American Diplomacy

American Diplomacy

Volume IX, Number 1, 2004

 

The UN Security Council and Iraq: Why It Succeeded In 1990, Why It Didn't In 2003, and Why the United States Should Redeem It
By M. James Wilkinson * and Christopher D. O'Sullivan **

"Does the United States really need the Security Council?" The authors, one an experienced career U.S. ambassador and the other a scholar in the field of UN studies, answer the question. Further, they set forth reasoned and thoughtful steps for the reform of U. S. foreign policy. –Ed.

The United Nations Security Council has, in the words of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, "come to a fork in the road (that) may be a moment no less decisive than 1945." The US administration precipitated the crisis when, unable to secure Council approval for using armed force against Iraq, it fashioned its own "coalition of the willing" and drove Saddam Hussein from power. The events surrounding the US action and its aftermath have spawned a vigorous debate over President Bush's policies and whether the Security Council in its present. . .or any other. . .form can play a serious role henceforth in the quest to ensure international peace and security.

In the years between the two wars with Iraq, the disasters in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda gravely tarnished the Council's image. A host of commentators, with American conservatives at the forefront, castigated it for fiascoes and ineffectiveness, culminating in its inability to deal with Saddam Hussein's obstructionism in 2002. Although the need for burden-sharing in Iraq's reconstruction has tempered the rhetoric, diehard neoconservatives find the Council an antiquated relic ready for the dustbin of history. On the eve of the US invasion of Iraq, Richard Perle, a prominent neoconservative advising the US government, put it starkly, "coalitions of the willing are, by default, the best hope for (a new world) order, and the true alternative to the anarchy of the abject failure of the United Nations."

But the Security Council's record includes significant successes. Its numerous peacekeeping operations have policed truces that ended deadly conflict; its nation-building activities have helped rebuild countries devastated by war from Afghanistan to Cambodia to Namibia; and its economic sanctions played key roles in bringing Libya to account for the bombing of Pan Am 103, and in ending the racist government of colonial Rhodesia. The Council and it alone can confer a "legitimacy" for the use of armed force that is recognized around the world, even if great powers, as the enforcers of Council actions, can choose to ignore it with relative impunity.

The Council's most impressive achievement as a body working together to tackle a major crisis was the liberation of Kuwait. This was no mean feat given shifting political sands in the United States and abroad, the enormous cost of such a major war, and the potential fighting power of the Iraqi forces. Regrettably, the ultimate breakdown of the postwar phase came to diminish the luster of the Council's accomplishment and the diplomacy that made it possible.

If the Security Council is as fatally flawed as some assert, why was it able to do the job in 1990-91? This article considers the differences between the two armed showdowns with Saddam Hussein, and what the comparison says about the central issues of Security Council capabilities and the course of American aspirations to global leadership.

The Origins of the Security Council Concept

The two Iraq wars can be looked upon as milestones in the search for an international security architecture. . .a set of institutions and procedures to manage disputes among nations and guarantee global peace. To understand and assess the Security Council's efforts to deal with Iraq, one must appreciate the historical context. The following section examines how the Security Council's structure evolved from the experience of the League of Nations, and how, once established in 1945, the Council's capabilities ebbed and flowed with the willingness of its members to work together.

The structure and functions of the Security Council owe much to its predecessor, the Council of the League of Nations, which initially had four great powers—Britain, France, Italy, and Japan. Four other members of the League Assembly were selected to join the Council on a rotating, non-permanent, basis. Perhaps its most noteworthy innovation was that the League Covenant granted the Council the power to issue verbal, economic, or physical sanctions against states violating international norms. Yet there were a number of problems from the outset. The United States, the largest of the victorious powers and the chief creator of the League, subsequently decided not to join, dealing a blow to the Council's prestige but, perhaps most importantly, undermining future efforts to create a workable system of collective security. Furthermore, the Soviet Union and Weimar Germany were not initially allowed in, although both eventually joined, Germany in 1926 and the USSR in 1934. The lack of concurrent membership at any given time by these three powers meant that putting substance into the concept of collective security remained unattainable. And, as the postwar era entered a period of renewed nationalism—with the growing power and assertiveness of so-called revisionist powers such as Italy, Germany, and Japan—the Council was confronted with seemingly insurmountable challenges.

