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Living in Interesting Times: The Canadian Election and Its Meaning
By David T. Jones
*
"Oh Canada" - What about our neighbor to the north? We love Canada, follow its hockey and baseball teams, purchase prescription drugs there and make our movies in Toronto. Yet we are ignorant about Canada's politics. The political scene in Ottawa is every bit as interesting and dynamic as in Washington, DC. Want to know more? Read this article. David Jones tells all. –Ed.
For those who notice our northern neighbor only when it seems to be about ready to disintegrate, you missed an interesting election held on June 28. But for a committed Canada watcher, this was a very special election. Indeed, for any student of political science, it was a fascinating spectacle.
For the Liberal Party, however, it was a five-week epitome of the ancient Chinese curse, "May you live in interesting times." For it was an unnecessary election, with timing easily twelve months ahead of any normal planning, and the outcome drove a very comfortable majority into a tricky-to-manage minority. The Liberals are Canada's "natural governing party" but for this next stretch of governing, they are going to have to be more adroit than has been necessary for them in over a generation since Pierre Trudeau led a minority government from 1972-74.
The results from the election are important but not profound either for Canada or the United States. The Liberals have survived to govern still again. Canadians have reassembled a right of center Conservative party; it will be a more effective foil for the Liberals. The Bloc Quebecois separatists are rejuvenated—but years from being able to hold a referendum. Our bilateral relations are in a holding pattern pending the outcome of the November election; major irritants such as the disputes over "mad cow" beef or softwood lumber tariffs are unlikely to be resolved before 2005.
To Review the Bidding
To understand the whys and wherefores of this election, some tangled background is necessary. For a decade, the current Prime Minister (Paul Martin) had waited with increasing impatience for the Liberal leader and incumbent Prime Minister Jean Chretien to retire. Having lost a battle for Liberal Party leadership in 1990, Martin waited first patiently and then with rising irritation for the end of the Chretien era from his perch as heir apparent and Finance Minister. However, during his tenure, Chretien did the unprecedented: he won three straight majority Liberal victories in 1993, 1997, and 2000. To be sure, he benefited from an equally unprecedented benign political environment: a totally fragmented opposition; the best economy in fifty years; and, following a near-death Quebec referendum in 1995, domestic tranquility. Moreover, Chretien liked being prime minister; he had converted the position into an "indoors with no heavy lifting" exercise leaving both domestic and foreign policy pretty much on auto control. If Canada was adrift, it was floating in calm seas with barely a cloud on the horizon.
To truncate the tale, pressure began to build on Chretien to retire heading into the 2000 election. Martin wanted his turn — he also was ageing (he is now 65) — and, even more pointedly, his acolytes wanted to exercise power. To deflect the pressure, Chretien implied that he would leave after another election victory. Holding that sanguine thought before Liberal dissidents, following the election, he finessed away a required party leadership review, partly by permitting a leadership race to begin. Martin instantly emerged as the obvious and enthusiastic (too enthusiastic for Chretien's liking) party choice. Chretien encouraged other entrants in a thinly veiled "anybody but Paul" effort — which fell totally flat. Finally, despite his earlier intimations that he would depart gracefully in the near term, he began dropping hints that he might remain as Liberal leader, and in May 2002 he ordered all the candidates to stop their leadership campaigns or leave Cabinet.
For the Martinites, this tossed gauntlet meant that Chretien had determined to frustrate their man indefinitely. The consequence was Martin's departure from Cabinet in June and a vigorous spin skirmish over whether he was fired (said the Martinites) or resigned (said the Chretienites). This brought the question of a leadership review back into play, and Chretien found to his dismay that while playing prime ministerial roles, Martin had organized/organized/organized and had seized effective control of the Liberal party bureaucracy. After a desperate effort to rally support and a final verification that he would be humiliated in a leadership battle, Chretien announced his resignation in August 2002 — but caveated that it would not occur until February 2004 (the epitome of the long goodbye).
