American Diplomacy

American Diplomacy

Volume IX, Number 3, 2004

 

Nation-Building in Iraq: Forgetting Clio's Lessons
Review by Roy M. Melbourne *

Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation-Building and a History Denied. By Toby Dodge. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003. Pp. 246. $29.95 cloth.)

Americans are known for their urge to get things done. They have now assumed the challenge of building at an early date a reasonably democratic state in Iraq. Only now is it sinking in that they are dealing with a desperate people turning defiant at the seeming lack of progress.

Toby Dodge's Inventing Iraq is an excellent title for this authoritative work, which describes the complex struggles in nation-building of three former provinces of the Turkish Empire—now known as Iraq—from the First World War to the present. In his well-researched narrative, the author draws some disturbing parallels between Britain's failed attempts to create a democratic Iraqi state and present-day American attempts to do the same. Dodge, a senior research fellow at the University of Warwick (UK), associate fellow of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, and consultant on Iraq for ABC News, is considered an internationally recognized authority on modern Iraq.

By virtue of their mandate from the League of Nations, the British were the first to introduce measures leading to self-govenment in Iraq. British attempts to simplify land tenure for tax purposes failed due to the lack of uniform practices throughout the country. For example, the shaik had been accorded land grants under Ottoman rule due to his ostensible influence, which London recognized and honored. The fallah or tiller of the soil paid the tax via the shaik for the privilege of using his land. And finally, the sarkal provided the financial means by which the tiller could cultivate his fields.

This archaic system of tax collection failed to collect adequate revenues for the colonial regime. Worse, it became a major destabilizing threat to both London and its sponsored local monarchy. In desperation, Whitehall approved Colonial Minister Winston S. Churchill's proposal to send bomber aircraft against disaffected areas in order to control local hostility and force tax compliance. This calamitous decision further antagonized an increasingly suspicious and resentful Iraqi populace.

Initially desired by Whitehall as an important cog for a secure route to India from the Mediterranean, Iraq proved to be more of a financial burden than geopolitical asset. In 1932, the British government finally abandoned its costly, failed democratic experiment in the Middle East. In collaboration with a compliant local monarch to achieve what it deemed a sovereign country, the League of Nations then admitted Iraq into its fold as an independent state.

Its newly-won sovereignty notwithstanding, the Iraqi "nation" faced deep-seated political divisions left over from Turkish domination. Those potential threats to its national unity included the Sunni majority fearful of losing its primacy to the Shia Muslims and the Kurdish minority which viewed its fellow Muslims with great distrust. The end of the monarchy would bring even more misfortune to its tragic history: dictatorship followed by an authoritarian Baathism. The costly war with Iran which the notorious Saddam Hussein launched resulted in some 300,000 casualties followed by a disastrous Persian Gulf War I, Shia and Kurdish insurrections, and subsequent, vengeful massacres. A second, US-led coalition would finally topple Saddam's wicked regime, but the same political divisions that the British failed to heal would reappear. Hence, there is good reason for the Iraqi people to have a warped view of politics, burdened with daunting problems which they can only presage as future failures.

Americans are known for their urge to get things done. They have now assumed the challenge of building at an early date a reasonably democratic state in Iraq. Only now is it sinking in that they are dealing with a desperate people turning defiant at the seeming lack of progress in "nation-building."

July 21, 2004

 


Endnotes

Note *: Dr. Roy M. Melbourne, a member of the board of directors of American Diplomacy Publishers, is a minister counselor (retired) of the Foreign Service. He held a number of posts in Europe, the Balkans, and the Middle East. Dr. Melbourne was in charge of the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad during the Qasim regime and has closely followed subsequent developments in Iraq. Back