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Observations on Europe at Year's End
By Sam C. Holliday*
Drawing upon decades of experience, Dr. Holliday assesses the state of European-U.S. relations, coming to a pessimistic view about near-term prospects. –Ed.
"Under American military protection Europeans have enjoyed six decades of peace. . . . They want to extend this era. However, they also want to replace the use of force in world affairs with negotiations. . . "
During 2004 I observed some disturbing changes in the Europe I remembered from when I first lived in Germany and Italy during the 1950s.
Earlier, from the 1960s to the '80s, the changes I had noted in Western Europe were mostly economic; there were only relatively minor differences of opinion between Americans and Europeans that would impact foreign policy considerations. Probably this was because Cold War threats made collective security appealing. While visiting for six weeks in Prague, Budapest, Zurich, the Netherlands, Belgium, and England during 2004, however, I observed significant attitudinal variances between Americans and Europeans on foreign policy issues.
The observations that follow are not based on polls or studies, and they lack the documentation of political science: They are my opinions and are generalizations to which many exceptions can be found, but they describe accurately the current situation in Europe as I saw it. And I believe I am not alone. Jacques Barzum, Samuel Huntington, Francis Fukuyama, and Bernard Lewis, have all noted some-what similar trends and patterns.
Attitudes That Shape Foreign Policy
Europeans generally tend to like Americans, American pop culture, and American things in general. They do not like American foreign policy, however. They consider it imperialistic. They see President Bush as a "cowboy" who does not understand the nuances of international relations. He puts them off by his confident personal style. They believe the United States is prone to action and the use of force, rather than to negotiation and the use of diplomacy — this because Americans lack historical perspective and have not really suffered from war. They believe America has exaggerated the threat from Islamists.
Further, many of the Europeans political and intellectual elites reject American foreign policy because of envy and arrogance. They envy the military power of the United States. However, they are not willing to do what is necessary to regain their former glory and power. Partially this rejection of American views is a reflection of the cynicism, hedonism, and lack of will of the European people.
In some respects the opposing attitudes noted can be viewed as those of "Hawks" and "Doves." The Hawk sees an enduring struggle between good and evil. The Hawk considers power and force essential to the achievement of stability and stability a prerequisite for peace. The Hawk is a risk taker. The European elites consider President Bush clearly a Hawk.
On the other hand, the Dove believes that power and force are evil and should not be used to resolve disagreements. The Dove believes that all disputes should be resolved through dialogue, compromise, and the rule of law — and this is the only way to achieve peace. The Dove is a risk avoider. Many Americans consider European leaders Doves.
That there will be debates between Hawks and Doves on the use of force is to be expected — such debates are eternal and they tell us much about a country. The Hawks prevail during the building stages of any polity, when national interests determine foreign policy decisions. Decline begins when there is a shift to an emphasis on comprise, caution, delay, collective security, and supranational organizations. In the final stage of decline the Doves take over shaping foreign policy decisions.
European Union
Europeans are undecided about an ever-closer merger under the European Union. Much of the current power of the EU is the result of what the elites have called "technical" changes that were undertaken without the approval of the people. If popular consensus had been required these changes would not have been possible. Conformity to directives from Brussels is at odds with the growing diversity of views of the people. They increasingly long for a return to their traditional national convictions.
The states of "old" Europe (France, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Scandinavia, etc.) are in decline. The nation-states that were built in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries are now either in the contentment or decay stages in the life cycle of political entities. They are no longer nations, which could have been symbolized by differing loaves of bread (many ingredients blended into something unique — with a crust). They have become multicultural countries of individuals and factions seeking and enjoying the good life. Today they can be symbolized as antipastos (separate ingredients together, but not one). The states of the "new" Europe (Ireland, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Serbia, etc.) are still in the building stages of the historically inevitable cycle, yet their elites share many of the views of the elites of "old" Europe. Therefore, it is unlikely that these countries will continue as strong, purposeful nation-states.
