



The Role of Islam in Malaysian Political Practice

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The historical, ethnic, religious, cultural, and political realities that fuse to inform the state of affairs in modern Malaysia make the country a fascinating study in contrasts. Malaysia can be simultaneously characterized as democratic and authoritarian, Asian and Islamic, developed and underdeveloped, and stable and tenuous. With a population that is 60 percent Muslim, however, Islam is the factor that most critically impacts Malaysian politics.¹ Examining Malaysian government and affairs of state, it becomes clear that Islamic symbols and concepts permeate a variety of aspects of political life, from its historical and structural foundations, to its continuing political discourse and practices. With the goal of better understanding Islam's role in Malaysian political life, this essay will describe the historical evolution and circumstances that gave Islam its preeminent status in Malaysian politics, and analyze the symbolic and substantive manifestations of Islam in this context. This description and analysis will make evident that the religion plays a vital role in the politics of the two primary Malay-Muslim political parties, but that this role is largely symbolic, due to the highly pluralistic nature of Malaysian society.

By Way of Background: the Malay-Muslim Connection

In analyzing Islam in Malaysian politics today, it is helpful to provide some historical background. Although there is disagreement as to the exact date of Islam's appearance in the region, scholars typically connect it to the first

travels by Muslim Arab sailors to the islands of Southeast Asia around the 8th century. Islam is believed to then have been brought to the port city of Malacca on the west coast of the Malay Peninsula by Muslim Tamil Indian traders around the 14th century.² These Indian bearers of Islam were *Sunni* Muslims who were greatly influenced by *Sufi* mysticism. Subsequently, the fusion of *Sunni* and *Sufi* practices combined with indigenous Malay beliefs and customs—such as animism—allowing for the evolution of a unique form of Islam still practiced in Malaysia today.³ As author Fred R. von der Mehden writes, until recent years, “extreme regional theological influences have been less significant in Malaysian Islam, giving it a certain parochialism.”⁴

After its introduction, the influence of Islam grew. It became engrained in the political dominion of Malacca in 1445, when a coup resulted in the installment of a Muslim ruler and the beginning of the Malacca Sultanate. The Sultanate's Islamic legacy to Malaysia was longlasting, and its espousal and promotion of Islam marks the start of the political entrenchment of Islam in Malaysian political life. As a mechanism for increasing its allies and support, the Sultanate encouraged the rapid and peaceful conversion of its subjects and other Malay royal families to Islam.⁵ When the anti-Muslim Portuguese conquered Malacca in 1511, the Sultanate was forced move to Johor on the southern tip of the Malay Peninsula, prompting the further spread of Islam. The Dutch later ousted the Portuguese from Malacca in 1641.⁶

Islam became even more integral to indigenous affairs of state with the arrival of the British. The English East India Company arrived on the island of Penang in northwest peninsular Malaysia in 1786, and over the next 100 years expanded its sphere of influence throughout the peninsula as a means of countering Dutch power.⁷ In 1874, the British signed the Pangkor Engagement with the Muslim Sultan of Perak, which allowed for the presence of a British “resident” in the royal court, and the furthering of British influence. This resident advisor could advise on all matters except those involving Islam and Malay customs, which would remain the

exclusive domain of the Sultan. Eventually there were British residents in all Malay Sultanates.⁸ In implementing this system, the British fostered the growth of a Malay-Muslim political elite. As British influence spread, Islam was one of the only areas over which the Sultans had any practical control, and they thus sought to retain and develop this domain of influence. Many of the descendants of these same Sultans became the Malay-Muslim political elite following independence.

