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Culture and Conflict
No. 9/10, Spring-Summer 1993
Political Violence in Western European Democracies
The concept of political violence deserves privileged treatment within political analyses. Whether invisible or spectacular, real or imagined, political violence is in fact a permanent feature in the public arena - as a threat, a challenge or a resource. Physical violence of the state or of contesting population groups is a specific type of political statement in a conflictive situation. Its symbolic dimension helps building identities, it displays power (or lack of it), it is imbedded in negotiating and bargaining processes. It uses a different " grammar " according to whether it is of an " angry " or " planned " nature. Finally, its elimination requires a constant strengthening of social controls. This in turn should lead to serious reflection on the ambiguous relationship between violence and democracy.
According to Norbert Elias, the control of emotions in a society is a determining element in the process of civilisation. A civilised society is one in which aggressiveness and violence are under social control, anchored in the organisation of the State. Elias considers the rules of good manners and courtesy to be a way of asserting ethical behaviour, and may thus collectively contribute to the maintenance of order in a society. Elias does not seem concerned by the fact that the rules of good manners not only restrain, but may also lead to violence or accompany it. He does not seem any more concerned by the paradox of " reserve ". However, this is precisely where the anthropological and political aspects of self-control need to be further studied, as has been already pointed out by a number of contemporary authors.
For a long time, the history of rural violence in 19th century France was seen in terms of political modernisation. Historians viewed developments as a trickle-down of ideologies starting in major urban centres. This interpretation of history adopts a pyramidal concept of society that takes little account of the population studied. Peasantry is seen as soft wax, waiting for the imprint of a message from mainstream society. It appeared to have no other choice than to submit to the mediation of leading citizens or accept an emancipation imposed from outside. Time has come to take a closer look at the recipient end, to study behavioural rationalities specific to peasant society, without, however, falling into the trap of the image sketched by the 19th century social observers. The township appears to be the ideal level from which to view the psychological and political specificities of peasantry.
The fundamental opposition between the vote and violence is not a mere ethical aspiration. It is confirmed by the experience of the polling station. Legal texts regulating their use show the wish of the legislator to ensure that the vote be the legitimate means of settling conflict. This process of political acculturation relies largely on the capacity of the public to apply self-restraint in accordance to the division of political work implicit in French republican tradition. Thus structured, the vote reveals a symbolic order in which violence should be completely eradicated. In reality, violence as a means of political action has not been disqualified neither in a linear nor in a flexible manner. Experience shows however that, in the midst of confrontations and pressures, the polling booth has become a protected sanctuary.
The example of violence against members of the church during the Spanish Civil War (1936 - 1939) shows the difficulty of defining different categories of political violence : religious violence, dissident violence, etc. The systems of " justification ", the distribution and nature of the acts of violence reflect the multidimensional character of such extreme situations : the argument of " need ", the depreciation of the victims by the Republicans confronted by the purely religious approach favoured by the Catholic Church.
Using four complementary hypotheses, the author attempts to explain two radically different situations in the 20th century : the extension of physical anti-Semitic violence in Poland as opposed to its virtual disappearance in France. The first hypothesis is based on Norbert Elias' thesis linking the interiorisation of violence to political centralisation ; in this respect political development in Poland and in France appear radically opposed. The second hypothesis - drawn from Tocqueville - considers that anti-Semitic violence is due to delayed political equality in the East. The third relates to the development of the citizenship concept. In France, the State achieved the acceptance of universal citizenship, whereas in Poland the weakness of the State and the feeble roots of the republican ideal rendered the status of the Jews precarious. The fourth hypothesis links psycho-sociology to political analysis. Whereas in a strong State, culture and politics are clearly distinct, in Poland, emotional factors (of culture or identity) merge with politics and give to anti-Semitism an echo within the political sphere.
