example a silo housing mirved intercontinental ballistic missiles, or an unfathomable symbolic target with meaning to the actor that is not apparent to the defender.

On the general level, the overall objective of methodological advances in the study of terrorism will eventually have to be a consolidation of analytical methods and practices – a convergence of risk analysis and intelligence analysis. Actor-centered analysis, however, must become central to both, for if we desire to both understand the threat and extrapolate the risks emanating from PVMs, we are compelled to understand their idiosyncratic "logic," which is inarguably the inferential basis relative to their practices, objectives, and motives.

In pursuit of this task, we do not have to reinvent the wheel, and we may take recourse to the existing methodological wealth: from intelligence analysis practices, such as the Analysis of Competing Hypotheses, to micro-historical approaches, to case studies, to Behavioral Evidence Analysis in the field of criminal investigative psychology. Because any profile of a PVM hinges upon the perspective (i.e., threat perception) we adopt, we must be careful not to portray static images, but rather endeavor to create dynamic motion pictures sustained by a multi-disciplinary feed from monitoring activities in the field and insight gained in the study. Permitting ourselves to better understand the context within which, and out of which, PVMs operate constitutes our best hope of interdicting future attack and damaging PVMs' personnel base and their capabilities. Learning how the authors of terrorism think and make decisions is our best line of defense against the potentially more potent terrorism of the future.

Emotions, Poverty, or Politics? Misconceptions about Islamist Movements

By Anne Marie Baylouny[*]

In recent years violent movements in the name of Islam have been catapulted to center stage in U.S. foreign policy concerns. However, before concrete strategies can be formulated to deal with this phenomenon, the nature and dynamics of Islamist mobilization itself must be understood.[1] What motivates an individual to join an Islamist group and possibly engage in violence? Under what conditions will these groups moderate their stances, and when will they radicalize? While our policy choices dealing with the Muslim world and international terrorism inevitably hinge on our answers to these questions, a serious application of theory has been lacking.[2]

Lessons culled from the study of contentious or claim-making politics provide valuable insight into unraveling the complicated political allegiances in the Muslim world and further contribute to the formulation of policy prescriptions to defuse Islamist movements' violent manifestations**.** Social movement theory in particular demonstrates that local political inclusion can stimulate moderation, stemming the progression of militant Islamism in its infancy.

Theoretical Explanations and Inadequacies

Analyses of the roots of Islamism have typically been based upon emotions, economic desperation, or cultural anger. By this line of reasoning, poverty, rejection of Western culture, or lack of hope for the future spur involvement in groups that aim, either through the creation of an Islamic state or isolation from the global community, to return the Muslim world to a past state of glory. Some link Islamism with poverty and deprivation. Others, including Islamists themselves, reiterate Samuel Huntington's claim that the West is culturally opposed to the rest of the world. Under these theories, policies to decrease Islamism's appeal would thus center on either economic growth or cultural separation; the rest of the world should work to either increase living standards in Muslim nations or relax their pace of integration into the international economy.

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[1] The term "Islamism" or "political Islam" is preferable to "Islamic fundamentalism," since the term fundamentalism is derived from the Protestant Christian context and only loosely fits the movement in Islam.

[2] Middle East and Islamic specialists are often area-bound, remaining uninfluenced by social science's extensive research into oppositional politics and unwittingly operating with discredited theoretical frameworks. Theory-oriented scholars for their part generally steer clear of Islamism, perhaps out of a belief in the area's presumed cultural exceptionalism, or due to its admittedly complicated particulars.

Appealing as those objectives may be to many, the data on Islamism, and on oppositional movements in general, indicate that the equation of economic or cultural distress with Islamism is misplaced, or at the very least incomplete.

Islamism, according to these psychologically- and economic-based explanations, is the result of an explosion of pent-up grievances,[3] the last resort of a person "fed up" and gone crazy.[4] While it makes intuitive sense, this theory does not fit the reality. Varying economic circumstances across regions and time periods do not match the occurrence of rebellions and protest movements, as many scholars have shown.[5] In fact, economic grievances abound throughout history, yet movements based on them have been rare. When is a grievance bad enough to start a movement? And why do starving populations often not rebel, while their well-off neighbors do? Iran's Islamist revolution occurred in a context of economic plenty, and an analysis of Muslim countries demonstrates the lack of fit between this theory and the actual history of Islamist actions.[6]

The social background of individual movement members further demonstrates the fallacy of such ideas. Islamist activists are neither economically deprived nor culturally traditional. They are neither loners nor marginal individuals searching for meaning and belonging, persons unable to get along in modern society. Instead, Islamists come from the most technically advanced sectors of society, often students or graduates of engineering and the technical sciences. Islamist activists are well rooted in their communities and have extensive personal networks, parallel to nationalistic terrorists in other regions of the world.[7] The September 11 terrorists, along with suicide bombers in the Palestinian territories, are a testament to this profile.[8] A survey of Hizballah adherents found that, despite its rhetoric, the party was not in fact the representative of the lower class; rather, the bulk of its support came from the middle and upper classes.[9]

Focusing on religion or religiosity to identify Islamists is similarly misguided. Religiosity and involvement in political Islam are not directly correlat-

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[3] This is the relative deprivation thesis of rebellion, pioneered by Ted Robert Gurr in *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970).

[4] A student aptly compared this theory to the Michael Douglas movie, *Falling Down*.

[5] See Mohammed M. Hafez, *Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003); Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Charles Tilly, *Popular Contention in Great Britain, 1758–1834* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995); and Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978).

[6] Hafez, *Why Muslims Rebel.*

[7] See Peter Waldmann, "Ethnic and Socaievolutionary Terrorism: A Comparison of Structures," 237–57, and Donatella Della Porta. "Introduction: On Individual Motivations in Underground Political Organizations," 3–28, both in *Social Movements and Violence: Participation in Underground Organizations*, ed. Donatella Della Porta (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1992).

[8] On the latter, see Lori Allen, "There Are Many Reasons Why: Suicide Bombers and Martyrs in Palestine," *Middle East Report* 223 (Summer 2002): 34–37.

[9] Judith Palmer Harik, "Between Islam and the System: Sources and Implications of Popular Support for Lebanon's Hizballah," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40:1 (March 1996): 55.

ed; Islamists and their supporters are not more religious than non-Islamists. Similarly, the level of support for Islamist movements diverges sharply from the level of popular acceptance of their goals – particularly the establishment of an Islamic state. In Lebanon, the overwhelming majority of Hizballah adherents, along with most Shi'ites in general, prefer a Western political system (modeled on Switzerland or the United States), not a theocratic one. Discrepancies exist between the percentage of people who voted for Hizballah and those who chose it as their favored political party, with lower ratings for the latter – indicating the practice of strategic voting instead of widespread belief in the movement itself. Hizballah members are not significantly more religious than the adherents of secular political parties. In fact, a significant number of the highly religious declared themselves opposed to the establishment of Islamic political parties.[10] Surveys in the West Bank and Gaza found similar opinions. Overall, less than three percent of Palestinians in the territories desired an Islamic state, while almost twenty-one percent trusted Hamas more than any other political faction.[11]

In fact, culture and economics are only indirectly related to Islamist mobilization for violent and moderate groups alike.[12] Grievances alone do not create a movement. At most, they are but one element that organizers can exploit to aid in organizing. Directly contradicting explanations of Islamism based in economic deprivation is the fact that substantial resources and networks are necessary for movements to organize.[13] Leaders generally come from relatively privileged social groups. Thus, the substance of the movement and its ability to mobilize members are more important than the broad statements about motivations picked up by the Western press. What does it take to attract an initial following and then organize it into a network?

Social Movement Theory and Islamist Responses to Democratic Carrots

Theories of contentious or adversarial politics, of which social movement theory is the most prominent branch, are well situated to address these issues.[14]

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[10] A significant percentage of the highly religious were found to be most distrustful of religious political parties. Harik, "Between Islam and the System," 41–67. Confirming these findings, see Hamzeh's data cited in Augustus Richard Norton, "Religious Resurgence and Political Mobilization of the Shi'a in Lebanon," in *Religious Resurgence and Politics in the Contemporary World*, ed. Emile Sahliyeh (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 229–41.

[11] Interestingly, support for an Islamic state in the West Bank was higher than in the Gaza Strip, the home territory of Hamas. Jerusalem Media and Communication Center, *Public Opinion Poll No. 42: On Palestinian Attitudes Towards Politics Including the Current Intifada – September 2001*, www.jmcc.org/publicpoll/results/2001/no42/htm.

[12] The prevailing typology to date distinguishes between radical (that is, violent or extremist) and moderate movements. This categorization can be based either on the tactics the movement chooses or, more commonly, their stated end goals in relation to the current political system. The moderates work within the system, often concentrating on social welfare or civil society organizations.

[13] John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory," *American Journal of Sociology* 82:6 (May 1977): 1212–41.

Social movement theory has long addressed the questions of terrorism and violent conflict. Through the lens of social movement theory, the conundrum of Islamism, so baffling from other perspectives, becomes clear. Beyond the demonstrations and letter-writing campaigns common to democratic systems, contentious politics span a continuum from riots to revolutions and terrorism.[15] Non-violent movements more typically recognized as social movements are included, but these are rare in authoritarian systems.

Despite the claims of movement adherents, the real motivating grievances of Islamism are local issues. Like other social movements, including the anti-globalization campaign, the concerns that motivate Islamists center on their towns, their states, and their local economies. Islamist movements differ considerably from each other, having been molded by the states they oppose, the resources available to them, their networks, and other specifically local factors. Even within the same state, movements can have radically opposed motivating agendas. Some even compete and attempt to defeat other Islamist movements.[16] Statements by group leaders and Islamist charters should thus be viewed in light of their actions in response to concrete changes. Publicly, Hamas may well adhere to its goal of eradicating Israel, yet its practice has in fact been moderated. What conditions will bring about a truce or, alternatively, a willingness to establish a legitimate political party and participate in democratic elections?[17] As Tilly stated, the "rhetoric of rebellion" does not equate to the actual grievance. Viewing the entirety of movement practices, instead of simply their statements, reveals an alternative logic.[18]

Acknowledging Islamism as a form of oppositional politics indicates that its trajectory is not random, but is instead governed by political considerations and strategic calculations. It can develop into different forms of protest

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[14] For social movement theory, see Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); and by the same authors, "To Map Contentious Politics," *Mobilization* 1:1 (1996): 17–34.

[15] Following Tarrow, contentious politics can be defined as collective activity on the part of claimants that uses extra-institutional channels to communicate their demands. Demands and the activities to achieve them exist in relation to the prevailing political system, members of the elite, or the opposition. Social movements are oppositional challenges, which are sustained continuously beyond the distinct moment of protest. Sidney Tarrow, "Political Protest and Social Change: Analyzing Politics," *American Political Science Review* 90:4 (December 1996): 874–83.

[16] Prominent examples are the various movements in Egypt. Mamoun Fandy, "Egypt's Islamic Group: Regional Revenge?" *Middle East Journal* 48:4 (Autumn 1994): 607–25; Ziad Munson, "Islamic Mobilization: Social Movement Theory and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood," *Sociological Quarterly* 42:4 (2001): 487–510; David Zeidan, "Radical Islam in Egypt: A Comparison of Two Groups," in *Revolutionaries and Reformers: Contemporary Islamist Movements in the Middle East*, ed. Barry Rubin (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003), 11–22.

[17] See Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, "Participation without Presence: Hamas, the Palestinian Authority and the Politics of Negotiated Coexistence," *Middle Eastern Studies* 38:3 (July 2002): 1–26; and Robert A. Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," *American Political Science Review* 97:3 (August 2003): 343–61.

[18] Tilly, *Mobilization to Revolution*, 234.

and organizing, including civil society and social welfare associations, given appropriate and credible incentives. The relevant influences for these movements are the array of political opportunities they face. The key questions for policy makers are, what are the prevailing power relations, how does the group want these relations to change, and what paths to inclusion in the political system are open or blocked? The third question includes splits among elites that movements can exploit, opportunities to partake in electoral politics, and the character of repression by the state.

Exclusion or inclusion from the political system plays a powerful role in radicalizing movements. While fears of "one person, one vote, one time" will remain, the data indicate that, when given the opportunity to participate in politics at the price of moderation, movements will alter their very nature to respond to this stimulus. Hizballah's experience demonstrates this dynamic. Not only has the group moderated its positions in order to enter electoral politics, but it also reframed its central objective, foregoing its stated goal of an Islamic state. Lebanon's substantial Christian population makes this a special case, to which Hizballah must be sensitive in order to avoid renewed conflict.[19] The party formed alliances with Christians and supported Christian candidates in elections. The incentives Hizbullah responded to demonstrate the fundamental logic of the movement, notwithstanding any rhetoric to the contrary.

Democratic theory has long held that participation in the formal political arena moderates political parties. Movements are co-opted, choosing to work within the limits of the system. They hope for change through the political process, rather than the risky option of violent conflict. Furthermore, once leaders or political parties have obtained a vested interest in the system, they will exert pressure upon the more radical wings of their movements not to jeopardize their established position. On the other hand, when the opposition party is illegal, no incentive to moderate exists.

To mobilize continuous support, organizations must provide public demonstrations of the movement's endurance, a sort of advertising or communication with the constituency. Newsletters may work for Greenpeace, but an illegal movement must employ alternative public means to advertise its existence.[20] CNN is perfect for international movements; local news suffices for domestic movements. Violence is one tactic that can be used to glue the movement together, create an identity, and promote group solidarity. Absent viable participation in the political realm, violence also serves the movement function of communicating demands to authorities.[21] When groups are legal, public per-

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[19] See Nizar A. Hamzeh, "Lebanon's Hizbullah: From Islamic Revolution to Parliamentary Accommodation," *Third World Quarterly* 14:2 (1993): 321–37; Muhammad Hussayn Fadlallah, "Interview: Islamic Unity and Political Change," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 25:1 (Autumn 1995): 61–75.

[20] Social movements make collective demands and undertake mobilizing or other public activities that unify the constituency. Charles Tilly, "From Interactions to Outcomes in Social Movements," in *How Social Movements Matter*, ed. Marco Giugni, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 253–70.

formances such as demonstrations can perform this vital role. Legalization provides an alternative, legitimate means to secure organizational survival.

In addition, movements do not merely build upon pre-existing identities or reflect group feelings already in place. Instead, social movements actively fashion new identities, mainly through the technique of framing. Framing is the formulation of ideological schemes akin to slogans that sell the movement to a constituency. Frames must resonate with the population by tapping into existing symbols, while at the same time transforming their cultural meanings. Problems are spun as unjust grievances for which clear blame can be assessed and a solution proposed by the movement. Familiar symbols are used in novel ways, much in the way that liberation theology altered Christianity by reframing poverty, once accepted as an act of God, as a social issue of fundamental injustice.

Religion plays a key role in Islamist movements, but not due to doctrinal specifics or the religiosity of Islamists. The practice of Islam within Islamist movements has been shown to be malleable, adopting aspects of nationalism and leftist or Leninist mobilization often deemed antithetical to the religious doctrine itself. [22] Religious movements have distinct advantages in authoritarian contexts. Islam provides a frame for solidarity, particularly when other organizing is forbidden. Not only can religious movements monopolize the organizing field, due to frequently harsh restrictions on mobilizing, but religion also provides symbols of justice extending beyond the individual's rational cost-benefit calculus.[23] In non-democratic environments, symbolic protest – the veil, the *kaffiyeh*, the colors of the flag, or vague slogans such as "Islam is the solution" – dominates political communication. The resources and networks requisite to mobilizing support, integral to social movement success, are also found in religion's institutional legacy and its charitable activities. In most of the Middle East, Islamist movements had been promoted by the state in previous decades as a counter to the left, a harvest whose fruit the region is now reaping.[24] Currently, Islamist charities substitute for the state's bankrupt social welfare institutions.

The democratic process itself may well be central to removing the

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[21] Violence may be unrelated to the movement's actual goals, but can serve instead purely to create organizational cohesion. Martha Crenshaw, "Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches," in *Inside Terrorist Organizations*, ed. David C. Rapoport (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2001), 13–31.

[22] Henry Munson, "Islam, Nationalism and Resentment of Foreign Domination," *Middle East Policy* 10:2 (Summer 2003): 40–53; As'ad Abu-Khalil. "Ideology and Practice of Hizballah in Lebanon: Islamicization of Leninist Organizational Principles," *Middle Eastern Studies* 27:3 (July 1991): 390–403.

[23] Ron Aminzade and Elizabeth J. Perry, "The Sacred, Religious, and Secular in Contentious Politics: Blurring Boundaries," in *Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics*, ed. Ronald R. Aminzade, Jack A. Goldstone, Doug McAdam, Elizabeth J. Perry, Jr., William H. Sewell, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 155–78.

[24] Joel Beinin and Joe Stork, "On the Modernity, Historical Specificity, and International Context of Political Islam," in *Political Islam: Essays from Middle East Report*, ed. Joel Beinin and Joe Stork (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 3–25.

impetus for violent tactics in Islamist movements; however, this democracy must be considered fair, authentic, and legitimate within the states in question. The Arab world is rife with countries whose elections display a democratic façade, while substantive violations pervade the process, escaping international criticism. Many more countries use the rhetoric of Islamism to deny civil liberties and basic human rights, fueling precisely the dynamic which drives targeted organizations to use violent tactics in their fight with the opposition. Any policy of encouraging democracy must be uniform, neither barring participants from the democratic process nor canceling elections Algerian-style.

Conclusion

Islamism is one of the most important geopolitical topics today, yet misconceptions about it abound. We lose a great deal by ignoring the knowledge generated through years of study in other parts of the world, data that could aid in correctly identifying what Islamism is, what causes it, when it turns violent, and how best to meet our policy aims regarding it. Movement pragmatism provides an opportunity to craft targeted policies. Disregarding the tendency of Islamist movements to respond to democratic incentives is tantamount to the tunnel vision that led to surprise at the fall of the Soviet Union or the revolution in Iran.

Some individuals and groups may be beyond the pale, immune to the blandishments of democratic politics. But even these hard-line groups originally grew out of local politics, and could have been defused at that level. The "Arab Afghanis," or Arabs who fought in the Afghan war, first earned their stripes in radicalization on the local front. Repressed and unable to operate in their own countries, they emigrated, eventually joining international groups, which lack a local social base. This process can be halted at the local level by identifying the operative political grievances and opening the political realm to contestation. For Islamist leaders to become political players, they must expand their constituency and be accountable to it. Given the disjuncture between the populace's goals and those of Islamist elites, moderation would most likely result.

Future Trends in Worldwide Maritime Terrorism

By Joshua Sinai[*]

Today, all the warning signs indicate the highest states of alert for terrorist attacks against the maritime sector worldwide. Al-Qaeda and its allies are thought to pose the greatest danger to the maritime sector, whether against military or commercial ships of varying sizes navigating the world's waterways, or against ports and related facilities. Ports, in fact, are threatened either as actual targets for attack or as entry points for smuggled weapons, including weapons of mass destruction (WMD). A second potential component of maritime terrorism is for terrorist groups to lease ships and boats to transport weapons from a multiplicity of suppliers to their intended recipients. Finally, there is great concern that a terrorist group, such as Al-Qaeda – which has a global reach, including its own fleet of vessels – possesses the motivation and capability to launch a waterborne WMD operation against American or other ports by detonating a nuclear or radiological dispersal device, thereby threatening the life and economic livelihood of that region.

The United States and its allies – including France – are especially vulnerable to maritime terrorist attacks because of their worldwide overseas presence. Some countries, such as Israel and Sri Lanka, already have a long history of facing maritime terrorist warfare. In many of the world's waterways, states also confront the threat of maritime piracy or the transshipment of illegal narcotics. Although such criminal activities may not be directly related to maritime terrorism, there is the potential of spillover to the terrorist arena because of the increasing linkages and joint efforts between criminal and terrorist organizations.

More than 46,000 vessels and some 4,000 ports make up the world's maritime transport system.[1] Cargo shipping is crucial to the well being of global commerce because, according to a recent OECD report, more than 80 percent of world trade is conducted by sea.[2] However, as noted by this report, much of this maritime infrastructure is "open and flexible – attributes that make it vulnerable to terrorist attacks or misuse…"[3] For these reasons, this sector "can be used to conceal weapons, or provide logistical support for terror organizations. Because ship ownership is easily concealed, the system can also serve as a source of funds for terrorists."[4] Most alarming, a "large and well-coordinated"

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[1] "Maritime Security Measures to Amplify Cost for Shipping," *Transport Security World*, 29 July 2003.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

attack against this sector that is could severely disrupt the entire maritime transportation system, shutting much of it down.[5] In fact, according to a study that simulated a major attack on the U.S. maritime infrastructure, the cost of such an attack could reach $58 billion.[6]

Thus, the threat of maritime terrorism is particularly significant today. Just like ground and aviation terrorist warfare, groups that engage in maritime warfare seek to cause mass casualties and damage the economic welfare and security of their state adversaries.[7] For example, when terrorists belonging to the Egyptian Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (also known as the Islamic Group) attacked cruise ships along the Nile River on four occasions from 1992 to 1994, tourists kept away from Egypt.[8] In the Philippines, when the Abu Sayyaf group attacks cargo vessels or abducts foreigners from a tourist resort (as it did in 2001), it has an impact on the entire country's trade and economy. In Somalia, when militiamen hijack foreign ships sailing off the country's coastline, vessels steer away from that region. The January 1996 seizure of a Turkish passenger ferry by pro-Chechen terrorists exposed the vulnerability to terrorist attack of passenger ferries in the Bosporus, as well as the Aegean and Black Seas astride the straits.[9] The October 2000 suicide bombing of the USS *Cole* by Al-Qaeda operatives in the Yemeni port of Aden, killing seventeen U.S. servicemen; the thwarted plot in June 2002 by Al-Qaeda operatives to bomb American and British warships, as well as commercial oil tankers, in the Gibraltar Strait; and the 6 October 2002 suicide bombing of the French tanker *Limburg* in the Gulf of Aden – all served as stark reminders that the world's military and economic vessels represent "trophy" targets of opportunity to terrorist groups. In response, Western passenger cruise ships avoid sailing to the eastern Mediterranean or other Middle Eastern destinations, which had been extremely popular tourist destinations in past years.

This essay's objective is to present an overview and highlight the latest and future trends in worldwide maritime terrorism. This is important for several reasons. In terms of tactics, just as in the September 11, 2001 exploitation by Al-Qaeda operatives of the "traditional" terrorist tactic of hijacking aircraft to strike at ground targets, maritime security officials need to anticipate a resurgence in terrorist targeting of maritime vessels and related transportation nodes, which used to be popular terrorist targets of opportunity in the 1970s and 1980s. As a result of such trends, today there is widespread concern that innovation by terrorist groups and their sponsors in developing new maritime terrorist tactics

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[5] Ibid.

[6] The simulated maritime terrorist attack scenario was conducted by the Conference Board and Booz Allen Hamilton; ibid.

[7] Rohan Gunaratna, "Trends in Maritime Terrorism: The Sri Lankan Case," *Lanka Outlook*, Autumn 1998.

[8] John Sitilides, "U.S. Strikes Expose Emerging Regional Threats," *The HR-Net Forum [The Washington Monitor],* 28 August 1998.

[9] Ibid.

and weapons will cause increasing destructiveness in terms of human casualties, physical damage, and economic costs against the maritime sector. Such new tactics and weaponry may also become increasingly difficult to detect because of terrorist groups' utilization of stealth vessels and other evasive techniques and technologies. It is hoped that a comprehensive understanding of these new trends will alert all those associated with the critical maritime transportation infrastructure – whether governmental or private, military or commercial – to adopt the necessary defensive and preemptive measures to prevent such attacks from occurring, especially those that might involve weapons of mass destruction.

> This essay is organized into five parts:
> • An overview of the linkages between maritime terrorism and piracy, arms, narcotics, and human smuggling.
> • An examination of terrorist groups with a maritime warfare capability.
> • An overview of regional maritime "hot spots."
> • A partial list of potential maritime terrorist targets, focusing on U.S. maritime assets.
> • An assessment of future maritime terrorist trends.

The concluding section summarizes some of the new trends in maritime terrorism that require situational awareness and prevention.

I. Linkages Between Maritime Terrorism, Piracy, Arms, Narcotics, and Human Smuggling

Acts of sea piracy, the smuggling of narcotics, arms and humans via sea routes, and the use of waterways by terrorist groups are interconnected and need to be viewed as part of the increasingly frequent linkages between maritime criminal activities and terrorism.

Maritime Piracy

Piracy at sea is considered an international crime. It is also a form of terrorism because, like terrorism, it employs violence to target ships' crews, passengers, and ship owners for commercial, and in certain instances political gains.[10] Maritime piracy is interrelated with terrorism because, as Philippine Foreign Minister Teofisto Guingona said at a recent ASEAN conference, the "modern-day version" of piracy has "political undertones although employing traditional ways, including kidnapping for ransom. It is sometimes linked to the secessionist aspirations of some elements in society, or simply Muslim militancy."[11] The Islamic separatist Abu Sayyaf movement operating in the southern

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[10] Commander Vijay Sakhuja, "Challenging Terrorism at Sea," No. 679, 19 January 2002, at http://www.ipcs.org/issues/newarticles/679-ter-sakhuja.html.

[11] "ASEAN, EU Experts Discuss Fighting Terrorism at Sea," *AFP*, 25 February 2002

Philippines is an example of a terrorist group that also engages in kidnapping, hijacking vessels, or using vessels to abduct foreign hostages in cross-border raids. It is also highly dangerous because of its links to Al-Qaeda.

