

Ethics & International Affairs

2002 VOLUME 16 NUMBER 2



Carnegie Council
ON ETHICS AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

THE SEPTEMBER 11 EFFECT

Nicolas de Torrenté • Omar Noman • Sima Wali
Robert L. Bach • James D. Ross

SPECIAL SECTION: HEALTH AND GLOBAL JUSTICE

Public Health or Clinical Ethics:

Thinking beyond Borders

Onora O'Neill

Personal and Social Responsibility for Health

Daniel Wikler

Access to Medicines and the Rhetoric
of Responsibility

Christian Barry and Kate Raworth

Responsibilities for Poverty-Related Ill Health

Thomas W. Pogge

International Justice and Health: A Proposal

Gopal Sreenivasan

DEBATE: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE POLITICS OF VICTIMHOOD

Robert Meister • Catherine Lu

THE THREE WAYS OF GLOBALIZATION

Stephen L. S. Smith on Bhagwati and Irwin

Samuel Moyn on Roberto Unger

Jedediah Purdy on Stiglitz and Soros

RECENT BOOKS ON ETHICS AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Contents

EDITOR'S NOTE Joel H. Rosenthal vii

ROUNDTABLE Introduction Paige Arthur 1

THE SEPTEMBER 11 EFFECT Challenges to Humanitarian Action Nicolas de Torrenté 2
Crafting A New Alliance with the Muslim World Omar Noman 9
Afghan Women: Recovering, Rebuilding Sima Wali 15
New Priorities for Philanthropy Robert L. Bach 20
Promoting Human Rights James D. Ross 27

SPECIAL SECTION Introduction Mira Johri and Christian Barry 33

HEALTH AND GLOBAL JUSTICE Public Health or Clinical Ethics: Thinking beyond Borders
Onora O'Neill 35
Personal and Social Responsibility for Health
Daniel Wikler 47
Access to Medicines and the Rhetoric of Responsibility
Christian Barry and Kate Raworth 57
Responsibilities for Poverty-Related Ill Health
Thomas W. Pogge 71
International Justice and Health: A Proposal
Gopal Sreenivasan 81

DEBATE Human Rights and the Politics of Victimhood

Robert Meister 91

Human Wrongs and the Tragedy of Victimhood

Response to "Human Rights and the Politics of Victimhood"

Catherine Lu 109

The Liberalism of Fear and the Counterrevolutionary Project

Robert Meister 118

Liberals, Revolutionaries, and Responsibility

Catherine Lu 124

REVIEW ESSAYS The Advantage to Trade: Bhagwati and Irwin

Stephen L. S. Smith 127

The Politics of Economy: Roberto Unger

Samuel Moyn 135

The Values of the Market: Stiglitz and Soros

Jedediah Purdy 143

BOOK REVIEWS Recent Books on Ethics and International Affairs 149

Contributors 183

Guidelines for Submission 187

Crafting a New Alliance with the Muslim World

Omar Noman

Most Muslims now live in democracies—a fact that is rarely acknowledged. The Muslim world has also elected five women heads of state in the past decade.¹ These two indicators are symbolic of the diversity within the Muslim world, and also of the direction in which that world is headed.

Few Muslims wish to be classified in a category that would prevent them from participating in the benefits of modernity. The pull of mass education, commerce, trade, and engagement with the world is strong. But these possibilities are openings that radical Islam is attempting to close off, which has led to an ideological civil war within Islam. In country after country, the middle class, the elite, and most of the poor are frightened by an austere version of theocratic Islam that has managed to gain political leverage. In order to sustain modern governments and access to the world in which they want to be active contributors, Muslims need an alliance with the West—not a confrontation.

The most visible aspect of the post-September 11 world, however, has been a confrontation: the United States' military response to the attacks. It has been far more extensive than anyone might have expected. It has involved a war against Afghanistan to remove the Taliban regime and, more significant, a global effort to fight armed, militant Islamic groups. Launching a war against Afghanistan was, politically, the relatively easy part. The Taliban were despised in most of the Muslim world, and their form of religious fascism produced widespread revulsion among Muslims. The two supporters of the Taliban regime—the governments of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia—ultimately did not face popular opposition to the invasion of Afghanistan. Though there were a few “sympathizers” (motivated either by strategic interests or ideology), their resistance was not a significant constraint on foreign policy.

The global fight against militant Islamic groups, however, will be much more demanding. In the Philippines, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and elsewhere, any armed

¹ For an analysis of the spread of democracy in the world, see United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 2002: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World* (New York: United Nations Development Programme, 2002).

