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Europe: A More or Less Perfect Union?
By Timothy Weaver*
In these days of overwhelming attention devoted to questions related to the Middle East and terrorism, we thought it would be not only instructive but a welcome change of pace to peruse observations on the institution of the European Union. –Ed.
The EU is a great deal more than a customs union and much of the constitution, if not the document as a whole, enjoys widespread support.
The subject of much recent chatter about Europe has been the extent or existence of the "transatlantic rift." However, in focusing upon this issue, many in America are missing some of the more fundamental changes, difficulties and opportunities that are emerging within Europe. While opposition to Iraq appears to have brought 'old Europe' together, the reality is that France and Germany's relationship contains some significant fault lines.
Moreover, an expanded EU and a constitutional treaty have the potential to precipitate profound changes in the future role of Europe as an economic, political and ideational unit. In short, an excessive focus on transatlantic troubles will miss more profound and influential forces at work within Europe itself.
"Old Europe" and American "Adventures"
Much ink and oratory has been expended by authors, journalists, political scientists, and politicians on the transatlantic fissures opened by the war on Iraq. Both sides have been hurt. Donald Rumsfeld's referring to France and Germany as "Old Europe" and Chancellor Schroeder's outspoken attack on American foreign "adventures," undoubtedly contributed to heightened tension within the alliance. However, these troubles have not paralyzed relationships crucial to the war against radical terror and other international problems. For example, despite hot and public disagreements between France and the US, the two have cooperated over the French-led Interim Emergency Multinational to be deployed in Bunia in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. Furthermore, cooperation from European states—including France—in the hunt for Al Qaeda has continued in Djibouti, the location of the Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa. Moreover, even states seemingly opposed to the US continue to commit troops to Afghanistan. Spain, for example, has doubled its contingent there, despite its withdrawal of troops from Iraq. Perhaps most importantly, there is little evidence to suggest a slackening in work done by cooperating intelligence agencies, police and law enforcement.
Also important is the fact that states like France have consistently opposed American "hyperpower," leading them to desire autonomy from the US approach. But when serious crises emerged, ranks closed. Even France has often supported America at the most critical moments: "We are all Americans" declared Le Monde on September 12, 2001. In the aftermath of 9/11, France, like much of the rest of the world, stood shoulder to shoulder with the US. However, this did not mean that France was prepared to follow US foreign policy come what may. Therefore, talk of the loss of France is overblown since France was never really America's to lose. To sum up, much of the recent "transatlantic rift" comes down to diplomatic bungling and a lot of hot air. Such air will certainly cool down when both sides realize the extent to which their interests and ideals are in harmony. Too much unites Europe and America permanently to divide them.
Germany and France: Bund Franco-Allemande?
When considering Europe though the lens of the recent transatlantic rift, one sees two historical rivals—France and Germany—as diplomatic bedfellows. However, this is the wrong lens to assess the real state of their relationship. Clearly, the two states no longer consider the other to be a threat, and indeed no longer see their counterpart as "other" at all: the mutual threat is practically nonexistent. However, significant disagreements remain that lie at the heart of Franco-German relations.
France has long considered itself as the senior partner in the relationship with Germany. But the reunified post-1991 Germany has increasingly acted as an independent, confident and "emancipated" power. This is problematic for France's foreign policy goals, particularly with respect to the role of Europe vis-a-vis the United States.
France considers US-European relations in balance-of-power terms, hoping that Europe will balance a perceived overly powerful and revisionist US. In March 2003 French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin argued that "to be truly stable, this new world must be based on a number of regional poles," thus asserting the French advocacy of multipolarity. Germany, conversely, considers its bilateral relationship with America as central to its interests. While this seemed momentarily jeopardized over Iraq, since the "end" of the war "Germany has swung back towards its traditional position of equidistance between France and America" (The Economist, June 2004). Thus, an increasingly Atlanticist Germany is a point of sharp disagreement, undermining France's desire for an anti-hegemonic coalition capable of balancing US power and influence.
The two former rivals also disagree on a second vital issue, the extent of integration with the EU: "German commitment to institution-building and its willingness to cede sovereignty is contrary to the French insistence on intergovernmental cooperation with little loss to national sovereignty."1 Put simply, Germany desires the future of Europe to be one of federalism, while France holds a vision of a "confederal structure reliant upon 'reinforced' interstate cooperation."2 The recent bund franco-allemande overshadowed underlying substantial disagreements not likely to be resolved soon. Harmony generated by anti-American positions will be neither necessary nor sufficient to resolve more fundamental fissures within the Franco-German relationship.
Bigger and Better?