The structure of the League Council also caused difficulties from the beginning. Unanimity was required for all decisions in both the Council and the Assembly, thus leading to frequent paralysis. When the number of non-permanent members increased to a total of 11 in 1936, this merely made unanimity more difficult. Judged by the lofty goals enunciated by its founders, the League Council failed to measure up to much of its original promise, and ultimately found itself unable to perform even its most basic functions. Yet if one assesses this experiment in the broader context of historical trends in the relations among states, it continues to stand, even after nearly a century since its inception, as a remarkable innovation. The Council established a number of important precedents that carried over into the era of the United Nations,in particular the effort to promote collective security and to move away from unilateral great power politics, toward more more cooperative, consensual approaches to the problems of the world. Perhaps most importantly, the Council served as a model for the next attempt to create a new and improved council of powers: the United Nations Security Council.

During the Second World War the "Big Three" allied powers of Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union formulated allied strategy by themselves. This was, however, not a formal organization, and China was gradually, at times grudgingly, accepted as the Big Three evolved into the Four Policemen. France, with her defeat in 1940, did not initially seem to merit much consideration, but ultimately reemerged as one of the permanent members of the Security Council of the UN in 1945.

The Security Council and Global Security, 1945-1990

Today the Security Council has 15 members, five of whom—the United States, Britain, France, Russia, and China—have permanent status with veto power. The other ten are elected to the Security Council by the General Assembly to two-year nonrenewable terms, thus the Security Council is not so much of a great power forum as it would otherwise be. The non-permanent ten are elected on a staggered basis, with five new members brought on board each year. The number of non-permanent members was expanded from six to ten in 1965 but has remained at ten since.

The Security Council began meeting in 1945 with much initial optimism that the world might now embark upon a new era in relations among states. After years of war, the world could be forgiven for succumbing to such optimism. And, in the United States, fear of a repetition of Woodrow Wilson's earlier mishandling of the peace led the Roosevelt and Truman administrations to oversell the Security Council's potential, particularly in the area of achieving security. Yet these high expectations were destined to be dashed. The Cold War, which evolved simultaneously with the history of the United Nations, would temper much of that initial optimism and come to have a profoundly negative influence on the history of the first four decades of the Security Council.

Initially, it seemed the Security Council might help ameliorate the Cold War, as it did indeed play a central role in adjudicating early Cold War tensions in Iran in 1946, facilitating a Soviet withdrawal. Its action in the subsequent Korean crisis, where large numbers of forces fought nominally under the UN banner, also led many to optimistically believe that the Security Council might loom large in the Cold War. The war which began when North Korean forces crossed the 38th parallel on June 25, 1950 marked the first time that the Security Council invoked chapter VII of the UN Charter to authorize force. The Council met in emergency session, where the Soviet Union had been boycotting the council in protest against the UN's refusal to seat the People's Republic of China. President Truman seized upon the opportunity to use the Security Council to legitimize the western response to North Korea's aggression. With the U.S. leading the way, a series of resolutions passed the Security Council before the Soviet ambassador, Jacob Malik, could return from his boycott and cast the predictable veto. Thus, in retrospect, the collective response to the Korean crisis was something of an anomaly. No member of the permanent five ever again risked boycotting the Security Council.

When the Soviet delegation returned so did the paralysis, and the US sought to use the General Assembly as an alternative peacemaking mechanism. Resolution 377(V), passed in November 1950 at the instigation of US Secretary of State Dean Acheson and commonly referred to as Uniting for Peace, set up procedures for the General Assembly to act when "the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exorcise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. . . " The resolution was not binding on members, as are Security Council actions, but it provided for ". . .recommendations to Members for collective measures, including. . . the use of armed force when necessary. . ." Ironically, United for Peace was first used by the United States to censure France and Britain at the time of the 1956 Suez Crisis, pressuring them to withdraw their invasion forces from Egypt. In the same year it was called into play against the Soviets over the Hungarian uprising. Its tenth and last invocation was the 1997 Emergency Special Session called at the behest of Arab States to censure Israel. Although the Uniting for Peace process can have a psychological impact, it is no more able than the Security Council to compel action by a major power and, on most issues these days, the United States would put little credence in an outcome determined by the Assembly's majority of developing nations.

Winds of Change on the Security Council

After years of Cold War inertia, currents of change began to stir the Council as the reforms of Soviet Union President Gorbachev took hold in the 1980s. The Iraq-Iran war proved the telling barometer. In 1980, Iran was a pariah state due to the ongoing US Embassy hostage crisis, and when Iraq attacked without prior warning, the UN response was muted. Although Iraq was clearly the aggressor, the United States and others tilted in its favor, offering support to prevent the worse evil in their eyes, namely Iranian victory. By 1987, after horrific losses on both side, the war was winding down and the new foreign policy of the Soviet Union opened the way for the Security Council to compel a settlement that kept either side from winning and thus preserved a power balance of sorts in the region. More than rhetoric, Council Resolution 598 held out the possible use of force by invoking Articles 39 and 40 of Chapter VII in its demand for observance of the truce, which then took hold under a Council-mandated observer mission.

