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Mobutu's Congo: A Reminiscence of the U.S. Role
By William J. Boudreau
The author was assigned as consular officer, later political officer, at the American embassy in Kinshasa from 1966 to 1968, arriving shortly after President Joseph Mobutu assumed power. This account of his role in U.S. diplomatic and military involvement at a critical moment during that period is taken from Mr. Boudreau's longer study, "A Teetering Balance: An American Diplomat's Career and Family." –Assoc. Ed.
We had just finished a successful celebration of the American Independence Day and I reported for work the following morning, July 5, 1967, with no expectation of what lay ahead. Upon entering the chancery, I learned that Katangese militia and white mercenaries had overrun Bukavu. I briefed the ambassador upon his arrival, who then called for an urgent country team meeting. Robert H. McBride had just recently arrived in Kinshasa, on June 16, assuming his duties as ambassador. We began gathering information on developments, learning that mercenaries had also seized Kisangani, where they were holding Europeans and others as hostages. Belgian plantation owner Major Jean Schramme joined his forces with French Colonel Robert Denard's mercenaries, entering the Congolese Army (ANC) camp and killing some 100 Congolese soldiers. President Mobutu responded quickly by declaring a state of emergency, closing all borders, imposing a curfew on all foreigners, calling on the UN to condemn foreign interference in Congolese affairs, and asking the members of the Organization of African Unity for help. Ambassador McBride alerted the Department of State, describing conditions as we knew them and requesting stand-by evacuation assistance. An editorial by The Washington Post, and published in the International Herald Tribune on July 13, addressed the situation. "The controlling fact is that the integrity of the Congo is central to the peace of a whole region of Africa. The United Nations spent four years and several hundred million dollars to prevent the carving up of the Congo and that purpose is still valid today."
What we endured in those days immediately following the mercenary rebellion was xenophobia to the extreme. Public radio announcements on July 5 declared, " The obscure forces of imperialism have just executed their Machiavellian plan against the Congo". They went on to state erroneously that foreign mercenaries had parachuted into Bukavu and Kisangani at 6:30 that morning. The press dubbed the mercenaries "les affreux" (the dreadful or frightful ones). Media reports added that some 200 additional mercenaries were known to be preparing to depart Brussels for the Congo, a point vehemently denied by Belgium. President Mobutu's proclamation, calling for a curfew for foreigners only, made the point to the Congolese that we were all suspect. In these turbulent times, having diplomatic status with diplomatic immunity was of little to no consequence as far as the Congolese soldiers were concerned. This paranoia ran rampart and was fueled by Mobutu's public pronouncements. He went on in his public appeals in the media telling the Congolese to use extreme vigilance with foreigners, that no one was to be trusted. Mobutu's message was that these measures were necessary "because of the complicity of certain foreign countries." He went on haranguing about how the "Europeans" (term generally used to identify any whites, but extended to cover all foreigners) were intent to undermine the Congo's sovereignty. He demanded particular scrutiny in authenticating the identification of foreigners in hotels. The fallout from the mercenary rebellion was the ultimate test for many expatriates concerning their futures as they faced the question of remaining in the Congo. Europeans, and particularly the Belgians, had endured an accumulative furor in the mid-1960s at the hands of the Congolese. Events such as public hangings, the nationalization of the copper mine operations, and strident public anti-white campaigns left the future very much in doubt. Thus, the current situation weighed heavily on most Europeans as they looked to their embassies for guidance.
A casualty of the prevailing vehement hostility toward all whites was my good friend Alfonso. He was a Spaniard, a former mercenary and very likeable. Alfonso had served the Congolese Government more recently as assistant military attaché in London and had returned to Kinshasa to operate an import-export business. He was engaged to be married to a delightful Belgian, Marianne, and he had abandoned the mercenaries more than two years earlier. This latter fact was well known at ANC Headquarters. My wife Dailyn and I often saw Alfonso and Marianne socially and Alfonso was a hit with our two boys. When we were away on our Rest and Recuperation trip in April-May, 1967, Alfonso and Marianne stayed in our home. We enjoyed their company and Alfonso was no threat to anyone. However, at the outset of the mercenary rebellion, Alfonso decided that the proper thing for him to do was to go to see the army chief of staff to profess his loyalty to President Mobutu. He was aware that the Congolese authorities were rounding up all the mercenaries in Kinshasa that they could get their hands on. These mercenaries, including other Europeans such as Belgian technical assistance men and women, were held in "preventive detention" at Kikoulou prison. The intent was to confine them so that they would be unable to join the rebellion. This was part of Mobutu's machinations that the European world had turned against him. As Alfonso ascended the stairs at ANC Headquarters, he was arrested and held incommunicado. Marianne phoned me at the embassy in tears telling me about Alfonso. As sympathetic as I was and as eager as I was to help my friend, I told Marianne that I would do what I could with the Foreign Ministry but I feared that I would not be successful because I had no jurisdiction over Spanish citizens. I advised her to contact the Spanish Embassy to which she replied that she had but that they had no clout in the Congo. As expected, I got nowhere with the Foreign Ministry. Alfonso's fate was perhaps sealed from the outset as indicated by the accusations of the Congolese representative at the UN. He charged that an international Mafia had conducted open aggression from abroad against his nation. He accused the Belgians, Spanish, and Portuguese of supporting "Machiavellian plans" engineered by Tshombe to overthrow the Congolese Government. Unfortunately, Alfonso was of the wrong nationality to be in the Congo at that time. During this chaotic period, I had my hands full keeping Americans out of harm's way. Alfonso was never seen again, but I was told by several sources that he had been killed. It was my information that the army chief of staff was not alerted to Alfonso's arrest and the soldiers immediately took matters into their own hands. He had a reputation as a lover and the word I got was that the Congolese soldiers did him in by cutting out his genitals, allowing him a slow death, and tossing his body in the river. At the time Marianne was contacting me, Alfonso's execution had already been carried out.
