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CIAO DATE: 07/06
Summer, Number 2, July 2005
Full Text (PDF, 135 Pages, 795 KB)
Security Problems within Post-Soviet Space by Nika Chitadze
(PDF, 4 Pages, 41 KB)
The problems of security within the territory of the former Soviet Union are numerous. The security architecture in the CIS is still in the process of formation, which complicates the situation. The situation in the CIS represents a combination of many factors, such as:
The Western Balkans Between Statehood and Integration by Mehmet Elezi
(PDF, 4 Pages, 45 KB)
The current threats to European security no longer come from within the continent. Friendship, partnership, and collaboration have now taken the place of interstate confrontation. Some tense issues exist, such as the Basque problem, the Irish problem, Kaliningrad, Transdniestria, etc., but they are largely isolated. The Cyprus crisis, silent since about thirty years, has represented a potential danger that extends over the entire island, but it seems like this issue is moving towards a solution as well.
There is another region that is calm for now, but not yet definitively: Southeastern Europe. At various times during the last century this region has been a threat to the security of the continent, causing headaches even in the major European capitals. If the assassination of Duke Ferdinand by Gavrilo Princip in Sarajevo sparked off World War I, the siege of Sarajevo has become a nightmare for the continent and the international community. Can this dramatic cycle be considered completely closed? One thing is for sure: one cannot speak about achieving security in the continent without calming its hot spots, such as Southeastern Europe. The intervention of NATO in Kosovo in 1999, the Stability Pact, and the attention of Washington and Brussels to the progress of the Euro-Atlantic integration of the region are historical steps in this direction.
Towards a Trans-Mediterranean Partnership for Peace? by Alain Faupin
(PDF, 6 Pages, 54 KB)
I am convinced that the common and frequent use of certain words sometimes blurs their true meaning. But when one takes the precaution of asking oneself, just before taking hold of a problem, "What’s up?" one comes to grip with the ideas behind the words, which the topic really deals with. This is what I did in this case. What does one really mean by "Partnership for Peace" and by "the Mediterranean"? The answers to these questions led me to wonder about the points of application of this "partnership": on one side, a world that it has helped to restructure since the end of the Cold War, on the red ashes of the Soviet empire; on the other side, a fractured world in search of peace, stability, security, and development. This situation can suggest three different approaches: a long preparatory phase; a common sense solution, progressive and limited in scope; or an offensive and wide-ranging approach.
Russia and the "Orange Revolution": Response, Rhetoric, Reality? by Graeme P Herd
(PDF, 14 Pages, 105 KB)
The Ukrainian presidential elections, which took place during November and December of 2004, have been labeled the "Orange Revolution." Within former Soviet space, they have been interpreted as a Western-backed "exported revolution." As such, these events are perceived to be part of a pattern of Western-backed revolutions stretching from Tirana and Belgrade to Tbilisi and Kiev, one that is now set to unfold in a tsunami- type chain reaction throughout the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). This article identifies the main arguments that support such a contention, questions its validity, and highlights key flaws and weaknesses in the assumptions that underpin it. It argues that the idea of Western-backed revolutions is so powerful that it has begun to shape foreign- and security-policy responses within the CIS, not least the Russian Federation. The "Orange Revolution" will not result in honest elections, greater transparency and accountability, better governance, and peaceful transitions of power, but rather the opposite. "Immunization" from the "Orange virus" may only be secured through the adoption of the Belarus authoritarian model, by "tightening the screws." This will have negative consequences for democratization efforts and the role and function of NGOs (both indigenous and foreign), diplomatic missions, international exchanges, and other organizations in Russia and the CIS.
Legitimacy and the Transatlantic Management of Crisis by Erik Jones
(PDF, 4 Pages, 49 KB)
The United States-led coalition in Iraq is suffering from a crisis of legitimacy. The evidence is everywhere around us. It can be seen in the decision by incoming Spanish Prime Minister Jos é Luis Rodriguez Zapatero to withdraw his country’s forces from Iraq as soon as possible.1 It can be read in the growing British popular support for an independent European foreign policy, in the decline of German and French popular support for the Bush Administration’s "War on Terror," and in the large percentages of respondents across Europe who question the sincerity of American efforts to reduce international terrorism.2 Word of the crisis is on the lips of almost every European politician, and it is in the pages of almost every major newspaper or journal published on either side of the North Atlantic.