Eighteen months later in December 1988, Gorbachev in a speech at the UN declared the Security Council would play a key role in the Soviet Union's changed approach to foreign affairs. His choice of venue for what in hindsight appears to have been a unilateral declaration of the Cold War's end seemed to demonstrate a vision on his part with the Security Council at center stage in a new international system that could now come into effect after having been postponed by East-West rivalry since 1945.

In the wake of Gorbachev's address, peacekeeping evolved in new directions. This "second generation" of peacekeeping was notable not only for the increasing degree of consensus among the permanent five—particularly Moscow and Washington—but also for a more concentrated, although not exclusive, focus on intrastate conflicts, as opposed to those between states, as well as an expansion of Council concern into peacemaking and nation building, areas rarely explored in the past. The new spirit of cooperation opened the doors for the Council to concern itself with geographic areas or spheres of interest previously considered "off limits."

As noted above, the Council in 1987 had been able to agree on an intervention to end the Iran-Iraq war, invoking articles of Chapter VII to threaten the use of force and compel a formal cease-fire. With the three subsequent years of nascent collaboration between East and West under their belts, delegates spoke of real possibilities that the Council would finally be able, in the Charter's words, to "end the scourge of war." The driving core of the Security Council, the Permanent Five, had reinforced their own cooperation with a procedure for regular consultation amongst themselves on important issues of the day, meeting outside the UN under a rotating chairmanship. There was an almost tangible desire to forge consensus. "Veto" had become a dirty word.

The Security Council and the Gulf War of 1990-91

By mid-1990 an atmosphere of teamwork pervaded Security Council chambers. In the three years following the Council's path finding action noted above to end the Iraq-Iran war, collaboration had intensified and delegates began to speak of real possibilities the Council would finally be able in a meaningful way to tackle the Charter's injunction to "end the scourge of war." The Council's driving core, the permanent five, had reinforced their cooperation with a procedure for regular consultation amongst themselves on important issues, meeting outside the UN under a rotating chairmanship. There was an almost tangible desire to forge consensus and "veto" had become a dirty word.

Adding to the halcyon mood, the American Administration under the senior President Bush enjoyed considerable credibility at the UN despite such aggravations as US arrears and America's widely denounced unilateral invasion to unseat Panamanian dictator Noriega in late 1989. The UN community drew comfort from the fact that the President himself had served as America's Permanent Representative from 1971-73. Moreover, the appointment of Thomas Pickering, a distinguished career diplomat, seemed to underscore that the Administration would take a serious, professional approach in its dealings with the UN. And, indeed, when the Iraq-Kuwait crisis erupted, the President and key advisors, gave high priority from day one to working with the Security Council and the international community.

The "new face" of the Security Council did not, however, dissuade Saddam Hussein from his second armed attack into a neighbor's territory, this time Kuwait. Iraq had long nurtured grievances against the Emirate, alleging illegal extractions of oil belonging to Iraq and claiming Kuwait itself to rightfully be Iraq's 19th province. As he massed his troops on the Kuwaiti border, the Iraqi leader may have drawn mistaken conclusions from the UN's indifference to his 1980 attack on Iran or from the western support he received as that conflict wore on. In fact, in the months preceding his attack on Kuwait, he had received ambiguous or confusing signals from western officials, including in a much publicized meeting with the United States ambassador. In any case, in the early hours of August 2, more than 150,000 Iraqi troops invaded Kuwait and chased the ruling al-Sabah clan into exile.

The battle between the two oil-rich nations was one sided militarily and politically. Iraq was a large country, militarily strong (despite its losses in the war with Iran), and clearly aspiring to regional dominance, while in contrast Kuwait was small, militarily weak and pro-western. The world was prepared to condemn Saddam's unprovoked aggression, but to put armies in the field and chase him from Kuwait was another matter. There was a real possibility the Iraqi dictator might have held onto Kuwait or its northern oil-fields if the United States did not find the resolve to oust him and mobilize the needed force. The Security Council looked to America for leadership.