During the curfew, I was the all-night duty officer on July 8. A telegram arrived bearing the caption, "EYES ONLY FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE". Being the only Foreign Service officer in the Embassy, I was perforce the ranking officer. The gist of the message was that three C-130 aircraft had been prepositioned on Ascension Island, a British possession in the Southern Atlantic Ocean, some 1800 miles from the Congolese coast. Secretary of State Dean Rusk stated that there was considerable concern on Capitol Hill, especially with Senator William Fulbright, over the possibility of the Congo becoming another Vietnam. The Secretary recognized the potential need to evacuate American citizens and he was prepared to authorize that the planes be sent over to Kinshasa if we felt it necessary. However, if the ambassador could get by without the use of any of the planes, it would be appreciated. Rusk added his request that, if any planes were required, it be kept to the lowest number possible. The message, while supportive and understanding of our plight, was hopeful that we would be able to ease the pressure on the White House over this situation. Secretary Rusk indicated the need for an immediate response. Recognizing my duty to get in touch with Ambassador McBride, I telephoned his residence. It is to be noted here that the telephone service was unreliable at best and nonfunctioning at worst. After several attempts, I was unable to get through to the ambassador's residence; I later learned that he was not at home but at the British Ambassador's residence at the time. Having made a good faith effort to reach Ambassador McBride and being precluded from leaving my post and testing the curfew, I had to decide on a response to the Secretary of State. We had been enduring four days of vitriolic diatribes emanating from the Mobutu government with no end in sight. The anti-white media campaign was threatening to stir the Congolese population into action, particularly in Kinshasa and Lumumbashi. Radio broadcasts went so far as to call on the Congolese to kill their foreign enemies. It exhorted the citizenry to "take up machetes, spears and poisoned arrows in order to cut to pieces the rest of the imperialist oppressors who believed they cause fear among our population with their Western bullets and powder". Although the ANC was making some progress against the mercenaries, American lives were still very much at risk. Knowing that a decision had to be communicated that night, I analyzed the pros and cons of having the C-130s come into the Congo. In my reasoning, I considered that the mere presence of American military aircraft might negate any possible need to evacuate Americans. Additionally, I thought that if the aircraft were not to be used for evacuation, they could buy us some goodwill by ferrying Congolese troops in their pursuit of the mercenaries. My conclusion was that, if the above circumstances developed, the prevalent xenophobia would be muted considerably. My response that night was, "EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE FROM THE AMBASSADOR. Fully understand the situation. Please send forward all three C-130s to Kinshasa."
During the course of that day, McBride announced that three C-130 transport aircraft from the U.S. Strike Command would be arriving to give long-range logistical support to the ANC. We did not want to provoke any further actions against Americans by declaring the primary purpose of having the aircraft in the Congo. It was thus that the goodwill aspect of the deployment emerged for local Congolese consumption. All of the local newspapers covered the item as their major headline story. "Responding to a request from General Mobutu," the story lines read, the planes would assist the Congolese "in non-combatant status" against the mercenaries. In quoting the announcement, the articles concluded, "The United States has sustained and continues to sustain the territorial integrity and thus the unity of the Congo." The next day, July 10, the four-engine Hercules transport aircraft arrived in Kinshasa, designated the U.S. Joint Task Force Congo (USJTFC) and consisted of 150 personnel including a unit of the 82nd Airborne. Also on July 10, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution addressing the situation in the Congo. It condemned any state that allowed its nationals or its territory to be used for recruitment, training or transport of mercenaries who try to overthrow the government of a UN member.
The ANC had gained considerably more poise from its earlier days, engaging the mercenaries in battle. The confidence of the Congolese was bolstered when they caused casualties among the whites for the first time. Unlike the ANC unit in Bukavu that fled upon being attacked by the mercenaries, the Congolese soldiers in Kisangani regrouped and fought back. The ANC units in pursuit of the mercenaries were bolstered with additional troops on July 11 as the regular logistical support flights by the USJTFC began. American involvement also prompted six African countries to offer their assistance to the Congo. The mercenaries were compelled to recognize the evolving realities and changing circumstances. After the mercenaries vacated Kisangani, the state of emergency was lifted on July 13 except for the eastern provinces of Orientale and Kivu, where les affreux were still operating. The focus on mercenaries gave the rebels (Simbas) some breathing room and the opportunity to rebuild its forces and resources. The Soviet Union, China, and Egypt continued as the main sources of supply for the rebels. These countries were still pursuing their intent to establish a regime more favorable to their causes in at least part of the Congo.
The Congolese Government had succeeded in getting the population riled up and that did not dissipate with the lifting of the state of emergency. Nonetheless, the USJTFC continued its logistical support operation with its aircraft transporting tons of equipment and supplies as well as airlifting hundreds of ANC troops.
October 10, 2004