Paris and Berlin are also caught up a third challenge: managing the expansion of the EU. Under a system allocating vetoes to single countries, France and Germany fear their power will be undermined. The deal struck on voting procedures in June 2004, allows states such as Poland and Spain to block measures, while preventing, the three biggest—Britain, France and Germany—from blocking on their own.3 Thus the weaker might exploit the stronger. Further expansion risks extending this trend. The result may downgrade France and Germany to secondary status, even with respect to "European" foreign policy. On Iraq, for example, official policy could be set in ways anathema to German and French interests.
Moreover, the prospect of Turkey's admission into the EU has already alarmed some. The "old" powers may worry about the relative loss of power which will result: within 15 years Turkey will be overtake Germany to become the EU's biggest member. The result would be Turkey having the heaviest voting weight in Brussels and the largest national block in the European parliament. While it is correct to point out that these facts will not necessarily result in Turkey's being able to dominate decision-making, it will undoubtedly make it a necessary, if not sufficient, partner in getting through controversial measures. While France and Germany officially support Turkey's entry, many are opposed through fears of relative loss of power.
Thus bigger is not necessarily better, especially for those states that will as a result become relatively smaller. This helps to explain France-Germany collaboration on this front. The enlargement of the EU which has already taken place, and the enlargement likely in the future, is likely to precipitate a significant shift in the power of the big states in the EU, and consequently in the policy and practice of the entity. Thus emerging EU will look fundamentally different in the medium- and long-term.
The European Constitution: To Be Or Not To Be?
Americans should also be aware of the European constitutional treaty. While the document presents a unique opportunity for the political evolution of the EU, the fact that states will probably not ratify, throws into question the future of the European project, and may even precipitate a life-threatening crisis for the EU.
EU rules specify that ratification must happen either through national parliaments or national referenda. France announced on July 14 that it would hold a referendum (much to the consternation of President Chirac who fears losing), largely due to Prime Minister Blair's reluctant decision to do so in the face of public pressure. France's decision to go for a referendum will make it the eleventh European state to do so; the rest will seek to ratify it solely through their national parliaments. The ratification process may cast doubt in the future of the constitution. As The Economist points out, if only one country were to vote no "it would be legally impossible for the constitution to come into force." The further concern is that a state's rejection of the treaty may throw its membership of the EU into question. Given that the treaty is comprised to a significant extent of existing EU treaties, a decision to reject the constitutional treaty, may in effect be a rejection of their commitment to the EU more generally. Continued membership in the EU by a state which had rejected the constitutional treaty would give credence to those who argue that laws passed at the EU level lack legitimacy and subvert democracy. Not only may such a situation undermine governments' membership of the EU in the eyes of their domestic critics, but it could very well drive a wedge between those states within the EU which did ratify and those who did not: "a constitution meant to unite a Union of 25 countries could thus end up dividing it." (The Economist, June 26, 2004)
It may be, however, that such gloomy pessimism is unjustified. While it is likely that the constitution will not be ratified, this does not necessarily mean that the constitution is doomed, nor that the EU as an institution is under threat. Perhaps unsurprisingly, German Ambassador Paschke, currently Management Advisor to the Council of Europe, is optimistic about its future prospects asserting that it would eventually be passed and that he expected to see a constitution within 10 to 15 years. This view is shared by The Economist, which argues that non-ratification will provide the opportunity for a better constitution, and a more perfect union, to emerge. Readers will no doubt be reminded of the tumultuous process by which the United States ratified its constitution. There is little reason to believe why the EU should progress without difficulty or division.
The constitutional process's limp start and lukewarm reception are fairly typical for EU initiatives but should not obscure its implications. The EU is a great deal more than a customs union and much of the constitution, if not the document as a whole, enjoys widespread support.
The EU's ambitions beyond the economic sphere are well known and have been asserted for decades. For example, Article B of the 1992 Treaty on European Union declares the intention to assert "its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence" and of developing "close cooperation on justice and home affairs." The expansion of EU law in areas outside the economic realm, such as the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, has made it a legal entity creating laws that must be taken into account by governments. The constitutional treaty, if it were to be adopted, would clearly further the EU's claims to be something far more than a purely economic institution.
The creation of Minister of Foreign Affairs, through combining the roles of Commissioner for External Relations and the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, will help satisfy Kissinger's complaint, "When I need to get in touch with the Kremlin, I know who to call. When I need to get in touch with Europe, who do I call?" However, the person that answers the phone will only be able to speak on issues of European unanimity. Therefore, the extent to which Europe will have a foreign policy, even if it adopts the constitutional treaty, will be limited.
There are also worries that the constitution lays the foundation for a European superstate, a United States of Europe. Pessimists aver that the fight to prevent this may wreck the European project altogether. However, such concerns are overblown and essentially hyperbolic. Indeed, for the first time there is a streamlined procedure by which countries can withdraw from the EU. Nevertheless, the constitution, if ratified, would certainly lead to more decisions being taken at the EU, rather than at the state level. While states can block measures though veto, it is the case that more voting will be done on a "double majority" basis which may mean that the citizens of individual states may not have a say on certain issues, in the event that their state is in a minority. Thus the EU is likely to develop a legal and political personality, its decisions being that of a unitary, multinational institution. These developments are profoundly important, as will be the arguments and disagreements that they will generate. That these debates will undermine the EU is unlikely, but they will shape the future of the institution.
