



An Islamic Revolution in Egypt?

By Rudy Jaafar

Middle Eastern countries—particularly in the second half of the twentieth century—have witnessed the rise of sociopolitical movements that pressure governments to adopt the Shari’a, or holy law of Islam, as ultimate arbiter of social and public affairs. The failures of socialism and pan-Arabism have, more than ever, strengthened the belief in political Islam as panacea to political and economic woes. These Islamic movements, coupled with other popular grievances, can often threaten established regimes and state structures, resulting in violent armed conflict and chaos. The history of the modern Middle East is replete with such events: the Syrian regime’s assault on the city of Hama in 1982, the nullification of the 1992 elections and the subsequent civil war in Algeria, and the recurrent flare-ups between militants and security forces in Egypt, to name a few. The most significant of them all, however, was the Iranian revolution, for it was the sole Islamic struggle that culminated in the establishment of an Islamic state. Using the Iranian model as a basis of comparison, I will examine the possibility, or lack thereof, of the emergence of a revolutionary Islamic government in Egypt, and by extension, evaluate the apparent uniqueness of the Iranian revolution in the history of political Islam. As the Arab world’s most populous nation, Egypt is also, quoting Fouad Ajami, the state where “Arab history comes into focus.”¹ In other words, an analysis of revolutionary political Islam in

Egypt would shed some light on the developments of Islamic movements in other Arab countries. I will start my analysis with the obvious: Iran is a Shi’a country, whereas Egypt’s population is predominantly Sunni. Is there an intrinsic characteristic in Shi’a Islam that allows its adherents to mobilize and fight for a religious authority? We will attempt to answer this question by considering, first, the ideological and doctrinal foundations, as well as the historical positions of Shi’a and Sunni spiritual leaders vis-à-vis temporal authority.

Temporal and Spiritual inter-relations in Shi’a Islam

The Shi’a, to this day, believe that the leadership of the community of Muslims is the divine right of the descendants of the Prophet through the first Imam ‘Ali. This line of descendants constitutes the line of Shi’a Imams, who have, historically, challenged the prevailing authority of their time. Their rebellious activity resulted in the martyrdom of the first three Imams and the subsequent persecution of their descendants. The Imami challenge to temporal authority continued until the *ghaiba*, or occultation, of the twelfth and last Imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi, in 874. Here, it is believed the twelfth Imam miraculously disappeared; however, he is to return to the temporal plane in the future in order to institute justice on earth and herald a golden age for Muslims and humanity.

Shi'a Ethos

The origins of Shi'a ethos are therefore found in rebellion and martyrdom. The rebellious and disappearing Imams of Shi'ism have enabled the development of a dual ideology that could be either revolutionary or quietist. Indeed, the paradigm of the messianic Mahdi can carry, on the one hand, a revolutionary significance, similar to the rebellions against the temporal authorities of the early founding Imams. In contrast, the ideology can also be quietist in nature, and here the concept of the ghaiba is of utmost importance, for, in the absence of the Mahdi, the Shi'a are to mind their own business and pay lip-service to the authorities.

Another major aspect of Shi'a ethos stems from the martyrdom of the early Imams. Ali's, and particularly Hussein's, deaths at the hands of their enemies have created an abhorrence of tyranny and injustice in the minds of the followers of Shi'ism. The early Imams have been remembered as champions of the oppressed in their struggle against the impious rulers. The dialectic between the concepts of justice and rebellion in opposition to those of tyranny and oppression has therefore been central to Shi'a thought. We will now examine the influence it has had on the development of the Shi'a clergy.

Iranian Shi'a Clerics

The particular historical and ideological development of Shi'a identity has led to unique results in the evolution of the Shi'a clerical establishment. Beginning in sixteenth century Iran, the Safavids bestowed upon these clerics, or 'ulama (singular: 'alim) - religious scholars considered guardians of Islamic traditions - economic benefits such as property and the right to collect religious taxes from the populous.² The Iranian Shi'a 'ulama enjoyed, therefore, from the start and as a result of their relative financial independence, strong positions vis-à-vis the state. Moreover, the decline of temporal

power in Persia, from the seventeenth century onwards, further strengthened the 'ulama and enabled them to question the legitimacy of the rulers. Another factor that proved to be a source of independence and increasing power for the 'ulama was the location of important Shi'a centers of learning and leadership outside Iran, in the Ottoman cities of Najaf and Karbala. Temporal and spiritual powers were therefore geographically separated, and the clergy could better resist the pressure of the Iranian state.³