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2 caught Security Council members and their capitals by surprise, and put their newfound cooperative spirit to the test. Washington, Arab, and European governments, Moscow and Beijing had all calculated that the movement of massive Iraqi forces to the Kuwaiti border was a psywar pressure tactic or bluff. They were wary, perhaps, but not overly concerned. Thus, Council representatives were taken aback when the news reached New York late on August 1 that Iraqi tanks, easily crushing opposition, were well on their way to Kuwait City. From a Security Council delegate's point of view, the good news was the clarity of the reports—there was no doubting the essential element of unprovoked Iraqi aggression; the bad news was that there was no game plan, no draft resolution text in hand to deal with the situation.

Security Council Resolution 660: A Line in the Sand

In New York, Ambassador Pickering swung into action about 9:00 p.m., August 1 within minutes after receiving news from Washington of the Iraqi invasion. His phone consultations with administration officials swiftly reached consensus to proceed on a Security Council resolution, and he immediately requested an emergency meeting under the Council's standing commitment to convene on one hour's notice. Not all members had quick communications and several needed more time to get instructions from capitals. No one quibbled over the delay of two to three hours and the 15 Council delegates began informal consultations around midnight. Pickering presented a draft with the strongest possible language that could gain approval on such short notice. Delegates soon hammered out Resolution 660, which in its essential elements:

During the Council's review of the American draft, there had been no serious disagreement on substance. Only Yemen balked, and informally its affable Permanent Representative suggested it was not a question of approving the invasion, but rather obligations arising from the Yemeni President's personal friendship with Saddam Hussein. The one material but minor change from the US draft language followed from a sensible suggestion that its reference to the Iraq-Kuwait border could engender controversy over exactly where the line was, whereas reference to positions of August 1 would be indisputable.

Amazingly, within less than eight hours from the first news of the invasion, council members had agreed on a text that committed the international community to oppose the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. Before dawn on August 2, the Permanent Representatives moved to the familiar horseshoe table for predictable approval of the resolution and public statements. Not only the Soviet Union and China were fully on board, but so too Cuba and Ethiopia, at the time self-declared foes of US "imperialism." Pickering was able to cast the US vote and catch a shuttle flight to Washington for a session of the US National Security Council.

Sanctions and Troop Deployments: Putting in the Teeth

Washington's first NSC meeting on August 2 did not develop a broad consensus on overall strategy, but it was decisive on the need for immediate sanctions against Iraq, particularly to cut off the country's oil revenues. Pickering returned to New York and circulated a draft resolution, which drew on tested language from the Rhodesian sanctions (SC Res. 253) for a comprehensive embargo, with potential exceptions only for food and medicine.

Spurred by emerging details of Iraqi brutality, Council members accepted strong language. The resolution went beyond 660, citing not just Articles 39 and 40 but simply "Chapter VII," thereby implicitly embracing the Chapter's full range of options, including use of force. It also established a Committee of the whole to oversee implementation. At US and British insistence, the preamble of Res. 661 reaffirmed the "inherent right of individual or collective self-defense" under Article 51 of the UN Charter, thereby buttressing the legal case for a US-led coalition to act at Kuwait's request if the Security Council should later fail to approve the use of force. Resolution 661 passed August 6, with Cuba and Yemen abstaining–the fact that neither voted no signaled their acceptance of the Council's action in principle.

Parallel to the Council's deliberations, the United States rattled its sword, first to deter any aggression against Saudi Arabia and then to increase pressure on Saddam with the modern version of gunboat diplomacy. US troops began deploying to Saudi Arabia during the early days of August when there was genuine concern that the Iraqis with their superior numbers might cross the border from Kuwait to seize a chunk of Saudi territory. The Saudi government initially hesitated, but faced with overwhelming Iraqi forces on their doorstep, they permitted a steady American buildup on Saudi soil.

Resolution 661 did not deal specifically with enforcement and was soon challenged by the possibility of tankers defiantly setting sail with oil. When the US ten days after the passage of 661, on August 16, announced it would begin boarding ships to enforce the embargo, China and other members expressed unease at the American use of military force in the absence an explicit Council authorization. The United States, although still uncertain of the Council's proposed language, took the point, and Resolution 665 was passed without serious opposition on August 25, approving a naval blockade and authorizing enforcement action by member states. Res. 670 of September 25 then virtually eliminated aircraft flights to and from Iraq.

Before August was out, major controversy arose over the implementation of sanctions. The United States, aided by the United Kingdom, had taken a very hard line on the 661 Committee and blocked consent for virtually all shipments, even though the language of the resolution provided an exception for food and medicine. Muslim charity groups, for example a women's group in Algeria, appealed unsuccessfully for permission to send aid to Iraqi women and children. Then a crisis blew up over third country nationals marooned in Kuwait and cynically denied assistance by the Iraqi government. India with 100,000 nationals at risk, loaded a ship with relief supplies, threatening to sail without Security Council consent if it came to that.