For his part, Martin went through the coronation motions. A leadership "race" quickly saw all significant opposition withdraw or even more adroitly decide not to run. The culture minister and one time deputy prime minister, Sheila Copps, elected career suicide by persisting in a vituperative and doomed campaign that proved she was long on "feisty" and short on "smarts."
Martin became prime minister in December 2003 with the obvious plan of holding an election quickly (probably in April) and securing his own mandate. This tactic was evident when the official budget and the Throne Speech (a "state of Canada" type address) on February 2 were replete with platitudes and short on programmatic specifics — specifics that presumably would await an election victory.
Gaining Control of the Party
It was a nasty transition between Chretien and Martin. The Liberals tore their party to shreds in the process of defenestrating Chretien and driving his loyalists into exile. Martin offered senior former ministers (and thus potential rivals) the equivalent of a limp handshake as they departed. Internecine fighting is always bitter, but the Martinites seemed to suggest that they were happiest when their opponents went away angry than when they just went away. Martin made a point of stressing noninterference in selecting Liberal nominees for individual ridings, permitting one of his newly selected ministers to go head-to-head with Copps, the most prominent female Liberal, who just by accident happened to be Martin's only competitor in the Liberal leadership race. It was payback time as she was ousted from her long time fiefdom and effectively jettisoned from Canadian politics.
At the same time, Martin directly nominated (a prime ministerial prerogative) a number of individuals to run in specific ridings. In several cases, these individuals were parachuted into the nomination over the objection of local Liberal associations and candidates who had campaigned for months in the district. It was smart politics and netted some highly qualified candidates, but the reek of hypocrisy did not help Martin's public credibility.
Scandal Emerges
Martin had barely time to take a deep breath when the Auditor General tabled a report to Parliament on February 10, detailing information on apparent malfeasance in the awarding and fiscal monitoring of sponsorships and advertising contracts in Quebec. These contracts were designed to give a stronger image of "federalism" in Quebec. Quickly labeled "Adscam," the circumstances have the labyrinthian intricacies of "Whitewater" or other comparable exercises when massive amounts of money evaporate, and legions of lawyers are rallied to find the guilty and/or defend the accused. In this instance, the Auditor General identified $100 million for which no identifiable records were extant. And then the fun began.
The Martin government was fully aware of the content of the report; problems of similar ilk albeit lesser dimensions had surfaced earlier. Consequently, there was instant damage control, an attempt to blame bureaucrats, to apologize, and promise investigations. This was the standard Liberal response to comparable past problems; however, it proved akin to combating a forest fire with a garden hose. Indeed, as the culmination of many problematic financial actions, including a national gun control registry that was budgeted for $2 million and has cost $1 billion thus far, Adscam was more akin to the snowball that started the avalanche. Quebeckers, in particular, were furious that the federal government was attempting to "buy" them with their own tax dollars combined with the intimation that those missing millions also funded federal and provincial Liberal campaigns against sovereignists. Martin then started ousting former senior Chretien officials with possible Adscam connections from sinecure positions; he declared himself "mad as hell"; and made a series of "never again," clean house speeches across the country and particularly in Quebec where support for the Liberals had dropped twenty points. Simultaneously, a parliamentary committee began calling witnesses, including a former minister and a plethora of mid and senior level bureaucrats. Testimony was predictably opaque and politicized with Liberals obfuscating and Conservatives denouncing. The result was an interim, "there's a lot of smoke" report. Still to come is a formal juridical investigation, but that does not seriously engage until well into the autumn.
Thus while Martin dodged the pre-election bullet, his crisis management tactics were debatable. His claim that he knew nothing about such Quebec activity, despite being the senior minister in the province and Finance Minister, is credible to those who know that Chretien cut him out of Quebec issues. Still it doesn't take a dyed-in-the-wool skeptic to wonder whether being deliberately unwitting was a moral flaw or whether real ignorance indicated incompetence.