The Usuli School

The independence of the 'ulama in eighteenth century Persia led to the emergence of a school of thought specific to Persian Shi'a Islam. The Usuli, or Mujtahidi, doctrine, as it came to be known, centered on the concept of the mujtahid, a cleric who has undergone extensive training in theology and has become a recognized interpreter of law and doctrine. This ideology bounds believers, rulers included, to follow the teaching of an accomplished mujtahid, sometimes referred to as marja'-e taqlid, in the political sphere as in other areas of human activity. Hamid Algar argues that, under Usuli doctrine, "the monarch was theoretically bound, no less than his subjects, to submit to the guidance of a mujtahid, in effect making the state the executive branch of 'ulama authority".⁴ Usuli doctrine therefore provides the mujtahid with tremendous power, his rulings carrying far more legitimacy than any issued by the state.

The emergence of these particular doctrines and powers of the Shi'a clergy in Persia is, therefore, a direct result of the historical conditions arising since the birth of Islam through the early twentieth century. We will now turn to the role of the Egyptian 'ulama, who have had a diametrically opposed historical path in a land subscribing to Sunni Islam.

Temporal and Spiritual inter-relations in Sunni Islam

Early Sunni doctrinal developments, and contrasts with Shi'ism

The history of orthodox Islam has produced differing results for the Sunni, compared to the Shi'a, 'ulama. The Sunni clerical establishment has historically supported the rulers and they therefore enjoyed the protection of the state. Unlike their Shi'a counterparts, the Sunni 'ulama therefore had to develop their doctrines under the aegis of a government claiming political legitimacy. The Shi'a 'ulama possessed no political protectors, and were, as a result, not forced to reconcile their doctrines with official temporal creed. Sunni clerics, on the other hand, in return for state protection, had to sacrifice their doctrinal independence.⁵ There have been interesting parallel historical processes, albeit with different end-results, between Sunni and Shi'a doctrinal developments. The Sunni Abbasid dynasty in Baghdad as well as the Shi'a Safavids of Iran had both supported, in their coming to power, 'ulama with a Mu'tazili outlook. Mu'tazili thought emphasizes the application of reason and educated judgment to questions of law and doctrine. This rationalist approach was challenged, however, in both cases, by traditionalists refusing to waiver from the literal meaning of religious texts. In Safavid Iran, as we have seen, the 'ulama maintained individual judgment and interpretation in legal theory; ijihad was indeed encouraged following rigorous training. In the Abbasid case though, the victory, for reasons beyond the scope of this study, was achieved by the literalists. Individual interpretation of law and doctrine was prohibited. This event is referred to as the 'closure of the doors of ijihad in Sunni Islam.' Evidently, this development further curtails the power of Sunni 'ulama.⁶

The 'ulama of Egypt

The Egyptian 'ulama's financial situation was radically different than that of their Iranian Shi'a counterparts; they were

financially dependent on the state. The Egyptian 'ulama received no cash money for their teaching but were paid in rations of bread, donations, gifts of clothing, or financial endowments.⁷ On several occasions, the Egyptian 'ulama were "cowed through finances" by the rulers due to their dependence on the state.⁸ Unlike the Safavids or the Qajars, the Ottoman and Mameluk rulers of Egypt were therefore very effective in curtailing the power of the 'ulama. Moreover, the Egyptian state's successful formation of a modernized army and a central bureaucracy in the early nineteenth century further reduced the power of the 'ulama.⁹ This case contrasts sharply, as we have seen, with developments in Iran. The financial dependence of the 'ulama on the state and the centralization of Egypt do not explain, however, the absence of political leadership on the part of the Sunni clerics. There were many occasions when the state effectively collapsed and the 'ulama were left with tremendous power on their hands, yet they failed to show leadership and take control of the situation. Throughout Egyptian history, the 'ulama have temporarily filled a power vacuum, when one occurred, only to relinquish political authority when it was firmly in their hands.¹⁰ The most notable example, occurred following the French invasion in 1798. Napoleon courted the 'ulama and lavished them with gifts and wealth for he saw them as natural leaders of the native society. He tried to establish a native government by offering the 'ulama the highest political offices, but the 'ulama would not accept. They informed him that they were accustomed to having Turkish officials at the head of all bureaus of the government, and Turks were finally retained at the head of the governorship, the army and the police.¹¹ Daniel Crecelius argues that this development is a reflex from the Sunni 'ulama's centuries-old submission to political tyranny, as well as