Trouble with the Euro—So Much for Multilateralism
The effectiveness of the Euro as a genuinely multilateral institution was undermined when France and Germany flouted the rules of the stability and growth pact last year and this year has gotten away with it. Specifically, they allowed their budget deficits to exceed the 3 percent of GDP limit mandated by the pact. By contrast, when facing a deficit of over 3 per cent Portugal obediently followed the rules and cut spending which deepened its recession and increased unemployment. Such inconsistency helps to fuel the view of one rule for the big and another for the small, thus enhancing dangerous Euro-skepticism within the smaller countries.
However, France and Germany's rule-breaking does not necessarily suggest the inefficacy of multilateralism per se. Rather, it may be a reasonable response to a bad rule. The fact that a qualified majority of Foreign Ministers voted to send the whole pact into abeyance, suggests that a majority of states considered it unviable. The Economist argued that pact's rules were "foolish economics" and the sanctions regime "idiotic politics."
However, further evidence of unilateralism came with the recent allegation that Greece fudged its figures on convergence in order to be admitted into the Euro (New York Times, September 23, 2004). Such news, added to the suspicion that Italy too has indulged in creative accounting, may undermine confidence in the fledgling currency. Both developments raise doubts about the likelihood states following rules of multilateral institutions, when such rules contradict national interests.
If some states keep defecting and adopt unilateralist positions without sanction, other states are likely to follow suit. Moreover, such examples give reason to question whether there can there be sufficient enforcement mechanisms within multilateral institutions to prevent future defection. This will reinforce the view that the EU's multilateralism is a limited instrument, comforting those who fear a superstate, but also threatening to render the whole less than the sum of its parts.
Concluding Remarks
The United States should draw important conclusions from this melange of events. First, despite much of the recent hullabaloo surrounding the "transatlantic rift," the US-European relationship will recover and endure from a crisis which has resided more in rhetoric than reality. Second, the bund franco-allemande, appears stronger than it really is. While France and Germany tilted away from the US, and towards each other, Germany appears to be moving back towards its preferred position of equidistance between the two. Their agreement over the constitutional treaty represents little more than a marriage of convenience on this particular issue. Third, the European Union's expansion and the drafting of a constitutional treaty suggest an ever closer Union among its nation states.
Clearly there will be a great deal of wrangling over the constitution, which will make it unlikely to come into fruition in the short term. Disputes may threaten the European project itself. The effect of these disputes may have global significance as power struggles within the Union may be reflected in decisions about states' relationships with the US and their willingness to enter into future conflicts. Fourth, examples of both large and small states breaking rules within the Eurozone raise questions about the efficacy of multilateral institutions in general and the EU and the Euro in particular. With too much of the attention on the first of these developments, America risks neglecting to recognize more fundamental changes afoot.
The Union is not in prefect shape, nor will its quest to become ever closer be without tumult. The sun across the Atlantic, much like the one painted on Washington's famous chair, is surely not a setting one; but once risen may be far short of expectations4.
October 30, 2004
Endnotes
Note *: Timothy Weaver is a research assistant at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He received his M.A. in political science from the University of Pennsylvania. Back
Note 1: American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, "Franco-German Security Relations," Cercle de l'Union Interalliee, Paris: October 17, 2003, at: http://www.aicgs.org/events/2003/10172003_summary.shtml Back
Note 2: David G. Haglund, "Has France Finally Said auf Wiedersehen to its German Problem?," Orbis, Vol. 48, No. 3, Summer 2004, p. 392 The new deal means that a "double majority" of 55 percent of states representing 65 percent of the population is required, plus the corollary that a blocking minority must come from at least four states. Back
Note 3: On September 15, 1787, Benjamin Franklin, speaking of the President's chair, at the back of which a rising sun happened to be painted, observed that painters had found it difficult to distinguish in their art a rising from a setting sun. Having often looked at that sun behind the President unable to tell whether it was rising or setting Franklin said that "I have the happiness to know that it is a rising and not a setting sun." Quoted in Hugh Brogan, The Longman History of the United States of America (2nd ed.), Longman: New York, 1999, p. 200 Back
Note 4: On September 15, 1787, Benjamin Franklin, speaking of the President's chair, at the back of which a rising sun happened to be painted, observed that painters had found it difficult to distinguish in their art a rising from a setting sun. Having often looked at that sun behind the President unable to tell whether it was rising or setting Franklin said that "I have the happiness to know that it is a rising and not a setting sun." Quoted in Hugh Brogan, The Longman History of the United States of America (2nd ed.), Longman: New York, 1999, p. 200 Back