

The Demographic Situation in Ukraine: Present State, Tendencies, and Predictions

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The demographic situation in Ukraine is characterized by an accumulation of tendencies that are reaching crisis proportions. The population is decreasing, with an increase in the death rate among working-age people and a negative balance of external migration. Under these conditions, a deterioration in interethnic and interreligious relations in society is possible against a background of a worsening socioeconomic situation for most of the population.

In this article, the basic indices characterizing both the current state and the trends of the demographic situation in Ukraine will be presented and analyzed. These include both the population statistics and the factors and consequences that can be derived from those statistics.

One caution that needs to be taken into account regarding the statistics is the lack of a census on the background of active demographic processes, including migratory processes, for a considerable period of time.² This gap is connected with several factors that followed the breakup of the USSR, the formation of independent states, and the transformation of their socioeconomic structure. This transformation included a reformation of the organs of state authority, among the functions of which is registering various population flows. In addition, the systems for collecting and processing information were also reformed, which has both resulted in a level of incompleteness in the register of information and made the data difficult to compare.

As a result, only certain data for the year 2000 are used in this article, while the main data set used is limited to that for the year 1999.

The numbers and sociodemographic structure of the population

Dynamics of the population's numbers

According to data from the census of 1989, the population of Ukraine numbered 51.7 million persons. At the beginning of 1993, it reached its highest level for

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² Censuses were conducted every ten years in the USSR era after 1945. The last census was conducted in 1989. A census was initially scheduled for 1999 in Ukraine, but it was not conducted. It is proposed that a census be conducted between 5–14 December 2001.

the entire postwar period—52.3 million persons.³ However, this increase in the population did not occur due to natural growth, but was a result of migration.

In general, the years 1991–93 were the period of the most active migratory processes among the republics of the former USSR, and this was particularly true for Ukraine. Many people were striving to return to their ethnic or historical homelands in order to receive citizenship there in connection with the breakup of the Soviet Union and the rise of independent national states on its former territory. In addition, certain native peoples and ethnic groups that had earlier been forcibly deported from the territory of Ukraine were rehabilitated, and their rights were restored at the end of 1989.⁴ The descendants of these individuals got the opportunity to return to their historical homeland at the beginning of the 1990s. At a minimum, over the period 1990–99, 1.6 million persons came to Ukraine from the countries of the former USSR to take up permanent residence.⁵ All these factors brought about significant migratory flows into Ukraine primarily over the course of the years 1990–93. A negative balance of external migration was first recorded in 1994, and at this point the growth of the population due to migration ceased.

The natural growth of the population had already revealed a tendency to fall off in 1991, when the death rate in Ukraine exceeded the birth rate for the first time in the postwar period—the coefficient of natural growth per 1000 persons in the population came to -0.8 .⁶ The negative trend was reinforced in the following years, and in the year 2000 it reached a value of -7.5 .⁷

As a result, after 1993 a reduction in the absolute numbers of Ukraine's population began. Over the course of the years 1993–2000, the population of Ukraine dropped by 2.9 million persons, from 52.2 million persons to 49.3 million. Of that number, four-fifths of the losses have been due to natural population losses (an

³ That is, over the period of time Ukraine has existed within its present geographical borders. After 1946 these included the territory of Transcarpathia; after 1954, they included the territory of the Crimea. According to the results of the census of 1959, 41.8 million persons resided in Ukraine; in 1970, 47.1 million; in 1979, 49.7 million; and in 1989, 51.7 million.

⁴ Declaration of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR "On recognizing repressive acts against peoples subjected to forcible resettlement as illegal and criminal and on securing their rights," dated 14 November 1989.

⁵ See V. Pal'ko, "Migratsiini protsesy: vid teorii do zhittevykh realii" (Migratory processes: from theories to living realities), in *Problemy migratsii* (2000), 2, 27.

⁶ *Statistichnyi shchorichnyk Ukrainy za 1998 rik* (Statistical yearbook of Ukraine for 1998) (Kyiv, 1999), 339.

⁷ In absolute figures, 385,100 persons were born in Ukraine in 2000, and 758,100 died; the natural growth of the population was minus 373,000 persons. See: *Ukraina u tsyfrakh u 2000 rotsi* (Ukraine in figures in the year 2000) (Kyiv, 2001), 180. In the period January-May 2001 the population of Ukraine dropped by another 176,200 persons, and as of 1 June 2001 consisted of 49,115,000 persons; the decrease occurred due to natural reduction ($-162,500$ persons) and migratory outflow ($-13,700$ persons). The intensity of natural reduction of the population in rural areas is 1.6 times higher than in cities (10.7 persons per 1000 inhabitants against 6.7). See "Naselennia krainy skorochuet'sia" (The country's population is decreasing), *Vlada i politika* (Government and Politics), 27 July 2001, 5.

excess of the death rate over the birth rate) and one-fourth as a consequence of migratory processes (an excess of the level of emigration over the level of immigration).

Factors determining the dynamics of population numbers

The causes of reductions in population numbers are: a reduction in the birth rate, an increase in the death rate, the unsatisfactory state of the health of the population accompanying the low quality of and insufficient access to the health care system in the country, and an excess of the level of emigration over the level of immigration.

The birth rate. Over the period 1991–2000, the number of births per 1,000 persons in the population dropped by almost forty percent (from 12.7 in 1990 to 7.8 in 2000), and in absolute numbers by more than forty percent as well; while 657,200 persons were born in 1990, 385,100 were born in 2000. The reduction in the birth rate in rural areas of the country is reaching crisis proportions. According to data from the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, out of the Ukraine's 28,794 villages, not a single child was born in 12,673 of them in 1999. There are no children aged between six and fifteen in almost one thousand villages.⁸

Against this background of a falling birth rate, the number of abortions remains stable and high. According to data from the Ministry of Health Care of Ukraine, 470,000 abortions were registered in the country in 1999.⁹ As a point of comparison, the number of births in 1999 came to 389,200 persons. For 320 of each 100,000 women not giving birth as a result of abortion annually, the procedure ends in death.¹⁰

Overall, the birth rate coefficient in Ukraine is one of the lowest among European countries (including the post-Communist countries). In the year 2000, the birth rate coefficient reached 7.8 in Ukraine. Lower figures were registered only in Bulgaria (7.7), Latvia (7.6), and Russia (7.6).