The British furthermore created schools of colonial administration, whose graduates would one day also contribute to this elite class.⁹

Once the British began to liquidate their colonial empire at the turn of the 20th century, they envisioned for Malaya, as it was then known, a system of parliamentary democracy, governed jointly by a “Malay Union,” and comprised of representatives from each of the major ethnic groups: the Muslim Malay majority, the Chinese, and the Indians. The British wished thereby to decrease the “power” of the Sultans and allow non-Malay minorities the rights of citizenship. Instead, this move prompted an abrupt Malay

backlash that marks the inception of modern Malay nationalism and Muslim politics.¹⁰ This backlash can be traced in part to strong feelings of economic insecurity among Malay-Muslims with respect to the Chinese and Indian worker and entrepreneurial populations, as well as to the belief that Malays, as *Bumiputras* (“sons of the soil”), should be provided certain “safeguards” and “special privileges.”¹¹

The emergence of Muslim politics in Malaysia is therefore tied to the issue of Malay nationalism that arose at this time, and to the deep and indelible connection between Malay identity and Islam. Indeed, Islam, along with *Bahasa Malayu* (the Malay language), has been called the *chief* component of Malay identity.¹² The Malay nationalist movement served to move Islamic issues to a central role in Malaysian political life and in 1946 produced a powerful, organized political force that remains a key player in current Malaysian politics: the United Malays National Organization (UMNO).¹³

The Malay elite that led the UMNO successfully challenged the ill-fated British-supported Malay Union. This resulted in the decision of the British to establish the Federation of Malaya in 1948, the Constitution of which – because it was drawn up exclusively by the UMNO, the Sultans, and the British – fully protected the special rights of Malays.¹⁴ Despite inter-ethnic tensions, the UMNO and the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) then forged a temporary alliance in 1952 as a *quid pro quo* which ensured victory for both parties. This Alliance was made permanent in 1953, and expanded to include the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) in 1954, but remained in the control of the UMNO.¹⁵ In expectation of national independence, the first national elections were held in 1955 with the Alliance winning 51 of 52 seats.¹⁶

Following the elections, the leadership of each Alliance party negotiated for four-months over the creation of a national constitution. The result was a compromise known as the “ethnic bargain,” that enshrined Islam as the national religion, in return for guarantees for the rights of other groups in Malaysia. The bargain is manifest in Article 3(1), which stipulates that “Islam is the

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religion of the Federation; but other religions may be practiced in peace and harmony in any part of the Federation.” In turn, Articles 8 (1) and 8 (2) reassure the non-Malay communities that “[a]ll persons are equal before the law and entitled to the equal protection of the law”; and that “...there shall be no discrimination against citizens on the ground only of religion, race, descent, or place of birth.”¹⁷ The Constitution provides citizenship and naturalization rights for non-Malays, but Article 12 (2) also makes it “lawful for the Federation or a State to establish or maintain . . . Islamic institutions or provide or assist in providing instruction in the religion of Islam and incur such expenditure as may be necessary for the purpose.”¹⁸ Finally, there are state-run *syariah* (the Malay for *sharia*, or Islamic law) courts that enforce personal and family laws for Muslims only.¹⁹

Experts on Malaysia have argued that the establishment of Islam as the official state religion was not intended to produce a theocracy, but rather was included at the insistence of the UMNO as a means of symbolically giving the Constitution the external features of an Islamic state.²⁰ Thus, the Constitution further built upon the centuries-old tradition of fusing Islam with the state. However, the constitutional framers also clearly went beyond the symbolic to consider the temporal concerns of modern political life, as is evidenced by the Constitution’s substantive and concrete language addressing important non-Malay concerns.

Post-Independence Political Practice in Malaysia

Since Malaysia gained independence from the British in 1957, it has held periodic state and national elections, as required by the Constitution. In theory, these have been open to all political parties. In practice, the Malay-Muslim UMNO has gained the largest share of the popular vote in every federal election since independence. Furthermore, the UMNO alliance of Malays and the major Chinese and Indian parties, as well as 11 smaller or regional parties (the *Barisan Nasional*, or BN), has always obtained the two thirds

majority of the *Parlimen* (Parliament) necessary to change the Constitution if it so desired.²¹ However, such changes would not be automatic in spite of this technical majority—it is vital to recognize, that Malaysian politics do not occur in an Islamic vacuum, absent any other considerations or influences. Despite the unparalleled hegemony of the UMNO in the BN and of the BN in Malaysian politics, the power of these groups is nonetheless checked by the multiple ethnic and religious groups and interests represented within the BN. Islamic symbols and issues do indeed play an important role in Malaysian politics, but they remain subordinate to, and linked with, the broader role of politics in a highly pluralistic society where Malays, who are predominantly Muslim, comprise 58 percent of the total population; the Chinese 24 percent; and the Indians, 8 percent.²² Indeed, UMNO’s political success can be attributed in part to its recognition and acceptance of these ethnic considerations, and to its successful pursuit of consociational democracy, even if by default.²³