an admission of their inability to perform the vital functions of government.¹²

The Sunni 'ulama could not conceive of a government in which they exercised power. Their role, as it has always been, was to advise the government of others; to govern the governors. They did not aspire to lead politically. They were preservers of tradition, political brokers at most, and they could not shatter this image of themselves.¹³ They correspond to the classical Sunni role of the Muslim thinker, best expounded by Al-Ghazali, described as "director of conscience for political authority in administering and disciplining men that order and justice may reign in this world".¹⁴

The doctrinal differences we have explored between the Shi'a and Sunni 'ulama are numerous and consequential. Alone, however, they do not explain the phenomenon of the Islamic revolution. After all, the Iranian 'ulama had coexisted for hundreds of years with rulers more authoritarian and despotic than Mohammad Reza Shah. Moreover, the clerics of Iran had not, preceding the revolution, advocated the seizure of political power; on the contrary, they had remained on the margins of politics. Based on this analysis, it is safe to conclude that there happened a specific development in twentieth century Iran which permitted the establishment of an Islamic republic. A development, as we shall see, not mirrored in Egypt.

The rise of the Islamist movement in Egypt

The government, al-Azhar, and the militants

As discussed earlier, the 'ulama in Egypt had always been an instrument of the state to legitimize the ruling elite. Following the 1952 revolution, however, the abuse of this instrument reached absurd proportions, as the following example illustrates. Under Nasser, the services of the 'ulama were used to legitimize Arab nationalism and socialism. Sadat then solicited al-Azhar to delegitimize

the socialists and the nasserites. He then pushed for support of his policies and used al-Azhar as a counterweight to the militants, as did his successor Mubarak.¹⁵ The Egyptian government's takeover of religious institutions, and their subsequent crisis of legitimacy, were the most important factors contributing to the emergence of radical Islamic groups, such as Jihad, Gamaa Islamiya, and Takfir wa al-Hijra, whose purpose was the violent overthrow of the regime.¹⁶ Another element strengthening the recruitment base of these radical groups was the explosion of the urban population due to a decrease in the mortality rates coupled with massive rural migration. Indeed, the slums of Cairo constitute perfect environments for the effervescence of radical Islamic ideologies, feeding on the alienation and destitution of large collectives of people. The Egyptian Islamic militants believed the clerics had surrendered their right as interpreters of the faith because they colluded with the unjust temporal authorities.

Violent actions against the rulers, carried under the banner of Islam, were therefore legitimate. These extremist groups engaged in assassinations and brutal attacks in order to destabilize the ruling authorities. The most notable event was President Sadat's assassination in 1981 by Egyptian army members of al-Jihad. Another important event is the November 1997 Luxor attack by Gamaa extremists which killed 58 foreign tourists and 4 Egyptians, and which resulted in a massive reduction in the number of tourists, followed by a serious downturn in the country's economy. Following these operations, however, there occurred a shift in support away from the militants. The Egyptian population's backing for the militant Islamists withered as images of the displays of violence were broadcast on the news. These actions appalled a large section of the people, and as a result, the militants lost the public support they had enjoyed. Moreover, the government seized the opportunity and responded with

an all-out war on these extremists before completely neutralizing their operational capacity. Many militants died or fled the country during these ruthless campaigns waged by the state security forces. The conclusion was an unconditional ceasefire announced by Gamaa Islamiya in March 1999, followed thereafter by Al-Jihad's declaration of the end of military operations in June 2000.¹⁷ Nowadays, therefore, the violent and direct threat to the integrity of the Egyptian state has significantly subsided. This development has not spelled the end of the Islamic movement in Egypt however. A 1994 al-Ahram poll declared that 86 percent of Egyptians believed violent Islamic groups did not work to the benefit of society. The same poll also mentioned that 73 percent thought non-violent Islamic groups benefited Egypt. There was therefore broad support among the people to give Islam a greater role in state and society; the disagreement was over the means employed to achieve that result.