The death rate. In contrast to the birth rate, the death rate in Ukraine is one of the highest in Europe. In 2000, the general coefficient of the death rate reached 15.3, compared to 10.6 in the countries of the European Union. Over the years 1991–2000, an increase of the death rate has been recorded in practically all age groups (with the exception of the age group 1-14), but the death rate is especially high among those of working age. The death rate index for working-age people

⁸ See N. Pokotylo, "Zhinki i diti" (Women and children), *Golos Ukrainy* (Voice of Ukraine), 6 July 2000, 4.

⁹ In the opinion of specialists, the real number of abortions is significantly higher, but the majority of operations for interrupting pregnancy are done without the appropriate documentation and registration. It is thought that the number of abortions exceeds the number of births by fifty percent at a minimum. Some sources adduce figures of up to one and a half million abortions a year.

¹⁰ N. Pokotylo, *op. cit.*

grew by a factor of eight in the period 1991–2000, and the portion of the overall death rate reflecting people of working age reached almost twenty-five percent.

The high death rate among working-age men is an especially alarming phenomenon, capable of causing significant demographic deformations. This level is estimated to be the highest in the world.¹¹ The death rate of men thus exceeds the death rate of women by two or three times in all age groups, but the difference is especially noticeable in the middle age groups of 30–45 years—that is, within the boundaries of the reproductive age.

Among the reasons for the high death rate among the working-age population since 1990, the most important is that of unnatural causes, including accidents, murders, and suicides. The main unnatural cause reflected in the death rate is suicide. The index of instances of suicide per 100,000 in the population is growing constantly: while in 1999 it came to 20.6, in 2000 it came to 29.4.¹²

The population's state of health, the quality of and access to health care. The indices of the state of health of Ukraine's population are characterized by a steady worsening tendency. At the same time, the state of the health care system is also getting worse. The number of medical establishments is decreasing and the level of their financing by the state has fallen to a critical level. The transition of medicine towards a pay-for-care basis has significantly limited access to health care for the overwhelming majority of the population.

Up to 70 million instances of sickness are registered annually in Ukraine. According to data from the Ukrainian Institute for Public Health, only 4.4 percent of men and 2.9 percent of women of working age in the country have high indices of health and are in the so-called safety zone; 22.1 percent of men and 19.4 percent of women are in average health, while 73.5 percent of men and 77.7 percent of women have one degree or another of sickness.¹³ Coincidental with a general fall in the birth rate, the number of children with chronic illnesses and of children who are invalids is growing. Out of every hundred children born today in Ukraine, twenty-five are either born with pathologies or acquire them.

The so-called social illnesses—such as tuberculosis, syphilis, or HIV/AIDS—are spreading. The incidence of tuberculosis more than doubled over the period 1990–1999, and the death rate from this illness increased by almost two and a half times. About nine thousand people die from tuberculosis annually, more than 80 percent of them of working age (15 to 59). There is an increasing tendency for growth in the incidence of tuberculosis among children and, for the period 1995–1999, the corresponding index rose by 55 percent. The number of instances

¹¹ See “Izlozhenie vystupleniia ministra zdravookhraneniia Ukrainy v Verkhovnoi Rade Ukrainy 10 noiabria 1997” (An exposition of the speech by the Minister of Health Care of Ukraine in the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine on 10 November 1997), 11.

¹² *Ukraina u tsyfrakh u 2000 rotsi*, 182.

¹³ See M. Babak, “Chy e zdorovi ukraintsi?” (Are Ukrainians healthy?), *Politika i kul'tura*, 27 February 2001, 33.

involving entire families, and also newborns, is increasing.¹⁴ Altogether, according to preliminary data, as of the beginning of 2001 about 625,000 persons were registered as being ill with this disease in Ukraine, a number that represents 1.4 percent of the country's population and bears witness to the fact that Ukraine is experiencing an epidemic of tuberculosis.

Syphilis is encountered in Ukraine almost a hundred times more frequently than in the countries of Eastern and Central Europe. Over the period 1990–99, the number of instances of syphilis in the country increased by more than eighteen times (from 3,100 in 1990 to 56,800 in 1999). The fact that the disease is spreading among children and juveniles suggests that the outlook is bleak. The index of the number of illnesses per 100,000 in the population of that age has grown over the period 1994–99, among children by more than four times and among juveniles by almost 150 percent.¹⁵

Ukraine, in the opinion of experts from UNAIDS and the WHO, has the “most dramatic” epidemic situation with regard to HIV/AIDS among the countries of the former USSR.¹⁶ As of the end of 2000, the number of officially registered cases of HIV infection came to about 36,000 persons.¹⁷ However, specialists assume that the number of persons ill with this disease in Ukraine is far higher than the officially registered number—perhaps around 285,000—and about 75 percent of those infected are young people in the age range 15–29.

Four regions (oblasts) in Ukraine (the Dnepropetrovsk, Donetsk, Nikolaev, and Odessa Regions) are experiencing an epidemic of HIV/AIDS. In these regions, the epidemic threshold established by the WHO is exceeded by three or four times at 70 instances of sickness per 100,000 persons in the population. The epidemiological situation is complicated by at least two factors, the influence of which could lead to a full-scale epidemic. First, the rate at which HIV/AIDS is spreading: Ukraine is the leader among European countries with about 500 new cases being registered monthly. By way of comparison, in Poland there are no more than 40 new cases per month. Second, the disease has gone beyond the limits of the group at risk and is hitting the general population, including children and young people.

¹⁴ “Stan dotrymannia ta zakhystu prav i svobod liudyny v Ukraini. Persha shchorichna dopovid' Upovnovazhenogo Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy z prav liudyny” (The situation with the observance and protection of human rights and freedoms in Ukraine, First annual report of the Ombudsman for human rights at the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine), (Kyiv, 2000), 98.

¹⁵ *Derzhavna dopovid' pro stanovyshche ditei v Ukraini (za pidsumkami 1999r.) (Government report on the state of children in Ukraine (according to the results of 1999))* (Kyiv, 2000), 81.

¹⁶ See “Epidemiia VICH-infektsii” (Epidemic of HIV infection), *Zerkalo nedeli* (Mirror of the week), 4 December 1999, 13.

¹⁷ Of those cases, 2,025 were children, and of 1,977 persons whose illness had reached the terminal stage (AIDS), 955 adults and forty-five children died of AIDS. Over the course of 2000 alone, 6,212 new cases were revealed, of which 737 were children (almost every ninth case).