As part of the rebranding of the Liberals as Team Martin, the prime minister was compelled to differentiate himself and his style from coterie Chretien. After all, when a party is ten years into power, it is hard to look fresh and even harder to run against Ottawa. Consequently, Martin was to be more open, more inclusive, more willing to listen — and much less of a "Godfather" character meeting the world with a "Shawinigen handshake" as did Chretien when throttling a demonstrator in 1996.
But Why Run Now?
There was a serious argument among Liberals over the merits of waiting an additional six to twelve months before holding an election. With the existing electoral mandate lasting until late fall 2004, there was no imperative to run. Circumstances had clearly changed, and the polls now showed that the smashing majority anticipated in February (well over 200 seats) had changed to a bare majority in April-May with heavy losses in Quebec. Why not step back, govern and prove that the new look Martin was a reality, and get the Adscam scandal resolved?
Still, there were many advantages in having a campaign now. First there were positives: very strong economy; low inflation; low unemployment; balanced budget; debt down; taxes reduced; spending up. Add to these lunch bucket pluses, there was little concern over Quebec separation and general appreciation that the government had avoided blindly following the United States into the Iraq swamp. Martin was still highly popular with a strong reputation from being the Finance Minister who slew the deficit, and he was rated as most qualified to be prime minister.
Thus the answer seemed to be that it was harder not to run than to run. There really was no program of legislation ready to govern; the program appeared to be an election campaign for a Martin mandate rather than trying to govern on the residue of the Chretien mandate. Moreover, the electoral bleeding from Adscam seemed to have stopped or at least slowed; the candidate selection process was virtually complete with commitments for office rentals/advertising. Additionally, the opposition was still getting its act together. After a decade during which Canadian conservatives divided the right of center vote, they united only in April under Stephen Harper, a relatively untried/unknown Alberta MP who had never directed a national campaign. Liberals believed the new Conservative party would be disorganized and gaffe prone. Likewise, the New Democrats (socialist) had a new leader (Jack Layton) with no national profile. As both Harper and Layton were intelligent and articulate, giving either party time to coalesce would only hurt.
Finally, there was the unstated impression that circumstances could easily get worse. Adscam has "legs" and there is a reasonable chance that senior Liberal political figures will face jail as the judicial inquiry grinds forward. There are other "lumps under the carpet" scandals waiting to be uncovered and also politically messy issues such as court opinions on homosexual marriage that were pending; these topics are as divisive among Liberals as elsewhere in the country. Additionally, there is a high profile security case that mixes hard issues of defense against terrorism, relations with the United States, media publication freedom, and human rights; it is likely to generate problems for any Liberal government. Finally, there were a plethora of unpopular and/or expensive decisions to be made regarding defense and foreign relations — often connected to bilateral relations with the United States that had been deferred. In short there was an entire flock of "chickens" circling the roost and most of them would make feathers fly upon landing.
Having chosen the timing with the most propitious combination of poll gazing and financial pump priming, the election was theirs to lose. And they lost it—well, they almost lost it.
The Campaign
Canadian elections run a minimum of thirty-five days; this limit reduces the official electioneering (although as is the case in other twenty-first century democracies, all parties campaign all the time), but also intensifies it. It is far harder to recover from error, and every action, every day is covered with apocalyptic intensity. In a nutshell, one could say that Martin started haltingly, but came on strong in the final week while Harper, after a smooth several weeks encountered a combination of problems that cost him votes and seats.
There was a sense of media skepticism toward PM Martin as the campaign opened on May 26. He was the "government," but he hadn't governed, and he had clearly evaded resolving Adscam. Drawing on focus group testing, the Liberals concentrated on resolving health care concerns—and contended that the Conservatives supported "U.S.-style medicine" (private payment for some medical services). But Martin looked every minute of his sixty-five years and sounded shrill and Howard Deanesque in his speeches. Moreover, he was blindsided by the provincial Liberal party in Ontario when the premier, against a flat promise during his recent election campaign not to raise taxes without a public referendum, instituted a new "fee" on health services on 18 May while eliminating several previous services. In short, he lied, and Ontario voters were furious at the federal Liberals as well as the provincial party. Moreover, during the back-to-back leaders debates, the head of the Quebec separatists, Gilles Duceppe, not only clearly won the French debate but also, in the view of many observers, also won the English language debate.
