|
|
|
The War on Terrorism: The Critical Role of Governments
By Edward Marks*
The author of this analysis is a frequent contributor to this publication and a member of its board of directors. A former Ambassador and career diplomat, he has a wealth of practical experience in assessing the pivotal role of governments in fostering conditions necessary to deal with terrorism. –Ed.
"Where there is a lack of will or institutional mechanisms, legal authority, and technical capability, terrorists exploit gaps or seams to move money, manpower, and materiel as well as to recruit."
The performance of governments is the center of gravity in the War on Terrorism. "Failed states, poverty, and chaos threaten us", as Sebastian Mallaby puts it in an article in the Washington Post (May 10, 2004). Out of this mixture comes the current terrorist threat, in some respects global and in all respects multi-faceted. By focusing on the existing in international state structure, which does not mean ignoring the importance of underlying movements and non-governmental actors, we have a central theme for both short and long counter-terrorism policies.
By the performance of governments, I mean both the range and quality of any given government's actual performance of its responsibilities. The current term of art is governance, which refers to how well a government operates—provides domestic and external security, fosters a stable domestic environment and economic activity, pursues the country's national interests abroad, and earns the support of the broad majority of its population. In Western terms, we generally assume that an effective modern government will be essentially secular, democratic, reasonably honest and more or less supportive of a free market economy. Effective governments in this sense are not merely security states, with an authoritarian regime and an effective security structure. An effective government must have legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens, regardless of what else it does or doesn't do.
Countries blessed with this type of government do not produce significant numbers of terrorists. Obviously even the best of today's governments are less than perfect and unresolved political, social, and economic problems—as well as religious controversy and personal problems—continue to create tension and conflict everywhere. The European terrorist groups of the 1970s and 80s and the American militia movements are examples of a sort of low-grade terrorist fever, which can occur even in comparatively well-run countries. These terrorist movements are restricted in character, with few adherents and limited in the damage they can cause—individual kidnappings and killings, and bombs producing low casualty figures. They are also relatively easily managed. Like other kinds of anti-social—and in some countries illegal behavior—such as prostitution, alcoholic drinking, and drug addiction, the existing security services are generally able to control such behavior at a level more or less acceptable to the society at large.
Today's threat is more pervasive and long-term in character. The number of activists is much larger, the breadth of their support in their communities, the self-sacrifice arising from religious motivation and the comprehensiveness of the threat they pose are all of quite a different nature than that posed by the various Red Brigades. They were elitist groups while the current Islamic Jihadist movements (the most important contemporary terrorist movements) clearly stem from much deeper and broader backgrounds. Today's major terrorist movements are anti-secular, anti-modern, anti-government and the Muslim Jihadist terrorist threat is in addition global.
While terrorism in various forms has been with us since the dawn of recorded history, today's most urgent threat comes from violent activists coming out of the contemporary phenomena of religious fundamentalism. Theological fundamentalism is flourishing in every major religion today, as pointed out in "Strong Religion" by Almond, Appleby, and Sivan in their summary review of the Fundamentalism Project of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. While very few religious fundamentalists are terrorists, a significant number of today's terrorists are religious fundamentalists. At the moment, the most militant, mobilized, anti-secular movements of a fundamentalist character appear to be in the Muslim world.
Islamic fundamentalism poses a global threat today for two reasons: Islam is a religion for a significant percentage of the world's population, widely distributed geographically, and it is dominant in a number of governments which rank near the bottom in terms of freedom or democracy, social justice, and economic development. As a group, they constitute a prominent collection of unhealthy states. The rise of anti-secular, anti-modern, anti-government militant movements in these countries is, to some degree, understandable.
Fundamentalism also exists, and even flourishes, in the religious life in more successful states but operates openly and in a healthier manner as part of the general body politic. This is the case in the United States for instance where, Oklahoma City and various self-proclaimed militias notwithstanding, the threat of internal terrorism is limited. The journalist Thomas Friedman famously pointed out that the second largest Muslim community in the world, in India, has produced no terrorists because the Indian society and social order—despite its faults and the very special and local Kashmiri situation—offers a reasonable role, status, and future for Muslims.