This study covers 38 Law textbooks published in France from 1940 to 1944. The vast output of anti-Semitic legislation by Vichy (143 laws and regulations published in the " Journal Officiel ") was accompanied by an equally abundant jurisprudence and commentary. Two characteristics should be noted regarding the authors : on the one hand, according to French tradition, they express a free opinion, independent from any hierarchical constraint ; on the other, they write textbooks for wider distribution than the original texts. It can thus be assumed that Law textbooks published between 1940 and 1944 provide a reliable indication of the degree to which anti-Semitic ideologies penetrated legal academia. Most textbooks combine silence or simple statement with disapproval or justification. Authors who justify anti-Jewish legislation often use legal arguments stemming from the laws of the Republic : the principle of general interest, of equality (in a negative sense). Only one textbook uses specifically racist arguments. In his conclusion, the author searches for the origins of " anti-Semitic laws " : colonial Law, the status of natives and certain xenophobic aspects of the legislation of the Third Republic. He adds the hypothesis that the " forgetting " of the Final Solution is not only characteristic of post-war revisionist doctrines, but also the result of condoning the anti-Jewish legislation of 1940-1944.
During the last decade unlawful activities appear to have reached a critical level in Italy. The Italian state no longer holds the monopoly of the use of violence in its own territory. However, organised crime can only enter into competition with the state - particularly through " protection " of property and people - if the latter is incapable of ensuring this monopoly. Such crime is thus intimately linked with the existence of the State. Far from being an " anti-State ", crime thrives on the inefficiency of the State. Organised crime is thus not associated with the disappearance of the State, but with its weakness. Reactions by the State (public policies), moreover, seem totally inadequate to the problems created by organised crime. The coupling of over-legislation with under-execution has a direct influence on the growth of unlawful traffic and of social regulation through violence.
One of the characteristics of a democratic society is its tolerance of conflict and of a certain disorder in its midst. This raises two series of problems. What about the famous " monopoly of legitimate physical violence " ? How can such a state, by classical means, cope with tolerated social violence ? The Centre for Advanced Training of the Gendarmerie Mobile attempts to reconcile this contradiction. On the one hand, it trains officers to defend the state, including the possibility of the sacrifice of their lives ; on the other, it constantly searches for ever better adapted methods to deal with " momentarily deviated citizens ". The Gendarmerie instructors teach the use of " necessary " force, creating soldiers of the interior devoted to the defence of the State. They teach the technique of " restrained " violence, i.e., using the minimum necessary violence against " aggressors ". Repression has become " maintenance of law and order " with the dual aim of not causing more disorder than that caused by the contestants, and " regularising " such contestation.
Military headquarters have a special approach to the reality of war reflected in figures, lines and arrows ; there is no subjective nor sensitive view. Journalists and TV spectators, on the other hand, see war as scenes of destruction and death. How has US and Iraqi censorship during the Gulf War affected this view as compared to earlier wars ? The author examines official and non-official practices in the Napoleonic wars and in World War I. " Showing " war has always been under the direct influence of those in power.
This contribution attempts to show, through a study of the Ulster Defence Regiment, how deeply the maintenance of law and order is integrated into the British political and social system both structurally and culturally. On the creation of the unit certain organisational decisions were made and later amended in a process of " professionalisation ". Emphasis is placed on recruitment policies as a factor of political violence, either by the direct intervention of the unit, or in the development of political confrontation in which the unit is necessarily involved. This study also shows the considerable - and scarcely-known - amount of autonomy permitted within the conflict itself or within the socio-political system, thus giving rise to " management " problems.
Two types of analyses can be applied to the impression of growing police violence in Great Britain in response to new social tensions. Firstly, there is the micro-sociological approach of Anglo-Saxon authors, such as William Westley, which contends that the police react because they feel endangered. Others see the police involved in a more subjective, conflictual interaction with the population. The approach of Norbert Elias takes more into account historical perspectives and the social environment. Retrospectively, there appears to be a reduction of social violence in Great Britain. But self-control has not become generalised as shown by the destructive behaviour of football fans originating from the lower levels of the working class. Police action, with the notable exception of the miners' strike episode, has also tended to be more restrained.