On the whole, according to estimates made by specialists, if the tendencies for the spread of tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS are not overcome in the very nearest future, then in five to seven years one in every three inhabitants of Ukraine will be struck by one or the other of these diseases.

The worsening indices for the state of the population's health notwithstanding, there is also a worsening in the quality of the country's health care. In the index of outlays per inhabitant for health care, Ukraine occupies position number 111 among the 191 countries of the world, and position number eight among the countries of the CIS.¹⁸ In terms of level of achievement of the goals of health care, Ukraine occupies position number 60. Not only are outlays for health care per inhabitant in the country insufficient, they also demonstrate a tendency toward steady decline. In 1997, per capita health care outlays came to \$47.30, while in 1998 they were \$32.20, and in 2000, only \$13.00. Overall, only 2.7 percent of GDP in Ukraine is directed at health care needs (the world standard being eight percent).¹⁹

The growing proportion of pay-for-care medical services and their cost, which is incompatible with the average wage in the country, are progressively reducing the access to medical care for the overwhelming majority of the population. Instances of sick people dying because they are unable to pay for the necessary medical services or medicines are no longer a rarity. While he was Prime Minister of Ukraine, V. Iushchenko admitted that ten percent of Ukraine's citizens do not have the possibility of availing themselves of medical aid. In the opinion of specialists, the real figure is far higher.²⁰ This is confirmed by the results of a nationwide sociological poll conducted by UCEPS in February-March 2001, in which more than half the respondents (54.5 percent) reported that they had had to decline medical examination or aid due to a lack of means to pay for it.²¹

A threatening situation has developed with regard to medical aid for children living in rural areas. According to data from the Ministry of Health Care of Ukraine, 95 percent of parents of rural children do not ask for medical aid due to the distance to medical establishments or due to an inability to pay.

The population's socioeconomic situation. The dynamics of the basic socioeconomic indices for 1990–2000 testify to a sharp decline in the quality of life for the overwhelming majority of the country's population. The basic factors determining the economic situation of the population over the course of that period of time were a loss of savings brought about by the hyperinflation of 1991–93, the

¹⁸ The three Baltic states, Belarus, Russia, Moldova, and Armenia were all ahead of Ukraine.

¹⁹ See "Izlozhenie vystupleniia ministra zdravookhraneniia Ukrainy na zasedanii Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy 14 noiabria 2000g." (An exposition of the speech by the Minister of Health Care of Ukraine at the session of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine on 14 November 2000).

²⁰ "Strakhova medytsyna: za i proti" (Insurance medicine: for and against), *Uriadovyi kur'er* (Government courier), 6 March 2001, 7.

²¹ See *Natsional'na bezpeka i oborona* (National Security and Defense) (2001), 3, 15.

spread of unemployment, a decrease in monetary income (wages and pensions), and a depreciation in the value of that income as a consequence of inflation.

According to data from selective studies of the work force using the methodology of the International Association of Trade Unions, the level of unemployment came to 11.9 percent in 2000 among the economically active population aged 15–70. Among working age people, unemployment came to 12.5 percent. The level of registered unemployment was 4.2 percent of the working age population. However, according to expert estimates, taking hidden unemployment into account, the proportion of the economically active population without work reaches 35–40 percent. In this regard, closer inspection shows some extraordinarily negative signs of unemployment in Ukraine. Almost one third (30 percent) of the unemployed are young people aged 15–24.²² Unemployment is acquiring a nature associated with economic depression. In 1999, more than half the unemployed (56.3 percent) had not had work for more than a year, while the proportion of those who had not had work for more than three years increased from 1.3 percent in 1998 to 3.8 percent in 1999.²³ The level of so-called family unemployment is growing, this phenomenon being especially characteristic of small towns and satellite towns to major industrial complexes.²⁴

At the same time, having work does not guarantee a good standard of living. In the first place, the wage level in Ukraine is critically low. The average monthly wage in 2000 came to 230 grivnas (US\$42), and only covered 85 percent of the minimum subsistence level. In addition, arrears in wage payments are a chronic problem, in spite of some improvement in the situation in 2000. As of 1 January 2001 the total amount of arrears in payment of wages came to 4.9 billion grivnas (about US\$9 million). As a result, there is a steady trend toward a reduction in the level of the income of the population. At present in Ukraine there are more than one million families in which the per capita income does not reach 50 grivnas (US\$9) a month, while in more than one hundred thousand families it does not exceed 20 grivnas (US\$3.60).

The existence of poverty and destitution was officially admitted in Ukraine only in 2000;²⁵ at that time, 27.8 percent of the population (13.7 million persons) was considered to belong to the category of the impoverished, and 14.2 percent (almost 7 million persons), to the category of the destitute. Thus there are grounds

²² “Pratsia v Ukraini u 1999 rotsi” (Labor in Ukraine in 1999) in *Statystychnyi zbirnyk* (Statistical Collection) (Kyiv, 2000), 11.

²³ *Ibid.*, 45.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 11.

²⁵ See “Pidsumky social’no-ekonomichnogo rozvytku Ukrainy u 2000r. na zavdannia na 2001r.: Vystup Prezydenta Ukrainy L.D. Kuchmy na zasidanni Natsional’noi Rady z uzgodzhennia dial’nosti zagal’noderzhavnykh i regional’nykh organiv ta mestsevogo smovriaduvannia” (Results of socio-economic development in Ukraine in 2000 and tasks for 2001. Speech by President of Ukraine L.d. Kuchma at the session of the National Council on coordination of activities of national and regional bodies and of local self-government), *Uriadovyi kur’er*, 14 March 2001, 5.

for predicting that poverty will be a persistent and chronic problem. This is confirmed, in particular, by the poverty of families with children, and particularly of families with numerous children. In about 78 percent of families classified as impoverished, one of the adults has work. Where both parents have work, 26.1 percent of families with children are impoverished. If the current socioeconomic conditions persist, children from impoverished families will be unable to have quality health care and education, and consequently a vocation, and will be doomed to hereditary poverty. In addition, under conditions of spreading unemployment and poverty, the number of marriages is going down (the index of the number of marriages per 1,000 persons fell from 9.3 in 1990 to 5.5 in 2000).²⁶ This leads, if not to a decrease in reproduction of the population, then to the growth of incomplete families and the spread of social orphans.