The political and intellectual elites in Europe are no longer interested in building nation-states. They want either a united Europe or world government. Some want the European Union to become a counterbalance to the United States in world affairs. Others want the United Nations to replace national sovereignty. European elites value welfare systems, social legislation, and group rights. Distribution of wealth has replaced national interests, duty, self-sufficiency, and rewards based on merit. Many of the elite associate peace and prosperity with the creation of the European Union. However, economic well-being is the result of increasing trade and rising prosperity. Many use the war in Iraq as an argument for why the EU should become a bulwark against the barbarism of the past.
Sacred and Secular Authority
There is no religion to instill the values required during the building of a nation. Christianity no longer shapes the behavior of most Europeans and no longer invigorates and elevates the mind. Christianity has been replaced by secular humanism, with its sympathy, compassion, and feelings seeking the unthreatening and the pleasurable. Christian beliefs, institutions, and buildings have become artifacts of the past. This contrasts with American culture, which still has basic religious concepts at its core, even though there is a separation of church and state.
On the other hand, large numbers of unassimilated Muslims now live in Europe, and even moderate Muslims are influenced by their religion. While they want to enjoy the benefits of Europe, they have no desire to build European nation-states. They have increasingly been influenced by radical interpretations of the Koran. There is a growing sense of alienation. Tensions have increased. Europeans have been unable effectively to defuse that tension or to integrate the Muslims into nation-states.
The secular values of civic virtue, duty, patriotism, and loyalty to a nation are much weaker than they were in the past. Postmodern thought and materialism have destroyed the secular base of national identity. The European marriage rate is at an all-time low, and the abortion rate is at an all-time high. If this continues, there will fewer Europeans and more Muslims in Europe. The European economy is stagnant and its welfare programs are expensive. European armed forces and weak and are unable ef-fectively to project military power abroad. Moreover, generally speaking, the people lack their former will. Today, secular ideals are unable to be the foundation of strong, purposeful nation-states, since most citizens are no longer willing to place their lives, futures, and honor at risk for a nation.
Perceived Threats
Under American military protection Europeans have enjoyed six decades of peace and ever increasing freedom and prosperity. They want to extend this era. However, they also want to replace the use of force in world affairs with negotiations, compromise, a new version of international law, and universal human rights. They want disputes throughout the world to be peacefully resolved — and for military forces to be transformed into peacekeepers.
Europeans do not recognize that the menace of what can be called the Third Jihad — mounted by a small fraction of all Muslims — is as great as the threats during World War II and the Cold War. They have been unable to counter the millions of Muslims now in Europe who sympathize with militant causes. They do not realize that if a Third Jihad is not stopped now there will be a clash of civilizations in the future which will make the death, destruction, and suffering of the First and Second Jihads pale in comparison. They do not recognize that Western Civilization — their gift to the world—itself is now endangered. If this situation continues, the countries of "old" Europe will soon be in the final stage of decline.
The Future
On 2 November 2004 in Amsterdam an Islamist shot and stabbed Theo van Gogh because he had made a film critical of how Muslims treat women. This incident was a wake-up call for much of Europe and it might bring changes in attitudes and threat perception. Europe must decide how to interact with its large Muslim population. Europeans pride themselves on civilized ways, their tolerance of diverse cultures, and the expansion of human rights, but these old values are not likely to provide protection from the Third Jihad.
It was Western Civilization, the nation-state, and nationalism that made Europe the most powerful region on earth during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It is difficult to see how Europeans can approach regaining that status in the future. There is no indication that Europeans are prepared to take the difficult steps necessary to reverse the effects of postmodernism. Of course, it is possible for Europe to reverse its decline — but it is not likely.
December 20, 2004
Endnotes
Note *: Sam C. Holliday is a graduate of the U. S. Military Academy at West Point. He earned a doctorate in international relations at the University of South Carolina. Back