India's ire forced the Council's hand. Resolution 666, passed September 13 with Yemen and Cuba again abstaining, provided for humanitarian shipments subject to strict monitoring of distribution in Iraq by international humanitarian organizations (the language at US and British behest), however, imposed such stringent requirements that the US/UK veto threat on the sanctions committee and Iraqi refusal to accept intrusive inspections continued to prevent virtually all relief efforts. The seeds thus sown were to produce major discord for over a decade.

The March to War

Although force had been authorized for the naval blockade, the prospect of a military attack to drive Iraqis from Kuwait remained controversial through September and October. The idea that sanctions could do the job, or at least should be given ample time, appealed to many, including some Congressional leaders. By October, however, the President and his closest advisors came to believe armed intervention would be necessary to free Kuwait. Major US force augmentations were announced in late October.

The President opted to try for UN Security Council action to set a deadline for Iraqi withdrawal. Britain's Margaret Thatcher and some in Washington argued for military action without further ado, fearing a negative Council reaction could make later use of force more problematic. And in fact, most Europeans, Moscow, Beijing, and Arab allies were obviously wavering on whether and when to contemplate military force. Secretary of State Baker was dispatched to garner support–votes on the Security Council and contributions to the coalition effort. He believed the Soviets were key and carefully worked out acceptable language with his Russian colleague, Edvard Shevardnadze, to detour around sensitivity to the phrase "use of force." They agreed on "all necessary means." The wording also pleased China, which gave up its principled stand against military action and agreed not to veto.

An historic meeting of the Security Council passed Resolution 687 on November 29 with Foreign Ministers replacing their Ambassadors for the vote. Cuba and Yemen, espousing antiwar sentiments, voted no, and China abstained. Resolution 687 gave Iraq "one final opportunity" to comply with Council decisions. If it failed to do so by January 15, the resolution authorized member states to "use all necessary means." On January 9, as a last gesture from the US side, Secretary Baker met with Iraq's Tariq Aziz in Geneva, but the Iraqi's were unyielding. The US administration still had to win over Congress. Resolution 687, according to James Baker, would be used to shame the opposition on the Hill. The failure of the last ditch meeting in Geneva evidently tipped the balance, and on January 12 Congress legislated authority for US military action. The Senate vote of 52 to 47 indicated just how close the margin was.

The war itself was short-lived. On January 15, the US began air strikes and on February 24 unleashed Desert Storm on the ground. Iraqi resistance crumbled and the United States called a halt to coalition operations after destroying much of the fleeing Iraqi armor columns. In response to criticism for not ordering the forces to go on to Baghdad and topple Saddam, Bush later wrote he did not do so because it would have meant going beyond the UN mandate, shattering the coalition, turning the whole Arab world against the United States and making the the Iraqi leader into a martyr. The President and close advisors expected Saddam would fall from power in the wake of his humiliating military defeat.

With the collapse of Iraqi forces, the Council moved to impose a postwar regime that would not only maintain sanctions to compel Iraq's complete disarmament, but also extract reparations and demarcate the Iraq-Kuwait border. Res. 686 on March 2 set forth basic terms for a cease-fire, and a month later, on April 3 Resolution 687 laid out the Council's requirements in detail, including the establishment of the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM). Implementing the main features of Res. 687–continuation of sanctions and the ambiguity of criteria for lifting them, as well as the complex requirements for UNSCOM operations–was to generate enormous controversy, leading inexorably to a poisonous split within the Permanent Five, between the United States and the UK on the one hand, and France, Russia, and China on the other.

Saddam's ruthless suppression of postwar Kurdish and Shia uprisings challenged the Council and found its unity and resolve wanting. Although Resolution 688 "condemned" the Iraqi government and "demanded" an immediate end to the repression, this time words remained just words. The resolution conspicuously omitted any reference to Chapter VII and there was no consensus on any serious follow-up action. The US and British, however, chose to interpret Resolution 688 as authority for establishing "no-fly zones," and deployed combat aircraft to enforce them for the next 12 years. The first was declared soon after the war in 1991 to protect a Kurdish-dominated zone in Northern Iraq and the second the following year to inhibit Iraqi air operations against Shia citizens in the South. While the French joined the northern no-fly zone in the beginning, they withdrew after the situation stabilized.