"Strong Religion" goes on to point out that:
"Long-term structural factors such as the organization and theology of the host religion, ethnic and religious heterogeneity, the growth and character of the economy, cultural secularization, and domestic and international politics must be understood as necessary but not sufficient causes of fundamentalism. . . .To turn these potentialities into reality we need human choices—the decisions of leaders and the needs and demands of members and supporters."
These long-term structural factors take many years to create an environment conducive to the emergence of fundamentalism and fundamentalist terrorism. While these factors include and cross-economic, social, technological, and demographic lines, they also are very political. In fact, fundamentalist violence arises in just those countries where inadequate governments rule: authoritarian, corrupt, brutal, incompetent; failed or failing essentially held together by force. To quote again, "Widespread government corruption, mistrust/resentment of the central authorities, combine with disaffected groups—i.e. Muslim population—to create an environment conducive to terrorist activities and recruitment efforts."
In other words, we can see that modern government is a necessary, if not sufficient, determinant for the growth of fundamentalism. "The authority structure of a state, the legitimacy of its institutions and leaders, the extent to which the state penetrates the society, the level of popular participation—all may shape the nature of movements arising in the society." Conversely, use of the authority and legitimacy of the state, not to mention its capabilities, is a necessary, if not sufficient, determinant of how we can respond effectively.
In addition to the problems they foster internally, weak or authoritarian governments are also poor "citizens" in the international community. Where there is a lack of will or institutional mechanisms, legal authority, and technical capability, terrorists exploit gaps or seams to move money, manpower, and materiel as well as to recruit. Inadequate borders, land and sea, permit movement of terrorists and their equipment. Lack of adequate institutions—political and bureaucratic—usually means a failure to cooperate effectively with other states on intelligence and information sharing, law enforcement, and migration issues. Although authoritarian states may have the tactical capability and even the will to cooperate, their assistance is tainted and their long-term usefulness is doubtful. Weak states, even when desirous of doing so, are unable to undertake effective efforts to deter, disrupt, and respond to terrorist attacks and threat.
However, even strong and legitimate governments may not agree on the extent of the danger. Will is as necessary as skill if a government is to design and implement a meaningful and effective counterterrorist program.
Over the past few years it has become increasingly obvious that contemporary terrorism is in varying degrees intermingled with other forms of criminal activity. The term nexus is used to define the overlap of terrorist activity with other types of transnational crime, including piracy, kidnapping, human and contraband smuggling, document fraud, money laundering, WMD proliferation, and narcotrafficking. Some of this overlap is deliberate on the part of the malefactors—narcotrafficking can be a source of funds for terrorists, terrorism can be a defensive tactic for narcotrafficers, money laundering and document fraud are tools of the trade for both. Some of the overlap however arises from the normal activity, so to speak, of the criminal service sector, the "fences" that have since time immemorial provided various services to criminals.
The existence of this nexus is of obvious importance to threatened governments and peoples, and it provides a more accurate picture of the overall problem. In one sense, it somewhat simplifies governments' plans as they move away, as many are now doing, from "stove-piped" policies: e.g. the War on Drugs, the War on Terrorism. For instance, more effective border controls inhibit all sorts of criminals, and need not be specific to any particular form of crime.
Political violence often arises in authoritarian states because they are, in some significant sense, unsuccessful political societies. At the other end of the spectrum are the failed or failing states where the government's incompetence is widely recognized. Here law and order and a nationally organized political, social and economic system falters and fails. Political violence arises here for the same reason: there is no viable political process in which to participate.
In such states, fundamentalist movements must operate underground, attempting to overthrow the government, as there is no political process in which to participate. And the number of such states remains steady if not increasing, despite the optimism about the rising tide of democracy in the 1990s.