External migration of the population. Although domestic labor mobility is generally low, the worsening socioeconomic situation in the country, the spread of unemployment, and the low price of labor compels people to migrate from Ukraine temporarily in search of work or to leave Ukraine to take up permanent residence in countries with more favorable employment conditions. According to expert estimates, labor migration from the country comprises about five million persons per year.²⁷ This migration is mainly illegal. For example, in 2000 45,000 inhabitants traveled abroad from the Chernovtsy Region of Ukraine alone for the purpose of illegally securing work. By contrast, only 33 persons were reported to have legally secured work in the near and far abroad.²⁸ Moreover, in recent years labor migration has taken on criminal features. A rise in activity in trading in people has been noted. Thus, from the beginning of 2001, in the Donetsk Region alone, the Criminal Investigations Administration uncovered four organized criminal groups engaged in the trade in human beings. Twelve Ukrainian citizens and six Turkish citizens were identified as a part of the groups. Twelve companies were also exposed which, under the guise of finding employment for citizens, were recruiting young women and girls to engage in the sex business and prostitution.²⁹

There have also been instances of Ukrainian citizens traveling abroad for the purpose of hiring themselves out to military and paramilitary units, including illegal groups. The Security Service of Ukraine Administration in the Ivano-Frankovsk Region has disseminated information that in recent times there has been a growth in the numbers of those who leave to serve in foreign military groups. Foreign radical political organizations and commercial structures are ac-

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ 'Sotsial'ni prava pratsivnykiv-migrantiv' (Social rights of migrant workers) in *Uriadovi kur'er*, January 12, 2001, p. 2.

²⁸ See *Ukrainsk'kyi regional'nyi visnyk* (Ukrainian regional bulletin) 22 (2001), 19.

²⁹ See "Seks-rabyni z Donechchyny" (Sex slaves from the Donetsk area), *Kievlіanin*, 20 September 2001, 11.

tively recruiting young Ukrainians into legal and illegal militarized formations. Ukrainians often wind up in the French Foreign Legion. In the course of the year 2000 alone, the special services have prevented eighteen instances of departure abroad by Ukrainian citizens who had decided to reinforce the ranks of foreign legionnaires. At the same time, it is known to the Security Service of Ukraine that a number of inhabitants of the Ivano-Frankovsk, Nadvirnian, Kalush, Kolomyia, Kosov, and Dolina Districts are serving in the French Foreign Legion. According to estimates by the Security Service of Ukraine Administration, this tendency will intensify given the existing socio-economic situation.³⁰

The number of citizens of Ukraine leaving to take up residence in foreign countries remains at a high level. In 1999, 110,600 persons left Ukraine, and 100,300 left in 2000.³¹ Permanent emigration from Ukraine involves a number of ethnic groups, most notably Jews, Germans, Czechs, Hungarians, and Greeks, but also, to a lesser extent, Ukrainians and Russians. Those who leave are usually of working-age with a high level of education. Between 1995–99, about 6,000 workers in the field of science and about 1000 from the arts and culture left Ukraine.³²

The trend of migration into Ukraine, as was already noted, has diminished (the number of immigrants decreased from 65,800 in 2000 to 53,700 persons in 1999), with migrants from third-world countries prevailing.

The high level of emigration combined with a decreasing number of immigrants is bringing about a negative balance of migration (in 1999 and 2000 it came to –0.9 per 1,000 persons in the population), and serves as one of the factors in the reduction of the total population in the country.

Consequences of negative trends in Ukraine's demographic situation

The unfavorable socioeconomic situation and the constant threat of unemployment and destitution are powerful factors in spreading a socially depressed condition in society. This in turn has an extremely unfavorable influence on the demographic situation by reducing the birth rate and growth.

Aging of the population. The population of Ukraine can be considered old both against the Rosset scale and using United Nations norms. Using the Rosset scale, the part of the population aged 60 and older stands at 20.5 percent.³³ Using United Nations norms, the part of the population aged 65 and older comprises 13.8 percent.³⁴ In developed countries, the aging of the population occurs due to a

³⁰ See A. Romaniuk, "Zhelaiushchikh stat' 'pushechnym miasom' vse bol'she" (There are more and more of those wishing to become "cannon fodder"), *Segodnia* (Today), 21 February 2001, 2.

³¹ *Ukraina u tsyfrakh u 1999 rotsi* (Kyiv, 2000), 187; *Ukraina u tsyfrakh u 2000 rotsi*, 183.

³² "Za p'iat' rokov z Ukrainy vyikhalo ponad tysiachu diiachiv mystetstva" (In five years more than one thousand figures in the art world have left Ukraine) *Khreshchatyk*, 19 May 2000, 2.

³³ According to the Rosset scale, exceeding an eighteen percent threshold of the proportion of persons aged 60 or older is considered an indicator of a "very high level of demographic aging."

³⁴ According to UN norms, a country's population is considered old when seven percent of persons are aged 65 or older.

lowering of the death rate of working-age people and an increase in longevity. In Ukraine this process has been brought about by a headlong decrease in the birth rate and an increase in the death rate of the working-age population (mainly of men). If demographic tendencies do not change, by 2026 27 percent of Ukraine's population will consist of people older than 60.³⁵

One widely accepted indicator used to compare standards of living in different countries is the expected longevity at birth. In Ukraine, the value of this index is decreasing. While the expected lifespan stood at 67.1 years for men and 75.4 for women in 1989, in 1999 it was 62.8 and 73.2, respectively. This is ten years less than for men in developed countries with a high level of aging, and five to eight years less for women.³⁶

The extremely high death rate for working-age men is also bringing about a distortion in the population structure by sex. In Ukraine, the noticeable excess of the number of women over the number of men begins in the age groups after thirty years of age. With each year, this point is dropping lower down the age pyramid, which will lead to a distortion in reproductive activity—a further drop in the birth rate, an increase in the number of births outside of wedlock, and accompanying increases in the number of incomplete families and social orphans.

Labor resources. Over the period 1995–99, the labor force remained practically unchanged, staying at a level of thirty million persons. Out of every hundred persons employed in the economy, fifty are women, seventeen are young people aged 15–28, and fourteen are people receiving a pension due to age, disability, or other special conditions. However, the consequences of the depopulation described above will begin to manifest themselves as early as 2007–08, when those born in 1991–92 reach working age. At approximately that time the demographic load on the able-bodied population will begin to grow.

