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Culture and Conflict
No. 5, Spring 1992
Urban Riots: Back to Politics
Urban riots are often seen as the resultants of frustration caused by the deepening of economic crises or urban problems. Quite on the contrary, we would like to show the importance of political relations in the emergence of such violence. However, the " political explanation " is too often reduced to a " one country " analysis, thus failing to explain the globalisation and the simultaneity of riots, specially conspicuous during the 1989 events. Raising the question of the transnational transmission of the repertory of actions (contestation and coercion), we suggest that the delegitimisation, for a brief moment, of massive coercion by government partly explains how it was possible for a generalisation of protests to occur not only in central and eastern Europe but also in India, the Arab countries and French-speaking Africa..
Charles Tilly, focusing on the 1989 events in central and eastern Europe, examines the relations between simultaneous, but geographically remote, social movements. He seeks an understanding of how such movements and political change achieve a " resonance " that gradually produces a network of events. These cannot be simply reduced to a series of parallel actions emanating from similar causes, nor to the power of the media. The author examines the insufficiency of current theory on collective action, and proposes hypotheses widening the concept of contestation cycles, emphasising interaction and historical factors.
Riots between Hindus and Muslims, due to their ancient origin, have long been explained on religious grounds. Later, economic and micro-sociological explanations were adopted, stressing local socio-economic conflicts. While these interpretations may have remained valid during the sixties and seventies, they failed in the last decade during which riots appear to be based more on political reasons. There exists a " majority inferiority complex " of the Hindu population which perceives the Muslim population as benefiting from international Islamic back-up and governmental preference ; this feeling is exploited by Hinduist groups, particularly for electoral purposes. For instance, the traditional role of the Hindu procession has been perverted into a demonstration of force, often at the origin of riots. Moreover, local and regional authorities - especially there where the rule of Law is on the decline - have exploited such tensions for their own benefit. Violence in recent years thus suggests an ideological model at the crossroads of international factors (the " Pan Islamic " impact), national factors (Hindu nationalist propaganda) and local factors (criminalisation of political life).
A quantitative analysis of political violence in South Africa shows the frequency of inter-community strife among Blacks since 1987. A widely held explanation ascribes this to the miserable living conditions, aggravated by the massive influx of rural populations as a result of " Pretoriastroika ". In addition, there is an ethnic explanation, namely, that this violence is a replay of the 19th century tribal wars between Zulus and Xhosas. This latter reasoning moreover justifies the role of the White community as a natural arbitrator. Philippe Chapleau rejects both explanations. He considers that the riots are the means of Inkatha - marginalised through its rejection, unlike the ANC, of armed struggle against Apartheid - to gain a position in the political forefront and to obtain that the Mandela-de Klerk twosome becomes a Mandela-Buthelezi-de Klerk threesome. The strategy of using violence to gain recognition as the third political force in the country has been largely successful. Now that the aim has been achieved, can Inkatha abandon this efficient practice ?
How has the " islamisation " of contestation in the Arab world developed since the early seventies, during which time a growing number of social agents appropriated the major themes of Islam ? Three case studies are presented : Syria in 1973, Egypt in 1986, and Algeria since 1988. Although the structural causes of recent fundamentalist revolts have remained unchanged and have perhaps even worsened, account must be taken of the growing dependence of opposition movements on international factors and on countries like Iran and Saudi Arabia who aspire to the exclusive tenure of Islamic legitimacy. Recent events in Algeria, however, have also shown the importance of purely national factors.
Since 1989, contestation in Yugoslavia no longer deals with political, social or economic issues, but is directed against the very existence of the State, since the constituent republics and populations contest the validity of belonging to a single political entity. This disintegration is largely due to the repeated efforts of the authorities to stifle - if necessary by force - any sign of nationalist self-expression and, simultaneously, their inability to encourage alternative contestation issues ; this has inevitably further promoted nationalist contestation. The demonstrations, riots and strikes of the late sixties and eighties only served to focus once again on the natìonalist problem, which dominates all other conflicts, both for authorities and opposition. Since all politicians use the same nationalistic themes and logic, any other form of contestation is ruled out, absorbed as it is by the nationalist repertoire - the only constant in Yugoslav political life. This situation inhibits the development of real " Yugoslav " contestation movements ; only those closely linked to and defined by national issues can express themselves. This " homonymous " crisis creates a deadlock, eliminates any possibility of gradual social, political or economic change, and finally leads to armed conflict between the republics.
The kidnapping of two German citizens in Lebanon in 1987, followed by that of four more in 1989, have their own specificity which differs from the taking of many other Western hostages. While Hezbollah undoubtedly is the main force behind these terrorist acts, in the case of the Federal Republic, it is not so much a question of inflicting damage on German interests in the Middle East, as of blackmailing Bonn authorities into releasing Mohamed and Abbas Hamade, arrested in Frankfurt in possession of explosives. Thus the motivations behind the kidnapping of citizens of the German Federal Republic reflect the role of German diplomacy in the region. Economic interests and specific historical factors provide the setting supposed to facilitate rapid negotiations.