The Security Council Between the Iraq Wars: A Decade of Missed Opportunities, 1991-2002

The Security Council's prestige and effectiveness were gradually undermined in the years after the first Gulf War, as the Council suffered major setbacks in Somalia, Rwanda, and the Balkans. In Somalia, the consequences of the failure of the UN mission were immense. While the UN had scored a number of successes on the humanitarian front, the loss of a total of 147 peacekeepers received most of the attention. Among other unhappy consequences, the United Nations had little success establishing even the most basic of Somali state institutions. The crisis also caused American public opinion, in the wake of a sometimes hysterical blizzard of media coverage critical of the operation, to question the necessity of US forces being used in areas not considered vital to American interests. Somalia delivered a serious blow to those who had advocated that the Security Council should increasingly take an interest in humanitarian interventions.

Missteps in Rwanda and Bosnia led to far greater losses of life on the ground. In Rwanda, the very recent memory of Somalia contributed to Security Council paralysis and the phenomenon of "humanitarian fatigue" which resulted in the Council largely standing aside as 800,000 Rwandans were slaughtered in one of the worst acts of genocide since the Second World War. Whereas it can be argued the UN's culpability for the genocide in Rwanda was largely one of neglect and omission, in Bosnia the Security Council was heavily involved from the very beginning of the conflict. Despite this early attention of the Security Council and the ultimate dispatch of 40,000 peacekeepers, Bosnia descended into madness, with the death of perhaps more than 250,000 people. The Security Council was unable to lift the long siege of Sarajevo and many of its proclaimed "safe areas" ultimately collapsed, the most controversial being the eastern Bosnian enclave of Srebrenica in July 1995, which resulted in the death of an estimated 10,000 Bosnian Muslims. Then in the subsequent crisis in Kosovo, the Security Council found itself, in the face of divergent views of the permanent five, unable to take action, thus precipitating NATO bombing of Serbia.

Furthermore, through the 1990s, there was a crumbling of support for the US/UK position toward Iraq on the Security Council in part due to eroding support for US-inspired sanctions, and in part due to disagreement among the permanent five over the UNSCOM mission and mandate, as well as the maintenance of the no-fly zones over Iraq. The sanctions imposed by the Security Council in August 1990 and maintained thereafter grew increasingly controversial as evidence mounted of the dire humanitarian situation in Iraq. The Security Council established the "Food for Oil" program whereby Iraq could export a limited amount of petroleum in exchange for the purchase of humanitarian supplies from abroad. Iraq's resistance to UNSCOM's inspections resulted in the December 1998 bombing campaign by the US and UK. Yet, throughout the decade after the first war with Iraq, only Britain consistently supported the US position on the Security Council with regard to Iraq, while France, Russia, and China criticized the US approach, arguing that it was both ineffective and unduly harsh. Saddam Hussein largely escaped blame, even though he used the oil proceeds to build palaces rather than feed Iraqi children.

9/11 and Washington's Unilateral Course

The September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington seemed initially to restore the Security Council's relevance. Within hours of the tragedy, the Council passed Resolution 1368, which unequivocally condemned the attacks, and soon followed with Resolution 1373, which obligated member states under Chapter VII of the Charter to deny all forms of support or safe haven to terrorists. To assist in carrying out the dictates of these resolutions, the Council established a special Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC). Without more political teeth and more adequate funding, however, the CTC could not undertake a serious enforcement role.

Useful as these resolutions and the CTC were, Washington declined to engage the UN in a major way as part of its response to 9/11. The US did not seek a mandate from the Council before its invasion of Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, arguing it already had adequate authority under Article 51 of the UN Charter providing for self-defense. Moreover, after its victory on the ground, Washington set up a postwar security regime in Afghanistan independent of the UN, and also unilaterally orchestrated the reconstitution of the government. The UN's envoy was granted only a token political role, although UN institutions were, not surprisingly, called on for maximum humanitarian assistance. In sum, the year following 9/11, rather than uniting the UN and United States in a focused campaign for the war on terror, drove wedges between them in large part stemming from divergent notions of what constitutes terrorism and what responses are acceptable.