Predictions and scenarios for the development of the demographic situation in Ukraine

Specialists at the Council for the Study of Productive Forces at the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine have worked out a forecast for the demographic development of the country to 2076.³⁷

One main hypothesis advanced is a palpable inflow into Ukraine of emigrants from Afro-Asian countries. It rests on an expected decrease in the population and a corresponding decrease in the work force as a consequence of the aging of the

³⁵ See *Ukraina moloda* (Young Ukraine), 30 May 2000, 1.

³⁶ For comparison, in countries with a high and very high level of aging, expected longevity is: Austria, seventy-four and eighty years; Spain, seventy-four and eighty-two years; Italy, seventy-five and eighty-one years; Holland, seventy-five and eighty years; Germany, seventy-three and eighty years; Great Britain, seventy-four and seventy-nine years; France, seventy-four and eighty-two years.

³⁷ The degree of reliability of forecast calculations is unfortunately decreased by the insufficient reliability of the initial statistical data concerning, first of all, legal and illegal migratory processes.

population. The aggravated problem of filling job slots will make the implementation of measures to attract immigrants from Asia and Africa into the country unavoidable. This is actually the sole source for satisfying the economy's need for labor and supporting the necessary level of economic utilization of territory.

Two scenarios for the possible development of the demographic situation are laid out. The first assumes that there is a strengthening of positive trends in stabilizing the standard of living of the population and a transition to industrial growth in two or three years. The second assumes a further aggravation of negative trends in the socio-economic situation of the country.

Under the first scenario, the following developments are expected:

- A stabilization and gradual growth in the number of arrivals from Russia (up to 70–90 thousand persons annually in the years 2010–30; that is, at the level of 1996–1997) and from the countries of the Transcaucasus Region, with a lowering of the intensity of reverse flows.
- An intensification (in the next three or four years) of the return of ethnic Ukrainians and representatives of peoples deported earlier (primarily Crimean Tartars).
- The number of those arriving will exceed the number leaving as early as 2003. The balance of migration will grow gradually, and in 2015 will reach a surplus of 150,000 persons;
- At the same time, a sharp increase in arrivals from the countries of Asia and Africa may be expected. The number of immigrants from those countries may reach 300,000 persons in 2050 and 400,000 persons annually at the end of the forecast period. Migrants from those regions will arrive in Ukraine primarily to stay; only fifteen to twenty percent will return or migrate to third countries.
- The dimensions of departures for countries of the West will stabilize at a level of 43,000 to 47,000 persons annually in 2004–05, with a gradual decrease to 30,000 annually at the end of the forecast period. Beginning as soon as 2005–07, the main part of that flow will be made up of temporary labor migrants, while the permanent emigration to countries of the West will drop to zero.
- The intensity of migratory contacts with the countries of the former Soviet Union will drop sharply during the second half of the forecast period, and they will lose their status as Ukraine's basic migratory partners.

If events develop according to this optimistic variant, the trend in the birth rate will change. The inflow of immigrants in the 2020s will also stimulate a rejuvenation and an increase in population, which as a result will reach approximately

52 million by 2060 and increase by another six million in the following fifteen years.³⁸

Under the second, and more negative, scenario, the following developments are expected:

- The size of the migratory inflow from Russia will be reduced from 47,000 persons in 1999 to 35,000 persons annually, beginning in 2001, and to ten to fifteen thousand persons at the end of the forecast period.
- The dimensions of arrivals from the European republics of the former Soviet Union will decrease from 5,700 to four and two thousand persons, respectively.
- The scale of departures of ethnic Russians, Belorussians, and Moldovans for their historical homelands will increase to 100,000–105,000 persons annually beginning in 2002–03. In 1998, the figure was about 95,000, and in 1999, as a consequence of military operations in Chechnya, it was less than 60,000.
- The flow of permanent migration to countries of the West will expand significantly. The number of departures for these countries will increase from 47,000–50,000 persons in 1995–99 to 60,000–80,000 over the course of the first decades of the twenty-first century, after which it will gradually decrease to 45,000 annually.
- The share of returning labor migrants in the general migratory flow is predicted to be at a level of 15–25 percent. It is assumed (based on the migration legislation principles of countries that may potentially receive Ukrainian workers) that the most common length of time for work abroad will be a three years, and that 40–50 percent of labor migrants will be returning to Ukraine specifically after three years, while a further five to ten percent will return after a more lengthy period.
- The flow of arrivals from the countries of Asia and Africa, practically unchanged in 2001–04, will begin to grow in 2015–20. However, the level at which immigrants stay will be low during the initial stages of the increase, with up to a third of the flow returning home or emigrating to more prosperous third countries. The proportion of those settling and staying among the arrivals from the countries of the East is expected to increase after 2012.

³⁸ O. Pozniak, “Otsinka maibutnykh obsiagiv migratsii v Ukrainu z tochky zoru demografichnogo prognozuvannia” (An estimate of future volumes of migrations to Ukraine from the point of view of demographic forecasting), *Problemy migratsii*, (2000), 3, 15.

At that time, as a consequence of lengthy depopulation and intensive emigration, the numbers and density of Ukraine's population will be seventeen to twenty percent lower than the current level (creating potential living space for immigrants from the East). Therefore, after 2030 the dimensions of migrant arrivals from these regions will be greater than under the optimistic scenario. The balance of migration of Ukraine's population under the worst-case variant of development of events in 2005–13 will stabilize at a level close to the current one. Over the course of the years 2014–15, the value of the negative migratory balance will decrease sharply, and several years after that Ukraine will become a country of immigration.

Under this pessimistic scenario, the demographic crisis will become ever more acute, and the population will gradually decrease. In 2076 it will comprise 40,200,000 persons.³⁹

Ethnic makeup of the population and interethnic relations

Ukraine is a multiethnic and multi-religious state. More than one hundred ethnic peoples have traditionally resided on its territory. The titular ethnic group consists of Ukrainians, whose share in the total population comes to more than 70 percent. The second most numerous ethnic group are the Russians, who constitute more than twenty percent of the population. Crimean Tartars, Karaims, and Krymchaks claim the status of “native peoples” of Ukraine.⁴⁰ Russians advance the demand that they be recognized as an “ethnic group that forms a state.”⁴¹

General characteristics

The population of Ukraine, as of 1 January 2001, belongs to fifty-four religious denominations. Among these, the Orthodox (Ukrainians from all regions of Ukraine except the western regions, as well as Russians), along with Greek-rite Catholics (Ukrainians from Ukraine's western regions), are predominant. Catholicism (mainly ethnic Poles), Judaism, Islam, and various Protestant denominations (including those which are ethnically defined, such as, for example, the Reformist Church of the ethnic Hungarians in Transcarpathia) are also widely represented.