The population explosion is part of the reason for this development but globalization and technology contribute. These situations do not remain isolated but inevitably draw in neighbors and other countries further afield. As Sebastian Mallaby pointed out in the oped piece quoted earlier "Even before September 11, the West was being drawn into civil wars at an accelerating pace."
Competent and therefore successful governments are those which avoid the estrangement or alienation of any significant numbers of its citizens, but rather instead create a sense of identity and support. Obviously other factors than government competence play a role: homogeneity of population, common history and religion, and similar ties. The degree to which these factors are absent make a government's job more difficult but there have been success stories in remarkably complicated societies.
The quality of governance takes numerous forms. Political legitimacy is a necessary condition. Some form of acceptable political process is another. A reasonable economic situation that offers opportunities and a share in the national wealth is a third. Finally, of course, some degree of social justice and effective management of relations between different religious and ethnic groups where they exist.
Where these conditions exist, anti-social behavior is kept at a manageable level. With respect to terrorism, the long-term key question is the ability of a government to govern in a fashion that precludes the formation of "terrorists". A common recommendation by many of today's terrorist experts is the need to "drain the swamps" or the conditions which breed terrorists. Draining real swamps, however, requires technique and equipment. Draining metaphorical socio-political swamps requires competent governance. More important for the long-term, competent governments make sure that swamps do not come into being in the first place.
However they do exist at the moment and pose a threat. Governments must therefore respond to the immediate threat as well as "clean the swamp". Much of the action available to governments will not produce an immediate and salutary effect. Statements of policy, passage of anti-terrorist legislation, and the creation of financial flow controls will not immediately impede the activities of any serious terrorist group. However such actions do over a period of time limit the operational space for such terrorists and gradually draw around them a net of effective government action. For instance, in early July of this year officials from Arab countries in Paris created the first regional organization in the Middle East and North Africa to fight money laundering, under the auspices of the global Financial Action Task Force created in 1989 to investigate money laundering of drug cartels and then expanded to track terrorist financing after 9/11. The Arab regional group joins five other regional groups and reflects the growing need for hitherto reluctant governments to join the global anti-terrorist effort. In the same week, the ASEAN ministers of foreign affairs meeting in Jakarta came to an agreement to prepare a program for cooperation in security matters. They specifically took notice of the activities of the terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah. Given the historical attitude of the members of ASEAN towards concrete action, this move signals another step on the road towards more robust responses by this important regional organization.
Often bedeviling cooperation in the war against terrorism is the persistent adherence of governments and peoples to the doctrine of national sovereignty. Still, an important example of how this doctrine need not be an obstacle is occurring in South East Asia whose governments are widely known for their prickliness about proposals and actions which appear to touch on their sovereignty. The almost instinctive immediate reaction of several South East Asian governments in 2003 to a U.S. floated idea of a Regional Maritime Security regime for the area was negative. That this reaction was at least partially the result of breathless and not completely accurate press reporting is beside the point. The U.S.G. had to engage in some quick remedial action if the essentially sensible idea of multinational maritime security cooperation was not to die aborning. Now back on track, the concept offers the possibility of a significant and long-term improvement in dealing with the whole range of transnational crime, not by focusing on the criminals (or terrorists) but on the need for all responsible governments to responsibly exercise their sovereign authority to establish and maintain law and order in their national territories, on their borders, and in international waters in their region.
Our war in Afghanistan was also keyed to the performance of a government, in this case one which supported terrorists, thereby requiring direct action against it. It should be noted that one of the prime objectives of the military action in Afghanistan was, and presumably still is, to replace the Taliban Government with one, which is, both "willing and able" to oppose terrorism practiced from its soil. As far as one can tell, that is also the objective in Iraq.
Even in immediate tactical situations, effective action by the locally concerned government is often the most effective, and in fact, may be the only option. Singapore's effective preemptive sweeping of up terrorists planning to attack British, Australian, and U.S. embassies and military forces in 2001 was an excellent example. The Singapore action was keyed by U.S. provided intelligence, but it was the Singapore Government—demonstrating will and skill—which made the strike. Equally important, the Singapore government has moved from that incident to a continuing counterterrorist policy and programs.