After the dust settled in Afghanistan with Osama bin Laden and surviving Taliban leaders on the run, Washington turned its attention ever more insistently to Iraq. Washington asserted that a preemptive war against Iraq was justifiable as part of the war on terror, alleging Iraqi preparations to use WMDs and links to terrorists including al Qaeda. The UK signed on, but the French and Russians balked in favor of a more sympathetic approach to Baghdad, relying on UNMOVIC inspections and carrying forward their own ongoing efforts to expand trade opportunities and ease the UN sanctions regime. Bitter wrangling persisted over the oil-for-food program, and a majority of Council members remained skeptical of the US charges against Iraq and the intelligence presented to support them. Beyond the issue of Iraq itself, the Bush Administration's new doctrine rationalizing preemptive war alarmed many governments. For some on the Security Council, the US position seemed to undermine basic principles of preventive diplomacy and collective security.

The Security Council and the Second Iraq War 2002-2003

As arguments over Iraq headed toward a showdown in the early fall of 2002, the Security Council was at best stumbling. Notwithstanding an occasional success, it had been riven by a decade of discord over issues such as sanctions on Iraq, ethnic conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, and the Arab-Israeli confrontation. The Council was further disconcerted by the attitudes of a US government with many key figures viscerally opposed to a strong UN. Washington's increasingly strident anti-Iraq rhetoric and its evident unilateralist disposition bedeviled perm five cooperation and widened the gap–almost ideological in nature–between the US and UK on the one side and France and Russia on the other. China sided with the latter camp because of concerns over perceived US readiness to intervene in other nations' affairs.

The second Iraq war thus unfolded in a context substantially different from that of 1990/91. In the first instance, it was colored by the events of 9/11, which had put Washington on a more aggressive path, using the terrorist threat as rationale for its national security strategy of preemptive attacks in the name of self-defense, although others would argue such a policy is contrary to the Charter's Article 51. Driven by its ideological convictions and an apparent confidence in its ability to carry American public opinion, the Bush administration by mid-2002 was clearly determined to wage war against Iraq without the kind of clear provocation that existed in 1990 and, if need be, without the support of the international community beyond its "coalition of the willing."

By September 2002, the Permanent Five were hopelessly divided over Iraq. Where one sits determines how one assigns blame for the failure to resolve differences prior to the American-led invasion of March 2003. Those who favored military action, especially in the US and Britain, point the finger at the French, Germans, and Russians for softness toward Saddam Hussein. Not surprisingly, many citizens of those countries and persons with a "progressive" bent would fault the US for an unjustified determination to go to war regardless.

With or Without the Security Council

President Bush threw down the gauntlet on Iraq in his watershed speech to the General Assembly on September 12, 2002. Saddam Hussein must change his ways, Bush insisted, or action would be unavoidable. His remarks were widely and correctly interpreted as promising the US would go to war on its own hook with coalition partners if the UN failed to act strongly enough. American diplomats began soundings on a Security Council resolution to authorize the use of force if need be. The British signed on, but France, Russia, and China argued for more time and greater reliance on UNMOVIC and its inspections.

Opposition to war from within the United States itself was effectively overcome when Congress on October 11 passed legislation opening the road to war with Iraq. PL107-243 authorized the President to use armed force to 1) defend the national security of the United States against Iraq and 2) "to enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq." Neither the Congress nor the President seemed bothered by the irony of defending Council wishes against the wishes of the Council. With war powers in hand after October 11, the Administration had no absolute need to refer again to the Security Council, although polls continued to show that a clear majority of Americans preferred to act in concert with the UN.

Evidently in response to the US public's concerns, Washington on October 25 formally engaged the Council by presenting a draft resolution which, similar to Resolution 660 of 1990, would have given an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein and consent to military action if he failed to comply. The French and Russians emphasized reliance on UNMOVIC inspections. Res. 1441, passed unanimously by the Council on November 8, was an unhappy compromise. Reflecting US demands, it strengthened the UN sanctions regime with terms almost impossible to meet, and it declared Iraq to be "in material breach" of its obligations. But, unlike Res. 678, it contained no trigger to ratify any future US military action. For the next several weeks, acrimonious discussion continued among governments (and on the streets) as to whether there was in fact merit to the US claim of an imminent threat from Iraq such as to justify war. The US and Britain tried hard to make their case. On February 5, Secretary of State Powell presented the Council with a detailed intelligence brief which purported to expose a range of Iraqi WMD programs. The presentation markedly swayed US public opinion, but was not persuasive to the other powers on the Council. Soon thereafter, UNMOVIC reported it had as yet found no definitive evidence of WMDs in Iraq.

Unmoved by UNMOVIC's report, the United States, UK, and Spain introduced a draft resolution on February 24 with language that could serve as the "trigger" by approving, in whatever ambiguous terms, military action against Iraq for failure to comply with Resolution 1441. Overcoming the French/Russian veto was a long shot, but the White House evidently hoped for a moral and PR victory by getting the nine vote majority required for passage of a Security Council resolution when there is no veto. There was not enough give from the seven nonaligned members, however. Unable to garner nine sure votes, and with a veto still certain in any case, the US and its coalition partners set their invasion in motion.