UMNO’s principal rival for support of the Malay-Muslim population, the *Parti Islam se Malaysia* (Islamic Party of Malaysia) or PAS, took longer to understand and react to the practical demands of a pluralistic society. While the UMNO can best be described as espousing a “secularist” Islamic ideal classification, or, “the belief that it is possible to separate the religious and political spheres of life,” PAS can be characterized as a hybrid of “modernist” and “fundamentalist” ideal classifications. It is modernist in the sense that it accepts “a compromise between a traditional Islamic and a modern Western nation-state model.” It is fundamentalist in that it espouses a government that seeks a return to the *Sunnah* (customs of the Prophet) and is rejects Western political models.²⁴

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PAS was created in 1951 to directly challenge UMNO's secular stance, in favor of elevating Islam's purely symbolic status in the Constitution to a more substantive and operational level.²⁵ Strong emphasis was also placed—in the words of PAS' third leader, Dr. Burhanuddin al-Hemi—on the fusion of “Malay nationalism with Islamic ambitions.” The party accused UMNO of selling out Malay interests to the Chinese and Indians in exchange for electoral success, and advocated an incremental approach toward its ultimate objective of Islamic governance, achieved within the established democratic framework of Malaysia.²⁶

PAS' first electoral victory in the 1959 elections gave it control of the largely traditional, conservative Malay states of Kelantan and Terengganu in the east, and of 13 national parliamentary seats. The 1969 elections yielded similar results, and PAS won almost half of the Malay-Muslim vote. These elections marks the beginning of real rivalry between UMNO and PAS.²⁷

The emergence of Islamic revivalism in the early 1970s marks the start of the most critical epoch of Islam's influence in Malaysian post-independence political

practice. Revivalism in Malaysia was not monolithic, but a multi-faceted movement with many causes, internal and external. Scholar Mohamad Abu Bakar attributes an internal re-education about the holistic nature of Islam as the primary cause of Malaysian revivalism.²⁸ This re-education created a greater awareness and understanding of Islam among Malay-Muslims and a heightened feeling that as *ad-din*, or a way of life, Islam needed a greater role in the public sphere.²⁹ While the primary forces behind revivalism were internal to Malaysia, there were

external factors that also played a part, including: the spread of Islamic literature, the influence of foreign fundamentalist movements and international Islamic organizations, the return of Malay-Muslim students from study abroad, and the struggles of co-religionists in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and in the Iranian Revolution.³⁰ New technologies aided the spread of these trends during this time frame. The popular and well-respected leader of the Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia (ABIM), Anwar Ibrahim, was the linchpin of Malaysian Islamic revivalism, which has been characterized as a balance between the return to and strict adherence to Islam among the faithful, and by an emphasis on education, modern technological skills, and economic progress.³¹

As a result of the emergence of Islamic revivalism in Malaysia and the wider Muslim world, as well as in response to PAS' continued electoral successes, UMNO began a trend author Syed Ahmad Hussein terms the “Islamization of UMNO.”³² When controversial UMNO Prime Minister, Mohamad bin Mahathir, took office in 1981 to begin what became a 22 year reign over Malaysian political life, he pursued a variety of policies, and is credited with modernizing the Malaysian economy to the point that it became known as one of the Asian Tiger “cubs.” His initial focus, however, was to defeat the radical PAS challenge. To this end, he more readily embraced Islamic themes and projects, and became more accommodating to Islam and pursued various Islamic policies. As UMNO Islamized, PAS further radicalized in order to distinguish its policies from that of its rival; this move provoked electoral defeats throughout the 1980s and PAS therefore ultimately returned to a more moderate approach.³³ As Mahathir's approach to governance became more authoritarian, PAS shifted its focus from Islam, per se, toward the promotion of democracy and transparency within a framework of Islam. UNMO itself, meanwhile, grew progressively marked by scandal and undemocratic practices. However, the resignation of Mahathir in October 2003 and the accession to Prime Minister of Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, a man with

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outstanding Islamic and political credentials, has reinvigorated the ailing party.