The FLNC (Corsican Liberation Front) undoubtedly holds a central position in the terrorist scene of the French territory. Despite its age, its military and organisational strength in Corsica, it varies from other terrorist movements, such as ETA and the IRA, to the extent that it has little recourse to arms. This self-restraint - unusual in terrorist circles - surprises the observer. However, the dramatisation of violence through secret press conferences has become a distinguishing feature of the FLNC. Whether mere affectation, historical tradition, or, more likely, a carefully prepared stage-set, this technique leads to the creation of a symbolic scene of confrontation permitting self-restraint. Through its close contact with the media, the FLNC achieves a " military presence " at national level, a political platform from which to proclaim its lawful representation of the " Corsican people ".
Some components of the French workers' movements claim a direct relationship with two outbreaks of violence between 1919 and the beginning of the thirties, namely, the revolutionary trade-union movement at the end of World War I, and the Communist Party from 1929 to 1931. This study analyses the aims of violence, compares the nature of the outbreaks and examines the difference between theory and practice during this period of history. It appears that the theory of proletarian violence is in fact a substitute for the general strike - a displacement from the factory floor to the streets. The attitude of the Communist Party, despite its declarations, appears to be influenced less by enthusiasm for revolutionary trade-unionism than by Sorel's concepts. Violence is an essential part of the workers' struggle and has little to do with theory. During these years, it remained in conformity with Sorel's analysis and maintained its geographical, and probably also sociological, heritage from pre-war days.
Violence is a discontinuous process depending on situational factors, and thus calls for analysis. We chose to limit the analysis to the actual manifestation, when there is an exchange of blows, rather than to prior causality. Police records show that violence is usually the result of an iterative process with tactical adjustments on each side, thus placing both camps at the same level. Some determining factors can be identified, such as the aims of the demonstrators, the perception the police has of the demonstrators, and its mission to protect property. Finally, the analysis suggests that such morphological factors as the number of demonstrators, the sequence of events and the composition of the groups must also be taken into account.
Many observers of farmers' demonstrations in France have noted their violent nature. Farmers are therefore often presented as untypical in the general movement towards moderation of social conflicts. This thesis is examined here in the light of Brittany farmers' claims since 1960. Indeed, a mere typology by intensity of violence does not indicate a trend towards moderation. Although Brittany farmers have significantly changed their methods, they certainly have not eliminated violence from their action methods. However, an in-depth analysis shows that there exists a fundamental difference between the movement of June 1961, when violence was the central instrument, and events in 1983-84, when farmers considerably reduced the level of violence confronted to the pressure of public opinion, which no longer condones brutality. One can thus conclude that the trend in farmers' contestation is also towards greater moderation.
Military censorship hid, as far as it could, images of violence and destruction during the Gulf War. Violence was not, however, completely disguised. Rather it was worked over, rehabilitated for TV and journalistic presentation. It was shown but cleaned up and embellished. This process was not only the result of censorship, but also an essential part of the media approach to the Gulf War. It is thus interesting to study the reasons for this particular processing of violence, and to identify the respective responsibilities of the military and journalists. The study moreover opens the wider issue of the use of worldwide TV. In matters of violence it appears difficult to use TV within a national framework, given the worldwide nature of this media. Thus, both Iraqis and Americans avoided showing death. This proved to be a strategic error for Saddam Hussein who attempted, too late, to correct it.
The two most important hunger strikes in France, outside prisons, carried out by illegal immigrants. Facing the limited means at their disposal, they chose to use violence against themselves, showing during the process a remarkable cohesion. The hunger strike is a way of hurting yourself after having been hurt by others.
Over the last fifteen years, the CGT (General Confederation of Labour) has regularly organised spectacular or " commando " actions in which a small, strictly organised group carries out war-like actions against symbols of the State or of the owners' class : occupying offices, blocking roads or railways, attacking production facilities, etc. These operations can be regarded as the unexpected side-effects of the routine of workers' demonstrations and the crisis of trade unionism. They mobilise some of the underlying values of the labour ethos : virility and its multiple variants, such as physical power, combativity, male companionship, solidarity, etc. This display of force, dramatised and controlled, shows the extent to which violence can be harnessed, ritualised and, in a way, pacified.