The path of non-violent political Islam in Egypt

The pillar of Muslim activism in Egypt and in most Arab countries is the Muslim Brotherhood.¹⁸ Established in 1928 by Hassan Al-Banna, the Brotherhood's ideology is based on the establishment of an Islamic state and the application of Shari'a as the only solution to all societal ills. Its commitment is to social justice and it perceives its foreign enemies as Capitalism and Zionism.¹⁹ In the eighties, following fruitless bloody conflicts with the government, the Brethren renounced violence as a means of achieving their political aims. Those members who disagreed and believed in the continuation of violent struggle splintered and formed the violent groups Gamaa and Jihad mentioned earlier. With this new non-violent strategy, the Brethren were allowed by Sadat to run for parliamentary elections.²⁰ The Muslim Brothers' new focus shifted towards penetrating the organs of civil society in order

to enlarge their power base and spread their message. Their targets were the professional associations of doctors, engineers, pharmacists and university teachers.²¹ Throughout the Arab world, these associations are the most active civil organizations because of the high level of education and political conscience of their members, as well as their independent financial resources. This new non-violent strategy proved very successful and political Islamic activism developed a substantial socioeconomic base. For example, the movement created new Islamic banks which amassed deposits surpassing those of state-owned or conventional banks. The movement was also capable of providing better health and social services than those of the state.²²

Public support for Islamic groupings also increased, when in times of crisis, these organizations outperformed the government in assisting the victims, as was the case in the October 1992 earthquake. The Brotherhood emerged from the 2000 elections with 17 seats, the largest group in the opposition.

As we have seen, the state's dominance of Al-Azhar's completely discredited the institution. This in turn has provided support to the Islamic militants from a population disenchanted by the dearth of a viable and constructive political ideology, as well as by increasing economic and social woes. The extreme violence perpetrated by the militants alienated the people, however, and the Egyptian government managed to subdue the militant Islamic threat to its integrity. The growth of the non-violent Islamic movement seeking to turn Egypt into an Islamic state has not been affected though. Indications actually point towards an increase in its popular base.

Iranian developments in political Islam

On the other side of the Middle East, Iranian history followed a distinctly different path. Similarly to the Egyptian case, there was massive rural migration, a destabilization of the traditional social groups due to rapid

modernization, and state repression.²³ The regime, however, was unable to weather the assaults on its authority. The Pahlavis simply could not hold on to power amid the massive nationwide campaign of civil disobedience.²⁴ A question arises: how was popular discontent transformed into large-scale rebellion, before ending in the establishment of an Islamic regime? We will start our analysis with the leader of the revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini.

Khomeini's leadership

With the publication of *Velayat-e Faqih*, his seminal work, and in a radical break with traditional Shi'a positions of political passivity, Khomeini advocated the acquisition of temporal power by the clergy.²⁵ He argued that it was the duty of the Faqih to seize power and implement the precepts of Shari'a as best as he could. A society based on the holy law of Islam, and guided by a Muslim religious jurisconsult, was the best that could be achieved before the coming of the Mahdi. Though many in the Shi'a clerical establishment opposed his views, Khomeini was able, nonetheless, to provide the 'ulama with a theoretical and doctrinal justification for political engagement. In order to expand his message further and unite, under his leadership, the various groups opposed to the Shah, Khomeini incorporated into his work ideas from another Iranian theoretical thinker, Dr. Ali Shariati. Khomeini substituted the concept of the faqih for Shariati's *rawshanfekran*, or 'enlightened intellectual', as the leader of the Islamic revolution. Moreover, in his discourse post-1970, he used Marxist terms of class struggle, plentiful in Shariati's analysis, to proclaim himself representative of the disinherited.²⁶ S.E. Ibrahim states that "Islamic and leftist ideologies provide a persuasive intellectual response to the issues of national crises, class malaise, and individual alienation".²⁷ Khomeini succeeded in magnifying their