Crisis Management: The Transformation of National and International Systems of Response by Andrzej Karkoszka
(PDF, 10 Pages, 80 KB)
In the past, several wise men have passed their judgment on a proper response to a crisis. And so, Talleyrand advised, "In critical situations, let women run things." James Reston said in 1967, "International crises have their advantage. They frighten the weak but stir and inspire the strong." In another bon mot, the Diplomat’s Dictionary says, "The usual response of international organizations to crises passes through predictable phases: they ignore the problem; they issue a statement of concern about it; they wring their hands while sitting on them; they declare that they remain seized of the matter; they adjourn."1 Regrettably, none of these half-serious comments are helpful.
Neither are the experiences of the decades of the Cold War of much assistance. During those days, several serious international crises occurred. Some of them had a truly historic and strategic nature, like the Berlin crisis in 1949 and 1961, the Suez crisis of 1956, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, and the crisis at the end of the Yom Kippur War in 1973. Others were of lesser magnitude, with smaller possible implications, and these occurred more frequently. All have had more or less far-reaching political consequences; all have been described, debated, and analyzed at length. However, these experiences and analyses prove of limited value in understanding and preparing for today’s menace, which may bring crisis upon us.
NATO Before and After the Second Gulf War by Mustafa Kibaroglu
(PDF, 3 Pages, 40 KB)
For an assessment of the possible roles NATO may have in the future, and their possible implications for international security, it would be useful to look back in order to make a meaningful assessment of where NATO was before the second Gulf War, and where it is heading toward in its aftermath.
It would not be inaccurate to argue that NATO came about as the product of the strategic vision of the United States for the post-World War II era. Anticipating that the war would come to a close with the victory of the Allied powers, whereby the Soviet Union would occupy a significant portion of continental Europe, the United States wanted to initiate the necessary institutional frameworks that would enable it to maintain a foothold in Western Europe. As such, it was believed that the U.S. would achieve a "forward defense" capability against its primary antagonist, namely the Soviet Union, on the eve of the nuclear age. Hence, the estate value of Western Europe, neighboring the Soviet Union as well as its zone of influence, was extremely precious to the United States. Having the capability to strike the heartland of the Soviet Union from this near location, if need be, while keeping the continental U.S. still far from the reach of most Soviet military capabilities, was made possible thanks to the existence of the NATO alliance. The "delicate balance of terror" that was eventually achieved due to the mutual "second-strike capabilities" of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union ensured that a certain degree of stability could be maintained during the Cold War period.
Counter-Terrorism Capability: Preventing Radiological Threats by Vladimir Lukov
(PDF, 20 Pages, 128 KB)
For many decades, terrorism was perceived as a contest between two sides: on the one hand, a group of people or an organization, and on the other, a sovereign state. However, during the course of the second half of the twentieth century, various countries began to use terrorist organizations to promote state interests in the international domain. In some cases, states have established "puppet" terrorist organizations, whose purpose is to act on behalf of the sponsoring state, to further the interests of the state, and to represent its positions on either the domestic or regional front. In other cases, states sponsor existing organizations on the basis of mutual interests.
The patron state provides its beneficiary terrorist organization with political support, financial assistance, and the sponsorship necessary to maintain and expand its struggle. The patron uses the beneficiary to perpetrate acts of terrorism as a means of spreading the former’s ideology throughout the world, or in some cases, the patron ultimately expects the beneficiary to gain control of the state in which it resides or impart its ideology to broad sections of the general public.
NATO Response Force: Rapid? Responsive? A Force? by Michael Mihalka
(PDF, 14 Pages, 97 KB)
The NATO Response Force (NRF) was intended to make NATO responsive to the security needs of the twenty-first century. However, by U.S. standards it is unlikely to be rapid, responsive, or much of a force. Nevertheless, the NRF will prove the most important vehicle for adapting European forces to the needs of modern expeditionary ventures.
The United States proposed a "NATO Response Force" at a meeting of NATO defense ministers in September 2002. U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld cautioned his colleagues, "If NATO does not have a force that is quick and agile, that can deploy in days or weeks rather than months or years, then it will not have capabilities to offer the world in the twenty-first century."1 The Americans had become increasingly concerned that the Europeans had become preoccupied with the needs of the 1990that is, to provide stabilization forces after a conflictand were ignoring the new threats that had appeared after the terrorist attacks of September 2001. "There are no more threats to NATO from within Europe, but from a nexus of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction," a U.S. official demurred. "NATO needs an expeditionary force, a strike force, that can move fast."
