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The Fable of the Knife
By Sam C. Holliday*
Following upon his earlier commentary "A Federation for Iraq", Dr. Holliday cites a fable about local control exercised by the use of a hunting knife to illustrate his belief that political control in Iraq must be established first at the local level, national elections or no. –Ed.
"A prerequisite for local level security during warfare is an effective intelligence system that will allow rapid response to any challenge to authority."
The Iraq campaign in the War on Terrorism suggests that each generation must relearn the lesson of the Fable of the Knife. Why has the warfare phase, following the fall of Saddam's regime, not been as successful as the war fighting phase that brought down that regime? The fable suggests the answer.
The origin of this fable is unknown. From 1947 to 1949 it was told in Greece; since then variations of it have been repeated many times around the world.
The Fable
Do three insurgents armed with one hunting knife, or a battalion, control a certain town?
The battalion is well equipped with the latest in vehicles, communication, and weapons. Its soldiers are well-trained professionals. Most of the time these soldiers are in their barbwire surrounded barracks or performing force protection duties. All guns and ammunition in the town have been collected and destroyed, and no enemy military units have been reported in the vicinity. Several times a day vehicles from the barracks drive through the town with the soldiers smiling and waving to the people; from time to time they stop and talk—as best they can—with the people. The civil affairs officer of the battalion meets with leaders of the town to discuss how to improve public utilities, facilitate economic development, and governance. He also talks—through an interpreter—about the glories of freedom and the advantages of democracy. Every day the battalion commander reports to his superior that the town is secure and under his control.
The three insurgents have no vehicle, only face-to-face communication, and one hunting knife. Anyone who has spoken out against the insurgents has been found the next morning in front of his home with his throat cut. The insurgents have made it clear to everyone in the town that their political views are the only ones suitable for the town.
Who effectively controls the town, therefore—the three insurgents with one hunting knife or the battalion of troops?
War, Warfare, and Peace
In Iraq the coalition forces have been superb in combat. Real time intelligence, speed, marvelous communication, and amazing weaponry brought overwhelming force on the critical mass of Iraqi military forces. They had no chance to react. Twenty-one days of war fighting brought an end to Saddam's regime.
But the end of fighting by military units did not bring peace—it brought warfare: protracted struggle with insurgents for the control of the people. Iraqi conventional military forces were destroyed or in certain cases they regrouped as hirabahists (those who use terror to achieve political goals). Some Saddam Fedayeen and Ba'athist diehards did the same. Those seeking a theocracy allied with the Iranian clerics filled power vacuums at the grass roots level. Some foreigners were recruited as jihadists (holy warriors) and came to Iraq to kill infidels. In light of these developments, only when the coalition and an Iraqi government neutralize any hirabahists, establish local level security, and provide effective local authority will there be stability. Only after stability can there be peace. The pattern of superb combat operations was repeated during April and in November 2004 in Fallujah. Stability and peace nevertheless still did not prevail.
It is now necessary to realize that the "big dog theory" of conventional war is inappropriate for this kind of fighting. The big dog theory holds that the biggest, badest dog can dominate all other dogs, and also the cats. In accordance with this theory, the coalition's conventional combat forces did indeed dispatch any and all conventionally organized enemies they could find to the ash can of history. But the hirabahists and Ba'athist diehards are not dogs or cats; they are more on the order of snakes, insects, bacteria, and viruses.
A prerequisite for local level security during warfare is an effective intelligence system that will allow rapid response to any challenge to authority. To achieve local security during warfare the authorities must have a capability greater than that appropriate for policing ordinary crime in peacetime. This means:
Distinguishing between hirabahists and normal criminals,
Some limitations on civil rights,
The use of informants,
Prosecutors able to use intelligence reports as evidence without revealing their source,
Detraining those conspiring to commit terrorist acts on intelligence alone—that is, before they commit a crime,
A legal system for the handling of hirabahists that favors swift justice over the procedures required in peacetime to protect the rights of those accused of ordinary crimes,
The use of stability forces—in contrast with combat troops—specifically organized and trained for internal security,
Use of methods generally associated with authoritarian regimes,
Even the use of assassination teams.
Of course, if the insurgents establish a sanctuary, that territory must be regained. In this case combat forces would use search and destroy operations similar to those used to fight guerrillas in conventional war, as has been done in Iraq since the end of major organized combat.
In addition to local level security, state building requires effective local authority. Each individual lives in a concrete, human, face-to-face world of clear and specific events and situations that can be seen, heard, and felt. Local authority is best built on custom and tradition, rather than some imported ideology. Effective local authority means local leadership to solve everyday problems. This leadership must be:
Capable of countering acts of intimidation, violence, and destruction;
Able to use initiative and flexibility to win loyalty and produce results;
Loyal to the goals of the central government;
Alert to signs of problems, inequities, and injustice;
Able to see that everyone has access to the basic necessities of life.
Only after local level security and local authority have been established is it worthwhile to focus on overall political and economic development, elections, national aspirations, and the unseen environment that shapes spiritual and material life. Until there is stability and peace, i.e., an end of warfare, the goal must be limited to providing the conditions for the Iraqis to achieve their own dignity. After there is peace the goal of the Iraqis can be self-evolution into a free, orderly, open, and self-sufficient country—and hopefully in time into a democratic nation-state.
Conclusions
As suggested by the Fable of the Knife, conventional combat troops (neither coalition nor Iraqi) can neutralize hirabahists so as to establish security and authority at the local level—and move from warfare to peace. In Iraq, for the near future, security and authority at the local level can only be accomplished within each of the eighteen provinces—not in keeping with some countrywide plan or in conformity with dictates from any central government in Baghdad. However, on 30 January 2005 it would a useful step to have elections in as many provinces as possible, so as to establish provincial governments of, by, and for the people. For the immediate future the coalition and Iraqi National Guard will have to provide overall security for Iraq. And the leaders of each province will have to provide local security and local authority—under the watchful eye of the coalition and the Interim Iraqi Government. Finally, any constitution should provide for a federation of eighteen self-governing provinces, rather than a centralized Iraqi government.
December 6, 2004
Endnotes
Note *: Sam C. Holliday is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. He earned a doctorate in international relations at the University of South Carolina. Back