Islamic Symbol and Substance in Post-Independence Political Practice in Malaysia

The rivalry between UMNO and PAS has prompted a competition to win the hearts and minds of the Malay-Muslim electorate, while also trying to appeal to—or at least not completely alienate—the non-Muslim voters of Malaysia. Both parties have invoked Islamic symbols and pursued substantive policies pertaining to Islam in an attempt to win public support. Purely symbolic gestures include rhetoric, statements, and moves of support or disapproval for certain policies, while substantive measures include legal actions that change or attempt to change state or national law, as well as establish permanent or more substantial programs and policies. It is difficult to completely separate each of the statements, actions, and laws that will be described below into the clear categories of “symbol” and “substance,” but the distinction presents a useful framework through which to view the broader connection between Islam and political practice in modern Malaysia.³⁴

Symbol

Over the decades, both UMNO and PAS have engaged in highly symbolic rhetoric and actions designed to appeal to the religious sentiments of Islamic voters for the purposes of political gain. PAS has, among other incidents, been recorded as calling UMNO leadership *kafir* (unbeliever or infidel) and has equated support of UMNO as tantamount to “apostasy.”³⁵ During the 1990s, the modernist-fundamentalist party also distributed a poster calling on PAS supporters to wage jihad and martyrdom against the UMNO and the BN alliance.³⁶ Moreover, there is documented evidence that PAS’ predecessor PMIP employed what could be called “scare tactics” during the 1959 and 1964 elections, for example forcing rural voters to swear on the *Quran* that they would vote for PMIP candidates, or handing out guides for Muslim voters that referenced the *Quran* and *Hadith*.³⁷ In all fairness, as PAS has gained more practical political

experience, it has softened its rhetoric and now often notes its commitment to democracy and transparency, thus subtly criticizing UMNO’s trend toward authoritarianism under Mahathir. As PAS’ message has evolved, it has also expressed its certainty that the tenets and practices of Islam are fundamentally compatible with democracy.³⁸ This evolution is evidenced by PAS’ election slogans during different periods; in 1986, PAS’ election slogan was the forceful “PAS: Party of Allah,” which softened to “Progress with Islam” during the 1990 and 1995 campaigns.³⁹

For its part, UMNO has associated rival PAS with Islamic extremism and terrorism as a means of frightening voters. This trend has been especially pronounced since the September 11 attacks, when UMNO linked PAS to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and other Islamic extremist movements, such as *Kumpulan Militan Malaysia* and *Jemaah Islamiyah*. Analyst Joseph Liow notes that UMNO justifies these verbal attacks on the grounds that PAS has been slow to condemn terrorists and extremists in the past, and because several members have voiced support for Palestinian suicide bombers.⁴⁰

More positively, one UMNO action that had a strong symbolic impact was its invitation to Islamic revivalist leader Anwar Ibrahim to join the Mahathir administration in 1981, a period marked by high Islamic sentiment in Malaysia. Scholar Syed Ahmad Hussein suggests that this move—also described as “the Anwar factor,” due to Anwar’s popularity and capacity for political mobilization—served to reinforce the party’s new commitment to Islam.⁴¹ When Mahathir later dismissed Anwar in 1999 on charges of sexual misconduct, the Anwar factor and its associated symbolism worked against the UMNO, leading to a public outcry over Anwar’s mistreatment in prison.⁴² At around the same time that UMNO co-opted Anwar, it also considered changing the “M” in its acronym to stand for “Muslim” rather than “Malay,” but later decided against the change.⁴³

Furthermore, during its nearly five decades in office, UMNO has had the opportunity to pursue many “feel-good” Islamic initiatives, such as sponsoring *Quran* reading contests, building

new mosques, scheduling Islamic programming on TV, and providing subsidies to civil servants who perform the *hajj*.⁴⁴ Initiatives such as these are generally politically safe in a highly pluralistic society like Malaysia, as they do not have a great impact on non-Muslim sectors of society, but at the same time are politically advantageous in that they do appeal to citizens who are Muslim. Under Mahathir, UMNO also began to encourage the use of Islamic greetings and salutations, and many government speeches now start with the Arabic greeting, *a salam a' laikum* ("peace be upon you").