Over the course of the years 1990–2000, as a consequence of the international migratory processes noted above, the correlation of ethnic groups and their absolute numbers in Ukraine have undergone changes. It will only be possible to establish what these changes are with a sufficient degree of reliability as a result of the forthcoming census.

³⁹ Pozniak, p. 15.

⁴⁰ The Crimean Tartars, Karaims, and Krymchaks are peoples who traditionally populated the Crimea and did not have a historical homeland beyond the borders of Ukraine.

⁴¹ The claims are more likely of a political nature and are tied to an effort to achieve recognition of the Russian language as a second official language in Ukraine.

The peculiarities of Ukraine's historical development, namely the lengthy periods that some of its territories spent as parts of different empires and later as part of the USSR, brought about significant sociocultural differences not only between representatives of Ukraine's various ethnic peoples, but also between regional groupings of the titular ethnic group. The latter manifests itself in several ways. Among Ukrainians, there are differences in the practice of using the Ukrainian and Russian languages in daily life, and in the attitude toward these languages and toward Russian and Russian-language culture. There are also differences in geocultural (and, accordingly, a geopolitical) orientation, either facing toward Russia or toward the countries of Europe.

The presence of ethnic peoples residing in compact groups on Ukraine's territory (Hungarians, Romanians, Moldovans, and Bulgarians), the high degree of Russification of the southern and eastern regions of the country, and the differences in ethnocultural identification of the titular ethnic group result in a complex interethnic situation in several regions of Ukraine. This creates the potential for possible separatist manifestations.

Transcarpathia is one of the most variegated regions in an ethnic sense; representatives of more than 90 ethnic peoples reside in the region's territory, in particular a group of ethnic Hungarians numbering 160,000).

Bessarabia (the southwestern part of Odessa Region) and *Bukovina* (Chernovtsy Region) are a territory where Romanians and Moldovans live in compact groups, to which certain circles in Romania lay claim, and which may become centers of Romanian separatism.

The southern regions of Ukraine (Nikolaev, Kherson, Zaporozhye, and Odessa Regions) and *Eastern Ukraine* (Kharkov, Lugansk, and Donetsk Regions) are presumed to be zones of action of the "Russian factor." However, the interethnic and inter-religious situation in the Crimea is the most acute situation today.

The Crimea. According to data from the census of 1989, representatives of 89 ethnic groups were resident in the Crimea, out of a total of 132 such groups in Ukraine as a whole.⁴² Altogether, there were 2,256,000 persons in the Crimea, of whom Russians constituted 67 percent and Ukrainians 26 percent, while Belorussians, Crimean Tartars, Jews, Germans, Bulgarians, Greeks, Poles, Gypsies, and other ethnic groups together made up seven percent.⁴³ The high degree of Russification of the Crimea is confirmed by the fact that 83 percent of the popula-

⁴² According to other information, 120 such groups are represented, including isolated cases of representatives of various peoples of the USSR.

⁴³ In absolute figures: 1,688,200 Russians; 719,094 Ukrainians; 51,412 Belorussians; 44,201 Crimean Tartars; 10,840 Armenians; 11,802 Tartars; 3,265 Germans; 3,008 Bulgarians; 2,798 Greeks; 5,944 Poles; 1,032 Gypsies; 898 Estonians. See V. Chumak, *Ukraina i Krym: fenomen na mezhi Evropy ta Skhodu* (Ukraine and the Crimea: a phenomenon border of Europe and the Orient) (Kyiv, 1995), 37.

tion (including 47 percent of the Ukrainians) considers Russian to be their native language.⁴⁴

Complex socio-demographic and political processes took place in the Crimea during the period from 1989–2000. The socio-demographic processes were brought about, first of all, by the mass return of Crimean Tartars to their historical homeland. The political processes were brought about by the breakup of the USSR and by the establishment of Ukraine's independence and the autonomous republic of the Crimea (the ARC) – a territorial autonomous entity – as a part of Ukraine with ethnic Russians as the predominant group in the population.

Ethnic Ukrainians make up about 25 percent of the Crimea's population, the majority of these Ukrainians being Russian-speakers. This situation demands that a rather balanced position be taken in the introduction of the Ukrainian language and the expansion of the presence of Ukrainian culture in the informational and educational field in the ARC. At the present time, the conditions in the autonomous entity for a more complete ethnocultural identification of the Ukrainians are inadequate. Only four Ukrainian schools (out of 583 in the ARC) and only two ukrainian libraries are functioning at present; four Ukrainian-language printed publications are being published (out of 240 being published in the autonomous entity). Only fourteen congregations of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev patriarchy – the independent, ethnically-oriented church – are active.

Crimean Tartars are returning to the Crimea after their forcible deportation in 1944.⁴⁵ About 300,000 Crimean Tartars, representing twelve percent of the Peninsula's population, are resident in the autonomous entity at the present time. The Crimean Tartars speak the Crimean Tartar language (which belongs to the Turkic language group) and profess Sunni Islam. The ethnic group of Crimean Tartars in the ARC has organs of ethnic self-government; however, they are not recognized by Ukraine's organs of governmental authority.

In August 1999, the "Arraid" Inter-regional Association of Public Organizations conducted a sociological study jointly with the Department of Psychology at Tauride University.⁴⁶ According to this study, the Crimean Tartars are firmly oriented toward maintaining their ethnic and religious identity. According to data from the poll, 77 percent of Crimean Tartars would prefer a school for their children and grandchildren with instruction conducted in the Crimean Tartar language

⁴⁴ Iu. Tyshchenko and V. Pikhovshchek, *Povernennia kryms'kykh tatar: Khronika podii* (Return of the Crimean Tartars: a Chronicle of Events) (Kyiv, 1999), 19.

⁴⁵ The Crimean Tartars had their own state—the Crimean khanate—on the territory of the Crimea until 1783. In 1783, the khanate became a part of the Russian Empire. In 1921, the Crimean Autonomous Republic was created as a part of the Russian Federation and existed until 1945, when it was abolished and the Crimea was given the status of a region (*oblast'*). In 1954, the Crimea was transferred to Ukraine with the status of region. According to official data, more than 200,000 Crimean Tartars were deported from the Crimea in May of 1944.