Major regions of sea piracy include the South China Sea, Indonesian and Philippine waters, Bangladesh, Malacca Straits, India, Ecuador, and the Red Sea, with the Bay of Bengal-Malacca Straits region considered to be piracy's primary "center of gravity."[12] In 2000, there were 471 cases of maritime piracy and armed robbery against ships.[13] Nearly half occurred in the busy sea lanes of Southeast Asia, the Malacca Strait, and the Indian Ocean. Pirates also became more deadly, with 72 crewmembers killed, 129 wounded and 5 others missing.[14] This figure represents a 57 percent rise from the previous year.[15]

Terrorist Use of Maritime Vessels to Smuggle Narcotics

Narcoterrorism refers to the resort by terrorists to the production and/or trans-shipment of narcotics to finance their operations, as well as the employment of terrorist tactics by drug traffickers to keep government security and law enforcement forces from interfering with their operations.[16] Evidence of terrorist (or guerrilla group) involvement in drug trafficking can be found in Colombia, Peru, Lebanon, Central Asia (including Afghanistan), Burma, Thailand, Sri Lanka, and other nations.

Colombia is at the center of the international cocaine trade, with enormous profits generated by the vast shipments of drugs flowing out of the country by air, river, or by sea from its coastal regions. Fishing vessels, speedboats, and commercial cargo ships transport large quantities of narcotics from Colombia to neighboring countries and directly to the United States and Europe. The drugs are usually hidden in containerized cargo, bulk cargo, or hidden compartments built into ships. The cargo is loaded or off-loaded either in port or using speedboats while at sea.

The Colombian FARC, which combines terrorist and criminal activities in its operations, is considered the world's preeminent narcotrafficking terrorist organization. Together with its criminal narcotrafficking counterparts, it is part of a sophisticated worldwide logistical infrastructure and supply network. In terms of its equipment, the FARC deploys a mix of light aircraft to parachute cocaine drops to waiting boats and ocean-going yachts and other vessels, and uses the latest technology, including the Global Positioning System (GPS), to organize yacht-to-yacht drug transfers (called "coopering", a process by which groups can evade customs checks as the transatlantic vessels, which are gener-

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[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Michael Binyon, "Deadly, Growing Scourge of Seas," *The Times* [London], 7 December 2001.

[16] Sean K. Anderson and Stephen Sloan, *Historical Dictionary of Terrorism* (Lanham, MD and London: The Scarecrow Press, 2002), 341.

ally checked, can dock "clean").[17] The local craft onto which the drugs are transferred for the last smuggling leg can then put into port with less likelihood of arousing suspicion.[18]

The Colombian drug trafficking organizations, such as FARC, generate billions of dollars in annual revenues, which they use to purchase the services of foreign technical specialists. These foreign specialists, in turn, provide these groups with highly versatile and innovative tactics, technologies, and equipment. This was demonstrated by the seizure on 7 September 2000 by the Colombian National Police of a partially constructed, 100-foot steel-hulled submarine from a warehouse outside Bogotá, Colombia. The $20 million submarine, if completed, could have been used to transport up to ten metric tons of illicit drugs from Colombia to remote off-load sites in Latin America and the Caribbean, while it remained at snorkel depth the entire time.[19] Russian organized crime was suspected of involvement in this submarine project because Russian instruction manuals, with Spanish translations, were found in the warehouse where the submarine was being built.[20] Although drug smugglers have used "semi submersibles" in the past, law enforcement officials do not expect them to become a significant threat in the future.[21] However, the close linkages between Colombian drug trafficking groups and Middle Eastern terrorist groups (and drug smugglers) such as Hezbollah, or even European groups such as the IRA, means that information sharing, and even cross-training, between them are contributing factors in advancing and upgrading their tactics and weaponry.

Terrorist Use of Vessels to Transport Weapons

As mentioned earlier, a second component of maritime terrorism is terrorist use of vessels to transport weapons. Several highly publicized incidents have occurred in recent years involving terrorists' use of boats and ships to smuggle weapons. For example, Al-Qaeda reportedly has extensively used cargo ships to transport its conventional weapons and explosives, including the explosives used in the simultaneous bombings of two American Embassies in East Africa in 1998.[22] The trend of terrorists' use of vessels to transport their equipment is likely to escalate with the continuous need by terrorist groups to transport their equipment worldwide, as well as to expand their reserves of arms and ammunition by having them transported to their safe havens.

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[17] "Global Drugs Ring Shattered," [Manchester] *Guardian*, 14 June 2002.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Statement of Donnie R. Marshall, Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration, before The House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Crime, 13 December 2000.

[20] Ibid.

[21] State Department International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Colombia, 1 March 2001.

[22] Philip Shenon, "U.S. Expands Plan for Cargo Inspections at Foreign Ports," *New York Times*, 12 June 2003.

Santorini Incident

On 6 May 2001, the Israeli navy captured the *Santorini* fishing vessel carrying weapons, including Katyushas, anti-aircraft rockets, mortars of various calibers, and massive quantities of ammunition, en route from Lebanon to the Gaza Strip.[23] The Israeli seizure resulted from a joint operation by the intelligence corps, the navy, and the air force. The Israeli military claimed that the weapons were intended for Palestinian terrorist groups for use against Israeli targets. The ship had set off from the port of Tripoli in northern Lebanon, and was headed in international waters to a rendezvous in the Gaza Strip until it was detained in the Mediterranean off the shores of northern Israel, outside of Israeli territorial waters. Some of the weapons, all of which were carefully packaged in water-proof wrappings, had been packed into barrels that were roped together. Israeli newspapers have published two versions of how the arms would be transported. According to one version, the aim was to drop the barrels into the sea at a designated point off the Gaza coast, where they would be retrieved by boats manned by Palestinian security services. According to the second version, the vessel was to be met by a fishing boat manned by Egyptian fishermen, who would then transfer the arms to a Palestinian fishing boat that would carry them to Gaza.

A crew of four Lebanese smugglers operated the *Santorini* fishing vessel. It was commissioned by a dissident Palestinian group led by Ahmed Jibril – the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), a Damascus-based group that had intended to step up attacks on Israel.[24] The vessel's crew surrendered without any resistance and immediately told the Israeli naval officers what they were transporting. Following the vessel's capture, Jibril, speaking from his home in Damascus, Syria, said his group would continue smuggling weapons and munitions into Palestinian Authority-held areas.

Because Katyushas have long been used by the Lebanese Hezbollah, and Hezbollah has previously engaged in the maritime smuggling of arms to Gaza, Israeli analysts pointed to a possible connection between the PFLP-GC and Hezbollah. During the last decade, for example, Jibril had forged links with Iran and Islamic radicals, which would indicate that Iran, Hezbollah's patron, was likely informed of this mission. The Syrian government, Jibril's direct sponsor, also likely was informed of the operation.

Moreover, because the PFLP-GC is a relatively small organization, whose activities are nearly all conducted abroad, including in Syria and Lebanon, it has nearly no presence in the West Bank and Gaza. It is therefore likely that such a large quantity of weapons was meant not only for the mem-

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[23] Amnon Barzilai, Daniel Sobelman, and Amira Hass, "Arms Boat Made Three Visits to Gaza," *Ha'aretz*, 9 May 2001.

[24] Danny Rubinstein, "Analysis: Weapons Were Meant for Many Fighters," *Ha'aretz*, 8 May 2001.

bers of Jibril's organization in Gaza, but for larger groups in Gaza as well, especially those comprising the various "resistance committees" – Fatah's Tanzim/al Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, who initiate the majority of the terrorist incidents against Israel. It is these groups that possess the operational capability to distribute such a large quantity of sophisticated weapons to trained persons who are capable of using them.

According to Israeli analysts, this was not the first time that this method has been used. Reportedly, in the past, similar shipments of arms in barrels had been unloaded onto beaches in Gaza and were hidden away in warehouses. In fact, the *Santorini* was apparently well known to Israeli security forces as a smugglers' vessel in the 1980s and 1990s, and several of the crew on board had been captured as drug smugglers in the past by Israeli navy patrols. As a further indication that the *Santorini* incident was not unique, the packing of the weapons by its crew was done in a professional manner, by people used to dealing with arms, and they appeared very familiar with smuggling armaments to Gaza. Moreover, prior to this incident, the Palestinian Authority had requested that Israel ease life for the local population in Gaza by expanding the stretch of water in which Palestinian boats are allowed to fish, thereby, indirectly, also facilitating the maritime transport of arms.

Karine A

Proof that the *Santorini* affair was officially sanctioned by the Palestinian Authority, as part of a larger, continuous maritime arms smuggling effort, came in the early morning of 3 January 2002, when Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) naval commandos seized the 4000-ton *Karine A* freighter ship in the Red Sea, some 300 miles off the Israeli coast. The ship was carrying 83 watertight plastic crates containing a variety of mainly Iranian-made weaponry, including short- and long-range Katyusha rockets, anti-tank missiles, mortars, mines, 1,500 kilograms of high explosives, sniper rifles, shotguns, and other equipment, including inflatable Zodiac boats, cylinders, and diving equipment.[25]

According to the ship's captain, Omar Akkawi, a colonel in the Palestinian naval police (whom the Israelis arrested), the arms were loaded on the ship at an island off Iran's coast in the Persian Gulf, with the waterproof crates intended to be transferred to smaller boats near the Egyptian port of Alexandria. They would then be transferred again near the Gaza coast, where they would be picked by Palestinian navy officers disguised as fishermen.[26]

Several factors made this smuggling operation extremely significant. First, its aim was to substantially upgrade the Palestinian forces' military capability with a huge quantity of long-range weaponry and explosives, as well as to provide them with a maritime terrorist capability with the Zodiacs and div-

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[25] "Weapons Ship Mystery Deepens," BBC News, 10 January 2002. www.news.bbc.co.uk
[26] Ibid.

ing equipment. Second, it violated the terms of the interim peace agreements between the Palestinian Authority and Israel, under which the Palestinian Authority is allowed only a limited number of small arms, such as rifles, for its police forces, but no heavy weapons, long-range rockets, or explosives.[27] Third, according to Israeli authorities, the ship was part of a smuggling operation coordinated by the Palestinian Authority, Hezbollah, and Iran. In fact, the Israelis implicated a senior Hezbollah security officer, Imad Mughniyeh, who also serves as liaison between Iran and Hezbollah, as playing a leading role in the *Karine A* affair.[28] Mughniyeh is also on the FBI's most wanted list for his alleged role in kidnapping Western hostages in Beirut during the 1980s and the hijacking of TWA flight to Beirut.

In retaliation for the *Karine A* smuggling operation, on 12 January 2002 Israeli military boats and divers attacked a Palestinian naval police base in Gaza City, destroying two patrol boats. One of the boats, named *Jandala*, was believed to be linked to the arms smuggling operation. In fact, the *Karine A's* captain and senior officer had reportedly previously served on the *Jandala*.

'Baltic Sky' Incident

On 22 June 2004, Greek authorities seized nearly 700 tons of explosives, mainly TNT, as well as 8,000 detonators and fuses, on board the vessel *Baltic Sky*.[29] The ship, built in 1966, and originally sailing under the Russian and Ukrainian flags until July 2001,[30] sailed under the Comoros flag of convenience, although reports linked it with an Ireland-based company. The ship had set sail from Tunisia on 12 May en route to Sudan – but had been sailing around the Mediterranean for six weeks – when Greek special forces stormed on board, off Greece's western coast.[31] The Greek Coast Guard had monitored the ship for five days, following a tip from international intelligence agencies that it was carrying suspicious cargo.[32] The ship's crew – five Ukrainians, including the captain, and two Azeris – were placed in custody. The Sudanese government claimed that the explosives – ammonium nitrates – had been ordered by a Sudanese chemical company and were intended for civilian use.[33]

The ship's weapons cargo was described as a floating "atomic bomb" by Greek Shipping Minister George Aromeritis.[34] The cargo was described as "Anfo," an explosive made by mixing ammonium nitrate with fuel oil.[35] Greek

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[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid.
[29] "Crew Held Over Explosives Cargo," BBC News, 25 June 2003. www.news.bbc.co.uk
[30] "Explosives Ship Intercepted," *Ports & Shipping*, 24 June 2003.
[31] "Crew Held Over Explosives Cargo."
[32] Brian Williams, "Greece Links Seized Ship's Explosive Cargo to Sudan," Reuters, 23 June 2003.
[33] "Crew Held Over Explosives Cargo."
[34] Ibid.
[35] Penny Spiller, "Storm Surrounds the Ship's Cargo," 24 June 2003. www.news.bbc.co.uk

authorities were concerned about the cargo because, although commonly used for mining and quarrying, Anfo is also used by terrorist groups, such as the IRA, in bomb attacks.[36] Contributing to concern over the ship was the fact that Sudan, the cargo's point of destination, is on the U.S. State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism, and the cargo's discovery came amid heightened terrorism alerts in the region.

As demonstrated by these cases, terrorist groups and their supporters use ships to transport weapons and equipment. In fact, another transportation mode needs to be addressed: the use of containers on board vessels to smuggle weapons and devices, including weapons of mass destruction, as well as human operatives. In October 2001, for example, Italian authorities discovered an alleged Al-Qaeda operative of Egyptian nationality hiding in a shipping container that was bound for Halifax, Nova Scotia.[37] The container was equipped with a bed and bathroom, and contained airport maps and security passes.[38] Little other information was obtained because the operative disappeared after being granted bail.

II. Terrorist Groups with Maritime Capability

A spectrum of terrorist groups worldwide is operationally capable of employing maritime means either to transport military equipment or conduct terrorist attacks.

LTTE

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) are considered to possess the world's preeminent maritime terrorist capability. The LTTE has built up "a brown (coastal), green and blue (deep sea) water maritime capability."[39] The brown and green water craft are launched from land by the group's Sea Tiger forces, with an estimated strength of 2,000–3,000 cadres.[40] The Sea Tigers employ machine guns, rocket propelled grenade launchers, radar, and speedboats to attack their adversaries.[41] This three-pronged maritime capability has provided them with the tactical ability to utilize their maritime fleet to covertly import military equipment from foreign suppliers, board vessels without permission, attack and destroy Sri Lankan naval boats and ships, and damage or hijack foreign-owned civilian vessels in Sri Lankan waters, particularly when they are transporting equipment that the group needs.[42] The LTTE's maritime capability is so potent that it even has established a "super secret Exclusive

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[36] Ibid.
[37] Shenon, "U.S. Expands Plan for Cargo Inspections at Foreign Ports."
[38] Ibid.
[39] Gunaratna, "Trends in Maritime Terrorism: The Sri Lankan Case."
[40] Ibid.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Ibid.

Economic Zone-Marine Logistics Support Team,"[43] consisting of Mirage-class fiberglass vessels that are fifty feet long and sixteen feet wide and capable of long-range operations.[44] These vessels are employed to provide protection to the group's ships when they sail toward Sri Lanka's maritime border.

Considered to be the most technologically and tactically innovative of the world's maritime terrorist groups, the LTTE's modus operandi is likely to be emulated by other groups. The LTTE shares with other maritime terrorist groups the political and economic motivation to engage in this type of warfare, which impinges on its larger adversary's efforts to achieve economic prosperity and security.[45] If the current peace process between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE breaks down, the LTTE's maritime warfare operations will surely resurface.

Al-Qaeda

Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaeda organization is a major maritime terrorist actor. According to a March 2002 report by Norwegian intelligence, Al-Qaeda owned about twenty-three vessels, including ocean passage-capable merchant vessels, which are operated or chartered through front companies in Liberia, Panama, and the Isle of Man.[46] This figure may or may not include other ships chartered, but not directly owned, by Al-Qaeda. Additionally, bin Laden's brother-in-law reportedly operates a fishing boat business in Madagascar and Asia that might provide additional logistical support to future Al-Qaeda maritime operations.

Al-Qaeda operatives have staged several major maritime terrorist attacks. These include the spectacular waterborne suicide bombing of the USS *Cole* in October 2001, in the Yemeni port of Aden, which killed seventeen American sailors, and the October 2002 small boat suicide bombing of the French supertanker *Limburg* off the Yemeni coast.

In addition to actual attacks, Al-Qaeda operatives have plotted attacks on several high-profile maritime targets that were foiled during their pre-incident preparation phases. These plots include a conspiracy by one of Al-Qaeda's Singapore satellite cells to target U.S. naval assets, a plot that fortunately was foiled when Singaporean authorities in December 2001 detained thirteen suspects who were members of a clandestine Jemaah Islamiyah or "Islamic Group" cell.[47] Although the main targets of this plot included the U.S. Embassy and the

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[43] Ibid.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Ibid.

[46] The estimates of vessels under al Qaida's control are based on Commander Vijay Sakhuja, "Challenging Terrorism at Sea," 19 January 2002, No. 679, http://www.ipcs.org/issues/newarticles/679-ter-sakhuja.html; and Intellibridge, "United States – Security: A Progress Report on U.S. and International Approaches to Maritime Security," *Homeland Security Monitor*, 10 July 2003.

[47] United States Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001* (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, May 2002), 21.

residences of U.S. military personnel in Singapore, the cell had reportedly "planned to attack several U.S. naval vessels moored off the coast of Singapore."[48] The Singapore plot was followed in May 2002 by the arrest by Moroccan authorities of three Saudi members of an Al-Qaeda cell that had planned to attack American and British naval ships in the Straits of Gibraltar.[49] According to Moroccan authorities, the Al-Qaeda operatives had planned to sail from Ceuta and Melilla, the Spanish enclaves on Moroccan territory, using inflatable Zodiac speedboats loaded with explosives to launch suicide attacks on the ships patrolling the straits.[50]

Other instances of intentions by Al-Qaeda to carry out maritime attacks include a report that its operatives were making their way toward southern California aboard a merchant ship, with Catalina Island – about twenty-three miles off the California coast near Los Angeles – mentioned as a possible destination.[51]

Hezbollah

Hezbollah, the Lebanese terrorist group, has either plotted or been linked to various maritime terrorist operations, including sea-borne weapons smuggling. Hezbollah is an indigenous Lebanese group that is sponsored by the Iranian government. Most of its terrorist operations are directed at Israel, its primary adversary. The majority of its operations take place on land. However, in the late 1990s, according to Singapore's Internal Security Department, a Hezbollah cell had plotted to bomb American and Israeli ships docked in Singapore.[52] To accomplish this mission, Hezbollah operatives recruited five Singaporean Muslims to assist with surveillance and logistics preparations.[53] Interestingly, Hezbollah's plan called for filling a small boat with explosives and ramming it into a ship in the Singapore Straits or in harbor – the same modus operandi that Al-Qaeda later employed to bomb the USS *Cole* in Yemen.[54] According to the Israeli Institute for Counterterrorism, the similarity of the blue prints used by Hezbollah and Al-Qaeda was not "coincidental," but part of a pattern of long-standing operational cooperation.[55] In fact, Hezbollah may have provided Al-Qaeda with explosives training that may have played a role in Al-Qaeda's 1998 bombings of the American embassies in East Africa, as well as the USS *Cole* bombing.[56]

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[48] Ibid.

[49] "Morocco 'Uncovers al Qaeda Plot," BBC News, 11 June 2002. www.news.bbc.co.uk

[50] Ibid.

[51] Charles Feldman, "FBI: Terrorists May Try to Arrive by Sea," CNN.Com, 19 June 2002.

[52] Institute for Counterterrorism [ICT – Herzliya], "Hizballah Planned to Attack U.S. and Israeli Ships in Singapore," [no date], http://www.ict.org.il/spotlight/det.cfm?id=790.

[53] Ibid.

[54] Ibid.

[55] Ibid.

[56] Ibid.

As discussed earlier, Hezbollah served as one of the coordinators for the *Karine A* smuggling operation, which was intercepted by Israeli naval commandos in January 2002.

Other Middle Eastern Terrorist Groups

Several other Middle Eastern terrorist groups reportedly are interested in developing a maritime capability, such as the Egyptian Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, while other groups, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Front, which is highly innovative in its tactics, contracts its maritime transportation enterprises to other groups, as demonstrated in the May 2001 *Santorini* operation.

Abu Sayyaf Group

The Filipino radical Islamic Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) employs sea vessels to carry out some of its kidnapping and hijacking operations. Because of the ASG's maritime warfare capability, the Philippines' maritime special forces are being trained by the U.S. military to upgrade their counterterrorism capabilities. As a result, it can be expected that the ASG's maritime capability will gradually diminish. The increasing effectiveness of the Philippines' special forces was demonstrated on 21 June 2002, when they tracked down and killed Abu Sabaya, one of ASG's top leaders, killing him and two of his men (with four others surrendering) as they were fleeing Mindanao island in a boat.[57]

III. High Risk Regional Waterways

The Middle East

Currently, the Middle East is undergoing a resurgence in maritime terrorist activity. The following indications and warning factors and observables are likely to cause new motivations and triggers for Middle Eastern terrorist groups to attack U.S., Israeli, and Western shipping interests either in the Middle East or elsewhere, including the U.S. homeland:

- Sharpening escalation in Arab-Israeli violence and instability.
- Using maritime warfare to discourage the U.S. and its allies from transporting supplies to rebuild Iraq's infrastructure, as well as to pressure the U.S. to withdraw from bases in the Persian Gulf.
- Seeking revenge against the U.S.-led allied military actions in Afghanistan and Pakistan against Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaeda network and the Taliban, including detaining their fighters in U.S. and Western prisons.

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[57] "Abu Sayyaf Leader Believed Killed," Guardian Unlimited, 21 June 2002. www.guardian.co.uk

- Demonstrating that Al-Qaeda still possesses a global reach by attacking U.S. vessels and seaports.
- The success of previous attacks, particularly the bombings of the USS *Cole* and the *Limburg* supertanker, in terms of the damage they caused and the ensuing publicity in influencing terrorist groups to launch further maritime attacks.

The Middle East's high risk regions cover coastal countries with a proliferation of radical subcultures such as Egypt, Lebanon, the Palestinian Authority's Gaza Strip, and Yemen, or directed by governments that actively sponsor terrorist groups, such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Sudan, or countries marked by internal anarchy whose coastlines border the region, such as Somalia.

The volatile **Persian Gulf** region is especially risky, particularly because of the U.S. naval presence in Bahrain and the U.S. role in reconstructing Iraq's infrastructure. American vessels in a **Yemeni** port are at great risk because the country is widely considered a crossroads for various international terrorist movements such as bin Laden's Al-Qaeda network and various Egyptian groups. To sabotage further progress in the Arab-Israeli peace process, **Iranian**-backed terrorist groups, such as Hezbollah and Palestinian rejectionist groups, are likely to carry out maritime attacks against U.S. vessels in the Persian Gulf and the eastern Mediterranean.

Lebanon is a haven for terrorist groups because of the protection offered to them by the Syrians, with Iranian support, in the form of unrestricted movement, military bases, and training facilities. As a result, terrorist groups use the country as a staging area for their attacks, including maritime attacks against Israel, or the use of Lebanese ports and coastline as an embarkation point to smuggle weapons to Palestinian Authority-controlled areas in the Gaza Strip. In the near term, Hezbollah, either directed by or acting independently of Iranian government support, is likely to use the Lebanese coastline to launch maritime attacks against Israel. Rejectionist Palestinian groups might exploit their access to the **Gaza Strip** coastline (as well as the **Lebanese** coastline) to launch maritime attacks against Israeli and allied U.S. vessels. This was demonstrated on 7 November 2000, when a Hamas suicide operative in a fishing boat attempted to attack an Israeli patrol craft north of Rafah in the Gaza Strip;[58] fortunately for Israel, the explosive-laden Hamas boat was identified by the patrol craft and sunk before it could damage the Israeli craft. As mentioned previously, the Palestinian Authority had attempted on a number of occasions to smuggle an assortment of weapons into the Gaza Strip either from Lebanon or Iran via the sea.

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[58] Rohan Gunaratna, "Sea Tiger Success Threatens the Spread of Copycat Tactics," *Jane's Intelligence Review* (March 2001): 12.

The **Strait of Gibraltar** and the **Mediterranean** are considered places of potential threats against Western shipping interests, whether military or commercial. In October 2001, NATO initiated Active Endeavor, a maritime anti-terrorism operation, covering the Mediterranean.[59] As part of this operation, NATO deployed military escort vessels to protect allied civilian ships through the Strait of Gibraltar at the entrance to the Mediterranean Sea.[60] The U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean is on high alert for possible terrorist attacks against its vessels.

In the **Gulf of Aden**, ships and yachts have reported attacks and attempted attacks while transiting the vicinity of Socotra Island. In the Gulf of Aden, for example, on 12 April 2001, three pirates in a wooden boat reportedly approached the *Daisy Duck* yacht and ordered it to stop. When the yacht increased speed, the pirates shot at the yacht using a machine gun. The yacht broadcast a distress call, and when its owner returned fire with his pistol, the pirate boat withdrew. As mentioned earlier, in October 2002 the French oil tanker *Limburg* was attacked by an Al-Qaeda unit in the Gulf of Aden.

Ships in the port of **Aden** have reported numerous burglaries and hostile boardings. On 16 May 2001, a Bahamian-flagged tanker docked in the Yemeni port of Aden was attacked by criminals who gained access to the radio room, whereupon they stole a laptop computer, two printers, and a fax machine. No crew injuries were reported.

On 20 January 2001, eight small boats, with six to seven men in each, approached an unidentified tanker. These boats proceeded to follow the tanker at a distance of fifty meters. The tanker's crew was alerted and the boats withdrew towards **Djibouti**.

Vessels transiting near the coast of **Somalia** are at extreme risk because of acts of piracy by Somali gangs. On the strategic route on the Horn of Africa along the southern approaches to Bab el-Mandeb and en route through the Red Sea and Suez Canal, members of **Somali**-based militia groups are reported to employ high-speed craft to attack and intimidate yachts and merchant vessels transiting in the Indian Ocean. These militias attack yachts with small arms, mortars, and rockets, seizing the vessels and holding their occupants for ransom.

The **Malacca Straits**, situated between the northern tip of the island of Sumatra and Malaysia, are one of the world's busiest shipping lanes. They are also considered among the world's most dangerous maritime routes, with vessels passing through these waterways often attacked by pirates.[61] In July 2002, for example, rebels in Indonesia's Aceh province hijacked a ship that was sup-

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[59] Helena Smith, "NATO 'Terror' Tipoff on Explosives Ship Sailing to Sudan," *The Guardian*, 24 June 2003.

