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Culture and Conflict
No. 4, Winter 1991
International Networks of Violence, Arms Transfers and Terrorism
It is necessary to analyse the international networks of violence in order to understand how, sometimes, besides or within states relationships, the autonomisation of some bureaucracies or private interests appears, giving to any " intermediary " a real power within arms transfers. We must also avoid a too statocentric vision and raise the question of the place of the transnational actors in relation to the irruption of widespread violence.
Recent proposals to control arms transfers to the Persian Gulf were built on the belief that major weapons suppliers exacerbated regional conflicts through their commerce. However, such proposals are unclear on the role that arms transfers should play in the external powers' strategies to control or manage regional conflicts. A detailed case-study of the way in which arms transfers were manipulated during the eight-year Iran-Iraq War helps in clearing away some of this confusion by highlighting two types of influence arms suppliers can gain : bargaining power and structural power The case-study illustrates that arms transfers provide little influence over the combatant's specific policies (bargaining power), while attempts to alter the range of military and strategic options open to them (structural power) are more successful, and should guide arms suppliers' efforts to frame control policies for the region. The paper, following its own analysis, offers some suggestions for the designing of multilateral arms transfer policies for the Middle East.
Facing the growth of the PRC as a provider of military-related technology and hardware - both conventional and nuclear -, we are compelled to consider the relationship between Chinese arms exports and regional violence. By considering the PRC's arms exports to three regions of tension and conflict - Southwest Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia - we may then gain insight into the relationship between Chinese arms and the prospects for regional violence. The article concludes by suggesting that due to international and domestic determinants, the PRC's arms exports in the foreseeable future are likely to expand as [1] the PRC's arms are drawn into regions of tension and conflict (as in Southwest Asia), and [2] as the PRC continues to use weapon exports to enhance its strategic interests (as ìn South and Southeast Asia).
Prospects for limitations of global arms sales improved with the settlement of a number of regional disputes and the end of the Cold War. The 1991 Gulf War also stirred new security concerns among less developed countries (LDCs), and the major powers limited their economic incentives to export weapons. Based on a review of several regional cases, the article infers that the prospect for continued LDC armament appears to depend on international hierarchies, recent war experiences, domestic and foreign threats (decline in the latter not necessarily diminishing weapon demands), and economic contexts. An evident pattern is the refitting and upgrading of existing equipment in the search for higher technology.
The Gulf War and the end of bipolarity dramatically changed the international arms market. American supremacy affirmed itself at the expense of its European, Soviet or Third World competitors. Even if this new context can explain the fact that arms control can, for the first time, be considered as a realistic prospect, the author emphasises the political instrumentalisation of arms sales, and remains cautious in his conclusions.
The author re-examines the hypothesis of a terrorist network manipulated by the USSR. This belief was often presented in an excessive and highly ideological manner at the end of the 70's. Since then, with the rise of Middle-Eastern terrorism and the end of communism, it has lost much of its appeal. However the author shows, in the light of recent data, that the thesis was not as unfounded as was contended by its critics at the time ; it describes quite adequately the functioning (or failure) of terror networks, but it fails to show why and how this type of violence found local roots and it doesn't lend itself in any way as a basis for the establishment of a theory of terrorism.
The terrorist bombings that rocked France during 1985-1986 are not well known. The media and the politicians spoke of them at the time, but preferred not to refer to them later so as not to draw attention to their mistakes at the time. The author provides a detailed description of the events and the legal evidence implicating members of secret organisations on the basis of the court proceedings of the prosecution of Ali Fouad Saleh and his group, and numerous interviews with the officials concerned. In a second part, he evokes the different hypotheses concerning the participation of Hezbollah and the Iranians. Moreover, he presents an analysis that questions such views of terrorism as those based on " terror networks " or " indirect governmental strategies ". Rather he sees the causes in a transnational transfer of violence. This leads to a new transnational theory which should abandon the overtly simple concept of international terrorism.