You can tell that a party is in trouble when it starts getting nicknames such as "Fibrals" or "Liebrals."
For their part, Harper/Conservatives practiced the maxim that when a party is destroying itself, just stay out of the way. If they had a theme, it was along the lines of, "These arrogant, thieving, lying politicians don't deserve to be re-elected." And at one point in the campaign over seventy percent of those polled agreed. In substance they promised more—more money for just about everything—and tax cuts to boot. Economists said the numbers didn't add up, but the Conservative just tortured the statistics until they confessed.
And for a while, the Liberals didn't know how to handle Harper. In 2000 the Liberals effectively demonized the new Canadian Alliance leader, Stockwell Day, as a scary un-Canadian, right-wing nut, religious fanatic, skidoo driver who thought that The Flintstones was a documentary. But this approach was hard to duplicate against a considerably more educated, self-possessed man who looked as if he would be at home in a backyard barbecue apron imprinted "World's Greatest Dad." Harder, but hardly impossible. Harper became a man with a secret (un-Canadian) agenda, who would tear up the Canadian Charter of Rights, put women in purdah, and sell Canadian boys as cannon fodder for U.S. imperial militarists. Maybe Mr. Harper wasn't personally "scary," but he was the pinstripe suit fronting for all of those cud-chewing, Albertan clodhoppers with antediluvian attitudes.
Nevertheless, for a precious moment, the Conservatives surged in the polls to the point where it appeared as if they might have not just a plurality but a majority. It was all downhill from there. A variety of unscripted remarks by Conservative MPs suggested that the Conservatives might really be, well, conservative! Not "conservative" in U.S. terms, but certainly so to a Canadian electorate whose center is a good two strides to the left of the U.S. center. Additionally, the Tory premier of Alberta suggested changes in the provincial medical program that fed into the Liberal charges of a Harper hidden agenda. Martin attacked the premier relentlessly for his derogation of the Canadian health care shibboleth. And a plethora of "American style" TV attack ads (in truth the Canadians need no tutoring in slicing smears) suggested to Ontario voters that Conservatives would end gun control, abolish abortion, and generate a stack of body bags following wild military spending.
Pollsters say that 225,000 people in Ontario changed their minds during the weekend before the 28 June vote, a move that won the Liberals twenty-five extra seats; vote switching in Quebec won another dozen in Montreal. From what the pollsters were predicting as a "too close to call" race, the Liberals extracted a strong minority government: Liberals 135; Conservatives ninety-nine; Bloc Quebecois fifty-four; NDP nineteen; and one Independent.
In the end, the Liberal brand still was stronger than factional animosity or popular distaste for scandal. In percentage terms, they lost almost none of their vote from 2000, while the Conservative vote was considerably lower than what might have been predicted from the summation of the two right of center parties in 2000. Some analysts concluded that fear overcame loathing. Ultimately, the Liberals proved that no matter what combinations of errors, omissions, bad luck, and/or incompetence was piled at their doorstep, they not only could not be defeated, they could not even defeat themselves.
What Does It Mean for Canada?
In short, more "interesting times." Although minority governments are hardly unknown in Canada (there were eight in the twentieth century), they are not frequent. The most recent was a Tory government in 1979, which collapsed after six months, primarily through miscalculation by then Prime Minister Joe Clark. Thus there are virtually no parliamentarians with practical "how it works" experience in running a minority government; there will be a lot of reviewing precedents and very close monitoring of any vote to be confident that when the government falls, it is by design and not by accident.
On the other hand, minority governments, both federal and provincial have often been productive and relatively enduring with the average about eighteen months. The most famous were the Pearson minority governments in 1963 and 1965 that ushered the existing social safety net and health care into the Canadian socio-political framework. Interestingly, when a majority government followed a minority, only once (the Joe Clark government) has the government been defeated and replaced by the opposition.