[60] Chris Morris, "Terror Fears Spark Ship Escorts," BBC News, 17 March 2003. www.guardian.co.uk

[61] "Nine Oilrig Seamen Kidnapped in Malacca Straits, Officials Say," *Industrial Fire Journal* (July 2002), at http://www.industrialfirejournal.com/industry_news.htm.

plying food and safety equipment to offshore oil rigs in the Malacca Straits, and then kidnapped nine of its crew members.

Any discussion of high-risk waterways must include the waterways navigated by oil tankers, since an estimated 75 percent of the world's oil is transported by sea. According to a report on "World Oil Transit Chokepoints," "oil transported by sea generally follows a fixed set of maritime routes," along which oil tankers must pass through several geographic narrow channels, or "chokepoints."[62] Important maritime chokepoints include the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Malacca, the Panama Canal, the Bab el-Mandeb passage from the Arabian Sea to the Red Sea, and the Suez Canal. What makes these chokepoints significant is that they are "susceptible to pirate attacks and shipping accidents in their narrow channels."[63] Oceangoing oil tankers, which deliver imported crude and other liquid products, are especially vulnerable to terrorist attack in these chokepoints, as demonstrated by Al-Qaeda's suicide bombing of the French oil tanker *Limburg* in October 2002. This attack was part of Al-Qaeda's overall strategy of targeting of oil tankers, as demonstrated by its plot in June 2002 to attack British and American naval ships and commercial oil tankers passing through the Strait of Gibraltar.

IV. Potential Maritime Targets

U.S.-flagged naval or commercial vessels represent high-value targets to terrorist groups not only because of the enormous publicity that such attacks generate, but because the size of these vessels and the difficulty of protecting them make them "soft targets." Other likely maritime targets range from U.S. and Western maritime economic facilities in the Middle East, Africa, or the South/East Asian regions, such as offshore oil-drilling rigs and oil tankers, to ferryboats or other human targets, such as passenger cruise liners.

Threats to U.S. Maritime Interests

There is great concern in the United States about maritime terrorism taking the form of mass destruction or mass disruption warfare. This is primarily due to the fact that terrorist groups, and, principally Al-Qaeda, are actively targeting American maritime assets in both foreign and domestic waters. Al-Qaeda already has demonstrated a history of targeting American maritime vessels in foreign waters, as demonstrated by the attack against the USS *Cole*. The U.S. homeland's coastal areas represent another set of potential "trophy" targets to Al-Qaeda, given its modus operandi of continuous attempts to strike at the heart of the American economy and other symbolic targets, just as it did in the September 11 attacks against the World Trade Center. In this case, some 95 per-

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[62] "World Oil Transit Chokepoints," *EIA Country Analysis Briefs*, November 2002, at
   http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/choke.html.
[63] Ibid.

cent of U.S. overseas trade is shipped by sea through more than 361 ports.[64] Moreover, many nuclear power plants are located in coastal areas (along with the majority of the U.S. population), making a waterborne attack against them a potential likelihood. In addition, American ports could be exploited by Al-Qaeda to smuggle a weapon of mass destruction into the U.S., given the difficulty of monitoring the more than 7,500 foreign-flag vessels that make some 51,000 annual port calls, and the 6 million loaded containers, including 156 million tons of hazardous material and one billion tons of petroleum products, that enter U.S. ports every year.[65] This is one of the factors that has generated so much concern about the potential smuggling of a radiological "dirty" bomb in a loaded container that might evade detection.

Ports and loading terminals are, therefore, major targets for terrorist attack, especially ports that serve as transfer and offloading facilities for foreign oil being imported into the U.S.[66] Facilities such as the Louisiana Offshore Oil Port, or LOOP, which is eighteen miles off the coast of Lafourche Parish, could be a potential target.[67] The LOOP offloads 1.4 million barrels of foreign oil a day, or 15 percent of the nation's daily imported total. According to a report by the consulting firm Bracewell & Patterson, the facility does have a counterterrorism plan, which was activated by the port's officials following September 11, and U.S. Coast Guard vessels are patrolling and conducting surveillance.[68]

As a result of these concerns, since the attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the U.S. Coast Guard has been boarding "high interest" vessels bound for local terminals that carry hazardous cargo or arriving from suspicious countries. In New York, for example, the Coast Guard has been patrolling the Hudson River near the Indian Point nuclear power plant in Westchester and the vicinity of the Millstone nuclear plant on Long Island Sound in eastern Connecticut.[69]

Potential Targeting of U.S. Cruise Industry

Another maritime area of concern is the popular U.S. luxury liner cruise industry, which has enjoyed tremendous increases in passengers over the past decade. Moreover, new classes of mega-cruise ships are in service that exceed 140,000 gross tons, carrying upwards of 5,000 passengers and crew members[70] – mak-

[64] Admiral James M. Loy, "Port and Maritime Security Strategy," statement before the Subcommittee on the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, U.S. House of Representatives, 6 December 2001.

[65] Ibid.

[66] Kathy Shirley, "Response to Terrorism Threat: Industry Re-examines Security Efforts," January 2002, at http://www.lioga.com/amogr_jan_industry.asp.

[67] Ibid.

[68] Ibid.

[69] Thomas Frank, "Coast Guard Faces New Security Role: Some Fear A Reduction of Boat-Safety Duties," *Newsday*, 16 June 2002.

[70] Admiral James M. Loy, "Seaports, Cruise Ships Vulnerable to Terrorism," Guest Commentary, 28 July 2001, at http://www.polticsol.com/guest-commentaries/2001-07-28.html.

ing them desirable "trophy" targets to ambitious terrorist groups. A terrorist attack against such enormous ships would not only cause a catastrophic number of casualties, but would also threaten the entire cruise industry's economic viability.[71]

In spring of 2002, the U.S. government issued a warning about the threat of "swimmers" possibly attaching incendiary devices to ship hulls.[72] This was followed by a September 2002 speech by Stephen Ronchon, chief of intelligence for the U.S. Department of Transportation, warning that, "cruise ships were vulnerable to 'aerial attacks' from small planes."[73]

The rapid spread of viruses on board cruise ships makes them easy targets for biological attacks.[74] Although not terrorist related, outbreaks in 2002 of gastrointestinal illness associated with the Norwalk virus among passengers forced cruise lines such as Disney, Holland America, and Carnival to cancel or cut short several cruises.[75]

V. The Next Phase in Maritime Terrorism

In the next phase of maritime terrorism, in addition to the small, bomb-laden suicide craft (such as the vessel that damaged the USS *Cole*), terrorists could set their vessels' steering mechanism (like the remotely triggered truck bomb) on auto pilot to head to a harbor, or in the direction of a targeted ship, and after abandoning the vessel set it to explode. The next phase is also likely to feature the use of submarines (including mini-subs), vessels with stealth designs to reduce their exposure to radar, and the launching of weapons of mass destruction from vessels, with potentially catastrophic consequences. Another area of concern is terrorist hijacking or use of oil tankers or ships carrying liquefied gas for suicide missions.[76] There is also a potential for state-sponsored maritime terrorism, such as providing terrorists with logistical support, a safe haven port, maritime training, and operational assistance in mining a shipping lane. Reportedly, Middle Eastern terrorist groups are influenced by the evolution in the Sri Lankan LTTE's maritime terror tactics and equipment, particularly in acquiring stealth vessels to more efficiently carry out maritime suicide terrorist attacks.

In terms of new trends arising from linkages between terrorist and criminal groups, there is great concern about the potential for criminal organizations, such as Balkan arms smugglers operating out of Albania, or others, to

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[71] Ibid.

[72] Rick Newman, "Full Steam Ahead: In the New Age of 'What Ifs?' Here is What Cruise Lines Are Doing to Keep You Safe at Sea," *National Geographic Traveler*, January/February 2003, 12.

[73] Ibid.

[74] Molly Feltner, *National Geographic News*, December 2002.

[75] Ibid.

[76] Eric Watkins, "Shipping Fraud Heightens Terror Threat," BBC News, 6 February 2002. www.guardian.co.uk

provide a logistical infrastructure for terrorist groups to smuggle weapons of mass destruction from the former Soviet republics, via Eastern European suppliers, to the Middle East or other destinations.

Conclusions

With the successful terrorist attacks on the USS *Cole* and the *Limburg*, and several other foiled attempts to attack maritime targets, such as the Singaporean and Moroccan plots, terrorist groups are actively attempting to exploit the maritime environment to mount increasingly lethal attacks against U.S., Western, and other nations' military and commercial vessels. Israeli and U.S. shipping interests are the prime terrorist targets. In the case of the U.S., terrorists are likely to exploit any opportunity to punish the U.S. for its war on Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, and for detaining their fighters in Guantanamo Bay and in other detention centers around the world. As a result, we can expect active plotting by Al-Qaeda operatives against U.S. maritime interests either in the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, East and Southeast Asia, and even against U.S. ports and coastlines, which would be considered the targets of highest symbolic significance. In a related trend, as U.S. naval combatant ships increase their readiness and deterrence posture in the Middle Eastern region, U.S.-flagged commercial ships will likely be attacked in their stead. Every effort should be made not only to prevent attacks similar to that against the USS *Cole* and the *Limburg*, but also to anticipate and preempt other targets of opportunity and new tactics and weaponry based on a thorough assessment of threat-related information about terrorist motivations, plans, and tactics.

Preparing to defend against the likelihood of increasingly lethal maritime terrorism is crucial, because terrorists are always searching for ways to exploit new adversary vulnerabilities, and maritime terrorism provides terrorist groups with a new and technologically advanced means to launch attacks against generally unsecured targets. Moreover, while extensive security precautions apply to air travel and important land installations, the civilian maritime industry is virtually unprotected, ports can be easily entered by vessels on a hostile mission, there is inadequate screening to board ships, terrorists can directly attack vessels or their crews in international waters, and can launch operations against shore targets by small boats, dinghies, submarines (including mini-submarines), or rocket-propelled boats. Furthermore, as terrorists and criminal groups increasingly cooperate in the maritime arena, it will be imperative for all the agencies responsible for protecting different components of maritime security – whether law enforcement, drug interdiction, immigration, customs, and even military special forces – to cooperate as efficiently as possible in countering this threat. Such cooperation must, above all, extend to the international arena, so that all waterways and ports around the world will be safe and secure.

The Education Of (Military) Leadership Personnel In A Postmodern World

*By Edwin R. Micewski**

> I see many soldiers: if only I could see many warriors!
> What they wear is called uniform: may what they conceal with it not be uniform too![1]

The concepts of education and postmodernism are, most often, neither clearly explored nor unequivocally defined. The two terms are fairly intricate and most controversially debated. They both allow for several different interpretations, tolerating contrasting ways in which to intellectually approach the subject. This essay intends to stimulate reflection and will present some ideas and personal suggestions as to how the military should deal with and join the postmodernist debate.

Some Introductory Philosophical Considerations

For instance, education can be understood merely as the fulfillment of an occupational qualification or, in full contrast, as a continuous and in itself never-ending process by which a human being forms himself mentally and finds his autonomous realization. One could also comprehend education as the acquisition of knowledge characteristic of a certain culture or society.

  Whereas, amidst all this diversity, everyone has his own perception and is aware that *education* exists, the same cannot be said of *postmodernism*. "Postmodern" is a very popular term, commonly used in the arts, philosophy, science, and politics. However, while many people use the idiom, nobody really knows what it means, or even stands for, in any way that is meaningful across different contexts or disciplines. And although we attribute the term to key thinkers such as Foucault, Lyotard, and Derrida, and assume that philosophers such as Nietzsche and Heidegger were the originators of the postmodern adventure, the question has been asked with increasing frequency: Is the phenomenon of postmodernism even real?

  It might be impossible to describe the phenomenon in all its genealogical history, or to grasp the entirety of the mainly controversial contemporary discourse. There exist a variety of explanatory approaches ranging from:

  1. The consideration that postmodernism is merely a part of modernity, to the assumption that it is a true overcoming of modernity.

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[1] Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (London: Penguin, 1969).

2. The hypothesis that it is just a life-feeling, a sentiment of the spiritual or individual as well as societal orientation to being a noticeable and measurable trend in politics, science, and art; or

3. Postmodernism simply being used as a metaphor, a quasi *terminus technicus* for the diversity, complexity, and plurality of present-day societies.

An appropriate path to postmodernism may lie in the attempt to carry out a 'negative selection' in the sense of listing those characteristics of modernity – this "incomplete project," as Jean-Francois Lyotard has called it – that are questioned and rejected by postmodernism.[2] The modern world (if we let it start with the Renaissance) cultivated the myth of unlimited and inevitable progress, of freedom as advancing emancipation, and the primacy of nature over religion. The scheme of modernity subscribed to the experimental and quantitative methodology of science, and has acknowledged the supremacy of analytical thinking and universal reason. Hence, in logical consequence, we should necessarily find ourselves in postmodernist thinking when we question the idea of progress, when we rethink the relation between man and nature, when we doubt the omnipotence of rationality and the exclusive efficiency of logical reflection, and when we reject the idea of emancipation in the sense of indifferent equality.

When we consider the "master narratives" of modernity – positivism and Marxism (the latter being the practical-political application of the former) – as gross mistakes, then we might be turning postmodern. When we reject the foremost goal of modernity, namely to bring about the autonomy of the rational human being and the destruction of metaphysics, we might be headed towards postmodernism.

But in all this questioning, doubting, and rejecting we have not found any stable ground or clear orientation. Confusion and uncertainty abound. In the meaning of a profound spiritual and philosophical crisis of our present time, the polymorphous reality of the so-called postmodernist societies has, for quite intelligible reasons, entered into the cultural-philosophical context of *decadence*.

In his account of five hundred years of Western cultural life, Jacques Barzun extends the etymological meaning of the term decadence as a "falling away." Much more than simple lethargy and paralysis, decadence indicates a lack of purpose and direction, although

> implies […] no loss of energy or talent or moral sense. On the contrary, it is a very active time. Full of deep concerns, but perfectly restless, for it sees no clear line of advance. Institutions function painfully. Repetition and frustration are the intolerable result. Boredom and fatigue are great historical forces.[3]

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[2] See Jean-Francois Lyotard, *Das postmoderne Wissen. Passagen* (Vienna, 1999).

[3] Jacques Barzun, *From Dawn to Decadence: Five Hundred Years of Western Cultural Life* (New York: HarperCollins, 2000), xvi.

If modernity was and is the attempt to *divinize* reason, then it was and is at the same time the desperation over rationality, together with the anxiety about this partially failed modernist project, that leads to exactly this state of affairs that Barzun describes and that seems to mirror so precisely the present-day condition of Western societies. (Post)modernism celebrates diversity and relativism, and the (post)modern society dissolves into multiple realities, various life-forms, and different discourses, each with its exclusive ontology and political pragmatics.

There is one element upon which most theories of the postmodern agree: that the mass media play a decisive role in a postmodern society. But, as Gianni Vattimo makes clear, the media (in a media and information society) do not make it more transparent. Even, and perhaps particularly in this respect, a postmodern society is complex and chaotic. The explosion of different views about the world is mirrored in the stupendous dynamic of the media technoculture. Metaphorically, the (post)modern individual is homeless, deprived of a solid foundation by multiple realities, and floating in a seething cauldron of information.

Political and Social Manifestations

Robert Kagan, in his book *Of Paradise and Power,* writes of a postmodern and post-historical European paradise. He translates (post)modern decadence into the context of transatlantic power politics and the divide between the U.S. and European strategic cultures. He cites the senior British diplomat Robert Cooper, who stated that Europe today lives in a "postmodern system" that rests on "the rejection of force" and on "self-enforced rules of behavior."[4]

Cooper is referring to the fact that Europe has neither the will nor the ability to guard its own paradise and keep it from being overthrown, mentally as well as physically. But the Hobbesian world that flourishes outside Europe demands strong commitments. In Kagan's perspective, the United States and some allies who share its views are willing to remain stuck in history and take on the Saddams and Ayatollahs, while leaving others to enjoy the pleasing fruits of their labors.

One inference of Kagan's analysis is that the physical weakness of Europe – in the sense of military incapacity and political disarray – is the cause of Europe's stance on matters of power and security. Although Kagan concludes that the key difference is "less a matter of culture and philosophy than of capability," the exact opposite may be true. It is, perhaps, not economic greed that made most of Europe try to cash in on a peace dividend and neglect their transatlantic commitment after the Cold War was over. Rather, what has to be blamed, by and large, is the strategic culture of Europe as it has been shaped by

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[4] See Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York: Knopf, 2003).

the subtle Cultural Revolution that has unfolded ever since the 1960's, with generations fully captivated by the temptations of modernity. And now, Europe is confronted with the shattered outcome of these fancy dreams, hiding behind the new ideals of a European as well as a global order guided by economic and democratic principles.

The transatlantic divide that has emerged in the wake of the 2003 Iraq War regarding the use of military force, so my assumption goes, has not been a result of incongruent military capabilities, but instead has its basis in the construction and configuration of (post)modern societies. In essence, this constitutes an enormous challenge to Western civilization as a whole.

One of the prominent contemporary American social philosophers, Michael Waltzer, has introduced the notion of *unsettlement* to describe the social conditions of present-day Western societies. This term comes close to describing the societal features of individual egotism and value relativism – that lack of purpose or direction and the absence of clear courses of progress so astutely described by Barzun.

However, it is not, or at least not only, the pluralism of values that creates the dilemma, but rather what Alasdair MacIntyre has designated as "Emotivism." This term refers to the phenomenon that judgments made by people are only expressions of feelings and personal preferences, and no longer carry any morally essential evidence. No matter what one believes in or stands for, it is equally valid to any other point of view. What this means for the (post)modern liberal nation-state that still has to make vital decisions, not the least in the sphere of foreign affairs and security, can be easily imagined.

It appears that our point of the postmodern critique of modernity is actually the reality of Western-type societies: they have lost their environment of traditional morality and guiding orientation. On the micro-level, it is because of individual aimlessness and relativism. On the macro-level, it is due to the fact that value-generating institutions like churches and other educational authorities are losing their influence.

Effects on the Military

Granting that soldierly professionalism has to persist in the three-dimensional context of society, politics, and the military, the impact of both the mental and techno-physical realities of such a (post)modern environment will have decisive consequences for matters of security and defense. These consequences will be felt on the functional level in the tasks and missions assigned to the armed forces, and on a societal level in terms of the military's social integration, as well as the overall legitimacy and acceptance the military might enjoy within the political system to which it belongs.

If we agree, with Wittgenstein and Lyotard, that the *language game* the military system produces – like every other professional entity – not only gen-

erates a semantic significance but also develops its own patterns of action and organizational culture – its own life-forms, as it were – then the following question comes to the forefront: how should the military system as a whole, and at the level of the individual member, interrelate with this environment?

What are the conditions, requirements, and necessities – but also the limits – for a civil-military and a politico-military discourse and interaction in this setting? Can the military world even sustain its distinct profile without being estranged and excluded from these surroundings, perhaps at the cost of alienation to the extent of being accepted as a necessary evil, an anachronism of times long past? Or will the military be absorbed by this social climate of (post)modern disposition?

With the paradigmatic shift of the global security environment, Western military organizations have developed from primary instruments of national defense into mechanisms of international crisis prevention and conflict resolution. The significantly altered tasks and missions assigned to the armed forces in an internationalized security arena have demanded close civil-military cooperation and, as a result of the changed character of military missions, also an extended horizon for efficient military leadership. While some commentators detect a questionable *civilianization* of the military, these developments have undoubtedly produced an augmented inclusion of "civil" subjects in the curricula of professional military education.

Does this mean that the civilianization of the military holds the solution? Can the soldier even wish to become absorbed by a society that structures itself as described above? Or rather, to the contrary, is there perhaps the chance for the military to play a role in enriching a society consumed by value arbitrariness, relativism, and skeptical fragmentation by reaching beyond the borders of professional military education?

Educating Leadership Personnel

While modernity was focused on *knowledge*, a postmodern approach focuses on *wisdom*. As the German philosopher Robert Spaemann makes clear, wise is what is prudent not only at first sight. Wisdom has to do with considering all consequences of decisions and acts. Every understanding of education and pedagogy aiming at major impacts, in the sense that at the end of the educational process there stands an exactly described capacity, misses the essence of education when it results in the creation of marionettes and curricular schemes. Only a holistic approach in education enables the student to adapt the content and transform it innovatively as demanded by the situation at hand.

Over time, the philosophical and scientific principles of modernity have reduced education to the status of mere "management of knowledge." Along the lines of analytical reason and linear progress in history, the educational approach was mostly understood as the accumulation of facts and data,

and more recently, their ready access (if possible, online and easily recallable from a network). No longer was the quality and emancipation of the individual of primary concern, but rather his regulation, aiming at teleological handiness and functionalism. The reductionist tendencies of technical determinism made us lose sight of the essential nature of ourselves as human beings. The consequences of this purely instrumental and teleological understanding of education turned out to be problematic, as a generally poorly oriented and insufficiently self-reliant human was being produced.

This is why, in the wake of postmodern currents, we have recently observed the turn to a concept of education which keeps an eye on the idea of a harmoniously cultured human as well as on the ideal of a comprehensively enlightened person. In this understanding, education embraces the dimensions of knowledge, capabilities, and virtues. Only when it also encompasses the realm of basic morality does it enable everybody to mold himself intellectually and, based on autonomy and self-determination, accomplish the total realization of his human Self. Thus, education is transformed into something that grants any human individual knowledge and wisdom built upon the grand traditions of human effort in the fields of humanities and culture. This qualifies one to build character while, at the same time, bestowing the moment of freedom upon him.

In short, education is more than imparting the immediate knowledge and capacity one might need to carry out his occupational tasks. Education embraces all that unconfined, freely available knowledge that transcends occupational necessities. In a way, the former sets in where the latter ends. Thus, education finally results in a state in which the individual is factually and, in the deepest sense of the word, ethically able to take on "responsibility" Thereby the concept of education is raised up to the level of a cultural task, if not duty, of ethical dimension, a claim that calls upon the individual as fully as any political system.

For military science, Carl von Clausewitz still represents the strong antithesis to modernist positivism and relativism. When he spoke about the "art of war" (*Kriegskunst*), he was referring to the fact that military leadership is an imaginative rather than a scientific capacity. This is why theory should be *contemplation* (*Betrachtung*) rather than *dogmatic doctrine*, and should lead to "generating ability."

Clausewitz also made clear that theory becomes infinitely more difficult as soon as it touches the realm of "moral values" (*geistige Größe*). Although the original phrase represents a much broader concept, the underlying idea is that, when it comes to dealing with human life and activity, theory is no longer about predicting and controlling the behavior of things.

Naturally, Clausewitz could not say anything about digital decision-making and the gradually disappearing difference between humans and technology. He could not predict the information age, with its information revolution, and the ensuing Revolution in Military Affairs. However, the opposition of

human and technological paradigms of our day parallels the dilemma between the Clausewitzean model and the positivist approach of the past two hundred years. Since war, in whatever form and on whatever level of technology, will remain a social act, we should never lose sight of the "eternal human face of warfare."

Perhaps the biggest challenge for the contemporary and future education of leaders will be to strike the right balance between "human factors" and technology. "Humanness," in the sense of an intricate mix of physiological, psychological, and sociological factors, will always be more powerful and decisive than any kind of technology. Technology will never be a substitute for creativity, morale, cohesion, esprit, or commitment – forever the supreme factors in winning or losing wars.

Conclusion

With regard to the postmodernism debate, the West is in transition. The current state of affairs is the period between the breaking apart of modernity and a postmodern future that has yet to fully arrive. In other words, if what we are designating as postmodernism is in reality the falling apart of modernist societies, bringing about this profound heterogeneity in the wake of the disappearance of great ideologies, there may be hope that meaning and direction will be found in this upcoming age of postmodernism. In this case, postmodernism does not necessarily have to represent a continuation of modernism or its further entrenchment, but could rather become a transgression of it that will lead us ahead of the limiting modern dictate of positivist reason.

Hope arises that we will be able to regain the full array of human faculties and forms of knowledge that lie far beyond the confinements of analytical reason. Politically speaking, there must be an expectation and determination to overcome the paralyzing decadence besetting the West.

Given the violent and war-prone condition of most of the post-Cold War world outside the West, and the nature of the threats inside, evolving around economic and social problems, ethnic hostilities and border disputes, illegal migration, organized crime and corruption – all of which can only be resolved through close civil-military cooperation – the discourse within the strategic community will be about competing interests, contending for resources, and a permanent struggle for the legitimacy of claims and demands.

Nevertheless, in an ever more complex arena of security, if the military establishments seize upon this opportunity rightly, the military will undoubtedly be part of the struggle for the spiritual formation of the future.

Civilized Warriors?
Professional Disciplines, Ethos, and European Armed Forces

By Patrick Mileham[*]

BEMUSED AND BEWILDERED

"Let us be very clear," declared NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson in March 2001. "There is, and will be, no single European Army. There will be no standing European Force." He reassured the audience, "National armed forces will remain just that; national forces under the command of national governments."[1]

While he was articulating a NATO position on the development of European armed forces, Robertson might have been distancing NATO, deliberately or subconsciously, from the European Union's (EU) concept of the development of many of those same national armed forces, which could lead to a single EU Army, Navy and Air Force, in perhaps ten or twenty years' time. Indeed, the EU generally, and particularly the "Old European" national leaders, are zealously driving forward the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and – whatever it means – a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI).[2] Are the decision-makers merely ideologists, whose successors in office will preside over bemused, bewildered, and less than competent warriors, or are they truly finding a way towards comprehensible, comprehensive, and effective security arrangements for the greater peace and stability of the world? Indeed, one should probably look even farther afield, to the forty-four nations that come together in the Euro-Atlantic Partnerships Council (EAPC), spread geographically from North America to the Urals, in promoting military professionalism as an integral factor of developing international stability.

The aim of this article is to explore certain qualitative principles, competencies, and criteria as means of professionalizing the armed forces of Europe, building internal and international confidence, and thereby assisting in the extension of democracy and security.[3] The term "disciplines" is used inten-

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[1] Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, "NATO – The Enduring Mission," *RUSI Journal* 146:2 (April 2001): 5.

[2] "Old Europe," a dismissive term used by U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, particularly in response to French, German, and Belgian resistance to the proposed military action against Iraq, quoted in the *Financial Times,* 18 February 2003.