PAS has also pursued feel-good initiatives in states where it has held political control, most notably in its stronghold state of Kelantan. For example, in Kelantan's state capital of Kota Bharu, Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat, *Menteri Basar* (Chief Executive of the State government) of Kelantan since 1990 and a *Tok Guru* (traditional leader), gives a *kuliyah* (lecture) in the street every Friday morning that typically has a religious *and* political message. These well-known *kuliyah* are recorded in books and on audio and video tapes and are then distributed throughout Malaysia.⁴⁵ They have served at once to spread the PAS religio-political message and to increase political visibility, while also building a strong sentimental connection between the PAS leader and the people of Kelantan. Symbolic initiatives such as these have actually allowed PAS to build political power and influence despite the substantial fiscal and administrative restraints imposed upon PAS-controlled states by the UMNO-led central government.

Substance

PAS and UMNO have also undertaken more substantive Islamic statements and policies in the years since independence, although these are fewer in number than the largely symbolic gestures described above. During the 1970s and 1980s, UMNO national leadership established several permanent bodies to promote Islam and Islamic education, including an Islamic Research Center and an International Islamic University. UMNO also elevated the National Council of

Islamic Affairs to a permanent status within the Prime Minister's office.

More significantly, Mahathir introduced Islamic banking, securities, and insurance laws and amended the constitution to increase the power of Islamic legal authorities.⁴⁶ Donald Horwitz describes the trend:

Nowhere . . . in Asia has the Islamization of law preceded more methodologically than in Malaysia where, in the span of a decade, dozens of new statutes and judicial decisions have clarified, expanded, and reformulated the law applicable to Muslims . . . what has been attempted is the creation of two parallel, relatively autonomous systems, one secular and one Islamic.⁴⁷

These changes are indeed revolutionary, however they are administered by each state and are still applicable only to the Muslims of Malaysia, in accordance with the 9th Schedule, List II, Paragraph 1 of the Malaysian Constitution.⁴⁸

Because PAS has maintained political control over several states on the eastern side of the Malay peninsula, it has also had the opportunity to pursue some more substantive Islamic policies. The clearest example of this is its 1992 introduction of *hudud* legislation—which the UMNO has been hesitant to pursue—in its stronghold state of Kelantan. *Hudud* is a portion of the *syariah* comprising a set of laws and punishments for offenses such as adultery, stealing, consumption of alcohol, and apostasy. Hussein suggests that PAS introduced the *hudud* legislation knowing that it would not be enforceable without amendments to the federal Constitution, which would be nearly impossible since it requires a two thirds majority in parliament. PAS itself has noted that the *hudud* requires strict rules of evidence and stated that it would not be enforced until society had fully understood its requirements.⁴⁹ Each time *hudud* has been introduced, it has been subsequently withdrawn on "technical grounds."⁵⁰ The PAS-controlled state legislature in Terengganu actually

passed *hudud* legislation, but its implementation was impossible because of the state's subordination to the federal Constitution.⁵¹

A more recent example of substantive PAS action is its Islamic State Blueprint document, which was officially presented in November 2003, but failed to be subsequently released to the public following criticism from both Muslims and non-Muslims.⁵² Despite the substantial media hype surrounding the terms of the Blueprint, the president of PAS repeatedly emphasized at its official release that PAS's concept of an Islamic state would uphold all of the current principles of the Malaysian Constitution, including freedom of religion, status quo of the court system, and the democratic rights of each citizen.⁵³ Because PAS never publicly released the full text of the Blueprint, it is impossible to know the true contents of the document and to verify the truth of its claims. Despite its failure to be released, this action is considered substantive because the Blueprint was several years in the making and was intended to serve as the party's strategic plan.