⁴⁶ N. Kiriushko. "Islam in the lives of the Crimean Tartars" in *Al'-Baian* 3 (May–June 2001), 5. The complete results of the poll are kept in the UCEPS archives.

and providing conventional and religious education, while 18 percent prefer a school providing a primarily religious education. Only five percent of those polled would prefer a school without religious education. In another finding, the Crimean Tartars are inclined to make the Crimea in particular their permanent place of residence. The overwhelming majority (76 percent) of those polled declared that they have no desire to leave the Crimea for any other place at all.

Out of every three children born in the Crimea today, two are Crimean Tartars.⁴⁷ There are grounds to conclude that a significant demographic shift should be expected in the direction of an increase both of the absolute number of Crimean Tartars in the Crimea and of their share in the total population of the Autonomous entity as early as the next generation.

Ethnic Russians constitute about 60 percent of the total population in the Crimean peninsula.⁴⁸ The overwhelming majority of these Russians profess Orthodoxy and belong to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in canonical unity with the Moscow Patriarchy. The political, socioeconomic, and sociocultural interests of the Russians in the Crimea are actively supported by Russia, where by no means all political and social circles have resigned themselves to the “loss” of the Crimea.

Russian schools subordinate to the Ministry of Defense of Russia function on the territory of the Autonomous entity, while a branch of Moscow State University carries out recruitment of students. Competitions for student compositions about Russia, the Russian language, and Russian culture are organized actively, and scientific and scholarly conferences, festivals, and tours of performers are conducted with the participation of representatives from the Russian Federation.⁴⁹

As a result, the degree of Russification of the Autonomous entity remains very high; out of 583 general education schools in the Crimea, 570 are Russian-language schools.⁵⁰ Teaching in Crimean institutes of higher education is conducted in Russian. The market for books in the Autonomous entity is 99.9 percent filled by Russian-language editions. All this testifies to the fact that the Russians in the Autonomous entity possess the ability to maintain their ethnic and religious identity. At the same time, the Russians are also oriented toward permanent residence in the Crimea. 76 percent of those polled answered that under no cir-

⁴⁷ N. Belitser and O. Bodruk, “Krym kak region potentsial’nogo konflikta” (The Crimea as a region of potential conflict), in *Etnicheskie i religioznye konflikty v Evrazii* (Ethnic and religious conflicts in Eurasia), Vol. 2 (Moscow, 1997), 85. Moreover, the birth rate in Crimean Tartar families is increasing.

⁴⁸ See M. Strikha, “Regiony v s’ogodnishnii Ukraini: konsolidatsiia chy integratsiia?” (Regions in today’s Ukraine: consolidation or integration?), *Ukrains’kyi regional’nyi visnyk* (2001), 22, 7.

⁴⁹ Losev, “Ukraina ne dlia ukrainsiv. Kryms’kyi variant” (Ukraine is not for Ukrainians. The Crimean variant) in *Ukrains’kyi regional’nyi visnyk* 22 (2001), 15.

⁵⁰ By comparison, there are nine schools with instruction in the Crimean Tartar language and nine with two languages (about 5,000 Crimean Tartar children—about fifteen percent of the total number of school age Crimean Tartar children—attend these eighteen schools).

cumstances do they plan to leave the Crimea. Two percent could leave for other regions of Ukraine, thirteen percent for countries of the West, and not a single one of those polled expressed a desire to leave for Russia.

The predominance of ethnic Russians in the makeup of the Autonomous entity's population, including the degree of the population's general Russification, the non-acceptance by certain political circles in the Russian Federation of the Crimea's detachment from Russia, and the maintenance of a Russian presence on the peninsula (including a military presence) have brought about (and are bringing about) significant separatist or pro-Russian sentiments among a significant portion of the Crimea's population. There have been attempts to bring about the secession of the Autonomous entity from Ukraine.

On the other hand, some Crimean Tartars have put forward slogans about creating an ethnic Crimean Tartar autonomous entity, the restitution of property lost at the time of deportation, and full-fledged participation in processes of privatizing Crimean enterprises and sharing of land. In their claims, the Crimean Tartars rely on help from Turkey as a Muslim country in which, moreover, a rather sizeable Crimean Tartar diaspora operates.

It is along the line of the interrelations between the ethnic groups of Crimean Tartars and Russians in particular (more specifically, of the Russian-speaking socio-cultural group within the population of Crimea) that interethnic and inter-religious tension is to be observed. This tension is threatening to become acute under the influence of both internal and external factors.

In connection with this, it should be noted that there has been little desire among Crimean Tartars to create their own state. Only five percent of those polled expressed favor for such a prospect. The majority of respondents strive for the establishment in the Crimea of a territorial ethnic autonomous entity within Ukraine. Another 27 percent think that the Crimea should remain an autonomous republic within Ukraine – that is, it should remain in its present status. These results suggest an absence of fertile ground for radical extremist and separatist tendencies among the Crimean Tartars.

What is alarming is the fact that a significant portion of the Crimean Tartars polled—35 percent—think that their life is getting significantly worse with the passage of time, while another ten percent say it is worse, but not much. Only fourteen percent said their lives were getting better. 58 percent pointed to a worsening of living conditions in comparison with where they lived before, and the overwhelming majority (76 percent) stated that the average monthly income per family member among them was no more than fifty grivnas (US\$10).

Statements like these have a real basis. Unemployment among the Crimean Tartars stands at 60 percent, as opposed to fifteen to twenty percent for the Crimea as a whole. Moreover, the prospects for satisfying the cultural and educational

needs of the Crimean Tartars are doubtful.⁵¹ A problem exists with the level of representation for the Crimean Tartars in organs of government, which leads to the self-isolation of the Crimean Tartars and to interethnic alienation.⁵²

At the same time, the Russian population views the idea of extending privileges to the Crimean Tartars very critically. 47 percent of those polled think the granting of such privileges to be unfair, while only 27 percent are of the opposite opinion. However, judging by results of the poll, the standard of living of the Russians in the Crimea is significantly higher than the standard of living of the Crimean Tartars. Only fifteen percent of those polled said that the average monthly income per family member was no more than fifty grivnas, and unemployment among the Russians is only eight percent.