[3] This article is the basis for a future research project proposed by the author. Some of its themes have already been revealed in a book chapter, "Professional Armed Forces: Concepts and Practices," in *Defence Management in Uncertain Times,* ed. Teri McConville and Richard Holmes (London: Frank Cass, 2003).

tionally, suggesting a convergence of the practical and the intellectual, while also implying a search for a universal doctrine of the military profession.

The genesis of this study was a request made to the author in 2001 by the NATO Secretary General's Special Advisor for Eastern Europe, Christopher Donnelly, to define what actually constitutes military competence, and to flesh out a description of what is meant by "professional armed forces." No proper definition of theory and practice existed at that point.[4]

Much of the literature and work on professionalizing armed forces has been concerned with post-Cold War reductions of mass conscript armies of continental Europe and the former Soviet Union, and particularly the implications for internal civil-military relationships, country by country. The term "professional" has chiefly been used by analysts outside the military, as the opposite of "conscripted." This article views armed forces from the inside looking out, concentrating on professionalism as an index of the quality of military activity, its efficiency, competency, and effectiveness. It does not exclude civil-military duty as a part of the fabric of the nation, or national service in its widest context. Full-time military service, referred to as "regular" in Britain, and synonymous with professional or "contract" military service in other languages, is thus the chief focus of this study.

To start with, one has to pose the following questions of first principles:
• What are armed forces for?
• How do they work?
• What combat roles are envisaged?
• What are the restraints on "fighting"?
• Why should individuals join the armed forces as a matter of choice?
• Is the military a "true profession"?

Since international law indicates that military action should be the choice of last resort, the "management of violence"[5] rather than the "act itself"[6] is a partial answer to the first question. While there is much classical theoretical literature on the subject, from writers such as Samuel Huntingdon, Jacques van Doorn, Charles Moskos, and Morris Janowitz, it will not be rehearsed here.

It is suggested that addressing these questions as both an intellectual and a practical exercise, leading to a set of disciplines, can help affirm a level

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[4] Conference entitled "Reforming the Ukrainian Armed Forces," held in July 2001 at the Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Lancaster. The intention was to develop a complete rationale and universal code for military service, far more than a mere 'benchmarking' system. The sociology (rather than theory or policy) of military professionalism has been developed by M. D. Feld (ascriptive), Arthur Larson (radical/pragmatic), Charles Moskos Jr. (institutional/occupational), and Giuseppe Caforio and Marina Nuciari (hybrid models). See Giuseppe Caforio, ed., *Handbook of the Sociology of the Military* (New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2003), 69–70.

[5] Harold Lasswell, *The Analysis of Political Behaviour* (London: Kegan Paul, 1947), 152.

[6] Samuel P Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), 13.

of professional confidence among members of armed forces, civilian leaders, and national populations generally. The ultimate purpose of articulating professional military disciplines is to promote peace.

Evaluating Competent Armed Forces

A general description of the military profession cites three components of "military effectiveness" and "fighting power": Conceptual, Moral, and Physical.[7] With particular regard to the latter, the military capabilities of all national armed forces are measured annually by such bodies as the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in *The Military Balance*, together with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in their *Yearbook.* The Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (RUSI) also produces annually the "Index of Martial Potency," which compares and contrasts the military resources of nations by region and globally. But these quantitative studies tell only half the story. In the rubric to the "Index," the RUSI editor, Michael Codner, warns that:

> It does not take account of a nation's efficiency in using defence resources, nor of such crucial issues as morale nor of the types of capability that are maintained…. A wider measure of national power would be required which would include all the sources of national power and weakness.[8]

It is the quality of the national armed forces in relation to "all sources of national power and weakness" that ought to concern politicians, military leaders, and those members of their publics who are serious about international defense and security.

It must be stated that a number of liberal democracies are extremely sensitive about the "function" of their military institutions. Some view their place in the nation as little short of ideologically embarrassing, and look at them as something of a necessary evil. The indications are that they do not wish their armed forces to be efficient; professionalism is perhaps directly or subconsciously equated with militarism, the enemy of civil society. Others accept armed forces as nation-building institutions, in default of other manifestations of national service or identity. In his introduction to his 2002 book *Democracy and Military Force*, Philip Everts juxtaposes the "traditional restraining role … of public opinion… when democracies have to decide on war and peace" and the "dangers of letting public opinion take charge of matters that are better left

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[7] Ministry of Defence, *British Defence Doctrine,* (Second Edition) JWP 0 – 01, 2001 (first edition 1996), prescribed "bases," rather than "components," citing five: Conceptual, Moral, Personnel, Material, and Supporting Infrastructure.

[8] Michael Codner, "The RUSI Martial Potency Index 2002," *RUSI Journal* 147:6 (December 2002): 14–15.

in the hands of trusted experts."[9] The conscripted service tradition restrains the development of fully objective military competence. Some liberal democracies – where the experts have indeed been well trusted – have mounted successful offensive military operations to compel and coerce errant nations and groups with the use of actual force, or to deter wrongdoing, such as in peacekeeping and humanitarian tasks. A nation's seriousness about military intent is usually related to GDP, although the military output or return on investment for the less robust and conscript-bound nations must be increasingly unsatisfactory. Conscription is expensive. It is also universally unpopular.

Some nations are therefore comfortable and "at one" with their armed forces, while others have maintained them with much less enthusiasm, prompted by different national political agendas and with reciprocal social distance and unpopularity. In the past two years it has become apparent that there is a growing, if not acute, need for an international reviewing of the level of professionalism of armed forces if they are to play an effective part in providing and maintaining security in the future. Specific military and more general security threats seem set to become even more diverse in character and of greater magnitude since September 11, 2001 than in the previous decade; they are likely to become even more dangerous, unpredictable, and sudden.

Peace Dividend

Many of the factors and consequences likely to affect the security and insecurity of the world, most notably in European and adjacent nations, were barely recognized in the years following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the end of the Cold War. That event occurred because "Gorbachev's peace offensive … [had] desperately sought to wind down an arms race with the technologically superior West that would cripple Soviet economy and society."[10] The Soviet Union dominated the Warsaw Pact member-nations in a way that was different from the dominance by the United States of NATO. That is why the Warsaw Pact collapsed so quickly, while NATO did not. This is not to say NATO is not slowly unravelling, or sensibly transforming, depending on whether one's viewpoint is gloomy or confident. It is nevertheless not unreasonable to point out that, from the perspective of the only remaining superpower, militarily the armed forces of an "Old Europe" conscription-based nation appear as unprofessional as those of a former Warsaw Pact nation's army, navy, and air force. The difference is that the former are rich and mature liberal democracies, while the latter are neither. Post-Cold War NATO sometimes seems effectively to suspend disbelief, while asserting that security is just more of the same old soldierly ideas and military habits.

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[9] Philip Everts, *Democracy and Military Force* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002,), xi.
[10] Vladislav M. Zubok, "Why did the Cold War End in 1989? Explanation of 'The Turn,'" in *Reviewing the Cold War. Approaches, Interpretation, Theory*, ed. Odd Arne Westad (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 349.

One test of political maturity is the nature and quality of civil-military relationships, both in terms of civil control over the military and the armed forces' relationship with the population. Some nations do not see America's military as truly professional as Americans do themselves. Professionalism is much more than powerful capability. Europeans see in the U.S. a type of sub-conscious militaristic culture that has proved to be so dysfunctional in the past.[11] It must also be pointed out that the much-trumpeted "revolution in military affairs" has had little material application in most of the nations of Europe. One can take little pride in the performance of most European nations' armed forces in the last decade. It is indeed difficult to see in what currency the peace dividend has been paid. That having been said, the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Helsinki agreement of 1975 led to a series of military and diplomatic confidence building measures in the 1980s, replaced directly by admirable post-Cold War Partnership for Peace (PfP) and Defence Diplomacy initiatives. But the question has to be asked, leading to what?

It is relevant to reflect, going back to the future, on what analysts believed in previous decades. Morris Janowitz, who has done so much to promote the understanding of military sociology since the 1960s, foresaw five indicators of change in 1960: a modification of "the basis of authority and discipline" in the direction of more persuasive methods of control; that "professionalism" would make progress by producing a nearer resemblance between the military and society; career structures would change to enable promotion for competence rather than patronage; a diminishing of skill differentials would occur between military and civilian elites through embracing scientific managerial methods; and the development of an increasingly "explicit political ethos." This latter trend did not mean political interference by the military, but rather enhancing and maintaining civil control over the military by greater reciprocal awareness and maturity in military decision-making.[12] Thirty years later, in 1990, Charles Moskos, Jr., another leading military sociologist of long standing, asserted that, "the active duty force would shrink dramatically to a well paid professional cadre"; "the soldier/scholar" professional would emerge "as the officer corps became a component of the general advisory service or the state on matters of international security [and]… Security studies [would become] broadly conceived … and significantly changed from the narrow focus on war fighting." In addition, conscription for military service would diminish, and in "states that persisted with the practice" it would become less acceptable; "the military/police divide in many states" would become obscured, as "armed forces took on not only more policing type functions, but also non-military tasks

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[11] It also has huge military-industrial power. So do Britain, Russia, and France.

[12] Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960), 8–12.

such as disaster management." Finally, Moskos argued that the armed forces' prestige and "social status would relatively decline."[13]

In many respects, these predictions for modernization applied, both with regard to the old European nations' armed forces and those of the disintegrating Warsaw Pact. In the former nations, political and economic post-modernistic understandings and practices were developing fast; in the latter, there was and still remains much post-*glasnost* and post-*perestroika* confusion. Some nations of the EAPC group are attempting modernizing and post-modernizing simultaneously as they reform their militaries, while others had long ago post-modernized their militaries into inefficient, symbolic/non-effective, or dysfunctional institutions. It is not unfair to assert that some neutral nations' declared position is a luxury guaranteed by the military efforts of neighboring non-neutrals, who stand ready to fight for them. The antithesis, perhaps, of the "warrior" is not just the professional, but the "civilized soldier," a term increasingly used in politico-military parlance in liberal democracies with strong military forces.[14] But the professional soldier has sometimes to perform some very brutish, offensive, unpleasant, and "uncivilized" tasks, none more so than in intense combat. Hence the term "warrior" is retained.

The most bewildered warriors remain those of the post-communist European nations. Three British analysts – Andrew Forster, Timothy Edmunds, and Andrew Cottey – have gathered together research on the present position and likely development of professionalization programs in Central and South-Eastern European and Baltic states, as well as the Ukraine and Russia. Intriguingly, the writer on the Russian armed forces, Dale R. Herspring, bases his conclusions on what he describes as a program of "de-professionalizing." In making sense of all this analytical activity, as viewed from the outside (only one of seventeen was a professional military man), the authors have developed a useful definition and "typology" of armed forces, leading towards "ideal" types – ideal meaning according to researchers' models, not what is ultimately morally desirable.[15] The programs inevitably look to the phasing out of conscription in many of the nations, a process that is at times seen as running counter to the variables of their geo-political defense and security positions. In this they are

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[13] Charles Moskos, "Armed Forces after the Cold War: The Personnel Implications," in Seminar Proceedings of the British Military Studies Group – Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, University of London, 20 December 1990, 15.

[14] Patrick Mileham, "Building the Moral Component," in *Military Ethics for the Expeditionary Era*, eds. Patrick Mileham and Lee Willett (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2001), 6l.

[15] Anthony Forster, Timothy Edmunds, and Andrew Cottey, eds., *The Challenge of Military Reform in Post Communist Europe, Building Professional Armed Forces* (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002). Ideal typology is presented by the authors on pp. 8–12: "Active engagement (power projection ideal type, territorial defence ideal type); Limited engagement (post-neutral ideal type, neutralist ideal type)." These are modified by variable factors and characteristics of "role, expertise, responsibility (chains of command and delegation) and promotion (career progression) typologies."

like many Western European nations; indeed, much of the work of these authors has universal application.

In the view of Karl Haltiner, there has been a general three-phased trend in the region: the downsizing of armed forces (1990–95), a "NATO-led internationalization and professionalization phase" (1996–2001), and a wave of modularization and increasing flexibility since about 2000/1. He writes generally about the demilitarization of societies in some thirty European nations and, in peace support operations, a trend toward the "constabularization and internationalization" of armed forces. He also writes of the widening civil-military gap in some nations, and what he describes as a "re-militarization of the military."[16] Much of this observation confirms what Janowitz and Moskos anticipated, but it is the remilitarization or further professionalization of the full-time cadre that needs further anticipatory analysis and subsequent confirmation.

What follows in this article is an attempt to view, as if from inside the military, the principles that can lead to an end-point for the smaller "well paid professional cadres" that should, may, or will prevail in many of the EAPC nations in perhaps twenty years' time. The following sections investigate in turn the variables within each of the three thematic defining components of "military effectiveness" and "fighting power" already referred to. Some objective, some subjective, but all qualitative, these identifiable variables lead tentatively towards a rigorous system of evaluation of the military profession, which in the foreseeable future should become universally acceptable.

The Disciplines of Theory

Whether military, academic, functional, or financial, any system of analysis requires objective disciplinary methods for evaluating theory and practice. In discovering theoretical conceptual and cognitive disciplines for armed forces in liberal democracies, it is necessary first to re-emphasize the need for civilian control over the military.

The monopoly over the use of force by government is a defining feature of liberal democracy. In theory, civilian ministers (and the civil servants answerable to them) should legally be given complete policy, managerial, and financial control over all uniformed officers, senior and subordinate, in the military hierarchy. How closely this theory is matched in the practice of enhancing security and defense needs is another matter. Clearer definition of the personal function and authority of civilians and military functionaries alike is required, but the routines, and above all the quality of relationships at all levels, will dictate whether or not civilian officials and military directors, commanders and managers, achieve the highest possible standards of internal efficiency and external effectiveness for their military institutions.

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[16] Karl W. Haltiner, "From Centre to Periphery. The European Post Cold War Military Reforms and their Impacts on Civil Military Relations," forthcoming from the Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Geneva.

All persons concerned, from the minister of defense to the last corporal or private soldier, "hold office." In democracies, executive power is based on service to the nation. A definition of the "holding of an office … [embodies] expectations of … certain standards … of the agent or office holder. The office is a trust in the legal sense of trusteeship."[17] In ideal democracies, executive power is based ultimately on elected trusteeship. The electorate categorically denies absolute, permanent power to individuals. This does not mean that unelected, "permanent" professionals hold constitutional powers over elected representatives in any other respect than trusteeship in their professional capacity, defined or implicit.[18] The professionalism of civil servants, as well as the quality of political leadership of ministers – one definition of leadership is the raising of expectations, as well as trust and proof of their fulfillment – is part of the formula.

Civil control over the military works well when each group of office holders – elected, or permanent, civilian or uniformed – are indeed experts, as Philip Everts requires them to be, and in whom the public places trust. The quality of the theory of the civil-military relationship is thus based on high degrees of trust, as promoted and maintained internally amongst trustees, and between these trustees and the public. Each category of official – political, ministerial, civil service, and military – has duties within this relationship. It is essential that ministers should not formulate rash or unreasonable policies, or give reckless commands, orders, or instructions, either in the routine administration and management of armed forces or on operations.

Military officers in truly professional armed forces do not have the right to refuse the call to comply with orders, but as a professional duty they have the right to use every means of persuasion (except political) to prevent the launch of reckless and ill-considered military actions and operations. While working within the constraints of domestic law, they also have to comply with international law. This is what Janowitz means by an "explicit political ethos." Well-conducted joint, routine, professional work, including risk-calculation, with respect to the expected end-state of military action, linked with legal, diplomatic, economic, and other considerations and actions should reduce or eliminate professional (or even traces of political) conflict between categories of professionals. All of these criteria having been met, trusted national armed forces can take their full place in alliance and international military coalition activities, where the same standards of trusteeship apply.

The second discipline of the military profession addresses the depth and breadth of military thought and doctrine. At the highest level of thinking, the tradition of objectivity is a defining characteristic of the profession, yet this mode of thought links it with other professions and the general population. The

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[17] Andrew Dunsire, "The Concept of Trust," in *Teaching Ethics, Volume 1. Government Ethics*, ed. Rosalind Thomas (Cambridge: Centre for Business and Public Service Ethics, 1989), 336–37.

[18] The U.S. model of large numbers of "political" civil servants, brought in as the president's "administration," is copied by some nations, with or without checks and balances.

resultant body of knowledge and wisdom, constantly reviewed and developed, should be codified in written form. But it must also be implicit in the collective wisdom and memory of the profession. Knowing when doctrines and practices are becoming outdated and reactionary is part of expert, professional judgment.

Military doctrine proper, like any professional doctrine, has the purpose of providing "first principles," both empirically derived and *a priori*, from which the profession and its supporting institutions and agencies can, literally, conduct research for new details, or sometimes new first principles. Publications of combat and operational doctrine, policy, and practice need to be written at various levels of theory and practice – grand strategic, strategic, operational, and tactical, in NATO terminology. A large number of supporting documents also need to be published to reflect the complexity and sophistication of a nation's armed forces, their duties, activities, and management.

Thus, quite distinct from the managerial infrastructure, which is part of force design, professional armed forces need to create strong links with external research institutions and maintain internal institutions which can study and develop the armed forces, as well as their links with other professions, occupations, and organizations. Some nations have military universities and specialist colleges. Many have staff colleges, where specialists join together to learn the art and science of generalist thinking, the wider application of force, and the various needs of security. Officer academies and training institutions for non-commissioned ranks and recruits likewise exist in all nations with any claim to modern, functional armed forces.

The third discipline of mature, professional armed forces is how they are conceived to interact with other institutions and agencies involved in providing national and international security. This should include the reciprocal quality of network relationships; other institutions, of course, also need to be highly professionalized for their relationships with the military to be efficient and effective for all parties. Typical national institutions are: intelligence agencies; civil police (unarmed or lightly armed police); gendarmerie (armed police); militia or national guard (volunteer); citizen army (conscript); volunteer, part-time armed forces, formed as military units; border guards; customs officials (including immigration control and revenue collection); and other emergency agencies. These are distinguishable because, in most democratic nations, the term "professional" is normally applied to full-time armed forces as the ultimate embodiment of the monopoly of violence under government control. Every institution and agency should themselves have clearly-defined roles and routine tasks, with as tight parameters as are appropriate, reasonable, and workable. Some would need to be demilitarized, since they currently overlap and conflict with the duties of regular armed forces. If there are efficient, routine, and normal overlapping roles and tasks, they must also be defined. It can be argued that, if one or more of these institutions fail, particularly in times of national emergency, the professional armed forces can be tasked to do their work, as apolitical manpow-

er of last resort so to speak, albeit with varying degrees of efficiency.

The fourth idealized and theoretical discipline of fully professionalized armed forces is the quality and quantity of resources allocated and the way they are configured. "Force design" is a structural and physical conception, subject to the close direction of policy makers – both civil and military – matching role and tasks with capability.

While the ability to guarantee total security from external aggression, or the ability to operate militarily far from their borders, is not claimed by many nations, some seem to accept wholly inadequate force capabilities even as full members of alliances for collective-defense: to them adheres the label "free riders." The claim of professional military status implies levels of high functionality, much closer to the total national defense end of the spectrum, than the minimum and symbolic.

In determining adequacy, one starts with constraints or opportunities of "polemity … the ratio of the energy employed (directly or indirectly) in warfare or preparations for it, to the total amount of energy available to society."[19] This crudely equates to the amount of GDP set aside for defense, and security more generally. If an insufficient budget is available to man, equip, and support armed forces to meet foreseeable or unforeseeable emergencies, they are likely to fail; in the event, their capability will not match their tasks.

There is little space in this article to discuss force design in detail. Included under this rubric, however, should be policy direction, management, funding, and other resources providing for a sufficiency of combat units, supported directly by "combat support" and "combat service support" units and personnel (to use NATO terminology). Systems, both material and managerial, together with a large array of military processes and procedures, are included in force design, based on sustaining operations over distance and time. The energy employed in concert with the design, development, procurement, maintenance and logistical support of all *materiel*, including consumables, together with relationships with home and international defense industries, are also closely connected with the quality of defense output, and to use the obvious financial term, the return on military investment. Professional armed forces need professional infrastructures of sufficient comprehensiveness, sophistication, and flexibility to act quickly in emergencies and for as long as necessary.

The quality of relationships, doctrines, and force design are thus significant indicators of professionalism. Armed forces that obviously fail, through paucity of quality and resources, will be diminished professionally in their own standing, and externally amongst populations, both at home and abroad, and of course by any enemy they encounter operationally. This leads to the second group of disciplines.

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[19] Stanislav Andreski, *Military Organizations and Society* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954), 127–28.

The Disciplines of Practice

The above disciplines of military effectiveness and fighting power should be evident in practical military application, resulting in proof of efficiency, or competence effectiveness.

The fifth discipline is that of technical expertise and use of technology. The techniques of fighting, from close quarter combat to the use of sophisticated high-tech weapons and equipment, constitute the practical, physical components of military power, subject to the policies, disciplines, and practices of force design already described. How efficiently the "technology" is used is based on military disciplines in the widest sense.

"Technical," meaning military specialist policies and practices are, of course, derived from doctrine, research, education, and training, and are passed on to new generations of servicemen and women, who in turn develop new policies and practices. In addition, the collective memory and wisdom of the armed forces needs to be fully engaged in order to perpetuate those skill sets useful in preparation for, and conduct of, military operations. Thus is "human capital" built up amongst military manpower over time.

Regular armed forces are unusual in one sense. They spend much time in training, preparation, and exercising their skills, both physical and mental, in only the partial expectation of having to apply them in real military situations. Ideally, most wise military professionals would live in the hope of not having to go to war, and not having to be involved in much danger or risk in operations other than war. If called upon to conduct hostilities, the natural and pragmatic desire is to "get the job done" quickly and effectively. Members of fully professional armed forces thus accept the policies, practices, preparations, and peacetime exercising of their skills, in the expectation that they are thereby reducing the danger levels of real operations and combat. The possession of well-trained armed forces increases the ability to deter an enemy attack and promote international security more generally.

The sixth discipline of professionalism is directly connected with ways and means. Armed forces, like any profession, need constantly to regenerate themselves. Professional armed forces are thus defined by the quality of their training and education. To continuously learn and improve individual skills, both practical and procedural, when working closely with others in teams (as the military routinely are required to do) is essential. Even for armed forces of modest size, this is a major effort of national polemity and resources. As military activities represent a very large-scale enterprise, unit, formation, joint, service, and combined (alliance) corporate training needs to be rigorous, realistic, and conducted continually.

For the career (as opposed to the short-service) personnel in armed forces, increasingly weight has been placed on education, taking personal understanding and skill much above the next level of promotion. Only one gen-

eration ago in the British Army, it was entirely accepted that "training [was for] people only in the skills they need, as near as possible to the time they are going to need and use them."[20] There was also not much requirement for the "soldier/scholar"; there now is. Education is conducted for the improvement of the mind's capacity to understand what, how, and why things happen and why people act, or should act, in general, and in this case in particular military contexts. Education of military leaders for the higher direction of forces, requiring independence of thought, ability to analyze critically, and argue both orally and in writing, is now widely accepted in professional national armed forces as a necessity, if everyone is to do their job expertly, cope with the increasing complexities of operations and advancing technologies, and enable civilians to understand military activities. The proportion of officers and NCOs educated at higher education levels is a significant indicator of quality, although additionally all armed forces personnel of any rank need to be highly practical, able to think decisively and act quickly. Extending the military education fields has also required an increasing amount of defense- and security-related research and development, to keep military officers (both commissioned and non-commissioned) abreast of other professionals, and relate them with the civil population and other parts of the employment market.

The next discipline of practical significance is that of measuring military performance, in terms of interior efficiency and effectiveness in achieving tasks. Sophisticated systems have been adopted by some national armed forces, in line with other public sector organizations, based on meeting measurable standards and objectives within a certain financial budget.[21] Statistical exercises in peacetime can be conducted to measure capability against roles and a wide range of tasks performed. The amount of individual recruiting, training, education for expertise, and qualification attainment can also be recorded and analyzed for trends that are maintained and improved (or show deterioration). Exercises and even operations of a limited scale can similarly be judged for quantity and quality of achievement. Major operations, conflicts, and wars conducted by armed forces tend to be measured not only objectively, but also in terms of political achievements as first-order consequences. Second- and third-order consequences are rather more difficult to assess. The chief aim of performance measuring is continuous improvement.

Professionals, by definition, take prime responsibility for improving and developing their own standards, and for modern liberal democracies, accountability and transparency of all the professions is a defining characteristic. The conceptual and physical components of military professionalism, how-

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[20] Colonel R. H. W. Crawford, "Officer Training," correspondence in *British Army Review* 81 (1985): 73.

[21] There are many civil "benchmarking" schemes for commercial and public sector organizations in the West, e.g. the EU-sponsored ISO 9000 series of standards, the European Foundation for Quality Management Excellence Model, Investors in People, etc.

ever, can be judged rather more easily than the moral or subjective attributes of the profession, which are our next topic for discussion.

The Disciplines of Subjectivity

The first of the intangible, subjective disciplines of military professionalism is the relationship of the armed forces with the civilian population as a whole – the "suppliers" of manpower and the "customers" of the service provided.

This relationship in individual nations is frequently measured and assessed, more or less scientifically, with volunteer enlistment figures, or the volume (percentage success) of the intake in countries where conscriptions still prevails.[22] Haltiner's work and Philip Evert's recent book, *Democracy and Military Force*, illustrate the extent to which civil-military relations, and particularly civilian attitudes, have been surveyed and analyzed by some nations, sometimes almost in the belief that armed forces exist only to be the subject of social research. The standing of armed forces as bulwarks of democracy has been measured by two particular surveys. The European Values Group Surveys (Gallup), conducted in 1979 and 1989,[23] and the National Pride Survey (Chicago) of 1998[24] have measured populations' confidence in their armed forces over the years.

The relationship between the armed forces and the population from which they draw their recruits, including potential officers, depends on six chief variables, most of which are self-explanatory.