In a recent article, the historian John Lewis Gaddis commented, with respect to America's thinking about foreign policy before 9/11, that "the whole premise of our thinking had been that threats came from states." Suddenly we found ourselves grievously wounded by a "gang most of us had never heard of." Since then the focus has shifted to those "gangs", to sub-state actors and the need to respond to a menacing movement. Much comment and thought has been devoted to that problem usually referred to as an asymmetric threat or asymmetric warfare and the need to produce some sort of asymmetric response on our part.
We may have overdone this response, sending legions of spies and Special Forces warriors and FBI agents scurrying around the world's back alleys in search of individuals. While a short-term necessity, this approach does look awfully like swatting flies (a policy President Bush said he did not want to pursue.). If asymmetric warfare poses a threat to the established order, the established order also obviously poses a threat as well as an obstacle to non-state actors.
The most effective response may not be to mirror image the threat but instead to rely on a more effective mobilization of the threatened—the existing governments of the international community. In fact, there may be no alternative. There is no autonomous international regime and the unilateral "special forces" approach is obviously tactical and limited. Multilateralism in the war on terrorism is not an ideological preference; it is Hobson's Choice. Unless, of course, the United States wishes to take on the task of cleaning up all the world's Augean stables.
The 9/11 Commission appears to have recognized this reality in its report. Its recommendations fall into two categories. Internal reform of the U.S.G. takes up eight pages in the Executive Summary under the sub-title of "Protect Against and Prepare for Terrorist Attacks". In this section are the recommendations which have been the subject of recent Congressional activity. Offensive actions to attack the terrorists and prevent the growth of Islamist terrorism, under the sub-titles "Attack Terrorists and their Organizations" and "Prevent the Continued Growth of Islamist Terrorism", are covered in just a few sentences over one page.
The second category of offensive actions is phrased in robust language—"rout out", "identify", "strengthen", "confront", "define", "communicate"—but these verbs apply to activities, which are mostly beyond the unilateral power of the United States. We may wish to root out terrorist sanctuaries but there are limits to how many Afghanistans we can take on. We can offer to strengthen our relations with Pakistan but it takes two to tango. Even the formulation and distribution of a better American message requires to some degree cooperative local governments.
In many respects the U.S.G.. does currently pursue a robust CT assistance and cooperation policy with other governments. The Department of State leads on with the inter-governmental dialogue and the Department's Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program provides concrete assistance with civilian security agencies. The Department of Defense matches this program through its various engagement programs with the security forces of other countries. The Department of Treasury energetically conducts training assistance with respect to financial transfers as well as actually participating in bilateral and multinational monitoring programs. Other agencies such as the Coast Guard, ICE, the FBI, and needless to say the CIA and other intelligence agencies are implementing similar programs in their areas of responsibility and expertise.
Other activities must also be included in a comprehensive counter-terrorism policy. Public diplomacy and public affairs must be used. Especially in the short-term, counter-terrrorism policy must include an appropriate role for direct action for the purpose of detecting and deterring terrorists. But even in this tactical sphere of action, the participation of other governments is always desirable and usually necessary, as when the JI leader Hambali was captured in Thailand. While unilateral action by the U.S. is often an option, we should not forget the warning that such action may have significant political costs, and may be actually counter-productive in the longer run. One version of how to rank the preference of categories of direct action calls for:
Action by the local government;
Action by the local government with the assistance and cooperation of the U.S.G.;
Action by the U.S.G. with the cooperation of the local government; finally,
Unilateral action by the U.S.G..
These programs are intended as support to a long-term policy, as well as to produce short-term results. Unfortunately U.S.G. policy tends often to be short-range in perspective. While paying lip service to the need to "drain the swamp", American development assistance designed to prevent conflict is seriously under-funded. While American strategic planners appear to recognize the value of economic development assistance in the aftermath of wars, as in the case of $20 billion in Iraq and the $2.3 billion in Afghanistan, development assistance as a part of foreign policy is allocated no more than $450 million per year for the military and $15 billion (at most) for development assistance world-wide. These funds are ludicrously inadequate when compared with those required for war preparation and war fighting.