Moreover, none of the opposition parties is interested in a quick return to the electorate—nor does the electorate want to see them. It was a cranky population that voted on 28 June and, despite the reality of a meaningful, "every vote counts" race rather than a Liberal cakewalk, a record low percentage of registered voters went to the polls. Specifically, the Conservatives need time to make the electorate more comfortable both with their leadership and their policies — and they need to devise those policies more coherently. The NDP needs to figure how to get votes back from Green Party that by taking 4.3 percent of the vote now qualifies for federal funding. And the Bloc Quebecois, having matched its highest seat total after two elections of decline, will want to exploit their fifty-four federal offices and fifty-four local riding offices to boost the chances that the provincial separatists will win the next election (probably not until 2007). Thus Martin has a certain amount of early leeway that he can exploit to advantage.
Consequently, Martin has that rare opportunity: a second chance to make a first impression. He has an opportunity to implement a long-deferred (since the 1993 platform) promise for a national childcare program. He has emphasized that a primary priority will be legislation to limit free speech when it becomes child pornography. He has indicated increased funding for the armed forces. There is a commitment for fresh funding for large cities. And he has promised still more funding and new arrangements with the provinces to "fix" health care services, notably to reduce waiting times for treatments such as cardiac surgery and hip replacement. While the Liberals do not have a majority (and even combined with their most obvious partner, the NDP would not reach a majority), Martin should be able to negotiate ad hoc alliances on such proposals. Additionally, he could declare these and other items subject to "free votes" and thus argue that his government does not fall should he be defeated on a particular bill. Martin's strength is supposed to be a willingness to listen to multiple opinions and assure all sides of a case are heard; he will have a continuing opportunity to demonstrate this well-advertised skill.
Not insignificantly Martin now has a chance to manage the Adscam minefield bequeathed him by former PM Chretien rather than having the Conservatives exhume all of those juicy slightly covered problems. Just the thought of the Conservatives supervising the juridical digging for the next decade probably galvanized the Liberals to campaign even harder. That does not mean that everything will remain buried, but "letting it all hang out" is now an option rather than an expectation.
The Bloc Is Back
Prior to Adscam, the BQ was regarded by all but their loving mothers as road kill awaiting the clean up crew. The Bloc had thirty-three seats heading into the election; they were expected to lose at least half to the Liberals. Instead they gained twenty-one seats and clearly have revived separatist hopes. Good portions of the gain are connected to Quebecker irritation over Adscam and federal Liberals presumed meddling in provincial politics. And while polling support for "yes" to the 1995 referendum question on separation has crept into the high forty percent brackets, the BQ did not gather a majority of the votes in the 28 June election. Moreover, with provincial Liberals in power, at least well into 2007, there is no likelihood of a near term referendum on sovereignty. So this is a "bide your time" time for the BQ. They will want to use their local riding offices to bolster PQ chances for the coming election, but since the next federal election could easily arrive before the next provincial election, they will want to make the most of their chance to push for greater benefits for Quebec. To claim credit as an illustration that Quebec independence would mean even better results for Quebeckers.
And Alberta Is Angry
Liberals took only fourteen of the ninety-one seats west of Ontario, and only two of twenty-eight in Alberta. Moreover, Albertans in particular were irritated (to put it mildly) that Martin campaigned against Alberta's health care proposals in the final two weeks of the campaign — an approach they believed designed to win seats in Ontario by suggesting that Harper and Al-berta's Tories had an un-Canadian rightwing agenda. Of course, the Liberals are nothing but pragmatic: the mother load of seats is in Ontario (108) and Quebec (seventy-five); for a generation, the Liberal electoral tactic has been blunt, "Screw the West and take the rest." The parliamentary system guarantees that Alberta will always be disadvantaged. Currently, Alberta has just declared itself to be debt free, the only province enjoying this status. As a consequence, it (and Ontario) are the only net contributors to the tax system, providing significantly more in federal taxes than they receive in federal benefits. But Ontario, in effect, runs Canada while Alberta just gets milked. Albertans see no way out of this bind short of constitutional reform that is highly unlikely; some are wondering whether Quebec-style "knife at the throat" threats of moving toward independence or at least greater autonomy would be appropriate. This alternative is now at the "cloud the size of a man's hand," stage, but Paul Martin's mid-July presence to flip pancakes at the Calgary Stampede did not mollify anyone except Liberal faithful.