- How "close" or "isolated" the armed forces and their society are in spirit, attitude, and "visibility."
- Voluntary or conscripted service.
- Martial or militaristic style of internal relationships within the military.
- Demographics of military personnel, their qualifications, and promotion opportunities within the manpower "force design."
- The national/international labor market.
- Armed Forces' reputation.

All are interlinked and interdependent; one needs special comment.

In contrast with large conscript armies of varying and dubious efficiency, bolstered by aging reservists, the demography of already all-voluntary regular armed forces is not generally understood. There is an implication that, since current fully professionalized navies, armies, and air forces are action-based

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[22] Haltiner, "From Centre to Periphery."

[23] Measuring the value placed on institutions of democratic states in Western Europe, such as parliaments, judiciary, police, press, education, armed forces, etc. Quoted in *Daily Telegraph,* 23 September 1991.

[24] Tom W. Smith and Lars Jarkko, *National Pride: Cross-National Analysis*, Report No.19, University of Chicago, National Opinion Research Center (May 1998). Willingness to defend the nation is an often-surveyed question.

enterprises with offensive and not just defensive roles, they chiefly attract young persons at the beginning of their working-life. Quite apart from physical occupational risk, as people mature, the majority require more stability and/or opportunities to progress to more financially rewarding and intellectually challenging phases in their lives. To maintain vigorous armed forces, only a small number – probably less than one quarter – are likely to be retained by the armed forces for senior non-commissioned and middle ranking commissioned and senior officer cadres – the "career" armed forces. The turnover of the volunteer "short service" element is extremely high, but that is not to say that they need not be highly committed, trained, and professional during the period of their service.

The next characteristic of professional armed forces remains an open question. By definition, do fully professional armed forces need to be wholly "voluntary"? On the face of it, it appears that there is an intuitive movement towards this being a defining requirement in liberal democracies, but confused thinking continues. Most nations in Europe, including former members of the Warsaw Pact, are intent on eliminating conscription over time, with an expressed end-date. One cannot, however, say that the Israeli or Swiss citizen armies are less than professional in the context of their roles. Defending home territory is a different matter than the ideal types of armed forces designed for force projection.

In many respects, this indicator of quality is closely related to the armed forces' relationships with the civilian population, controlling authorities, and other agencies of national security. To answer the question, one has to search among the psycho-philosophical complexities of individual as well as group motivation and morale, but common sense indicates that one volunteer, motivated by choice, may be worth a number of pressed men, as the familiar expression has it. One has to ask, however, how willing is the volunteer? Certainly, according to the British military doctrine of 2000, there is the requirement for all members of the armed forces to accept the "legal right and duty to fight and if necessary, kill, according to their orders and an unlimited liability to give their lives in doing so. This is the unique nature of soldiering."[25] This statement is deemed a "covenant," not a "contract." Perhaps that is why the expression "warrior" is retained, to reinforce the "war fighting ethos,"[26] the "superior good" prevailing over otherwise intransigent evil in "power projection" armed forces. Nations that have written military "contracts," which do not include such statements, may have unprofessional (in the specialist sense) inhibitions guaranteed by human rights law. As a result, military duty may become weakened or meaningless.

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[25] Army Doctrine Publication, Volume 5, *Soldiering the Military Covenant*, Ministry of Defence (Britain), Army code no 71642, February 2000, 1-1.

[26] War fighting ethos," in *British Defence Doctrine,* 2nd ed. (London: Ministry of Defence, 2001, 3-4 to 3-5. "Superior public goods" are usually held to be health, education, and personal security.

The question must be, is voluntary unlimited liability the most significant of all indicators of military professionalism? The answer is likely to be found in the argument that the majority of those who join the armed forces voluntarily in the first place are more likely to accept this unique liability, even if for only a brief period of their lives, than those who are coerced into joining. In different nations, different armed forces, and indeed different parts of an armed force, a variety of factors exist from the beginning of a person's service and before he or she takes part in any operations. In the event of active service, or once combat begins, who knows how oneself or others will behave and act? Most of the evidence of bravery or avoidance of danger (if observed) is *ex post facto*.

On balance, with all arguments considered, I believe that fully professional armed forces should be entirely voluntary by definition. All other professions I can think of are voluntary and fully disciplined groups of persons, in many senses of the adjective.

The tenth professional principle is military discipline itself. Traditionally understood, according to Max Weber, it means:

> the consequently rationalized, schematically trained and accurate execution of received orders – without giving expression of personal criticism – and the constant inner submission to that objective.[27]

Traditional, un-modernized armed forces rely for their efficiency and effectiveness on varying degrees of coercive conditioning by authoritarian, militaristic means. Modernized armed forces could be said to promote rational, enlightened, more consensual means to inculcate discipline.

National military laws, written codes of conduct, and unwritten practices exist, more or less modernized to suit changing conditions, within a particular armed force and more or less in accord with the laws of the parent society. Disciplinary procedures taken against those who violate these norms are needed to show exemplary justice, punishment, and to reform the individual. For serious offenses, courts martial try individuals in a fashion similar (or not so similar) to the way in which national civilian courts try cases of criminal or civil law. This constitutes the lower purpose of military discipline. The higher purpose of such procedures is to uphold high standards of professionalism, promote successful military endeavor and high morale, as well as maintain public confidence.

A moot question arises: is self-discipline a higher, more voluntaristic, psycho-philosophical motivation than imposed discipline? In voluntary armed forces, self-discipline certainly is highly prized as a natural consequence of voluntarism. The question is, then, how necessary and to what extent is imposed discipline able to develop inner-directed self-discipline? The justification for

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[27] Max Weber, *Economy and Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 866.

induced discipline by authoritarian means (lightly applied for the intelligent, more strongly applied for the slow-witted) in the armed forces of liberal democracies has to do with setting the highest standards. Be a recruit ever so well motivated and keen to show self-discipline from the outset, he or she may not be aware of the required institutional professional standards. The intelligent commander or instructor will therefore quickly recognize high motivation and use appropriate methods to encourage the potentially self-disciplined, intelligent recruit or trained soldier. There should be no need to resort to highly militaristic methods which, as time progresses, for volunteer armed forces have an increasingly dysfunctional impact.

A seemingly permanent feature of military effectiveness is the dichotomy of the commander and the commanded. It forms the penultimate principle of professionalism. All armed forces continue to employ a wide range of rank distinctions amongst their members. They also maintain formal distinctions between commissioned officers, non-commissioned officers, and holders of subservient office – private soldiers or enlisted men. In their force designs, individual nations need to categorize the statuses of individuals and the internal demographic shape of their armed forces' personnel structure as part of normal manpower planning.

What can be stated about *all* members of the military hierarchy is that there are formal, professional relationships at many levels, which define the hierarchy and who can make what decisions – operational and in other contexts – and who has to obey them. Some of these formal relationships are well defined, highly developed, and entirely relevant; others may be accidental or archaic. Clarity about who can impose discipline and punish according to military law is the crucial division between commissioned (superordinate by legal instrument), warrant (subordinate qualified status), and non-commissioned ranks and those holding no rank or formal office at all.

While shades of militarism may still persist, much of the time in truly professional armed forces, informal, interpersonal relationships exist between persons working closely in teams together, to good effect.[28] A "professional relationship" is a well-established and useful term, implying mutual respect. Some military cultures, conversely, may be too informal, rendering them less than effective. Workable, modern, professional relationships, meaning a mixture of formality and informality, are probably easier to achieve in voluntary armed forces. Conscripts tend to be deeply divided from cadre NCOs and career officers, and healthy informal relationships are unlikely to be formed as part of the military culture.

An indication of the high quality of professionalism within armed forces is therefore an understanding of the need for hierarchies and rank struc-

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[28] See Charles Kirke's four socio-anthropological 'structures' in "A Model for the Analysis of Fighting Spirit in the British Army," in *The British Army. Manpower and Society into the Twenty-First Century,* ed. Hew Strachan (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 227–41.

tures, the clarity of status, the quality of formal relationships and, equally important, the quality of informal relationships between real, live human beings working together in circumstances of difficulty or danger. An understanding of when one should act formally with a senior or subordinate person, or switch to informal means of communication and interpersonal action, often enables the whole military endeavor to work, organically as well as systematically, towards a greater likelihood of success.

Finally, there is a group of intangible factors that need to be brought together to promote and sustain professional, effective, and "usable" armed forces.[29] They are institutional and personal leadership and a well-developed, natural corporate ethos, leading to high reputation and morale. These are noticeably lacking in most conscript forces. It has been found that, in civilian organizations, typically "up to 85 percent of a corporation's value is based on intangible assets," and if those assets are not effective, the company declines or collapses under external pressure.[30] So what is the case in military organizations?

Numerous, mainly inconclusive works have been written, and many opinions expressed about leadership. Two significant factors spring to mind. Effective leaders are successful. They bring high quality to their own performance and that of those they lead, collectively and individually. Essentially, leading is an inspirational activity, which by definition is spiritual both in quality and performance.[31] Leaders raise expectations amongst the led: consistently effective leaders faithfully fulfill or exceed expectations. Professional armed forces, as a qualitative indication of their standing, manifestly require to be commanded by officers (commissioned and non-commissioned) who are effective leaders, and amongst the best of their generation. Their duty is to motivate. Motivation is a variable factor, based on willingness and choice. Strong motivation, self-directed choice, and intelligent obedience are likely features of professional, volunteer armed forces.

The ethos of an institution is, again, an intangible, spiritual quality. In short, it can be described as ethical culture. "Ethics differ from morality in that conduct may be described as 'moral' when it is maintained or observed as fact, but becomes 'ethical' as it rises from fact to ideal."[32] Ideals, values, beliefs, and

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[29] A clearly expressed requirement in the introduction to the publication of Britain's *Strategic Defence Review, Modern Forces for the Modern World,* 1998, 1. The contrast is with "Forces in being," that is, forces for deterrence and display only, not for "use."

[30] David Norton's Foreword to Brian Becker, Mark A. Huselid, and David Ulrich, *The HR Scorecard. Linking People, Strategy, and Performance* (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 2002), ix.

[31] See Patrick Mileham and Keith Spacie, *Transforming Corporate Leadership* (London: Financial Times/Pearson, 1996), 21–34.

[32] Rosamund Thomas, *The British Philosophy of Administration* (Cambridge: Centre for Business and Public Sector Ethics, 1989), 141. F. S. Northedge draws attention to the ideal, or *ethos*, and *kratos*, or reality, of human behavior in the real world less than ideal. See Northedge, *The International Political System* (London: Faber, 1976), 222.

performance are all part of the ethos of armed forces. High standards – the ability to fulfilling professed claims – are an aspiration of all professional persons who take their calling seriously. "Ideal excellence" and "the 'genius' of an institution" are other, dictionary meanings of *ethos*. The study and promotion of standards of ethical behavior in the military context – above and beyond the legal requirements – is increasingly conducted at officer academics and practiced on operations.[33] Integrity of armed forces, in many senses of the word, is of paramount importance.

Morale is dependent not only on internal factors, such as are listed in all the indicators of professional quality mentioned above, but significantly in terms of reputation amongst the civil population and other professions. Reputation, "that immortal part" of a person or institution, is of particular sensitivity in life-and-death occupations.[34] A high reputation is dependent on high standards of internal leadership and morale, exemplified by faithful and effective performance.

All these factors are dynamic and variable. They are also fragile. Even modest failure can affect morale and reputation severely and undermine ethos. So the best guarantors and trustees of morale, ethos, and reputation are the leaders, personified by both military and civilian holders of office. The morale of armed forces is thus closely linked to standards of leadership and the collective confidence and commitment individual members feel, based on ideals and ethos. Low morale is the consequence of fear of failure, or actual failure. It is, moreover, dependent on numerous situational factors, personal relationships, and events. Some of these can be measured and an assessment made of their consequences for corporate morale, commitment, and performance.[35] Finally, morale reflects the quality of the civil-military relationship explained above. Morale and confidence are synonymous.

Conclusions – Universal Disciplines

"The true soldier is the enemy of the beast in man, and none other," asserted Field Marshal Montgomery.[36] In a modern liberal democracy, that person is the civilized warrior.

Nations and alliances get the armed forces they deserve, just as they do governments. Circumstances change, as do perceptions; if one is optimistic, then they change for the better. The perceptions of professionals and the public, based on retaining a firm connection with reality as it affects the objectives of

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[33] The Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics (JSCOPE) in the U.S., and the Royal Institute of International Affairs and United Services Institute's recent series of "military ethics" conferences, are evidence of research and debate.

[34] William Shakespeare, *Othello*, Act II, Scene iii, line 266.

[35] See Mileham, ed., "'Morale in Armed Forces' Conference Proceedings", *RUSI Journal* (April 2001): 46–53.

[36] Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery, *History of Warfare* (London: Collins, 1968), 567.

professional practice, is crucial. Combat and operations other than war, including peace support, are the *raisons d'etre* of armed forces. Professional failure is therefore dangerous, and the full extent of the dangers is not necessarily apparent before the event. Military effectiveness in normal day-to-day work, and the realistic expectation of success in operation, has to be the culminating point of all trust, trusteeship, and professionalism, both within the profession of arms and among those who direct and support their nations' armed forces.

In summary, the forecasts of Janowitz and Moskos are increasingly being realized in Europe and the West, but the quality of armed forces has to be constantly scrutinized. Armed forces will have to remain ready, able, and willing to fight as warriors, conducting some unpleasant and uncivilized, offensive, brutish acts of violence, death, wounding in body and mind and destruction – if they are called on to do so. This is what they profess to do, beyond their mere functionality.

Military professionalism needs to be measured and judged according to a universal conception of military power against both actual preparedness and performance. The disciplines, principles, criteria, and standards guiding armed forces include the following:

- Objective control by civil authorities who are themselves professionally and democratically led.
- Well-conceived and fully developed doctrines, from which all military activity flows.
- Mature and responsible relationships with other national and international security and defense institutions and agencies.
- Fully comprehensive force design, allocated resources, and infrastructures.
- Appropriate technological and technical expertise developed to a high standard.
- Highly trained and well-educated military personnel.
- Objective quantitative and qualitative performance measurement systems and processes.
- Supportive and understanding reciprocal relationship with the civil population.
- Voluntary basis of military service, workable contracts and terms of service.
- Corporate ethos of discipline and self-discipline.
- Healthy internal relationships in the hierarchy of ranks, based on effective leadership.
- High ethical standing, morale, and reputation, based in performance.

The only appropriate conclusion to this article is to comment briefly on internal and external reflexivity. It will have struck the reader that all these indicators of professionalism are interconnected and interdependent, both directly and indi-

rectly. Robust systems and procedures for internal and international evaluation are useful in themselves for quality monitoring and control. In time, the above disciplines, and others developed by policymakers, can become confidence building measures of considerable persuasiveness. A true profession requires explicit, codified standards. "Such standards are Universal … capable of general application irrespective of time and space," we are reminded by Huntington.[37] Such could be the universal contribution of the professions of arms in forming a widespread international Security and Defense Identity to ensure the greatest possible collective security.

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[37] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 8.

Central Asia: Mackinder Revisited?

By Michel Hess[*]

When Alfred Thayer Mahan, an American naval officer, noted the seeming correlation between the rise of *Pax Britannica* in the nineteenth century and the development of the British Navy, he argued convincingly that naval capabilities were the *sine qua non* to national power.[1] With the waning of British supremacy, however, this paradigm was challenged by technological advances in land transportation. The advent of railroads and the internal combustion engine meant that land power would assume the dominant position in the twentieth century. It was Halford Mackinder, a British geographer, who noted that, while only a quarter of the world's surface was land, the three contiguous continents of Asia, Europe, and Africa constituted two-thirds of the planet's solid surface. Mackinder referred to this landmass as the "World Island."[2] The key to strategic domination, according to his model, was the "heartland," the part of Eurasia that is formed by Central Asia, the Caucasus, and parts of present-day Russia.[3] Strategic domination involves exclusive access to energy resources, and Mackinder thought the World Island would contain significant portions of those resources.

While these early proponents of *Geopolitik* introduced important geographic considerations into strategic studies, their approach provided the foundation for policy aberrations by Nazi Germany,[4] and also polarized academic debates in their time.[5] It was Nicholas Spykman who introduced modifications

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[1] Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Seapower upon History, 1660-1783* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1897).

[2] Halford Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality* (New York: Holt and Company, 1919), 150: "Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland. Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island. Who rules the World Island commands the World."

[3] Gerald Robbins, "The Post-Soviet Heartland: Reconsidering Mackinder," *Global Affairs* 8 (Fall 1993): 95–108.

[4] Mackinder's ideas appealed in particular to Karl Haushofer, a German geographer with considerable influence in Nazi military circles. This influence laid the foundation for many of Hitler's conceptions of *Lebensraum* (a term coined by Friedrich Ratzel), leading to military aggression against Eastern Europe and Russia. Haushofer and Mackinder's ideas also preoccupied American strategic research during the war, as evidenced by J. Thorndike, "Geopolitics: The Lurid Career of a Scientific System which a Briton Invented, the Germans Used, and the Americans Need to Study," *Life*, 21 December 1942.

[5] Nichols Spykman, *The Geography of Peace* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1944); Michael P. Gerace, "Between Mackinder and Spykman: Geopolitics, Containment, and After," *Comparative Strategy* 10 (October/December 1991): 347–64.

into the school of thought by de-emphasizing the importance of the heartland, and by arguing that, "who controls the rimland rules Eurasia, who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world."[6] Spykman referred to the rimland as an area roughly covering Western Europe, the Middle East, and South and East Asia. If one of the primary tasks of strategic analysis is forecasting, then Spykman's analysis has proved to be remarkably accurate. Without necessarily concluding that Spykman's work constituted "a central theoretical foundation of George F. Kennan's famous postwar proposal for a 'policy of containment' of the Soviet Union," he can be credited for predicting at least two developments after the Second World War: Russia's and China's roles in the balance of power, and U.S. protective policy towards Japan.[7]

What is the merit of geopolitical approaches in a post-Cold War era of rapid technological developments, digital communications, and globalized economies and polities? On their face, the distinctions between the heartland, the rimland, and the World Island have become analytically inaccurate. The empirical manifestations of this inaccuracy are manifold: globalization, inter-continental ballistic missiles, weapons of mass destruction, globally operating terrorist networks, Islamic fundamentalism, and transnational organized crime. These phenomena render any notion of *territorial control* functionally mean-ingless, regardless of military power. A more apt description of recent develop-ments in the rimland and the heartland would outline preventive and repressive crisis management for regional stabilization and influence, or a "muddling through." But has Mackinder's heartland theory indeed become obsolete? Not necessarily. NATO's intervention in Afghanistan and the protracted engagement by coalition forces in Iraq confirm rather than undermine the value of conven-tional military capabilities, albeit in the form of lighter and more flexible infantry forces supported by strategic airlift. In addition, the conventional wis-dom in the current foreign and security policy debate forecasts a Central Asia that will become once again entangled in a new Great Game between powers struggling to gain a foothold and resources in the heartland, much along the same lines as during the times of tsarist Russia and colonial Britain.[8]

This essay evaluates this renewed interest in Central Asia. It puts the region's current and projected importance in the context of the foreign policy interests of the United States, Russia, China, Turkey, and Iran, and views it in the light of regional and international security considerations. The paper advances a three-pronged argument:

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[6] Nichols Spykman, *The Geography of Peace* op.cit., 43.

[7] James F. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, *Contending Theories of International Relations* (New York: Harper and Row, 1981), 65. See also G. R. Sloan, *Geopolitics in United States Strategic Policy, 1890-1987* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), 127–239, and Colin S. Gray, *The Geopolitics of Superpower* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1988).

[8] See for example Lutz Kleveman, *The New Great Game: Blood and Oil in Central Asia* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2003).

- Simplifying geopolitical paradigms continue to legitimize foreign and security policy strategies by all external actors in Central Asia, with tangible implications for the tactical conduct of statecraft. Since the break-up of the Soviet Union's heartland domination, *Geopolitik* has even experienced – paradoxically – a veritable renaissance in both academic and policy circles. Al-Qaeda-organized and sponsored terrorist attacks have only intensified an already existing belief that the heartland bestows a geopolitical advantage to the power that controls it.
- This revival of a geopolitical approach towards Central Asia is based on inaccurate perceptions of and assumptions about the region, and exaggerated, deterministic reductions of foreign policies to competitive energy imperialism.
- Central Asia would only under a specific set of conditions become the platform for a new Great Game, but the parameters for these conditions are unlikely to emerge in the foreseeable future.

The geopolitically driven ambitions of the most important actors in the region are both ephemeral and ambiguous: ephemeral because of a lack of resources, coordination, and an honest interest in long-term sustainable development of Central Asia; ambiguous because of the difficulties encountered in the reconciliation of divergent challenges. The most prominent challenges include but are not limited to the current political order in the region, the rise of Islamism, radicalization in the absence of other alternative and viable forms of political expression, the absence of a larger vision of regionalism on the part of both Central Asian states and external powers, and the complexity of preventive and sustainable anti-terrorist measures in an environment that is marginal, fragile, and economically disadvantaged.

An Uncertain Renaissance

Central Asia has gained significant global attention for primarily two reasons: the region's role as a buffer zone and as a platform for strategic projection in the war on terror and the exploitation of energy reserves in the Caspian Sea area. The global campaign against terrorism led to an intensification of diplomatic efforts and a foreign military presence in the region comparable in intensity to the economically motivated initiatives that took place in the 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union. [9] During the first ten years of post-Soviet independ-

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[9] In October 2003, Russia opened the Kant air force base outside of Bishkek. 500 Russian troops will be based permanently at Kant, Russia's first new military installation on foreign soil since the breakup of the Soviet Union. The troops are part of a rapid-reaction force based on the Collective Security Treaty signed by non-GUUAM CIS member-states in Dushanbe in April 2003. Kyrgyzstan is a rare case where both American and Russian bases are located. The Manas base, however, which was set up by the United States after September 11 for airlift needs in Afghanistan, is in the process of being reduced to 1,100 men, down from 2,000, two-thirds of which are American (see *The Economist*, November 1, 2003, 60). The United States maintains a second, less significant base in Uzbekistan.

ence, Central Asian states looked beyond Moscow primarily for capital and technology to boost their oil drilling and the exploitation of natural gas reserves. With every Al-Qaeda terrorist incident, however, it became tragically clear that the delicate balance between economic and security interests had been mismanaged by both national authorities and foreign interests. Retrospectively, the decisive factor in this miscalculation did not rest with the extraction of resources, but with their safe transportation from landlocked production sites to distant markets.[10] While a pipeline that would bring fuels through Iran was impracticable, given the stalemate of U.S.–Iranian relations, Afghanistan presented itself as a convenient transit alternative. When the Taliban came to power in 1996, they found widespread financial and political support as perceived harbingers of authoritarian stability and the predictability so fundamentally important for capital investors. Al-Qaeda's militancy, with its obvious links to the Taliban regime, threw the miscalculation into sharp relief. Thus Operation Enduring Freedom, thus the seeming strategic renaissance of the rimland bordering Central Asia, fuelled by unprecedented high-level diplomatic activities and an upsurge of bilateral and multilateral assistance programs. But what kind of *renaissance* was it?

Without September 11 and the uninterrupted record of terrorist incidents, the structural weaknesses of state authority, the lack of legitimate (let alone democratic) institutions, protracted economic difficulties, widespread poverty, porous borders, ethnic tensions, and religious extremism would have done little to recommend Central Asia for a central role in the geostrategic spotlight. The reactive mode of the attention focused on the region underlines both the need for and the shortcomings of *negatively motivated* preventive security measures: *stopping* the operations and growth of terrorist networks; *stopping* the illicit narcotics trade, which targets Western markets, and narcoterrorism;[11] *stopping* the numerous regional conflicts from developing into major ones; and *preventing* the interruption of unhampered access to the region's energy resources. The ostensibly renewed interest in the region by the United States, Russia, China, Turkey, and Iran finds expression in short-term tactical and improvised policies rather than any long-term strategic planning.

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[10] Terrorist actors are acutely aware of the strategic importance of critical national infrastructures. Some of the most vulnerable elements of this infrastructure are energy transportation and transmission facilities such as power lines, pipelines, fuel tanker trucks, electric power substations, power generating plants, pipeline pumping and compressor stations, refineries, and natural gas and liquefied natural gas facilities. Typically, clandestine bombings form the core of the modus operandi against such facilities (see "Protecting Energy Facilities From Terrorist Attacks," *Intersec* 13:1 (January 2003): 14-17).

[11] "Narcoterrorism" is not specifically recognized as a crime in most countries. Georgia, for example, is drafting legislation to do classify it as a crime. See Jemal Gakhokidze, "The Fight Against Terrorism and Crime in the Context of National, Regional and Global Security," *Trends in Organized Crime* 7:1 (Fall 2001): 85–91.

Strategic and Tactical Considerations

While there are signs that the United States has been turning military and diplomatic resources away from Central Asia and the Caucasus towards Iraq and the Middle East in order to avoid the problems associated with strategic overextension, even a reduced U.S. presence in Central Asia will have lasting effects. Geopolitical considerations have led the United States to establish a small quasi-permanent presence in its attempt to root out the conditions that breed terrorism on the one hand, and to maintain access to Central Asia's oil and gas reserves as an alternative to Middle Eastern reserves that are subject to greater political volatility on the other. The much-reduced military presence indicates, however, that U.S. policy towards Central Asia and the Caspian region remains tactical in nature and therefore uncertain. With the successful ousting of the Taliban regime, the need for high-level engagements seems to have disappeared, even given the residual instability in Afghanistan. The U.S. military presence will therefore continue to be maintained at a modest level in Central Asia as long as Al-Qaeda operations continue, and as long as the Taliban have a small chance to return to power. With regard to energy reserves, it is clear that Russian (Siberian) and West African oil has become significantly more important for ensuring stable, diverse supplies than the Caspian basin. The completion of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline is more likely to reduce rather than increase the American presence in the Caspian region, as already evidenced by a decline in economic assistance programs.