Why Is Post-Conflict Rehabilitation Important for Preserving and Developing Transatlantic Relations by Plamen Pantev
(PDF, 3 Pages, 35 KB)
Preserving and developing transatlantic relations has proved to be an indispensable tool for handling the various challenges of global international relations, both in the past century and in the first years of the present one. The attraction of membership in NATO for countries that are still undergoing the process of post-conflict rehabilitation activities, the accession of new members to the Alliance from the former Soviet bloc, the examples of vitality and institutional modernization by the North Atlantic organization itself are significant arguments in this direction. Whatever the differences within the transatlantic community have been in the past and are at present, preserving and developing relations between Europe and North America have no substitute in terms of guaranteeing the democratic trends and stability in the world. There are allies, partners, friends of the transatlantic community, but they do not play a substitute role in promoting the progress of human civilization. Making the world safe for global economic activity, a place where human rights and dignity matter, is the heart of the transatlantic philosophy and construct.
Russia’s Perception and Hierarchy of Security Threats by Dmitry Polikanov
(PDF, 7 Pages, 59 KB)
As Russian President Vladimir Putin enters his second term and Russia embarks on the course toward modernization (some experts would call it authoritarian modernization, though), the country is approaching an important phase in its development. The general message sent by the modernization process is the end of the transition period in Russian politics and economy, which will require the formulation of new tasks for the future. Among them, it will be necessary to reassess Russia’s place in the world and to see how to ensure the country’s competitiveness (a fashionable word for the Russian establishment) in the global arena. Therefore, the Russian perception of security threats becomes a subject of extreme importance.
Iran’s Nuclear Program: U.S. Options After the Elections by Matthew Rhodes
(PDF, 6 Pages, 57 KB)
Iran’s growing nuclear capability is emerging as the number one issue for the Bush Administration in its second term. For the past three years, the dominant focus on Iraq, in the words of former Secretary of State Colin Powell, "sucked the oxygen" from other security issues. Now, however, it is increasingly Iran that stands center-stage in defining the uses and limits of the strategy of preemption, the agenda for the broader Middle East, and the future of America’s relations with Europe.
Post-Conflict Rehabilitation: From Aid to Development by Mladen Stanicic
(PDF, 58 Pages, 7 KB)
The new European approach regarding the economic aspects of post-conflict rehabilitation (PCR) in the so-called Western Balkans was set out in the preparation documents for the EU Summit in Thessaloniki in June 2003. It stated, inter alia, that as the Western Balkan countries gradually moved from stabilization and reconstruction based on aid to association and sustainable development, policies pursuing economic and social cohesion at both the national and regional levels would become increasingly relevant. What was required was to better integrate the goal of economic and social cohesion into EU policy towards the region. There was a pressing need for new strategies to promote structural reforms across the region, including additional forms of pre-accession assistance. This would encourage states in the region to mobilize their own resources to support positive development in particularly critical areas. At the institutional level, these countries should be granted the status category of pre-accession without negotiations, which would enable them to access the pre-accession funds such as SAPARD (Special Accession Program for Agriculture and Rural Development) and ISPA (Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-accession). In other words, these countries should be treated as pre-accession candidates without the obligation to open negotiations on membership until they were found by the Commission to be fit on their individual merits.
European Security and Private Military Companies: The Prospects for Privatized "Battlegroups" by James K Wither
(PDF, 20 Pages, 146 KB)
"Mercenary" remains a pejorative term. It is associated with the hired killers implicated in coup attempts in Africa in the 1960s and 1970s, and more recently associated with human rights abuses in post-Cold War conflicts in Eurasia and the Balkans. However, until the nineteenth century a large part of the armed forces of most European nations was supplied by the private sector. It was normal for professional soldiersespecially those with technical expertise, such as artillerymen or siege engineersto offer their services on the open market. Often contractors organized soldiers into formed units on behalf of paying clients, notably the condottieri that held a monopoly on providing military services to the city-states of fifteenth-century Italy. Later, formed bodies of mercenaries were hired by the emerging nation-states of Western Europe and integrated into their armies. Units of Swiss, Scots, and Irish soldiers served in the armies of France. Great Britain hired nearly 30,000 German mercenaries to help fight the rebellious American colonists. Commercial contractors were also required to equip, feed, and sustain troops in the field, carrying out many tasks that would later be performed by uniformed logisticians in the large standing armies of the twentieth century. But, just as mercenaries supplanted unreliable feudal levees towards the end of the Middle Ages, they began to fall from favor as the scale of warfare increased and mass citizen armies emerged during the French revolutionary wars. For the last two centuries, a state monopoly on armed violence has been an accepted feature of national sovereignty.