impacts. His groundbreaking work fused the two ideologies together, the Islamic and the leftist, and their combined effect proved to be far superior than the sum of their individual parts. Khomeini's ideas spread to large segments of the Iranian population; poor young militants interpreted this new Shi'a doctrine in a revolutionary context, and the educated urban middle class joined the chorus. This intelligentsia deluded itself into believing that in the end, following the removal of the Shah, it would unseat Khomeini, this "charismatic but impotent old man".²⁸ Their predictions, obviously, failed miserably. In addition to the poor and the secular middle class, another important social group, the bazaar, joined Khomeini's revolutionary forces. These merchants represented the traditional allies of the clerical establishment in Iran and the two classes had, in the past, joined forces in their hostility to a strong state. The bazaar always resented a centralized government that could have burdened it with heavy taxation. It had therefore supported the 'ulama in their opposition to the state since the late 19th century. The alliance between the mosque and the bazaar was old and well established. With the first violent incidents in 1978, the revolutionary wheel was set in motion. In addition to Khomeini's leadership, the popular uprising benefited from the confluence of several other factors: the 'ulama provided logistical and organizational support using their network of 80,000 mosques, the bazaar supplied the funds, and the rural migration of the previous years provided the human potential for mass mobilization in every major city in Iran.²⁹ In summary, we can state that though the opposition to the Shah was widespread and the popular movement benefited from favorable causes, most importantly, it was united under the leadership of the Ayatollah, as he accomplished two major developments. He first transcended, theoretically, the limitations of the *marja'-e taqlid* and

established the concept of Velayat-e Faqih, increasing further the power of the clergy. Secondly, he created an umbrella for all the different political and social movements opposing the Shah.

Comparative Analysis

The Egyptian 'ulama lost their legitimacy, and the popular religious leadership of the opposition passed to reactionary organizations created by men who were not clerics with traditional religious educations. The ensuing rift between these two poles of the Islamic movement in Egypt severely constrained its powers and effectiveness in challenging the state. The Iranian religious movement was capable of facing the Shah with one united front, whereas the Egyptian Islamic opposition is handicapped by its internal conflict, which has prevented the emergence of a unifying figure in the image of the Ayatollah Khomeini, an indispensable leader in the case of the Iranian revolution.

Another important factor is the scope of the ideology underpinning the revolt. The Iranian revolution contained elements of a class struggle superimposed on the religious nature of the event. Khomeini's radical ideology was the cornerstone of this revolution, for it united the multifarious forces opposing the Shah under one banner, that of political Islam. Though Egyptian Islamists attracted people from diverse backgrounds, their ideas were opposed by the clerical establishment, and were therefore denied their support in becoming a significant force for change. The organizational role played by the mosque in the Iranian revolution is a case in point. The legitimacy of the governments the radical Islamists are fighting is also of importance to this study. The Shah, for example, was alien to his people. His forced modernization policies, as well as his Kemalist attacks on the traditional mores of his society, decreased his legitimacy. His strong alliance with the US and Israel, as well as his capitulation to the American

demand of legal immunity to US personnel in Iran, also damaged his credibility. On the other hand, the radical Egyptian groups face a government possessing stronger credentials from the populous. Nasser, for example, was the champion of nationalism and pan-Arabism, a larger-than-life figure who was extremely popular in Egypt. Nasser was therefore able to fight the Islamists more effectively than the Shah. Even Sadat's position was better than the Shah's, for, though he signed a peace treaty with Israel, he had fought a successful war with the Israelis and managed to regain the Sinai with the Camp David accords.

Conclusion

I have traced, throughout this study, the historical, doctrinal, ideological and political dimensions of the Islamic movements in both Iran and Egypt. Both actors sought to initiate a popular Islamic revolution and topple the government, though only one was successful. Today, it seems unlikely that the second event will occur; in other words, Egypt will not experience an Islamic revolution. However, this conclusion does not exclude the possibility of Egypt becoming an Islamic state. Indeed, as it is mentioned in this research, the Egyptian Islamists are gaining ground. They are slowly, but surely, penetrating all instruments of civil society; they have shifted their strategy from a top-down to a bottom-up approach. Nonetheless, their ultimate goal has remained the establishment of an Islamic government. Vali Nasr distinguishes the two movements as Red and Green Islam.³⁰ Red Islam corresponds to the Iranian case; a revolutionary ideology imbued with elements of Marxist class struggle. Green Islam, on the other hand, is not revolutionary but consists of a slow and gradual evolution towards the establishment of an Islamic state. Geneive Abdo's work³¹ is insightful in this respect, as it elucidates some of the tactics and progress achieved by the new Islamists of Egypt in furthering their agenda.

The views and opinions expressed in articles are strictly the author's own, and do not necessarily represent those of Al Nakhlah, its Advisory and Editorial Boards, or the Program on Southwest

Asia and Islamic Civilization (SWAIC) at The Fletcher School.

