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Ethics & International Affairs
Annual Journal of the
Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs
The "War" on Terrorism: A Cultural Perspective
Fawaz A. Gerges
Clearly, Osama bin Laden does not subscribe to any international rules in his unholy struggle against the world. The fatwa (religious ruling) issued in February 1998 by the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders—the network of terrorist organizations bin Laden established—holds that "to kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim." 1 It makes no distinction between noncombatants and combatants, viewing civilians as soldiers in a zero sum confrontation.
Bin Laden claims that targeting American civilians is a legitimate defensive act, because "Muslims believe that the Jews and America have overplayed their hand in humiliating, degrading, and punishing Muslims." Moreover, "these attacks on American targets are legitimate public reactions by the Muslim youth, who are willing to sacrifice their lives to defend their people and Islam." 2 The Saudi dissident and his lieutenants further justify their bloody deeds by arguing that the existing international norms are inadequate to address their grievances because, in their view, the United States dominates the system of states and controls its institutions, including the United Nations.
Regardless of its veracity, this assertion sheds light not only on bin Laden's twisted logic, but also on the need to affirm the moral and political importance of existing international norms and rules. In the quick unfolding of events, some observers and policymakers tend to neglect and downplay the importance of this simple but powerful premise, going so far as to advocate changing the rules of the state system by pursuing an ambitious strategy to "end" states or regimes that support terrorism. They argue that if we do not topple the existing regimes that harbor terrorists, we will encourage people who hate us to continue attempts to kill us in appalling numbers; states waging proxy wars are by definition bound by no laws, and combating them on the contrary assumption is to risk entering a one-sided suicide pact. 3
This line of thinking fails to recognize that one of the major goals of terrorists like bin Laden is to get rid of the existing norms and rules governing the theory and practice of international diplomacy. For example, bin Laden has stated that his goal is to destroy the very foundation of international relations and overhaul the system of power politics that punishes Muslims and keeps them down. This is a revolt against secular history and heritage and what he terms Western hegemony over the lands of Islam: "This humiliation and atheism has ruined and blinded Muslims. The only way to destroy this atheism is by Jihad, fighting, bombings that bring martyrdom. Only blood will wipe out the shame and dishonor inflicted on Muslims." 4 Originally, bin Laden hoped that in reaction to the killing of thousands of innocent Americans, the United States would lash out angrily and irresponsibly against Muslims, thus precipitating a clash of civilizations. Bin Laden lost his gamble: the United States did not play into his hands by pursuing a strategy that could have pitted the so-called camp of belief against the camp of disbelief. The Muslim umma (worldwide Muslim community) did not rise up and join the fray. Surveys show that 40 percent of Arabs and other Muslims sympathized with bin Laden's criticism of the United States and the pro-Western regimes it supports, but they rejected his terrorist methods. It was only this group's apathy that enabled the activist pro-bin Laden camp to misinform, propagandize, and distort the political sensibilities of other Muslims. 5
The Bush administration strategically used international institutions, including the Security Council, to define the September terrorist attacks as an "act of war" and to put together an international coalition to attack and defeat the Al-Qaeda organization and the Taliban regime. The Bush administration approach has found many supporters in the international system, including many in the world of Islam. Although many Muslims remain skeptical about the U.S. war against terrorism, they appreciate its narrow focus and limited nature so far. The first phase of the U.S. war against terrorism has achieved its stated purpose: the toppling of the Taliban regime and destruction of the al-Qaeda networks in Afghanistan.
More important, the decisive military defeat in Afghanistan has discredited bin Laden in the eyes of most Arabs and shattered his well-constructed image of holy warrior. Bin Laden lost not only the war on the battlefield but also the campaign for the hearts and minds of the "floating middle" of Muslim public opinion. Even those Arab multitudes that initially flirted with bin Ladenism out of anger with the United States have now discovered that his inflated rhetoric was composed of thin air. However, bin Laden's loss of the propaganda war does not imply that the United States has won. Poll results show that anti-American sentiment is a staple of Arab politics. Today, to be politically conscious in the Arab world is to be highly suspicious of the United States, its foreign policies, its values, and its institutions. For many Arabs and other Muslims the United States has become a scapegoat for the ills and misfortunes that befell their world in the second half of the last century.
The danger lies in the ambiguity of the U.S. strategy regarding the next phase of the war. Will the Bush administration buy the argument of the hardliners and expand the war to Iraq, thus sacrificing the legitimacy principle at the altar of political and strategic calculations? Undoubtedly, the United States possesses the military capability to win wars; yet the real difficulty comes after victory on the battlefield. The U.S. foreign policy establishment should not become so intoxicated with the victory in Afghanistan that it loses sight of the complex realities of world politics with its critical restraining mechanisms. The United States will not be able to win the war on terrorism until it finds the political will to invest in rebuilding decimated civil societies such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and even Iraq.
Bin Ladenism taps into the Arab sense of victimization and the deep reservoir of accumulated grievances against the United States. With the Taliban vanquished and the al-Qaeda network in Afghanistan destroyed, the challenge facing the United States is to tackle the deepening anti-Americanism in the region by reassessing the efficacy and fairness of its foreign policies. The manner in which the United States conducts the struggle against terrorism will ultimately determine the nature and character of the Muslim response—either resistance or cooperation; it will also determine the potential supply of suicidal foot soldiers to the unholy war waged against the world, not just the United States, by those who subscribe to bin Ladenism.
Notes
Note 1: World Islamic Front Statement, "Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders," available at www.atour.com/news/international/20010928b.html. Back
Note 2: See the recruiting tape of Osama bin Laden, which I translated and edited with some colleagues for Columbia University, available at www.ciaonet.org/cbr/cbr00. Back
Note 3: See, for example, the thought-provoking essay by Fredric Smoler, "Fighting the Last War-and the Next," American Heritage (December 2001), pp. 38-42. Back
Note 4: See the recruiting tape of Osama bin Laden. Back
Note 5: See Fawaz A. Gerges, "The Arab Tide Turns Against Bin Laden," Los Angeles Times, January 4, 2002. Back