ROUNDTABLE

group is now under the joint assault of the domestic government and U.S. intelligence forces. In some cases, this is leading to tension with allies, as in Pakistan, where the government has had a rather complex relationship with some of these groups—many of whom have been part of clandestine operations in Kashmir. Forces in Pakistan sympathetic to the Kashmir cause view any actions the Musharraf government takes against these groups as a betrayal.

Similarly, in countries such as Uzbekistan there are fears that governments will use the war on terrorism to repress legitimate political opposition and to further control religious political parties—something that might, in a worst-case scenario, create the foundations for the violent removal of secular governments by religious forces. In countries such as these, the United States is now confronted with the complex dilemma of trying to advance security interests while sustaining support for political liberalization and democracy. Over the long run, the absence of political freedoms in “client” states, such as prerevolutionary Iran, led to the growth of anti-U.S. religious forces. Not repeating the same error in the current context is important. In the war on terrorism the United States is inevitably involved in the domestic political evolution of countries. Continuing to support the people of these countries in their struggle for more open political systems while working with existing governments against armed militant groups is a delicate balancing act.

An exclusively military response, which ignores support for reform, could add fuel to a very dangerous fire. It is noticeable that both Palestine and Kashmir have acquired renewed salience after September 11. The continuing spotlight on the Middle East and South Asia is a reminder of the dangers such disputes pose to global security: they provide a fertile breeding ground for the emergence of desperate militant groups that have very little to lose. Thus, even the purely military part of the response involves considerable investments in diplomacy and engagement. To varying degrees the war on terrorism needs to be accompanied by intense political and diplomatic engagement. We urgently need to craft a policy agenda—one that carves out new foundations for trust and exchange between the Muslim world and the West.

This process has already begun over the past year, but it needs to be significantly strengthened and broadened if it is not to fail. One of the most problematic political obstacles to a coalition of reform remains the question of how to create both a Palestinian state and a secure Israel. Indeed, the politics of the Middle East

continue to be a powerful emotional tool for terrorist groups. It was no coincidence that all of the hijackers were from the Middle East, home to a minority (20 percent) of the Muslim world. And it was no surprise that the subsequent video statements of leaders such as Osama bin Laden evoked the plight of Palestinians as well as appeals against the presence of U.S. military bases in Saudi Arabia. The statements were an open call for overthrowing existing regimes in the Arab world and for their replacement by anti-American puritanical theocracies.

In the immediate aftermath of the attack, the Bush administration recognized that it must take on the issue of the Palestinian state. The recent deterioration of prospects for peace in the Middle East only heightens the need for all parties to reinvest in a negotiated settlement. Not only is this the only viable long-term solution, doing so will rob militant groups of one of the key strategies they use to gain support—the exploitation of the Palestinian cause. Moreover, the United States should not be distracted from its investment in the diplomacy required to address the Palestinian state by pursuing military action against Iraq. An attack on even as unpopular a figure as Saddam Hussein carries the risks of alienating key allies and intensifying a sense of Arab humiliation. This reaction could be severe—especially if the attack takes place despite the warnings and pleas from moderate Arab leaders such as the King of Jordan.

Above and beyond the Palestinian question, the alliance between the Muslim world and the West should rest on a broad, long-term coalition that combines a mix of political, socioeconomic, and military responses to the current crisis. Some of these measures are specific, while others are generic. Getting this combination right in various circumstances will determine how the relationship with the Muslim world evolves. The approach has to be one that recognizes the interest of Muslim societies in consolidating their relationship with the West in general, and the U.S. in particular. The goals of this alliance should be to build modern, open, democratic societies in the Muslim world. For this objective to succeed there is a need to integrate—not isolate—Muslim countries.

First, the U.S. needs to pay particular attention to supporting Muslim countries that have become democratic. Due to a variety of strategic and economic interests, the United States has frequently been perceived as an ambivalent supporter of freedom in the Muslim world. Even now, active U.S. support for a regime change that would replace an existing ally with a democratic system is unlikely to be forth-

ROUNDTABLE

coming—though even in these circumstances major external powers should not be viewed as obstacles to change. Further, and perhaps more important, the new wave of democracies in the Muslim world needs especially strong support. Their success is critical for the spread of civil and political freedoms. Many of the large democracies are, however, currently in trouble. Countries such as Indonesia, Nigeria, and Bangladesh face a range of problems: in some, the political parties are undemocratic; in others, the judiciary and a free media are under pressure. The challenges of democratic decentralization are intense, and addressing these democratic deficits is critical.² By providing visible and targeted support to new Muslim democracies, the United States signals its commitment to the struggle for freedom in Islamic countries.