What Does It Mean for the United States?
To be honest, virtually nothing at all; certainly nothing in the short run when the U.S. political obsession will focus on the November election, and foreign affairs are a four-letter word: Iraq. The nagging bilateral economic problems such as BSE and softwood lumber will continue to nag; we have no incentive to solve them before our election, not with Senator Kerry demanding that we protect the purity of U.S. beef.
In the very near term, Martin has some serious reorganizing to do. One of his casualties was the best-qualified Minister of Defense in a generation. The 20 July Cabinet announcement proved that finding a strong candidate for what is a secondary position (wherein two recent incumbents have been defeated in the election following their appointment) was not easy. The shuffle of Foreign Minister Bill Graham to Defense was a de facto demotion for Graham; he has some defense-related experience, but that makes him an experienced cipher. His longstanding skepticism about U.S. policies (far antedating the current administration) reduces his leverage in Washington; this was bad enough in foreign affairs, but it will be worse on security issues. Matching him with Secdef Rumsfeld is a juxtaposition of an Indian tiger with a Siamese cat. Replacing Graham as Foreign Minister is Pierre Petigrew, whose expertise falls into economics and international trade. This background provides him strength is areas of major Canadian interest, but he will be playing catch-up on bilateral U.S.-Canada issues.
Also hanging fire are those long/long pending White Papers on defense and foreign policy. Basic guidelines for Canadian policy in these areas are now a decade old, and reportedly they are not scheduled for release until autumn. With new ministers in each area, however, the prospects for further delay are obvious. Just what does Ottawa intend to do in two areas starved for significant funding but hardly as popular as health care? While Martin will probably commit more funds to defense, it will be a sop to Cerberus rather than a serious increase.
PM Martin is now a known quality in Washington. His April visit left a good impression at the White House; he may not have gotten a nickname from Bush fils, but he will benefit indefinitely by not being Jean Chretien with his coterie of vocal anti-Americans. Indeed, Canadian observers thought that his best performances during the spring were in Washington and at D-Day observances in Normandy.
We do not expect Martin to be overtly pro-American, but we do anticipate that his criticism will be more sophisticated and less public. We anticipate Canadian agreement to join missile defense for North America, the alternative being the vitiation of NORAD. Indeed, Martin might even feel free to spend a weekend at Camp David.
And, oh yes, the resurgence of the Quebec separatists has been noticed. Although there is no referendum on the horizon, sooner than one might hope, we will be dusting off our "mantra" of polite preference for a strong and united Canada.
The election, however, gave new impetus to a regularly troubling theme: Canadian embrace of anti-Americanism. Politicians campaigned against "American-style health care" and denounced "American style attack ads". While there is a basic truth to the observation that Canadians can think of no better way to define themselves beyond "not Americans," it is a tiresome reflection of an equally basic socio-political immaturity. After all, no other significant country defines itself as "not" another. Do French say they are "not Germans?" Argentines that they are "not Brazilians?" Koreans that they are "not Japanese?" Thus for Canadian politicians to trot out their "we won't be the fifty-first state" cant prompts the pointed rejoinder — "And who invited you?"
August 5, 2004
Endnotes
Note *: The author, a retired career diplomat, served as minister-counselor for political affairs at the U. S. embassy in Ottawa during the mid-1990s and has retained his close interest in Canadian politics. Mr. Jones has published previously on the topic in American Diplomacy. He holds degrees from the University of Pennsylvania. Back