The rapid U.S. operational engagement in 2001 and 2002 in Central Asia, followed by a scaled disengagement in 200, is indeed symptomatic of the absence of a visionary application of any long-term strategy in the region.[12] The engagement has been devoid of a broader sustainable and regional dimension beyond the ousting of Al-Qaeda leaders and the Taliban regime. The uncertain nature of the U.S. presence is an important element of the region's chronic instability. At the same time, the United States' Central Asia engagements have attracted widespread attention to the obstacles and opportunities presented by economic and cautious political reforms. Furthermore, the technical assistance programs in border management and law enforcement may in the medium term have a positive impact on regional stability, as radicalized movements encounter not only more difficult conditions for recruitment and maneuver, but also more professional and better-equipped security forces. In short, geopolitical and domestic security considerations have led the world's foremost economic, political, and military superpower to become involved in one of the most remote and powerless regions of the world. Whether this strategic choice will

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[12] In the fiscal year 2002, the United States provided $580 million in aid to Central Asia, as compared to $250 million in 2001. For 2003, the level is likely to be at the 2001 level or lower. See Charles William Maynes, "America Discovers Central Asia," *Foreign Affairs* 82:2 (March/April 2003): 120–32.

end with an incremental decision to withdraw the remaining tactical presence remains to be seen. However, Central Asia's rapidly changing role in the global terrorism-prevention scheme is illustration enough of the legitimizing power that Mackinder's ideas still have on foreign policies which neither promote a larger vision of Central Asian regionalism nor address the complex and difficult tasks of good governance, in particular the reconciliation of democratic principles with Islamic traditions.

Unlike the United States, Russia's foreign policy is more consistently anchored in a grand strategy in the Mackinderian mode towards an area that Moscow has always considered its own backyard. With the dissolution of the convergence of interests between Russia and the United States in the immediate aftermath of September 11, this grand strategy has been further consolidated: continuing maintenance of a military presence throughout the region (in Tajikistan and Kazakhstan in particular), establishment of the new Kant military base in the Kyrgyz Republic in order to "deter terrorists and extremists of all kinds," intensified intelligence exchange and cooperation between the Federal Security Service (FSB) and Central Asian security services (FSB's annual conference of CIS intelligence chiefs), and a new military doctrine which renews Russian ambitions to regain some of the political, military, and economic influence it has ceded to the United States, China, and Turkey in the wake of September 11. The military reassertion is directed particularly toward China, as the doctrine threatens the use of nuclear weapons against conventional attacks in "situations that are vital for the survival of Russia and its allies."

These measures indicate that Russian policy in the region is dominated by a focus on terrorism, asymmetric threats, and the desire to contain NATO's influence, pursued through the bilateral individual Partnership for Peace (PfP) programs and multilateral PfP exercises in the region, such as the Fergana Valley exercise.[13] The new military doctrine places emphasis on the independent role of air power, lighter and more flexible infantry forces, special forces to counter asymmetric threats, and – most importantly – the role of military forces in defending Russian economic interests abroad and protecting Russian-speaking minorities in CIS countries. Following the classic paradigm of *Geopolitik*, the doctrine links domestic security to the control of the heartland through the presence of Russian troops in Central Asia. By linking fragile regimes, terrorism, and "soft" security threats to the need for control of the heartland, Moscow demonstrates that geopolitical reasoning still plays an important role in the definition of its grand strategy. Similarly, the novel system of intensified intelligence coordination strengthens Russia's information position with regard to asymmetric threats emanating from the region, notably on

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[13] The new military doctrine was published in early October 2003 as a 73-page blueprint by the Ministry of Defense. It states notably that, "if NATO is preserved as a military alliance with its existing military doctrine, this will demand a radical overhaul of Russian military planning, including changes in Russian nuclear strategy."

the penetration of Islamic fundamentalism, drug trafficking, separatist movements, and critical infrastructures.[14] A joint intelligence database on organized crime and terrorism and the development of the CIS Anti-Terrorist Center in Bishkek illustrate the advantages provided by a common KGB heritage, which is still shared by many intelligence services throughout the region. Close intelligence coordination between Russia and the United States also continues to be important to the leadership in both countries, as comparative advantages in the analytical and operational intelligence fields have brought complementary advantages to both sides in Central Asia. Both sides are also benefiting from intelligence to further their economic interests, notably the promotion of leading energy corporations. As Central Asian states with hydrocarbon reserves rely on a Russian-owned pipeline system subject to trans-shipment fees, Russia considers the development of any alternative transport routes as a security threat.

China's position vis-à-vis Central Asia is characterized by a long-term consistent and geopolitically motivated foreign and security policy. Due to this consistency, China is likely to become the most important long-term power and reference point in and for Central Asia. Russian needs and interests are split between Europe and China, viewing the former as an opportunity and the latter as a competitor and threat. Potential economic cooperation between Russia and China on energy and water in Central Asia are unlikely to develop significantly as long as borders remain vulnerable and the demographic balance unfavorable. The role of the European Union in the region is most likely to be marginal, due to a significant absence of policy coordination and a lack of interest. In this vacuum, China is best positioned to seek economic integration with Central Asia. This integration will satisfy China's immense needs for energy and water, but will also create a fertile ground for Russian-Chinese conflicts over mounting Chinese influence and illegal migration. The recent long-term acquisition offensive by Chinese petrochemical corporations in Kazakhstan's giant North Caspian Sea project indicates that the world's third-largest consumer of energy is keen on boosting its already rapid economic development in the coastal areas.[15] It also indicates that China has taken a head start over Russia and the United States, which are still in the early stages of negotiating oil and gas agreements in the Caspian basin.

Finally, Turkey and Iran are unlikely to become significant actors in Central Asia, although for different reasons. While Turkey acquired substantial influence and engaged in a number of business activities in Central Asia in the

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[14] For example, the FSB and the Kazakh Committee of National Security (KNB) are thought to have exchanged data on Islamic religious groups in Central Asia. Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) is also likely to have used the KNB's channel to Turkey.

[15] The long-term nature of these acquisitions is shown, for example, by China National Petroleum Corporation's pledge to invest in the development of Aktobemunaigaz over the next twenty years. China National Offshore Oil Corporation has also purchased an 8.5% stake from the British Petrol Group.

1990s, the recent economic downturn has undermined Erdogan's revived pan-Turkic ambitions and stripped his vision of its necessary material credibility. Central Asian regimes realized that the Turkish model for a secular state with Islamic traditions cannot address national and regional challenges; nor was the divisive internal debate over European Union accession in Turkey particularly encouraging for regimes that are trying to preserve domestic stability. Iran's role as an important market for the Caucasus and Central Asia has not lived up to its potential, given Iran's geopolitically advantageous position. The reasons for this failure are manifold, but are essentially related to bureaucratic politics, political instability, imposed sanctions, and hesitant reforms. With changed domestic and external parameters, Iran is more likely to articulate geopolitical ambitions and take a proactive role in Central Asia.

Structural Limitations and Caveats

The above sketch argues that Central Asia has enjoyed a temporary revival of policy attention, but that this revival is unlikely to either yield any positive results for the region's sustainable development and democratization or a new Great Game between powers for the control of the heartland. For one, the policy attention has been primarily negatively motivated, focused on the short term, and self-interested. As part of a poor and remote region, Central Asian countries have skillfully marketed their geographic position. They have garnered short-term benefits from the global war against terrorism, the United States' drive for a westward pipeline, Moscow's drive to keep control of Caspian oil, China's drive for an eastward route with Kazakhstan, and Iran's call for oil swaps to satisfy energy needs in the north. The long-run perspectives are already giving clear signals. First, foreign military and defense commitments are shrinking to a tactical minimum in the region. Second, the initial enthusiasm for the vastly exaggerated Caspian oil reserves has given rise to scenarios of heartland energy wars, which have proven to be completely unfounded. The magnitude of capital investments and technology required to modernize Soviet-style drilling equipment has proven prohibitive; national regulations and bureaucratic obstacles have turned investors away, for example, from oil and gas extraction in Turkmenistan; and other, more important energy reserves in Siberia and West Africa are likely to shift economic attention away from Central Asia.

Another, more positive set of preconditions would be necessary for Central Asia to maintain the long-term interest of key players and therefore to reap any sustainable benefits. These preconditions, however, do not exist at this time. First, the United States has not shown any inclination to develop a long-term strategy for the region. While geopolitical simplifications have led to increased U.S. investments in the energy sector and a diplomatic-military presence and offensive, both are likely to dwindle in the light of improved stability and more reliable alternative oil and gas reserves elsewhere. In the political

realm, Iraq and the Middle East are more prominent stages on which the reconciliation between Islam and democratic governance has to be hammered out. Iraq is also much more likely than Central Asia to become the stage on which to develop and test the policies appropriate to the new challenges of the post-September 11 world. Central Asia's stability is closely tied to a functioning U.S.-Russian relationship, and only with China's assertive role will the region remain a global focus.

Second, Russia's geopolitical heartland ambitions as expressed in the new military doctrine fall short of their promise. Is Moscow willing and able to employ armed forces to further its national interests in Central Asia? Russia's willingness to pursue this course is in little doubt, as expressed by a grand strategy that draws upon Mackinderian terminology. However, given her current capabilities and sunken operational investments in Chechnya, Russia lacks both the economic and the technical means necessary for any protracted intervention in Central Asia. Capabilities for long-range and pre-emptive strikes are largely absent (outdated precision-guided weapons, aging strategic bombers, and an insufficient number of multi-purpose radars for "smart" bombs). The gap between a doctrine based on *Geopolitik* and the resources available to implement that doctrine lowers the probability of Russian participation in a hypothetical new Great Game.

Third, China is most preoccupied with growing political instability in Central Asia. While the United States may not have the long-term will, and Russia lacks the capabilities to follow through on its geopolitical ambitions in the heartland, China is only too concerned and aware of the importance of bordering Central Asia. Regime changes in the region will have a direct impact on Chinese national security. The continuing suppression of the Uighur population in China's Xinjang Province poses considerable challenges to a central government which attempts to eradicate or downplay the natural ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and religious affinities which the Uighurs share with the larger Central Asian zone.[16] As evidenced by Chinese petrochemical takeovers, China is the key player with the most rational basis for a long-term engagement in Central Asia (escalating energy needs, population pressure, looming separatism) and adequate economic instruments and political-military clout to defend its national interests in the region.

Finally, while Turkey and Iran may have heartland-oriented grand strategies on paper, their ambitions fall even farther short than Russia's, as neither cultivates the traditional institutional linkages which provide Russia with convenient access to all Central Asian governments.

Central Asia is therefore unlikely to be turned again into a platform for a new Great Game, as the interested powers either lack the will, resources, and

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[16] See for example Graham E. Fuller and S. Federick Starr, *The Xinjang Problem* (Washington, D.C.: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, SAIS, 2003).

interest, or have other priorities that absorb scarce resources. The choice of allo-cating economic or military assets for the implementation of tactical and strate-gic decisions is not an easy one. The gap between geopolitical arguments and the capabilities to follow through is particularly pronounced with respect to Central Asia. The rhetoric advanced by Turkey, the United States, and Russia reveals to a certain extent an ignorance about the region, or the persistence and fallacy of historically-rooted analogies.

What are Central Asia's realities? Why would the territorial control of Central Asia deliver any geopolitical advantages, as suggested by Mackinder's geographically deterministic model? First, even as a geographically remote region distant from open market economies, Central Asia cannot be considered a "natural fortress." The "soft" security challenges underline the vulnerability rather than the impregnability of the heartland. Thus these challenges, along with modern weapons technologies, transform heartland domination into a lia-bility rather than an asset.

Second, while technological advances have expanded the possibilities for rapid troop movements and power projections by railroad, they also changed the strategic airlift capabilities of armed forces. Long-range bombers have weakened the fundamental importance of geography, thus calling into question the type of infrastructural base investments that were made after the Second World War. The new bases enabling U.S. strategic airlift in Romania, Bulgaria, and also Central Asia are logistically more flexible and much more modest than the first generation of bases in Western Europe.

Third, a central position in the heartland opens up considerable strate-gic vulnerabilities along an enormous littoral rimland, and is therefore a source of permanent insecurity. Russia's geopolitically grounded new military doctrine is therefore fully in line with its tradition to seek buffer zones against attacks through outposts. Paradoxically, any incursions into the rimland by the United States and China bolster this deeply rooted Russian insecurity even further.

Fourth, it is an illusion to expect major productivity advances in the heartland to result through external domination, as harsh climatic conditions make agriculture and mining difficult endeavors. The extraction of natural resources demands above all major capital investments, which are unlikely to create any immediate trickle-down productivity boosters at the local level. Compared to Western Europe's role in supporting the United States' rise to strategic domination, Central Asia does not seem to be able to offer the same kind of advantages.

While Eurasia's mythological role in the geographic positioning of powers seeking or maintaining global domination continues to loom large, the heartland has neither delivered any major advantages and assets to its inhabi-tants nor to its occupying powers. Estimates about fossil fuel reserves in the region had to be corrected massively, and the mythic quality of geopolitical argumentation has been disclosed further with the appearance of every com-

plexity and diversity that has called the received wisdom into question. The direct application of Mackinder's heartland model to today's Central Asia is therefore unethical, immoral, and unjustifiable. Unethical because it provides a deeply flawed foreign and security policy foundation insensitive to the diversity of the region and to the security challenges, which transcend state-centric solutions. Immoral because hegemonic ambitions come at the cost of regional local development and ignore the need for effective preventive measures against asymmetric threats. Unjustifiable because heartland power does not and will never deliver the putative advantages promised by the model. The first important step towards regional stabilization and the introduction of good governance based on democratic principles, the rule of law, and human rights is therefore to acknowledge that unexamined assumptions, analogies, and outdated theories have been a driving force in policy-making towards Central Asia, and are also to a certain extent responsible for the region's weaknesses. The next step is to foster multilateral efforts that make an honest attempt at improving Central Asia's well being. These could serve as a geographic launching pad for a genuinely global preventive strategy that offers solutions for the post-September 11 security challenges.

Cyprus in Europe: Solving the Cyprus Problem by Europeanizing it?

By Peter A. Zervakis[*]

At the time of the Treaties of Rome in 1957 creating the European Economic Community (EEC), and the Agreements of Zurich and London in 1959 founding the Republic of Cyprus, both of the new "postmodern polities" emerged despite the lack of any historical precedent.[1] Based on international treaties rather than domestic constitutions, they were constructed to open the traditional sovereign nation-states and their borders to trans-national modes of European governance.[2] Because they were not typical state actors, they did not fit into the political landscape of the era. Given the complicated but carefully balanced institutional and power sharing arrangements between the member nations of the EEC and the supranational institutions in one case, and the divergent Greek and Turkish ethnicities of the Republic of Cyprus forcing compromises in collective decision-making in the other, these resembled neither classical sovereign nation-states nor post-war modern international organizations like the United Nations (UN), which were grounded mainly on diplomatic interactions between governmental representatives. The creation of supranational organs like the Commission, with legal competencies in particular policy areas (internal market); the directly permeating quality of European (economic) law in the member states; and the introduction of direct elections to the European Parliament since 1979, as well as the single currency in 1999/2002, all belong to the distinctive quality of the European Community (EC) as "*un objet politique non-identifié*."[3]

The distinguishing characteristics of the "incomplete statehood of Cyprus"[4] include, first, the limit of sovereign rights for the Republic of Cyprus, based on the required consent of the guaranteeing powers (United Kingdom,

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[1] Thomas Dietz, ed, *The European Union and the Cyprus Conflict. Modern Conflict, Postmodern Union,* (Manchester University Press, 2002), 203. [Author: publisher?]

[2] Peter Zervakis, "Globalisierung und Europäisierung als Herausforderungen für den Wandel des Nationalstaats in Europa," in *Ethik, Politik und Kulturen im Globalisierungsprozess, Eine interdisziplinäre Zusammenführung*, ed. Ralf Elm (Bochum, 2003), 295. [Author: publisher?]

[3] Alberta M. Sbragia, "Thinking about the European Future: The Uses of Comparison," in *Europolitics*, ed. Alberta M. Sbragia (Washington, D.C., 1992), 257; and Dimitris Chryssochoou, *Towards a civic conception of the European polity*, ESRC Working Paper 33 (University of Sussex Press, 2001), 24.

[4] Christopher Brewin, *The European Union and Cyprus* (Huntingdon, 2000), 1-3.

Greece, Turkey) to any domestic constitutional changes. Second, these powers had the right to intervene, either commonly or singularly, for the restoration of state unity. Furthermore, sovereign English military bases (almost three percent of the island surface of Cyprus) provided an anachronistic feature comparable only to the four-power status of Berlin, and the power sharing between the two contrasting ethnic groups became institutionalized at the cost of the majority principle.[5] Finally, from the beginning, both non-state constructs were missing the unifying concept of a national identity. Therefore, the founding documents of the EEC as well as the Cypriot *Volksgruppenstaat*[6] (communities state) guarantee to secure peace, welfare, and stability by keeping the balance between the divergent national interests through permanent negotiations between their members.[7]

As the economies of Germany and France integrated step by step, the injurious nationalism that had led to two world wars began to dissolve. Following the Franco-German partnership, the pledged political parity between Bonn and Paris became the engine of further integration in Western Europe despite different population ratios and geopolitical considerations.[8] From 1954–59 on Cyprus, on the other hand, the Greek Cypriots fought a bloody war for independence from the British (and their Turkish Cypriot allies) and *enosis* (unity) with Greece. Afterward, a complex constitutional order, with mutual checks and balances, was forced upon the majority of Greek Cypriots to secure political equality with their Turkish counterparts. This sought to prevent the outbreak of conflict for the long term between not only the Greek and Turkish Cypriots but also their respective mother countries, both of which were NATO members. However, the political goal failed, largely due to the Greek majority's disinterest in and unwillingness to accept mutual cooperation with the Turkish minority based on equal rights. Indeed, three intra-Cyprus civil wars followed in 1963–64, 1967, and 1974, all featuring the direct intervention of Greece and Turkey.[9]

In the past decades, the European Union has become a success story in promoting peace, stability, and welfare among its members. In spite of different size and population, its politically equal member states have learned voluntarily to handle conflicts among one another without violence and without the need for a supranational institution with its own monopoly of power. Worldwide, the

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[5] Peter Zervakis, :Die politischen Systeme Zyperns," in *Die politischen Systeme Osteuropas*, ed. Wolfgang Ismayr (Opladen, 2002), 847.

[6] Christian Rumpf, "Verfassung und Recht," in *Handbook on South Eastern Europe. Vol. VIII. Cyprus*, eds. Klaus-Detlev Grothusen, Winfried Steffani, and Peter Zervakis (Göttingen, 1998), 158–60.

[7] Tozun Bahcheli, "Domestic Political Development," in *Handbook*, eds. Grothusen, Steffani, and Zervakis, 98; and Geir Lundestad, *"Empire" by Integration* (Oxford, 1998), 3–4.

[8] Peter Zervakis and Sébastien von Gosslar, "40 Jahre Elysée-Vertrag: Hat das deutsch-französische Tandem noch eine Zukunft?" *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* B 3-4 (2003): 6-13.

[9] Peter Zervakis, "Zypern," in *Studienhandbuch Östliches Europa,* vol.1, ed. Harald Roth (Cologne, 1999), 442–43.

EU has gained role-model status, demonstrating how peace, prosperity, and conflict prevention are possible through mutual agreement, to the benefit of all parties. After the German reunification in 1990, the EU members, as the actual "masters of the treaties," signed the Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam respectively, expanding their predominantly economic association incrementally into a political union. This took place through the introduction of a single currency (against the will of – not least – the Germans), reforms of the existing EU institutions, and the establishment of policy areas of further development, such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy, as well as the European Security and Defense Policy, all of which led to the so-called deepening of the Community. Above all, the EU offered to open its doors to eight aspirant countries from former communist-dominated Eastern Europe, along with Malta and Cyprus. Up to this point, the Community had been largely dominated by Western European nations. But with this political project of millennial, developmental proportions, the EU will contribute through its enlargement to the stabilization of these nascent market-economic democracies in Central and Eastern Europe by promoting massive modernization, transformation, and internal reforms. Along with the NATO enlargement, the EU will provide for the eastward expansion of the security community established after World War II, thus creating the foundation for Europe's claim to its future role as a world player in the twenty-first century.[10]

When the Greek Cypriots finally applied for full membership in the EU, with strong support from the Greek motherland, the Turkish Cypriots had little intention of enabling the reunification with Greece. Rather, the Greek Cypriots sought to effectively counter the security threat presented by the Turkish Army presence to their claim of being the only sovereign people on the island. With the involvement of the EU's superior economic and financial strength, especially with regard to its share in world trade and its ambition to act as a "civilian power Europe"[11] (thus using preferably non-military means in order to promote democratic principles worldwide), the Greeks insisted on integrating the divided island on their terms after the conciliatory but exhaustive attempts of the UN of more than 30 years proved ineffective.[12] Thus, importing the still-unresolved Cyprus dispute into the EU became their primary objective. From Brussels, on the other hand, the first application of the civilian power concept to the Mediterranean region seemed quite attractive, not least because of

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[10] Michael Kreile, "Die Osterweiterung der Europäischen Union," in *Europa-Handbuch*, ed. Werner Weidenfeld (Bonn, 1999), 802; and Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik, *Die europäische Sicherheitsgemeinschaft. Das Sicherheitsmodell für das 21. Jahrhundert* (Bonn, 1995).

[11] François Duchêne, "Europe in World Peace," in *Europe Tomorrow*, ed. R. Mayne (London, 1972), 32–49; and Stelios Stavridis, "Failing to act like a "civilian power": the European Union's policy towards Cyprus and Turkey (1974-2000)," *Studia Diplomatica* 54:3 (2001): 75–102.

[12] Peter Zervakis, "The Accession of Cyprus to the EU: The Greek Viewpoint," in *Cyprus and the European Union, New Chances for Solving an Old Conflict?*, eds. Heinz-Jürgen Axt and Hansjörg Brey (Munich, 1997), 137–50.

the Union's sheer economic preponderance in its relations with Cyprus and Turkey. Both are fully dependent on the Union – one of the largest aid donors in the world – in their trade and development. But those countries have also been politically and institutionally closely linked with the EU, since the association agreements with Turkey in 1963 and Cyprus in 1973, respectively. Recent provisional highlights of the Union's active involvement in the Eastern Mediterranean for "Regional Peace, Security, Stability, and Prosperity" include:

- The beginning of substantial accession negotiations between Nicosia and Brussels since spring 1998 for the adoption of the *acquis communautaire,* the conditions for the internal market, and the common policies (CFSP, ESDP, JHA) on the entire island.
- Realization of the Customs Union with Turkey after Greece dropped its veto.
- The long-term inclusion of Turkey in the future southern expansion of the Community as a necessary completion of the imminent eastward enlargement.

In this essay, the ins and outs of the dynamic process of European association and the EU membership of Cyprus (and Turkey subsequently) will be explored. This is to be analyzed in particular for the special case of Cyprus to find out whether the EU has gained more impact there as an actor or as a mere "framework" providing the basic conditions to transform the Cyprus dispute domestically.[13] Therefore, the specific historical reasons for the unresolved ethno-political Cyprus question need to be examined, as well as the abortive political-diplomatic approaches under UN mediation up until now. The historical analysis of why all international arbitration attempts have as yet failed to resolve the Cyprus problem provides a foundation for the discussion of Europeanization as a successful model to be used in the long run for the resolution of conflicting domestic ethnic interests.[14] Furthermore, this article will attempt to determine the contribution of the EU to the mutual approach of both strictly separated Greek and Turkish Cypriots through civil society institutions like the many non-governmental organizations that are presently blossoming in Northern Cyprus and are organizing mass protests against its elected government to resume negotiations to reunify.[15] Finally, the question will be addressed regarding what potential exists for the solution of the ongoing Cyprus problem under the com-

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[13] Thomas Diez, "Why the EU can nonetheless be good for Cyprus," *Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe (JEMIE)* 2 (2002): 14.

[14] See Ralf Zoll, ed, *Ein Modell zur Vermittlung konfliktärer Interessen. Die griechisch-türkischen Beziehungen und der Zypern-Konflikt* (Münster, 2000); and Patrick R. Hugg, "Cyprus advances towards Europe: Realism and rationalism," *Perceptions* 6:3 (2001): 94.

[15] Nicole Schulze, "'Cracks in the Wall': Bikommunale Aktivitäten und friedensstiftende Maßnahmen auf Zypern," in *Zypern. Gesellschaftliche Öffnung, europäische Integration, Globalisierung*, eds. Gisela Welz and Petra IIyes (Frankfurt am Main, 2001), 23–43.

mon umbrella of the UN and the enlarging and constitutionally deepening EU, given the current easing of tensions between both ethnic groups on the island, as well as between the mother countries, Greece and Turkey. One has finally to take into consideration that the latter in the meantime is seriously trying to implement domestically the Union's high democratic standards in order to qualify for EU membership, but still resists any change to the status quo on the island of Cyprus.[16]

The History of the Cyprus Problem

The Cyprus problem embodies an unresolved nationality conflict between two ethnic groups indigenous to the island. The issue is one of the last remnants of the century-old fate of the declining Ottoman Empire, indeed one of the most complicated problems in modern European history.[17] With the empire's decline, the relatively liberal position of the British colonial administration, which took over Cyprus in 1878 from the Ottomans, was confronted with both the penetration of Greek nationalism (*enosis*, or unification), and later the Turkish-Kemalistic reactive movement of *taksim* (separation). Resulting from concessions for extensive administrative autonomy, especially in education, a strict separation of both religious groups favored the cultural inclination of each group toward their respective motherland. An independent, inclusive, co-determining nationality could not develop under these conditions. Thus, the Greek Cypriot revolt against the British rule, with demands for annexation to Greece, resembled more the irredentist movements in South Eastern Europe than the Third World anti-colonial independence movements. The "consociational"[18] democracy as founded in the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus (since 1960), with its extensive self-administration for both ethnic groups, proportional ethnic representation in the government branches, and comprehensive veto powers for the Turkish Cypriot Community, was therefore not conducive to the amicable solution of the Cyprus issue because there was no common consensual political culture.[19] At the end of 1963, the powder keg exploded: Archbishop Makarios III, as president of the Republic, unilaterally demanded from the Turkish Cypriots the revision of the constitution, meaning a loss of many of their guaranteed rights. Their anticipated rejection heightened tensions between the various armed radicals, so that a very small provocation from the Greeks

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[16] See the latest Report of the EU Commission, *Continuing Enlargement. Strategy Paper and Report of the European Commission on the progress towards accession by Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey* (Brussels, 2003), 15–16, at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2002/pdf/strategy_paper2003_full_en.pdf (last access: 10 November 2003).