Second, the United States has to support progressive socioeconomic change. One of the most critical areas is female education, as women have typically borne the brunt of the puritanical assault of fundamentalist groups. Accompanying investments in basic health, population planning, and other social services can help advance women's status in Muslim and non-Muslim countries alike. These progressive democratic changes can come even at low incomes, as the case of Bangladesh shows. Similarly, Malaysia and Indonesia have used social policy investments to reduce their rates of population growth. Open, tolerant, modern Muslim societies are an important part of the battle against fundamentalism. Aid programs should support Muslim countries that invest in their people—particularly women—if they wish to play a strategic role in supporting human development.

Third, to a far greater degree than before, aid programs have to pay attention to the promotion of an education system that teaches skills necessary for a modern economy. The poor quality and irrelevance of education systems in many Muslim countries have led to the growth of religious political education in the extreme, in the form of anti-Western *madrassas*. In countries such as Pakistan, aid agencies need to support the revitalization of the education system, particularly the public education system, which is in complete disarray. Even without the danger of radical threats represented by the *madrassas*, external support for modern, better-quality education is a vital investment in support of progressive change in Muslim societies. Unfortunately, many countries are not in a position to borrow money to finance educational reform. The U.S should alleviate this problem by supporting the provision of grants to countries interested in making the changes

² For an excellent review of the dilemmas involved in addressing these problems, see Thomas Carothers, *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999).

toward a modern educational system. Many prominent figures in the current administration favor the use of grant facilities for investments in human development, and providing an expanded grant facility in support of education reform programs in Muslim countries would be an important incentive for change. A number of significant educational initiatives are already underway in countries such as Costa Rica, Chile, Malaysia, Singapore, and South Korea, and enough experience has been gained by international organizations to adapt and help countries tailor these experiences to their circumstances.

Finally, operations against militants need to be based on alliances with the people and the government of a country, and fought in terms of a common struggle. This may not be easy under all circumstances, but rooting out militant groups is as much in the security interest of Muslim countries as it is in the interest of the United States. Already, U.S. Special Forces are engaged in a variety of joint operations and training programs for government military units engaged in antiterrorist operations. The key political challenge in the military aspect of the alliance is to create national support—and not necessarily consensus—by emphasizing the benefits of these actions for the country itself. This can be achieved partially by conferring with the government in order to create a list of groups considered terrorist, and then by making it public.

This point is important, for it concerns the very legitimacy of the alliance. Allegations of terrorism should be backed up publicly with evidence, and the proposed measures against terrorist groups should be a matter of public debate. Taking weapons out of the hands of militant political groups and criminal organizations has obvious benefits for civil peace and, potentially, for economic development. Citizens of beleaguered cities such as Karachi do not need to be convinced of the merits of disarming violent groups, and they are likely to welcome external support for national efforts. But the process of designating organizations as militant terrorist/sectarian/criminal—and of providing evidence against them—has to be made more open if it is to win public support. Excessive secrecy does a common cause a disservice and gives the impression that the national government is undertaking actions that are against its will. In some cases, this open process will create friction, not least when groups have been supported by governments in the past and are involved in “proxy wars,” as in Kashmir. In no country, however, has there been any significant public show of support for groups such as al-Qaeda, and as long as actions remain confined to well-defined groups there is little danger of public reaction against them. On the contrary, most citizens will welcome the opportunity to reduce the proliferation of light weapons.

ROUNDTABLE

One year after the attacks on the United States, we are at a critical juncture. The radical puritans did not succeed on the scale that many feared; indeed, radical Islam has shot itself in the foot by giving governments in the Muslim world all the more reason to shut it down. It is likely that al-Qaeda expected a wave of popular sympathy and admiration for its tactical brilliance in pulling off a most improbable mission. The applause it received was, however, scant. Suddenly, because of crimes willed and carried out by a tiny minority, the whole world of Islam was put on the defensive. In contrast with the terrorists' desires, Muslim countries thrive on trade and commerce, they seek more—not less—integration with global markets, and they crave opportunities to revive faltering economies. It is in the interest of the West to engage Muslims around the world in a far-reaching military, political, and socioeconomic alliance in order to help them realize these ambitions.