Conclusion

Islam has been intimately tied to Malaysian government affairs and political life since the time of the Malacca Sultanate in the 15th century, but its modern roots can be traced to the start of British decolonization, which produced the Malay nationalist movement and the birth of Malaysian Islamic politics. Islam, as one of the key characteristics of Malay identity, has served as both a mobilizing and polarizing force in Malaysian politics since independence in 1957. The symbolic and substantive examples described in this paper further underscore this fact.

The two primary Malay-Muslim parties, the more secular UMNO and the more religious PAS, have vied for dominance of the Malay-Muslim vote, while simultaneously striving not to alienate non-Malay-Muslims or infringe upon their Constitutionally-guaranteed rights. The primary mechanism for achieving this balance has been the deliberate, creative, and continuing use of Islamic symbolism and substance. However, symbolic statements and acts pursued by UMNO and PAS greatly outnumber the amount of

substantive actions, as is demonstrated by the previous examples, and further borne out by other recorded incidents of Islamic-influenced political acts. Moreover, of those substantive actions that have been pursued, a large number have had little or no impact on society, as political leaders have been unwilling or unable to effectively implement these initiatives.

The underlying reason for the political emphasis on symbolic actions and gestures over substantive ones can be traced to the pluralistic nature of Malaysian society, which informs the nature of the Constitution and the political party coalition structure in parliament. In a highly pluralistic society like Malaysia, where Islam has played an important role in the state since its inception, symbolism has been an important mechanism for expressing Muslim identity without substantially infringing upon the rights of minority groups. Scholar Hussein notes that Malaysian political parties are keenly "aware of the value of the politics of symbolic action," and have used it to their advantage.⁵⁴ Indeed, the skillful employment of Islamic symbolism has helped the UMNO maintain political control, but has also allowed PAS to gain political ground. In 1979, Prime Minister Hussein Onn of UMNO said, "you wonder why we spend so much [money] on Islam . . . [if we do not] Parti Islam [PAS] will get at us."⁵⁵ Likewise, "PAS would define the [UMNO] government's Islamization as cosmetics, long on symbolism but short on substance."⁵⁶ In other words, both parties recognize and exploit the power of symbol for political gain. It is—after all—the fight for hearts and minds, and subsequently votes, that is the ultimate political objective of every political party in a democracy, and in this regard, Malaysia is not an exception to the rule.

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The views and opinions expressed in articles are strictly the author's own, and do not necessarily represent those of Al Nakhlah, its Advisory and

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- ² Robert Day McAmis, *Malay Muslims: The History and the Challenges of Resurgence Islam in Southeast Asia* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 10-16.
- ³ Mohamad Talib Osman, "Islamization of the Malays: A Transformation of Culture," in *Readings on Islam in Southeast Asia*, Ahmad Ibrahim, Sharon Siddique, and Yasmin Hussein, eds., (Singapore: ISEAS, 1985), 44. McAmis, 50
- ⁴ Fred R. von der Mehden, "Malaysia and Indonesia," in *The Politics of Islamic Revivalism*, Shireen T. Hunter, ed., (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), 247.
- ⁵ R.S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, *Malaysia: Tradition, Modernity, and Islam* (Boulder: Westview, 1986), 11.
- ⁶ *Ibid.*, 12.
- ⁷ *Ibid.*, 13.
- ⁸ McAmis, 38; Milne, 15-16.
- ⁹ Syed Ahmad Hussein, "Muslim Politics and the Discourse on Democracy," in *Democracy in Malaysia: Discourses and Practices*, Francis Loh Kok Wah and Khoo Boo Teik, eds. (Richmond, UK: Curzon, 2002), 81.
- ¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 81-82.
- ¹¹ *Ibid.*, 81; K.J. Ratnam, "Religion and Politics in Malaya," *Readings on Islam in Southeast Asia*, Ahmad Ibrahim, Sharon Siddique, Yasmin Hussain, eds. (Singapore: ISEAS, 1985), 143.
- ¹² Ratnam, 143.
- ¹³ Hussein, 81-82.
- ¹⁴ Milne, 23.
- ¹⁵ Milne, 27.
- ¹⁶ Milne, 28.
- ¹⁷ Constitution of Malaysia, <http://www.helpline.com/law/constitution/malaysia/malaysia01.php>.
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁹ Constitution of Malaysia, "Schedule," <http://www.helpline.com/law/constitution/malaysia/malaysia15.php>.
- ²⁰ Ratnam, 143-144.
- ²¹ Central Intelligence Agency, "Malaysia," *The World Factbook*, 2004, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/my.html>. Daniel Kingsbury, "Malaysia: Inclusion and Exclusion," *South-East Asia: A Political Profile* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 274.
- ²² Central Intelligence Agency, "Malaysia," *The World Factbook*, 2004, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/my.html>. Note: "Other" ethnic groups comprise 10 percent of the total population.
- ²³ Arend Lijphart defines consociational democracy as "government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy." Arend Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy," in *World Politics*, 21, no. 2, 1969.