The Russians living in Crimea have a sharply negative attitude toward a potential status as a territorial ethnic autonomous entity within Ukraine. Not a single one of the Russians polled supported that status, but fifteen percent of the Russians polled think that the Crimea should become an autonomous republic within Russia, while another twenty-four percent think it should become an independent country. As was mentioned above, among the Crimean Tartars, only five percent think that Crimea should become an independent country.

Such moods are fertile soil for incitement of interethnic dissension, which is already manifesting itself today in the form of inter-religious conflicts. Such conflicts were noted in the summer of 2000, when the Spiritual Board of Crimean Muslims suspended its membership in the "Peace is God's Gift" interfaith association to signify a protest against establishment of the Simferopol and Crimean eparchies of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and against crosses for worshippers and display boards saying, "The Crimea is the cradle of Orthodoxy." Crimean Tartars tore down such a cross in the village of Morskoe in October 2000. Clashes between them and the Orthodox population were avoided, thanks to the intervention of law enforcement agencies. Conflict between the Crimean eparchy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the Crimean Tartars over a former monastery building was prevented in September 2001 only by the arrival of President of

⁵¹ Acceptance of teachers for training for Crimean Tartar schools at Tauride National University has been reduced, and recruitment into Crimean Tartar groups at the teacher-training school created within the framework of the return and settlement program for Crimean Tartars has been stopped. In 206 settlements where Crimean Tartars are concentrated there are no schools, kindergartens, or libraries at all. Comparing this with past conditions, in 1936 386 high schools and 475 elementary and incomplete middle-school Crimean Tartar schools were in operation in the Crimea.

⁵² During elections to the Supreme Soviet of the ARC in 1994, the Crimean Tartars were given a quota and created a faction of fourteen persons in the Crimean parliament. Elections in 1998 took place under a new law, which did not envisage allotment of quotas. Moreover, whereas the Crimean Tartars were able to vote according to their place of permanent residence in 1994, in 1998 about 100,000 Crimean Tartars (who were not Ukrainian citizens at that time) were unable to vote. Their protests led to a sharp aggravation of tensions in the Crimea in January-February 1998.

Ukraine Leonid Kuchma. However, the danger of conflicts of this kind remains and is becoming more acute, particularly in connection with accusations directed at the Crimean Tartars over their ties to Chechen militants, participation in military actions against Russia's Federal troops in Chechnya, and so on.⁵³

According to the results of a sociological poll of the ARC's population conducted by UCEPS in March 2001, the majority of those polled (61 percent) do not exclude the possibility that religious conflicts involving the use of force will arise in the Crimea, and just less than a third (27 percent) of the Crimea's inhabitants are sure that such conflicts are impossible.⁵⁴

Predictions

Over the coming fifteen to twenty years, the demographic situation in the Crimea will change substantially. The proportion of the Crimean Tartar population in the general population will increase by means both of natural growth and the further immigration of Tartars from the Central Asian countries.

In 1995, it was assumed that 400–600,000 Crimean Tartars would return to the Crimea in the next five years.⁵⁵ However, that did not happen, and only 50–60,000 actually returned.

In the event that a cardinal improvement in the socioeconomic situation does not occur, a sharp radicalization among the Crimean Tartars is possible. The assimilation of the Crimean Tartars should not be expected; rather, Crimea may evolve either in the direction of a Ukrainian Switzerland or in the direction of a Ukrainian Kosovo.⁵⁶

A poll by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine provided the following results:

Of the various groupings identified in Ukraine, Belorussians are the least inclined to maintain a unique culture, with only 29.9 percent expressing this intention. At the same time, representatives of other ethnic peoples (Poles, Bulgarians, Moldovans, and Jews) registered a rather high level of desire to preserve their

⁵³ The Union of Orthodox Citizens of Russia stated that the *medjlis* (parliament) of the Crimean Tartar people was "in close interaction with Chechen terrorists." V. Semin, "SBU razberetsia s provokatorami" (The Security Service of Ukraine will deal with provocateurs), *Vlast' i politika* (Government and politics), 21 September 2001 2. Some of the mass media have disseminated information about ties Crimean Tartars have to Chechen militants and about the recruiting of Crimean Tartar volunteers in particular by the "Imdat" and "Borz-Ukraina" organizations. E. Borivoi, "Ukrainskii sled Dzhikhada" (Jihad's Ukrainian trail), *Versiia*, 23 May 2000, 12.

⁵⁴ "Krym na politychnii karti Ukrainy. Analychna dopovid' UTsEPD" (The Crimea on the political map of Ukraine. An analytical report of the UTsEPD), in *Natsional'na bezpeka i oborona* 4 (2001), 25.

⁵⁵ Chumak, *Ukraina i Krym: fenomen na mezhi Evropy ta Skhodu*, 37.

⁵⁶ Such opinions are expressed by researchers. See, for example: N. Belitser, "Mizhetnichni vidnosyny ta islams'kyi chynnyk u Krymu" (Interethnic relations and the Islamic factor in the Crimea), in *Kryms'ki studii*, (2000), 1, 37.

cultural uniqueness. Those polled suggested that this desire was in reaction to attempts at forcible Ukrainization.

According to the results of investigations into the urge to leave for various historical homelands, Jews (52 percent) and Germans (45.7 percent) demonstrated the strongest tendency in this direction. The desire to emigrate was insignificant among Hungarians and Russians.

Trends among Russo-Ukrainian groupings

Three organizations have come forward with sharp criticism for the Ministry of Education of Ukraine: the Russian Movement, the Russo-Ukrainian Union, and "For a Unified Russia." These organizations do not like "Kiev's official policy of eliminating Russian-language education in Ukraine and encouraging assimilation of Russian and Russian-speaking citizens." According to official data, over the last decade the Ukrainian government has changed the language of teaching from Russian to Ukrainian in 1300 schools. At the present time, teaching in the Ukrainian language is conducted in 90 percent of the country's schools, although half the population considers Russian to be its native language.⁵⁷

Small but politically active structures exist: "The Civil Congress of Ukraine," the Party of Slavic Unity, the "Union" party, the SLOn association, and the Party of Regional Rebirth of Ukraine (PRVU), among others. Here, regionalism or frank separatism, the battle for union with Russia or for a restoration of the USSR, are more likely to be colored by ethnocultural factors. Rather than these extreme goals, the real objectives are presumed to be securing the status for Russian as an official language and the retention of a high degree of Russification of public life, culture, and education in the country.

⁵⁷ "Ja russkii by vyuchil..." (I would have learned Russian), *Kievskii region*, 20 September 2001, 21.