[17] Peter Zervakis, "Historische Grundlagen," 69-90.

[18] Albert F. Reiterer, *Cyprus. Case study about a failure of ethno-national understanding* (Frankfurt am Main, 2003), 129.

[19] Zervakis, "Die politischen Systeme Zyperns," 847–51, 880.

sufficed to trigger the spiral of violence in Nicosia, which received additional momentum from several interventions from Greece and Turkey. The civil war of 1963–64 resulted in the division of Nicosia and the solidification of the Turkish enclave.

The Cyprus issue became internationalized on several occasions, particularly with the UN Security Council Resolution to deploy UNFICYP (United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus) for the prevention of further clashes, the restoration of public order, and the return to normality. In the meantime, the blue helmet deployment, originally planned for three months, continues today, having developed into the world organization's longest peacekeeping mission and international diplomatic fiasco. Both local conflicting parties have yet to succeed at finding a path to peaceful conflict management despite the help of the UN and endless peace talks between the political representatives of both communities. Moreover, the Turkish army's invasion in 1974 was caused by the Greek coup against President Makarios, which was supported from the Athens Junta and called for incorporation of Cyprus into Greece. Consequently, a "population exchange" and the forced military division of the island territory followed under the auspices of the UN. Thus, the end of the intra-Cyprus warfare was enforced by the Turkish intervention and the bold deployment of the UNFICYP-soldiers, who have watched over the ceasefire line since 1964. But this did not suffice for an enduring peace on Cyprus. Despite the noble intentions of all UN Secretaries General since the 1960s to overcome the island's division peacefully, the representatives of both ethnic groups have consistently proven themselves unwilling to reach a durable compromise, as the models for possible solutions offered by the conflicting parties diverge ever more from one another. On the one hand, the Greek side has sought a reunification, namely based on the *status quo ante* in the form of a federation with strong, predominantly Greek central power. On the other hand, the Turkish minority's determination for separation has strengthened continually since 1964, materializing in their unilateral declaration of independence on 15 November 1983, which Turkey alone recognizes.

Another hindrance to a solution among the insular groups lies in the difficulty for involved regional (Greek and Turkish) and international (UN/EU/U.S.) actors to persuade the Cypriots to change the status quo, which has historical roots but also provides rather stable conditions. A survey in the Republic of Cyprus in March 1990 confirmed the increasing mutual alienation due to the sweeping absence of social, cultural, and economic contacts between the ethnic groups for almost thirty years. The majority of the surveyed Greek Cypriots want to keep the Turkish Cypriots at a distance, and categorically reject closer familiar or good-neighborly relations.[20] The Turks on the island's northern part, conversely, display sympathy for a closer relationship with the

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[20] Nathalie Tocci, *The 'Cyprus Question': Reshaping Community Identities and Elite Interests Within a Wider European Framework*, Working Document 152 (Brussels, 2000), 9.

EU for economic reasons. Their historically legitimate distrust of looming Greek dominance leads them to insist on independence, as well as the prior accession of Turkey to EU membership.[21] A simple solution to the Cyprus issue based on either reunification due to a postulated, insular identity (common colonial past, customs, norms, and practices) or the peaceful co-existence of both communities in one political entity (the official Greek view) or, on the contrary, sticking to the status quo (Turkish view) can be thus ruled out in the short term. But today, with the introduction of the European perspective, the Cyprus problem definitely no longer has the same meaning as it did in 1960, 1964, or 1974, despite the everlasting diplomatic negotiations on reunification, which continue as if the issue has not changed over the last forty years.

The Internationalization of the Cyprus Problem

In March 1964, the "dummy government" of President Makarios was officially recognized by the General Assembly and the Security Council of the UN (Res. 186/1964) as the sole internationally legitimate body for the entire republic. Since then, the Greek Cypriot politicians have been able to play out their claim of being the sole representation of the island – in affront to the island's Turks – to their diplomatic and economic advantage. After the island divided in 1974, the Greek southern part of the island accomplished a "small economic miracle"[22] through massive financial support from international organizations, tourism, and offshore activities. Regarding the political quest to overcome the island's division, the Republic of Cyprus, with Greece's support, sought the assistance of the UN. Thanks in part to the efforts of the UN Secretaries General, several agreements were completed in 1977 and 1979 between the leaders of both Cypriot communities, Makarios (and after his death Spyros Kyprianou) and Rauf Denktash.[23] These contained for the first time basic directives for future negotiations:[24]

- Formation of a bi-communal Federal Republic consisting of two parts and both ethnic groups. Each group should have the rights of its own territory, but the central government would have the core responsibility for guaranteeing national unity.
- Successive demilitarization of Cyprus and the insurance of independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-aligned status of the republic against integration or secession of either section of the island.
- Beginning of negotiations on the restoration of freedom of movement, free choice of residence, and compensation for property titles from displaced persons.

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[21] Dietz, *European Union*, 157–58.

[22] See Demetrios Christodoulou, *Inside the Cyprus Miracle* (Minneapolis, 1992).

[23] For a critical assessment of Denkta?'s ambivalent role in the Cyprus dispute, see Michael Knüppel, *Rauf R. Denkta? und seine Rolle im Zypernkonflikt* (Göttingen, 1999).

[24] Paris Varvaroussis, *Deutschland und die Zypernfrage* (Munich, 1995), 249–51.

　　　• Initiating confidence-building measures to build trust between both communities.

Although the Security Council and the General Assembly commended these principles as a breakthrough in the Cyprus negotiation process and bolstered them in a few resolutions, approval of a comprehensive accord failed among both ethnic groups. One cause stems from the diametrically opposed under-standing of the term "federalism" between the Greeks and Turks in Cyprus. While Greek Cypriots see a central government with the ultimate responsibility of securing the so-called three freedoms (freedom of movement, property, residence) on the entire island, Turkish Cypriots aspire to found two partial states, each with their own sovereignty rights, tied to a loose confederation.[25] The Greek Cypriots equate the admission of an independent Turkish Cypriot sovereignty with the solidification of the island's division since 1974; thus they categorically reject a confederative concept for the island.[26]

On the initiative of UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar, who conceived two further schemes for a resolution in 1983, a rapprochement was once again in sight. But this time, the proposals failed, not because of Rauf Denktash, who considered the arrangement worth signing, but rather because of the Greek side, which feared that it had diverged too far from its own ideas.

　　　The catalogue of suggestions presented by Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992 is the most comprehensive proposal on the Cyprus issue to date. In detail, the future coexistence of both groups is managed concretely in the proposal. The Security Council adopted Boutros-Ghali's "Set of Ideas" enthusiastically in two resolutions (No. 774/1992 and No. 789/1992) as the basis for the attainment of a settlement. This time, the Greek Cypriots accepted essentially all 100 points, while the Turks agreed to 91. Nevertheless, the former signaled the deci-sive misgiving: Denktash demanded a weak central government with strong, partial sovereignty in the sub-states and representative parity in the council of ministers, while advocating a restrictive course regarding the open issue of the return of refugees (he rejected a Turkish Cypriot resettlement and the surrender-ing of useable agricultural land in his constituency). He also stipulated effective rules for the protection of his ethnic group as conditions for demilitarization. In order to oblige Denktash and achieve the rapprochement of both Cypriot groups, Boutros-Ghali introduced a package of confidence building measures (among others, opening of the Green Line for border transport, intensification of encounters between members of both societies, youth and student exchanges, and language classes) to both negotiation leaders.[27] Above all, the Turkish

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[25] Nanette Neuwahl, *Cyprus, Which Way? - In Pursuit of a Confederal Solution in Europe*, Jean Monnet Working Paper 4 (Boston, 2000), 9.

[26] Bahcheli, "Domestic," 117.

[27] Maria Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis, "Little Confidence in Confidence Building? Conflict Resolution in the Context of the United Nations," in *Cyprus*, eds. Axt and Brey, 36–54.

Cypriots were favored by this package of measures, because it would have contributed to the lessening of their diplomatic and economic isolation and stimulated growth in its GNP of up to 20 percent.[28] Nevertheless, the Turkish Cypriot leadership rejected the agreement in April 1994.

Subsequently, the relationship between the acrimonious parties worsened dramatically, and reached a new all-time low in 1997/98. In addition, the Greek Cypriot policy toward Europe, with its strengthened cooperation against the resistance of the TRNC, was largely responsible for this. During this stalemate, the U.S. Delegate to Cyprus, Richard Holbrooke, presented his new plan in November of 1997.[29] Along the cease-fire line, the creation of a third, mixed-population zone was to be created and later be given back to the Greek Cypriots. There the Turkish Cypriots, along with Greek Cypriots who had been displaced from that area, would be allowed to work and live together with the protection of multinational troops under U.S. leadership. The provisional government would prepare for the construction of a federal Cypriot Republic as well as the accession of Cyprus to the EU, but with Turkish participation.

However, the Turks rejected this proposal as well (after initial assent), because the Luxembourg EU-summit in December snubbed Turkey's hopes to qualify as candidate for membership. The Greek Cypriot government had to realize that the TRNC and Turkey showed no interest in solving the Cyprus issue on UN terms, and both sides had grown more distant from the other than was the case at the outbreak of the conflict. Other political options were being explored by the Greek Cypriots.

Europeanizing the Cyprus Problem

The Republic of Cyprus Approaches the Community

After the internationalization of the Cyprus issue, with the fruitless attempts at peace arbitration from five UN Secretaries General failed and the political weakness of that international organization was revealed, the liberal President Georgios Vasileiou gave in to the pressure from the Greek government of Andreas Papandreou and submitted in the name of all Cyprus an application for full membership in the EC on 3 July 1990. The step relied considerably on the Association Agreement from 1973, which built an official tie between the EC and the Republic of Cyprus securing the openness of the traditional British market for Cypriot products; the agreement further planned for the creation of a customs union in two stages within two years. The accord also contained numerous agreements for the removal of all trade and customs barriers between both partners, with the help of the adoption of a common customs tariff, the harmonization of several policy areas (competition, national subsidies, legal and

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[28] Martin Pabst, "Zypern: UN, EU und der Status quo," *Vereinte Nationen* 49:4 (2001): 141.

[29] Jürgen Reuter, "Zypern, Vereinte Nationen und Europäische Union," *KAS/Auslandsinformationen* 9 (2001): 28–30.

administrative convergence), and the guarantee of free movement of goods, such as agricultural products, through the Republic. In addition, the agreement included the provision to form a common Association Council. After extending the first stage several times due to incalculable obstacles regarding the island's division, a modus operandi concerning the second stage was reached, according to which the customs union would be realized completely in two phases by 2002.[30] Between 1977 and 1994, Cyprus received a total of 136 million ECUs from the Community in form of loans, non-repayable assistance, and special payments. With the exception of a certain proportion reserved specifically for the Turkish Cypriot population, many projects were financed with those resources for the improvement of infrastructure in the capital city of Nicosia (city planning and development, waste disposal, and electricity). In this fashion, all island inhabitants reaped benefits.[31]

When the Greek Cypriot decision-makers were no longer satisfied merely with the customs union near the end of the 1980s, they began to strive for full membership, but were nevertheless motivated in this direction less by economics than by politics. They hoped that the prospect of membership in the EU could give a new impetus to the resolution of the Cyprus problem. At the very least, they wanted to bring in the Community to finally take over responsibility for the local conciliation of the conflict. This would also provide a minimal guarantee of security for the Greek Cypriots from the Turkish army.[32] Nevertheless, Vasileiou hesitated to carry out this change in policy, because he feared that the Europeanization of the Cyprus issue would unnecessarily burden any future agreement with the Turkish Cypriots under UN intervention. Furthermore, *Evropi* enjoyed little respect among the unions and the largest parliamentary party, the communist AKEL, because people feared the disappearance of their own small and highly subsidized industries and remembered the lukewarm support from the Community at the time of the Turkish invasion in the summer of 1974. Therefore, the Greek Cypriots' turn towards Europe can be seen as a tactical move to neutralize the Turkish military occupation, which was seen as a threat to the Greek Cypriot claim to exclusive rule. Moreover, Greece had belonged to the EC as tenth member state since 1981, while Turkey was not a member. In addition, all Athens governments up to 1999 tried adamantly to convince their EU partners that Turkey could not claim to belong to Europe because of the Cyprus ordeal, nor should their adversary be regarded a part of the Community's Mediterranean interests.[33] (Only three years later, the EU

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[30] Commission of the European Communities, *Regelmäßiger Bericht 1998 der Kommission über Zyperns Fortschritte auf dem Weg zum Beitritt* (Brussels, 1998), 6–7.

[31] Commission of the European Communities, *Stellungnahme der Kommission zu dem Beitrittsantrag der Republik Zypern* (Brussels, 1993), 15.

[32] Neill Nugent, "EU Enlargement and the 'Cyprus Problem'," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 38:1 (2000): 136.

[33] Zervakis, "Accession of Cyprus," 142.

Commission supported the petition from the Greek Cypriots – which largely came about due to pressure from Greece.[34]) However, the Commission emphasized the economic inequality between both parts of the island, and stressed that the integration of Cyprus into the Community would first require a peaceful, balanced, and enduring resolution of the Cyprus issues.[35] It also assured the UN Secretary General of the Community's support of his efforts in the political settlement of the Cyprus question.

In this last point, the problematic nature of the accession application for the Turkish parties as well as the (West) European member-states becomes clear. The Turkish leadership and Turkey objected vehemently to the unilateral Greek Cypriot application for EU membership in the name of the entire island. They justified their arguments with the international treaties of 1959–60, which excluded Cyprus from entrance into any international organization to which both Greece and Turkey did not belong.[36] Thus they rejected categorically any EU accession for the island if the open question of Cyprus's status were not addressed; otherwise, they threatened the incorporation of the TRNC into Turkey if the EU took in the Greek-dominated Republic. In addition, the Turks perceived a connection between the entrance of Cyprus into the EU and the integration of the island with Greece, which relates to the old *énosis* movement, "only by other means."[37] The leadership of the TRNC did not relent from its main political demands, even in the face of potential economic benefits for the population. Since then, it has rejected participation in the Cypriot negotiating delegation, because that would mean an affirmation of the Greek Cypriot claim to exclusive representation, and due to majority relations it could not build its own negotiating position vis-à-vis the EU.

Another reason for the three-year delay for an EU position on the Greek Cypriot accession application has to do with the EU partner states' minimal interest in membership of a divided Cyprus, especially compared to its activity with the Eastern European enlargement.[38] In the case of the accession of a divided Cyprus into the Community, 15 governments, 16 parliaments, and all important institutions of the EU, including the European Investment Bank and the European Central Bank, all have a say in the matter. Given the seemingly insuperable difficulties, even into the 1990s neither the heads of states in the Council nor the Commission showed any interest in a direct or indirect conflict arbitration role in a distant, problematic, peripheral region.[39] Instead, the Community limited itself unobtrusively to supporting all pertinent UN resolutions.

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[34] Commission, *Stellungnahme*, 22.

[35] Commission, *Stellungnahme*, 23.

[36] See Maurice H. Mendelson, *Why Cyprus Entry into the European Union Would be Illegal.* Legal opinion, Meto Print, London, 2001.

[37] Tozun Bahcheli and Nicholas X. Rizopoulos, "Beyond Partition," *War Report* 54 (1997): 18.

[38] Commission, *Stellungnahme*, 23, 43, 64; and Brewin, *European Union*, 3–14.

[39] Nugent, "EU Enlargement," 138–39.

Accession Negotiations as a Catalyst for a Solution?

With the positive response to the Greek Cypriot accession application, the European Union became directly involved in the insular conflict for the first time. At the beginning of October l993, the EU Council of Ministers assigned the Commission to conduct preparatory talks with the Republic of Cyprus, in order to familiarize them better with the *acquis communautaire*. The peculiarity of the Cyprus application became evident once again at the EU summit in Corfu in June 1994. On the initiative of the Greek EU presidency, who threatened its partners otherwise that it would not ratify the accession of Austria, Sweden, and Finland, it was decided to include Cyprus and Malta in the group of Central and Eastern European candidate countries.

Eventually, through a historical compromise, the French president succeeded for the first time on 6 March 1995 at finding an actual date for the beginning of accession negotiations with the Greek government of the Republic of Cyprus without making such talks dependent on the condition of a previous agreement with the Turkish Cypriots. In 1999, a Fourth Financial Report was signed with Cyprus for 72 million ECUs for the structural preparation of the Republic's accession (i.e., development of civil society and promotion of projects in the interest of both ethnic groups); 54 million Euros will be given for the period 2000–2004.[40] Consequently, Athens, despite hefty domestic resistance, promised to lift its veto against the establishment of a customs union with Turkey and ceased to boycott the enlargement process. At the end of 1997, the European Council of Luxembourg decided to implement a special convergence strategy with Cyprus and opened a lucrative Community economic adaptation program with the Turkish Cypriot population; at the same time, however, the EU rejected Turkey's application for membership brusquely. On 30–31 March 1998, formal negotiations over the "conditions of accession to the Union and the corresponding adjustment to the Treaties" began with Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia, and Cyprus.[41]

However, none of the Turkish Cypriot representatives participated in the actual accession preparations, such as evaluation or screening, intensified convergence strategies, or accession partnerships, because of the political leadership's "negative position."[42] The former had already closed an association agreement with Turkey in August, which prefaced a partial integration of both partners in certain policy areas.[43] Still, the Community exacerbated the intra-Cypriot conflict with their Hellenophile decision, because they refused, like its stubborn member in the Balkans, to treat the Turkish Cypriots as equal partners, which under the circumstances could have been possible without acknowledging the TRNC.

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[40] Commission of the European Communities, *Regelmäßiger Bericht 1998 der Kommission über Zyperns Fortschritte auf dem Weg zum Beitritt* (Brussels, 1998), 8.

[41] Commission, *Regelmäßiger Bericht 1998*, 5.

[42] Commission, *Regelmäßiger Bericht 1998*, 8.

[43] Pabst, "Zypern," 142.

Only after receiving some pressure from the Commission did the Greek Cypriot government finally allow a few Turkish Cypriot representatives into the delegation (who, in any event, could have been outvoted in most key issues). Out of these suspicions, and in order to demonstrate his own independence, the Turkish Cypriot leader demanded his own negotiating delegation and separate referenda for the EU accession process, as UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali had prescribed in 1992. In contrast, the EU maintained its negotiations with the Greek Cypriots with the vague hope that the economic and security-political advantages of EU membership for the whole island would benefit both ethnic groups. Accordingly, the Greeks, in accordance with the Commission, persisted in claiming that the prospect of EU membership would function as a "catalyst" for conflict resolution.[44]

At the Helsinki summit of December 1999, the European Council took its most far-reaching steps, given the "thaw" in Greco-Turkish relations: it recognized Turkey as an accession-willing future candidate for membership. However, this entailed certain political stipulations (respect for human rights, protection of minorities, democratization, rule of law, institutional stability), as the European Council had determined in Copenhagen in 1993 for all candidate countries. In response, the leaders of the EU member states emphasized that a political solution would ease the Republic of Cyprus' accession to the EU. If there were no solution by the end of the accession negotiations, the Council would then make a decision on the accession without using the political solution as a prerequisite, considering all significant factors.[45]

The Helsinki resolutions were depicted as a "masterpiece of Byzantine diplomacy."[46] While the tangible advantages of détente policy on the European level were demonstrated to Athens, the long-refused status of EU candidacy was granted to Turkey after Greece's assent. The EU membership negotiations with the Greek Cypriots, on the other hand, closed successfully by the end of 2002, independent of a political solution of the conflict. Finally, at the last Copenhagen Summit of 12–13 December 2002, the EU Council concluded unanimously that Cyprus (no longer the "Republic of Cyprus," as it used to be cited formally in all EU documents before)[47] was formally accepted to become

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[44] Commission of the European Communities, *Regelmäßiger Bericht 2000 der Kommission über Zyperns Fortschritte auf dem Weg zum Beitritt*, (Brussels, 2000), 10; Heinz-Jürgen Axt, "Enttäuschte Hoffnungen auf Zypern," *Europäische Rundschau* 29:2 (2001): 77; Patrick R. Hugg, "Cyprus in Europe: Seizing the Momentum of Nice," *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law* 34:5 (2001): 1360; Joseph S. Joseph, "Cyprus: From Past of Ethno-Political Division to a Future of Euro-Unity?" in *Transformationserfahrungen. Zur Entwicklung der politischen Kultur in den EU-Kandidatenländern*, ed. Gábor Erdődy (Baden-Baden, 2003), 230. For a critical evaluation on the assumption of a "catalytic effect," see Dietz, "Why the EU," 3–6.

[45] SN 300/99, 3.

[46] Peter Zervakis, "Griechenland," in *Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 1999/2000*, eds. Werner Weidenfeld, and Wolfgang Wessels (Bonn, 2000), 338.

[47] Heinz-Jürgen Axt, "Gordischer Knoten in Kopenhagen nicht durchschlagen: Zypern, die Türkei und die EU," *Integration* 26:1 (2003), 77, footnote 27.

an EU member by May 2004, after ratification of the accession treaties by all prospective and current member states and the EU Parliament. At the same time, Turkey was given a so-called rendezvous clause: by December 2004, the Union will definitely decide whether Turkey then meets all political criteria to start access negotiations "without any further delay."[48] Nevertheless, the reservations of some EU members concerning the accession of a divided Cyprus remain, and the EU has not bound itself legally to solve the problem while it continues to favor the accession of a reunited island:

> EU membership, following a political settlement, will provide an effective framework for guaranteeing fundamental democratic and human rights and for raising living standards and reducing disparities in income. Participation in EU programmes and networks and specific EU policies to promote structural adjustment will underpin economic development in the north.[49]

Yet the Community has some leverage to bring the two groups into further negotiations, because only a mutually agreeable accession can elicit an easing or resolution of the conflict; however, this will require a special accord. Therefore, a few high-ranking representatives of the Commission and the Council visited the island frequently in 2002–3 to explain the complex EU position.[50] There the Europeans promised to accommodate the terms of a comprehensive settlement in the Treaty of Accession until May 2004 at the latest:

> … in line with the principles on which the European Union is founded; as a Member State (which is free to determine its own constitutional arrangements!) Cyprus would need to speak with a single voice and ensure proper application of EU law. The EU would make a substantial financial contribution to support the development of the northern part of a reunited island.[51]

And Brussels continues to promote bi-communal projects like conflict resolution workshops, etc., normally organized in the buffer zone or abroad, mainly in cooperation with the UN. For the last two decades, mainly upper-middle-class professionals and academics from both sides (more or less fluent in English, the common medium of understanding in those meetings) have tried to build a climate of mutual trust and understanding among Cypriots of both eth-

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[48] See http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/index.htm (last access: 10 November 2003).

[49] Commission of the European Communities, *2002 regular report on Cyprus's progress towards accession* (Brussels, 2002), 29.

[50] Oliver Bauer, "Die Zypernpolitik der Europäischen Union. Interessen, Akteure und Szenarien," *Perspektiven im Zypernkonflikt,* eds. Abraham Ashkenasi and Georgia Duprés (Frankfurt am Main, 2002), 244.

[51] Commission, *2002 regular report,* 26.

nicities, with the aim of gradually developing a common Cypriot identity which might prove a necessary condition for the solution of the Cyprus problem.[52] But the participants from both communities have often met with public resistance from their own nationalist media and politicians accusing them of being unpatriotic and even treacherous. This can be seen as a clear sign for the uncompromising political leaders who keep the Cyprus dispute alive for their own internal use to preserve their traditional power over both weak societies with the help of the two competing ethnic nationalisms on the island, in the process stunting the growth of the as-yet underdeveloped Cypriot civil societies.[53]

Therefore, without external pressures for internal reforms – mainly as the result of the upcoming accession of the island into the EU – there is little hope that the well-established grip of the politicians on their respective civil societies will loosen. Thus prevailing nationalistic attitudes in both ethnic camps prevent the creation of a trustful atmosphere, which is a precondition for a mutual resolution of the Cyprus problem and the future function of the two communities' coexistence in a bi-communal state. Otherwise, some unresolved questions remain, with the sole factual (if not judicial) EU membership of the Greek part of the island: How can Cyprus enter the EU without officially recognizing the Turkish occupation of the island's northern part? Will the membership of just one group of Cypriots not further deepen the division of the island? In the meanwhile, has the original UN approach to accept only the Greek Cypriots' official status as representatives of the whole island (which was followed stubbornly by Greece and the EU) not proven counterproductive, while bringing them together to the negotiation table as if they were equals? And – as Günter Verheugen, the EU-enlargement Commissioner recently put it in the European Parliament – how can the ongoing deployment of UN peacekeeping soldiers be tolerated in an EU member state?

Domestic Rapprochement in the Framework of the EU?