- ²⁴ "Islam and Political Values in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria." *Middle East Journal* 33, no. 1 (Winter 1979), 1-19. (Referred to in Sharon Siddique, "Conceptualizing contemporary Islam: Religion or Ideology?" in *Readings on Islam in Southeast Asia*, Ahmad Ibrahim, Sharon Siddique, and Yasmin Hussein, eds. (Singapore: ISEAS, 1985), 341.
- ²⁵ Ratnam, 144. The original name of the party was the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party or PMIP; the name was changed to PAS in 1973.
- ²⁶ Hussein, 85.
- ²⁷ Ibid., 85.
- ²⁸ Mohamad Abu Bakar, "External Influences on Contemporary Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 13 no.2 (September 1991), 220.
- ²⁹ Liow, *Reconstructing*, 2
- ³⁰ Abu Bakar, 220 – 228.
- ³¹ McAmis, 81.
- ³² Ibid., 86.
- ³³ Syed Ahmad Hussein, "Muslim Politics and the Discourse on Democracy," in *Democracy in Malaysia: Discourses and Practices*, Francis Loh Kok Wah and Khoo Boo Teik, eds. (Richmond, UK: Curzon, 2002), 74-107.
- ³⁴ Clearly, because PAS leadership has not had the depth of political experience at the most senior levels that UMNO has had over the decades, they have not been in a position to enact substantive Islamic policies, but there are several more substantial actions and statements taken by PAS that can be analyzed for this purpose.
- ³⁵ Ratnam, 146.
- ³⁶ Hussein, 91-92.
- ³⁷ Ratnam, 146-147.
- ³⁸ Hussein, 96; Dato' Seri Tuan Guru Hadi Awang, President, PAS Party Malaysia. Full-Text Speech. "The Launching of the Document on Islamic State." November 12, 2003. www.freeanwar.net/July2003/facnews121103b.htm.
- ³⁹ Hussein, 93.
- ⁴⁰ Joseph Liow, "Outlook for Malaysia's 11th General Election," Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore, March 2004.
- ⁴¹ Hussein, 88.
- ⁴² Joseph Liow, "Outlook for Malaysia's 11th General Election."
- ⁴³ Hussein, 87.
- ⁴⁴ Ibid., 74-107.
- ⁴⁵ Khoo, *Searching*, 18.
- ⁴⁶ Hussein, 88.
- ⁴⁷ Donald Horwitz, "The *Quran* and Common Law: Islamic Reform and the Theory of Legal Change Part I," *American Journal of Comparative Law* 42 no. 2 (Spring 1994), 236.
- ⁴⁸ Constitution of Malaysia, "Schedule."
- ⁴⁹ Hussein, 95, 97.
- ⁵⁰ Liow, *Deconstructing*, 4.
- ⁵¹ Ibid., 14.
- ⁵² Dato' Seri Tuan Guru Hadi Awang, President, PAS Party Malaysia. Full-Text Speech. "The Launching of the Document on Islamic State." November 12, 2003. www.freeanwar.net/July2003/facnews121103b.htm. Lim Kit Siang, "The PAS Decision to not Make Public its Islam State Blueprint is most Disappointing," September 17, 2003, <http://www.malaysia.net/dap/lks2617.htm>.

⁵³ Dato' Seri Tuan Guru Hadi Awang, President, PAS Party Malaysia. Full-Text Speech. "The Launching of the Document on Islamic State."

⁵⁴ Hussein, 88.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 86.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 94.