It is true that much international and multinational activity directed towards the terrorist threat is limited to verbal posturing, but it is by that means that an international consensus and international law is built. Whether intentionally or not, all these approaches assume the continued validity of the concept of national sovereignty. However, secure in our own national status—and the power that supports it—we do not always appreciate the nervous sensitivity of other governments and other peoples. The explosion in the number of independent governments since the end of WWII has produced governments of widely varying stability and self-confidence. The range in power and competence among them almost belies the very concept of national sovereignty as it is traditionally espoused. The Delian doctrine first described by Thucydides holds true today: large countries do as they will, smaller countries as they must. A modern corollary might add that middle-size states maneuver a lot.
What does this all mean for America policy for combating terrorism? As stated in the beginning of this article, a focus on other governments' performance should be the central theme of U.S.G. policy for dealing with contemporary terrorism. It should be the focus because it is both central to the problem and the area in which U.S.G. action can make most difference. Focusing on the central role of governments, other governments, can provide a central theme for a U.S.G. combating terrorism policy in the short, medium, and long term. It offers an acceptable approach just because it meets the needs of those governments as well as ours. As a nation-state itself, the U.S.G. has a stake in the continuation of the global nation-state system. As the—currently—preeminent nation-state the Westphalian System is especially a matter of interest for the United States as a widely accepted system, which provides an accepted forum for its actions.
The task facing the U.S., therefore, is to convince the other nations that terrorism is a serious threat to all—not merely to the U.S.—and that all must therefore combine to fight it. With a modicum of care and a rededication to the practice of skilled diplomacy, U.S. leadership in this effort can be made acceptable to other governments and peoples because it serves the their interests and touches their emotions as well. The widespread reaction to 9/11 illustrated the inherent allegiance which exists.
Finally, an increasingly important element of the global CT effort is the role of international organizations and especially the UN. Long-established practices and methods of inter- and intra-state dialogue exist, including the development of an extensive system of international law often referred to as the Law of Nations. This system provides a time-tested process for the pursuit of common interests. It succeeds when nations are convinced that it serves their national interests to work within the system, and fails when they do not. The legitimizing capability of the UN to unilateral as well as multilateral action ought to be obvious given developments in Iraq. Mobilization of the UN, however, cannot be obtained merely by formal engagement in the Security Council and the General Assembly. Other countries must be recruited to work for an active UN role and this recruitment ought to be another objective of bilateral engagement by the U.S. Government. The road to an active UN role to a great degree runs through national capitals. In this sense, as well, the center of gravity is the role of national governments.
In the final analysis, responsibility for combating terrorism must rest with governments acting on behalf of their people, and the United States must pursue policies, which encourage and assist them. As a matter of fact, much current American policy and counter-terrorism programs are devoted to bilateral and multilateral government-to-government relations. The vast majority of funds and effort expended (apart from Iraq) goes to that effort. However that effort is instinctive rather than deliberate and diluted by a persistent search for a quicker, cleaner solution—such as direct action. Our lack of deliberate focus on the central importance of other governments causes us to become impatient with others who do not or cannot immediately see things our way and who do not perform to our standards. In a world awash with media influenced attitudes about the virtue of direct and violent action, traditional diplomacy can appear pallid and irrelevant. Yet it remains the essential tool of choice for long-term success in a world composed—still—of autonomous nation-states.
December 2, 2004
Endnotes
Note *: The author was a U.S. Foreign Service officer from 1956 to retirement in 1995, with two years out for military service. His career took him to eight posts abroad, including Guinea-Bissau, where he was the U. S. envoy. Most recently, although formally retired, he has been attached to the Joint Interagency Group for Counterterrorism, U.S. Pacific Command. Amb. Marks is a member of the American Diplomacy Publishers board of directors. Back