After the progress report from the EU on 13 November 2001, the Union declared its goal in Cyprus "to find a political solution under the auspices of the UN before Cyprus enters the EU, although this does not represent any prereq-

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[52] See Sonja Bienert, "Konflikt und Kommunikation. Peacebuilding-Aktivitäten der bikommunalen Gruppen auf Zypern," in *Perspektiven*, eds. Ashkenasi and Duprés, 301–49; Oliver Wolleh, "Zypern: Gesellschaftliches Rapprochement im Spannungsfeld von impliziter Anerkennung und Repression," *Südosteuropa Mitteilungen* 42:2 (2002): 83–99; and *Culture in Common – Living Cultures in the Cypriot Communities. Proceedings of German-Cypriot Forum Conference 22-24 May 2003 Berlin/Üdersee.*

[53] Although it seems that there is a certain asymmetrical relationship in the two civil societies with respet to the strength of active NGOs. See Caesar V. Mavratsas, *Ethnikí omopsychía kai politikí omofonía. I atrofia tis ellinokypriakís koinonías ton politón stis aparchés tou 21ou aióna* (National unanimity and political consensus. The atrophy of Greek Cypriot civil society at the dawn of the 21st century) (Athens, 2003).

uisite for the accession."[54] EU accession and UN conflict resolution negotiations between both ethnic groups thus were treated complementarily, with the intention of adjusting all deviations from community law to the final accession treaty. The EU does not view itself as an active conflict arbitrator – thus it has never developed its own strategy to solve the Cyprus problem, and since 1993 it has regularly sent special envoys to simply observe the UN peace talks – but it views the accession dynamics as an opportunity that can be used to bring about an agreement. However, a failure would intensify the division on the island, to the disadvantage of both communities (who would achieve no regulation of territorial, refugee, and compensation issues, elimination of the differences in wealth, or recognition of past failures), and their motherlands (who would potentially lose both bilateral balance and Turkish EU accession) as consequences.[55]

When the EU summit in Helsinki in December 1999 named Turkey a future accession aspirant, a solution to the Cyprus issue was nearly reached the following year, given the new, indirect rounds of the so-called proximity talks in Geneva and New York between representatives of the two ethnic groups and the UN's special mediator Alvaro de Soto. There he presented concrete, detailed discussion proposals for the central topics of the distribution of powers between both ethnic groups in a Cypriot "common state" and in the "component states."[56] In autumn of 2000, comments from UN Secretary General Kofi Annan proved to be of particular significance for the negotiation process as well as future conflict solution. He called for the recognition of the political equal rights of both ethnic groups in order to reach a comprehensive balance between the claim to an exclusive right of representation in the Republic of Cyprus and the claim to sovereignty in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.[57] Nevertheless, the Turkish Cypriots rejected Annan's suggestions, and their leadership refused further participation in the UN talks. In contrast, the EU Nice Summit greeted Annan's efforts and supported them strongly. The Union criticized the negative position of the Turkish Cypriot leader, and turned to Turkey as a means of leverage by making their progress in the EU accession process dependent on Turkey's position on the Cyprus issue.[58]

In analyzing Annan's proposals, which later became the framework for his overall master plan in November 2002, it is apparent that no resettlement of the immigrated Turkish settlers was to take place, nor would all Greek refugees be allowed to return to the island's north; this certainly made the proposal less

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[54] Commission of the European Communities, *Regelmäßiger Bericht 2001 der Kommission über Zyperns Fortschritte auf dem Weg zum Beitritt* (Brussels, 2001), 25.

[55] William Wallace, "Reconciliation in Cyprus: The Window of Opportunity," Robert Schuman Centre Discussion Paper (Florence, 2002), 2.

[56] Reuter, "Zypern," 29–36.

[57] Pabst, "Zypern," 143.

[58] Commission, *Regelmäßiger Bericht 2001,* 22.

attractive to the Greek Cypriot side, which has shown scant willingness to confront thorny issues from the past and make the necessary compromises on details of future nation building.[59] Nonetheless, President Klirídis announced his willingness to find a compromise so as not to be responsible for the failure of new negotiations. In response, the Turkish side demanded the reestablishment of the confederation, because it did not agree with the stipulation in the accession talks that it speak with one voice in the EU. At the same time, the Turkish Cypriots were being asked to surrender partial sovereignty to the unified whole of Cyprus. Additionally, the occupation of Northern Cyprus was being called into question. A military presence under UN, NATO, or ESDP command, with mixed Greek and Turkish units, seemed more realistic to Annan, because Turkey could not afford any heightened security concerns, given its own EU membership prospects.

When Rauf Denktash offered to meet his former school friend Gláfkos Klirídis for the first time since 1997, the proposition took place with support from Ankara, in order to show a positive sign of Turkey's renewed willingness for negotiations before the European Council conference in Laeken, on 14-15 December 2001. Thus began a new marathon of talks in Nicosia between the UN representative de Soto and the two key persons who have rule the island's political machinations for decades. The new talks, as had become the pattern in the preceding years, were regarded by many observers as perhaps one of the last opportunities to solve the island's division before the accession of the Republic into the EU.[60] Thus the urgency of the negotiations entailed a set schedule for the next six months (until the end of June 2002) to negotiate three times a week in the buffer zone with UN support, insulated from the public. In this manner, the Greek Cypriots and the EU, which pushed both sides to compromise, hoped to be able to include the criteria for a resolution to the conflict in the language of the accession treaty before the end of the accession negotiations. Otherwise the Union would be confronted with the unresolved Cyprus problem after enlargement, a complication that could threaten the EU's abilities to manage regional stability and security.

Although the more than forty bilateral meetings finally ended without concrete results, the conditions for a resolution to the conflict appeared more favorable than at any time since the founding of the Republic of Cyprus. The EU, as a peace community, and its member states were to take a more active role in the Cyprus issue, in that they agreed to promote the readiness to compromise with appropriate financial as well as political-diplomatic incentives for both parties in the conflict. Otherwise, the entrance of a divided Cyprus into the

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[59] For a possible alternative to the problem, see Neophytos G. Loizides and Marcos A. Antoniades, "A credible commitment model: Settler, refugee, and immigration issues in post-settlement Cyprus," *Journal of Peace Research* (forthcoming).

[60] Jürgen Reuter and Paris Varvaroussis, "Der Beitritt Zyperns zur Europäischen Union: Risiko für neue Instabilität der EU?" *Südosteuropa-Mitteilungen* 42:2 (2002): 66.

EU would increase the likelihood of conflict on the island, as well as between Greece and Turkey. Consequently, this would endanger the security of the Eastern Mediterranean as well as the credibility of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy.[61] Up to this point, the EU Commission had sole responsibility for leading the accession negotiations with Cyprus and Turkey, because most member states had shown no strong inclination to get involved. In contrast to the case Macedonia, where representatives of the EU and the member states sent large amounts of money and prominent officials, the relative lack of interest and involvement in Cyprus is blatant, although the situation is just as unstable.[62] Given previous experience, serious difficulties in finding a compromise are to be expected in the following areas:

- Binding constitutional agreements within the context of future Cypriot EU membership
- Return of (mainly Greek Cypriot) property and territorial changes (with the burden borne primarily by the Turkish Cypriots)
- The issue of the future of Turkish settlers in Northern Cyprus
- Credible security guarantees for the economic existence of the Turkish Cypriots
- Unity over transitional steps to build up mutual trust and to create support in both populations for the unavoidable adjustment process.

Despite these foreseeable difficulties, it is noteworthy that both sides were beginning as early as possible in the negotiations to eliminate their barriers to interethnic and economic contacts over the line of demarcation. The goal was to accomplish this even before the issues concerning status were resolved, and the EU promised to support such transitional steps with financial incentives.

Yet the danger of the unresolved Cyprus issue affecting the complicated internal EU decision-making processes remained, should a political solution not be reached at the last minute. In order to escape the dilemma of the self-made Cyprus trap, the EU Commission tried to reduce the asymmetry in its Greek-Turkish-Cypriot relationship. At the same time, it has concentrated for a long time on convincing the Turkish Cypriots of the advantages to them of common EU membership with the Greek Cypriots:[63]

- The Turkish Cypriots would be free to determine their own internal structure and security measures after entrance into the Community. All existing accords with Turkey concerning the Cyprus solution would not be affected by the EU accession, so long as they do not prevent the

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[61] Ludger Kühnhardt, "Stolperstein im Mittelmeer. Zypern vor dem Beitritt," *Internationale Politik* 57:1 (2002): 51. See George S. Yiangou, "The Accession of Cyprus to the EU: Challenges and Opportunities for the New European Regional Order," *JEMIE* 2 (2002).

[62] Wallace, *Reconciliation,* 7–12.

[63] Commission, *Regelmäßiger Bericht 2001,* 25 and Commission, *2002 regular report,* 26.

Cypriots from speaking with one voice in the EU committees and fulfilling their requirements as EU members.

- Since February 2002 the EU Commission has worked on a one-time only special adjustment program in the amount of over 206 million Euros (from 2004 until 2006) in support of the Turkish Cypriots, with the creation of a functioning market economy in the event of a prior settlement of the Cyprus dispute. In this case, the EU would offer further structural programs for modernization of agriculture and tourism in northern Cyprus – which would represent the poorest regions of the enlarged Union – in order to help alleviate fears of domination from the more economically successful Greek Cypriots. Furthermore, an EU informational centre in the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce is supposed to contribute efficiently to business people and EU politics as well as support the union movements in both parts of the island. As a result, the EU hopes to achieve improvements in relations between the ethnic groups and develop mutual interests before accession to the EU. Likewise, a communication strategy seeks to promote public awareness of and interest in the EU in both Cypriot communities.
- The EU referred to opinion polls in northern Cyprus, where more than 90 percent of the Turkish Cypriots recognize the economic and political advantages of EU membership and favor EU accession after the solution of the Cyprus issue. And it referred to left-wing nongovernmental organizations that are representing and organizing thousands of dissatisfied Turkish Cypriots who are in a state of unrest and are campaigning for a partnership state.
- The Community guaranteed to all Cypriots the primacy of democratic and human rights, including the protection of cultural, religious, and linguistic diversity. Democracy and the application of the rule of law were also secured, as well as inclusion of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in EU institutions.
- The EU also let the TRNC know that enlargement was their last chance to share in the wealth of the southern part of the island.
- In the end, the Commission has consistently worked since 1995 – partly in cooperation with the UN bi-communal projects, as well as with the program of confidence building measures – toward the construction of a strong civil society in both parts of Cyprus.[64] At least a third of the 57 million Euros that the EU allocated to Cyprus for the accession preparations are therefore being used to finance reconciliation projects between the two ethnic groups.

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[64] See, for instance, the contribution of the daughter of the former Greek Cypriot president and MP Katie Clerides, "Citizens as Peacemakers: The Experience of Cyprus," in *Cyprus. In Search of Peace and Justice*, eds. R. C. Sharma and Stavros A. Epaminondas (New Delhi, 1997), 248.

Still, these activities have not been able to unfold between the populations of Cyprus, because the Turkish Cypriot leadership had long since created substantial impediments to the participation of people in any activities that involve crossing the demarcation line. Consequently, organizations, opposition parties, and unions led a demonstration in July 2001 under the slogan, "This Country is Ours!", in which about 3,000–4,000 Turkish Cypriots participated. The protesters contested the further economic degeneration of Turkish Cyprus and demanded that their government take a positive position toward the bi-communal activities.[65] Furthermore, in summer 2002 some 86 NGOs, representing about 38,000 members, signed a declaration entitled the "Common Vision of the Turkish Cypriot Civil Society,"[66] calling for a mutual settlement of the Cyprus problem and full membership for Cyprus in the EU. The "Common Vision" does not favor two separate and sovereign states, but rather that the two politically equal sides should establish a "partnership state" with a single international legal identity and with an effective democratic process to manage its relations with the EU along the lines of the Annan proposals.[67] Finally, the mass demonstrations in Lefkosa continued in 2002–03, even demanding Denktash's resignation.[68] Indeed, the Union, and especially Germany, has been expected by both the negotiators and ethnic community leaders to consider the following basic demands for a successful conclusion of the present Greek-Turkish talks:[69]

- The political representatives from both parts of the island must finally recognize that one-sided suggestions will not lead to acceptable solutions for the unity, freedom, and prosperity of Cyprus. Therefore the two ethnic groups should permanently reject the option of annexation into their motherlands.
- Also, neither ethnic group can seek to dominate the other. The effective concept for the twenty-first century is the trusting cooperation of all Cypriots in a united Europe, in which the EU member states, as well as the regions and communities, have their own powers based on the principles of federalism and subsidiarity. Thus the EU member states, particularly those with high levels of ethnic diversity, should assure comprehensive societal and cultural rights of autonomy as an incentive for loyal participation in the central government as a way of preventing separatist tendencies.
- Similar to the Belgian case, ethnic groups should not be limited to their own settlement region; rather, a federal solution with two areas and two

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[65] Commission, *Regelmäßiger Bericht 2001,* 10, 22.

[66] See the full text in http://www.dzforum.de (last access: 10 November 2003).

[67] Commission, *2002 regular report,* 27.

[68] Axt, "Gordischer Knoten," 73.

[69] *Athener Zeitung* 5 April 2002, 22–24.

communities should be reached. An enduring peaceful solution for Cyprus based on the bi-communal negotiations necessitates not only the mediation of the UN, but also the involvement of the Union as a believable regional guarantor of the stability of all of Cyprus.

When it became clear that the Turkish government had started to earnestly reform the constitution to fully comply with the Union's strict democratic criteria, and the religious-conservative Islamist (but Europhile) reformer Recep Tayyip Erdogan became prime minister in November 2002, Kofi Annan finally decided to present both Cypriot parties with his overall Basis for Agreement on a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem: "The status and relationship of the State of Cyprus, its 'common state' government, and its 'component states,' is modelled on the status and relationship of Switzerland, its federal government, and its Cantons."[70] The "component states" are to secure the widest possible autonomy for both ethnic groups short of full sovereignty. Together with a rotating presidency, this model guarantees real political equality for Greek and Turkish Cypriots and enables Cyprus to speak with one voice as a state in the form of an "indissoluble partnership" resembling the constitution of 1959. All Cypriot citizens shall also enjoy internal component-state citizen status. As with European citizenship, this status shall complement and not replace Cypriot citizenship.

At the same time, Annan pushed for a separate referendum in both communities on his plan by the end of March 2003, essentially telling both parties that it was a "take it or leave it" proposition. In this way, he wanted to prevent new endless rounds of discussions with subsequent revisions, after his original plan had already been amended twice.[71]

The plan left room for diplomatic bargaining on only two major aspects of the Cyprus dispute: the problem of refugees whose homes were left behind enemy lines following the Turkish invasion, and the question of how the two communities would share Cyprus' territory. Notwithstanding their rhetoric, most Greek Cypriot politicians still have the following objections:

- With a Cyprus consisting of two sovereign "constituent states," the Turkish Cypriots could become so independent that they would gradually secede from the "United Cyprus Republic."
- The Annan plan establishes a divisive and dysfunctional system of governance that is inadequate for running an island like Cyprus.
- The plan essentially legitimizes the continued presence of the settlers from Turkey, and opens the way for the transformation of the demography of the island.

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[70] See http://www.mfa.gov.tr, http://www.european-cyprus.net/cgibin/hweb?-A=612&-V=eucy; and Axt "Gordischer Knoten," 68–71.

[71] See http://www.swp-berlin.org/produkte/brennpunkte/zypernchance1B.htm (last access: 17.12.2002; and http://www.pio.gov.cy/other/revised_un_plan.pdf.

The Turkish Cypriot officials, on the other hand, are unhappy with the dominant position of the Greek Cypriots in the powerful central government institutions of the proposed federal state (the legislative and executive branches), a position which, to the UN, is simply a reflection of the numerical superiority of the Greek Cypriots. Regardless, it was argued that most legislation would emanate from the EU. Also, the plan does not grant the TRNC full recognition before they sign the plan. And, finally, whereas the Greeks demand full rights for refugees to return to their pre-1974 homes in northern Cyprus, including reoccupation, the Turks are only willing to offer compensation, because only a few Turkish Cypriots would want to live among Greek Cypriots again.[72]

In the final analysis, Annan failed again with his maneuver because, on 10 March Denktash, together with the Turkish government, finally rejected the third Annan Plan[73] and the referendum, despite a more conciliatory reaction from the new reform government in Ankara to review its Cyprus policy.[74] They now argued, instead, that the Annan plan did not serve Turkish interests. No doubt they had several good reasons for this decision: the then-ongoing Iraq crisis; the split in Europe over whether or not to ally with the U.S. and U.K.; the Turkish disappointment with the EU's decision to postpone the opening of membership negotiations until 2004; an internal dispute between Erdogan and the Turkish military on who has ultimate political authority; and, finally, the election of the new Greek Cypriot President Tássos Papadópoulos in February, with the support of the traditionally Cypriotist and moderate AKEL, because he was believed to be a traditional nationalist and "hard-line-rejectionist politician," due to his long EOKA past.[75] Opinion polls taken at the time among Greek Cypriots also showed a negative attitude towards the Annan plan – in sharp contrast to the positive views expressed in Athens – because there is a widespread fear among Greek Cypriots that the Turkish Cypriot longing for political autonomy might reverse the traditional Greek majority over key decisions in territorial and property questions.[76]

But it was the Turkish refusal that put an indefinite hold on the Annan plan, the most intense efforts of the UN to solve the Cyprus problem on the basis of a detailed plan for a comprehensive settlement. In mid-April 2003, it was President Papadópoulos alone who signed the accession treaties with the EU in Athens in a ceremonial act under the Greek EU Presidency. Only a week later, deputy Prime Minister Serdar Denktash, son of the President, officially

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[72] "Cyprus-Question. Recent developments on Cyprus," Foundation Center for Studies on Turkey (FRAME), 20 April 2003, at (http://www.zft-online.de/news/article/detail.php?ds= 090ff54ae1afbd8427af91917d2fe173, last access: 10 November 2003).

[73] See http://www.typos.com.cy/nqcontent.cfm?a_id=28596 (last access: 10 November 2003).

[74] Paris Varvaroussis, "Der Beitritt Zyperns zur Europäischen Union und die Sicherheit in der Region," *Südosteuropa Mitteilungen* 43:3 (2003): 63, footnote 13.

[75] Caesar V. Mavratsas, "Aspects of the Cyprus Problem: Political and Culture and Civil Society," *Culture in Common*, 38.

[76] Axt "Gordischer Knoten," 76.

opened the internal "borders" of Northern Cyprus for visitors from both communities, commenting in the press that, "Cypriots can perhaps begin solving the Cyprus problem on their own, without outside interference – and they should do it gradually."[77] It seems that this shocking move to partially lift restrictions on free movement on the island was mainly intended to channel the ever-rising amount of internal frustration against the Denktash regime. But, as with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, thousands of ordinary Greek and Turkish Cypriots were at least initially euphoric at crossing the Green Line that had separated the island since 1963. This sudden and dramatic change transformed the Cyprus problem, with an effect whose outcome is still unknown: the experiment will have to prove whether the civil societies are ahead of the politicians, and whether the Cyprus problem can now be solved "from the bottom up." If so, it might lead to a decisive rapprochement between both communities in the long run.

The parliamentary elections in Northern Cyprus in December 2003 will test whether the anti-Denktash opposition, with the support of the EU, is already decisive enough to convince a majority of voters that the president of the TRNC must no longer be automatically viewed as the spokesman for his community in the next inter-communal negotiations. And, for the first time ever, the EU Commission in its latest progress report (November 2003) on Turkey's accession, while still avoiding taking over any direct mediation in resolving the Cyprus problem, put unusually direct political pressure on Turkey to finally push the Turkish Cypriot government to resume negotiation talks on the basis of the Annan plan. Otherwise, it openly threatened that, "the absence of a settlement could become a serious obstacle to Turkey's EU aspirations." At the same time, it offered its assistance to find a "speedy solution to the Cyprus problem."[78]

The message the EU sent to Turkey is clear: there is a link between the settlement of the Cyprus dispute and Turkish EU membership. When the Greek part of Cyprus has become an EU member as the Republic of Cyprus, Turkey will, after May 2004, be meeting at the negotiating table a country which Ankara does not officially recognize. Moreover, Turkey will be in the position of being an occupation force in EU territory. This is why a solution to the problem is so important in realizing Turkish membership in the EU. However, Turkey needs to feel that the EU is serious about Turkey's membership; only then may it be willing to make compromises to solve the problem on the basis of the Annan plan, which has failed to meet the expectations of nationalists on both sides.

Integration of Cyprus in the EU: An Effective Model Resolving Diverging Ethnic Interests?

Cyprus signifies a special case in the forthcoming round of EU enlargement, given its distinctive insular geography between Christian occident and Muslim

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[77] Mavratsas, "Aspects," 38.

[78] EU Commission, *Continuing Enlargement*, 5, 20.

orient as well as its apparently insurmountable international and historical problems of domestic co-existence involving two different ethnic groups with different ethno-religious identities. In view of that, the island offers a unique "window of opportunity," in Kofi Annan's words, to try out new models of conflict resolution. For the EU, a promotional role as stability provider, peacemaker, and prosperity benefactor in the Eastern Mediterranean could develop, if the EU succeeds at applying the dynamics of enlargement as a strategic instrument of flexible cooperation in the service of overcoming the diplomatic stalemate in the island's ongoing conflict.

But applying "democratic conditionality"[79] as the most frequently evoked feature of the enlargement process led to an asymmetrical impact: the Community, under pressure from its member state, Greece, permitted only the Greek Cypriots to enter the EU as the sole representatives of the unified government of the already deceased Republic of Cyprus. Thus the Union lost its own impartiality in the dispute, to the advantage of the Greek side. Then the EU started an exclusive material bargaining process with the Turkish Cypriots, offering attractive financial incentives to accept the conditions of the Annan plan and join the Greek-dominated negotiation team in Brussels in a minority status, while keeping Turkey on the waiting list for membership, during which time her commitment to democratic norms and values, as well as to resolving the Cyprus dispute, come under intense scrutiny. The EU's credibility as a political actor has suffered a great deal, as did the political representatives in both communities with their ambivalent responses to the Annan plan. If both parts do not succeed by May 2004 to officially join the EU together, they will have to pay the price: "The Greeks will not receive any of the occupied lands back, and the Turks will continue in their political isolation and economic misery."[80]

However, the necessary rapprochement of the deeply divided conflicting parties in Cyprus requires an approach to problem-solving beyond the rubric of the nation-state. Meanwhile, the EU is experimenting with new forms of governance in the European multi-level system.[81] This European governance is ideally based on a complex, balanced dialogue led by the governments, the EU institutions, and the civil society in Europe, and at the same time interested in a collective, binding arbitration and decision system. If the EU manages to transfer the success of its governance approach to the solution of the Cyprus problem, then it could promote more flexibility, willingness to cooperate, and acceptance among the conflicting parties for an end to the island's security dilemma and division. As an educational community, the EU can act as an

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[79] See Frank Schimmelfennig, Stefan Engert, and Heiko Knobel, "Costs, Commitment, and Compliance. The impact of EU democratic conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia, and Turkey," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 41:3 (2003): 495–517.

[80] Mavratsas, "Aspects," 39.

[81] See Commission of the European Communities, *European Governance. A White Paper* (Luxembourg, 2001).

example for the political elites of divided Cyprus, and illustrate how radically relations in the multi-level system have changed as a result of European integration. It follows that the classical terms of nation-state, sovereignty, and statehood have lost their everyday political significance. In addition, one needs to consider the large variety of political and constitutional systems within the EU, which reach from the relatively centralized models of France and United Kingdom to the loose federal structure of Belgium. Therefore, it is not too difficult for the Community to offer plausible assurances of protection to the Turkish Cypriot group within its limited territory.[82]

In coming to grips with the Cyprus issue, the EU must further develop practical measures in the near future, to prevent the small island of Aphrodite from becoming the largest problem of EU enlargement. Simultaneously, an increase in stability will result only if the EU manages to define its relations to Turkey more clearly. Yet it may prove quite helpful that Cyprus is the first accession country that must bring together on the national level two opposing cultures, drawing on Christian and Muslim traditions. The EU should show that the accession of Cyprus cannot be perceived as a victory for the Greek Cypriot population over the Turkish Cypriot minority; rather, the entire population of Cyprus benefits. Thus, it must be examined, whether – after the freedom to travel has been improved below the threshold of an international acknowledgement of Northern Cyprus – compulsory resettlements can be excluded, and the TRNC can participate in the free trade and customs union. Additionally, as with the codification of the Turkish language as an official EU language in the accession treaty, the Republic of Cyprus must be persuaded to make a constructive contribution.[83] The future of the Community depends considerably on whether the EU succeeds at establishing a broad democratic dialogue between the traditional Christian and Islamic archrivals within a shared Western and secular political framework.[84] Here, the EU will have to involve itself more intensively than it has previously done in the cooperation between both groups on Cyprus in order to demonstrate its integrity and credibility to these new European citizens. Ultimately, whether Cypriots of both ethnic groups will be able to solve their conflicts amiably with EU support under the common umbrella of Europe ultimately will depend on the number and extent of bi-communal networks that are created. In this manner, Turks and Greeks in Cyprus must first learn that they can realize their interests believably, profitably, and efficiently only through joint membership in an enlarged European Community.

"*Wandel durch Annäherung*" (transformation by mutual approach), to cite Egon Bahr, the architect of the inner German détente policy in the 1970s, can only be realized within Cyprus if the two parties move closer together from

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[82] Wallace, *Reconciliation,* 9.

[83] Deutsch-Zyprisches Bürgerforum. *Projektbericht* (Köln, 2001), 11–19.

[84] Larry Siedentop, *Democracy in Europe* (London, 2000), 207.

project to project under the stable framework of the EU, guaranteeing to NGO's the freedom to conduct inter-communal activities, creating mutual trust and understanding for interethnic cooperation. Then both camps will have to accept that the two existing political systems in one country[85] can in fact peacefully coexist to their mutual benefit under a loose state federation and, with Greece and Turkey closely integrated in the European Union, contribute finally to peace and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean. Thus the real strength of the EU to solve the Cyprus problem lies in its "power of attraction."[86] Eventual full EU membership for Cyprus and Turkey offers the necessary incentives and the economic, political, legal, and security frameworks to accommodate the integration after the settlement of the Cyprus dispute. But it will largely depend on the political interests of all domestic and external parties involved to provide for rapprochement as the condition for trustworthy and binding commitments to finally regulate inter-communal co-existence on the basis of the Annan plan.

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[85] Zervakis, "Die politischen Systeme Zyperns," 889; and H. Tarik Oguzlu, "The EU as an actor in the solution of the Cyprus dispute: The question of 'how'," *JEMIE* 2 (2002): 21.

[86] George Christou, "The European Union and Cyprus: The power of attraction as a solution to the Cyprus issue," *JEMIE* 2 (2002): 22.