¹ Fouad Ajami, *The Arab predicament: Arab political thought and practice since 1967* (New York: Cambridge University Press), 13.

² Nikki Keddie, "The roots of the Ulama's power in modern Iran," in *Scholars, Saints, and Sufis: Muslim religious institutions in the Middle East since 1500*, ed. Nikki R. Keddie (Los Angeles: University of California Press), 221-222.

³ *Ibid*, 226.

⁴ Hamid Algar, "The oppositional role of the Ulama in Twentieth-century Iran," in *Scholars, Saints, and Sufis: Muslim religious institutions in the Middle East since 1500*, ed. Nikki R. Keddie (Los Angeles: University of California Press), 235.

⁵ Nikki Keddie, "The roots of the Ulama's power in modern Iran," in *Scholars, Saints, and Sufis: Muslim religious institutions in the Middle East since 1500*, ed. Nikki R. Keddie (Los Angeles: University of California Press), 216.

⁶ *Ibid*, 223-224.

⁷ Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, "The Ulama of Cairo in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries," in *Scholars, Saints, and Sufis: Muslim religious institutions in the Middle East since 1500*, ed. Nikki R. Keddie (Los Angeles: University of California Press), 154-155.

⁸ *Ibid*.

⁹ Nikki Keddie, "The roots of the Ulama's power in modern Iran," in *Scholars, Saints, and Sufis: Muslim religious institutions in the Middle East since 1500*, ed. Nikki R. Keddie (Los Angeles: University of California Press), 213.

¹⁰ Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, "The Ulama of Cairo in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries," in *Scholars, Saints, and Sufis: Muslim religious institutions in the Middle East since 1500*, ed. Nikki R. Keddie (Los Angeles: University of California Press), 159-163.

¹¹ Daniel Crecelius, "Non-ideological responses of the Egyptian Ulama to modernization," in *Scholars, Saints, and Sufis: Muslim religious institutions in the Middle East since 1500*, ed. Nikki R. Keddie (Los Angeles: University of California Press), 173-174.

¹² *Ibid*.

¹³ Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, "The Ulama of Cairo in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries," in *Scholars, Saints, and Sufis: Muslim religious institutions in the Middle East since 1500*, ed. Nikki R. Keddie (Los Angeles: University of California Press), 164-165.

¹⁴ Gilles Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt* (Los Angeles: University of California Press), 229-230.

¹⁵ Muhammad Qasim Zaman, *The Ulama in contemporary Islam: custodians of change* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press), 146.

¹⁶ Tamir Moustafa, "Conflict and Cooperation Between the State and Religious Institutions in Contemporary Egypt," *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 32 (2000): 10.

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- ¹⁷ The Economist Intelligence Unit, "Country profile 2002: Egypt," The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited (2002): 9.
- ¹⁸ Saad Eddin Ibrahim, *Egypt, Islam, and Democracy* (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press), 56.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid*, 24.
- ²⁰ Tamir Moustafa, "Conflict and Cooperation Between the State and Religious Institutions in contemporary Egypt," *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 32 (2000): 17-18.
- ²¹ Saad Eddin Ibrahim, *Egypt, Islam, and Democracy* (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press), 58.
- ²² *Ibid*, 60-61.
- ²³ Gilles Kepel, *Jihad – The Trail of Political Islam* (Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press), 108; Hossein Bashiriyeh, *The State and Revolution in Iran, 1962-1982* (New York: St Martin's Press), 34.
- ²⁴ Said Amir Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown – The Islamic Revolution in Iran* (New York: Oxford University Press), 191.
- ²⁵ Gilles Kepel, *Jihad – The Trail of Political Islam* (Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press), 40.
- ²⁶ *Ibid*, 41.
- ²⁷ Saad Eddin Ibrahim, *Egypt, Islam, and Democracy* (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press), 26.
- ²⁸ Gilles Kepel, *Jihad – The Trail of Political Islam* (Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press), 7.
- ²⁹ Hossein Bashiriyeh, *The State and Revolution in Iran, 1962-1982* (New York: St Martin's Press), 121-122.
- ³⁰ Seyyed Reza Vali Nasr, lecture on Latest trends in political Islam, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, MA., 5 November 2003.
- ³¹ See Geneive Abdo, *No God but God: Egypt and the triumph of Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press).