Postwar: the Security Council and the US Collection Plate

The United States did not require Security Council approval for its invasion of Iraq, but it did need the Council's authorization to untie revenue from Iraq's oil. The first step was relatively elementary: Res. 1472 passed on March 28, freeing up funds and implementing contracts already in train under the oil-for-food program. The most critical issues, however, were not addressed in this initial Council action: control over future oil revenues, ultimate responsibility for government of the country and the source of funds for the requisite, hugely expensive reconstruction of infrastructure. The Russian Foreign Ministry was quick to point out that the wording was not an ex post facto legitimization of military action and that the US coalition was referred to as the "Occupying Power," and as such was responsible in Moscow's view under international law for "solving humanitarian problems" in Iraq.

Despite the bitterness engendered by the debates over Iraq, it became apparent that the United States and the Security Council would have to work together on rebuilding Iraq. The French and Russians blustered, but withheld their veto power, and Res. 1483 of May 22 gave the Americans their essential next requirement by lifting all nonmilitary sanctions and transferring control of oil revenues to the occupation authority, thus resolving legal questions which had held up oil sales. In response, the US went along with a somewhat expanded role for a UN Special Representative and left the door open for later consideration of UNMOVIC inspections. On August 14, another small corner was turned on the road to reconciliation within the Council when Res. 1500 "welcomed" the establishment of the US-sponsored Governing Council of Iraq, although it pointedly avoided conferring any badge of authority.

The bedrock questions of Iraq's political evolution and reconstruction remained unanswered months after Coalition forces put Saddam Hussein to flight. A period of tough bargaining and continued differences between the United States and other Council members seems certain–whoever wins the US Presidential election in November 2004, neoconservative thinking will remain a strong influence in Congress. How these issues play out will shape not only the fate of Iraq, but the future look of global security architecture and the role to be played henceforth by the Security Council, which suffered a grievous loss of public confidence in the wake of the disputes over Iraq.

1991 v. 2003

Why was the outcome on the Security Council so different in 2002-2003? It's mandate and operating procedures changed not one whit between the two wars with Iraq. The five members with veto powers of course remained the same. The ten non-permanent members rotated, but their overall political make-up was little different: a couple of westerners, the usual contingent of nonaligned movement states from Latin America, Africa and Asia, including the presence in 2003 of Arab Syria to match that of Arab Yemen in 1990.

Two major factors can perhaps be singled out to describe the differing outcomes: the extent of the threat to international peace and the leadership of the United States as the world's only superpower with the capability to deploy decisive force.

  1. The nature of the crime. Saddam's armed attack in 1990 on its much smaller neighbor state was perceived by virtually all UN Member-states as unprovoked aggression that required a Security Council response under the Charter. The issue quickly became whether to use military power to remove the Iraqi army or to squeeze it out over time through sanctions. In the second confrontation, by contrast, there was no such event to instantly clear the minds of governments. The nature of the threat posed by Iraq in 2002 was hotly disputed, the facts were fuzzy, and when the pivotal nations represented on the Council could not find consensus, they split into two opposing camps. Council unity is always problematic: the nonaligned contingent has had irreconcilable differences with the US for years over Arab-Israeli issues, and the case of the former Yugoslavia also illustrated the lingering gap between East and West. The Iraq crisis of 2002/3 showed that even western democracies with deeply shared fundamental values will not be able to cooperate when their government leaders, whether driven by political-economic considerations or public opinion, perceive the problem to be of a vastly different magnitude.

  2. US leadership and 9/11. The Administration of the senior President Bush was predisposed in 1990 to forge an international coalition under UN auspices, although it reserved to itself the ultimate decision on using force under the right of self-defense for Kuwait. At the time the US bid for Security Council cooperation was a bold step given uncertainty at home, the initial hesitation of critical allies such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and the unpredictability of the Soviet Union and China. In the first three months after Saddam's August 1990 invasion of Kuwait, there was a substantial body of opinion in the US and abroad that favored sanctions as the main instrument to bring Saddam to heel. But the US Administration successfully argued that Kuwait should be freed without delay through military action. Of equal import, Washington made clear that it could assemble sufficient force to do the job without fail–the "job" of course did not include occupying and rebuilding Iraq, a task that could not be so easily guaranteed. In the end Council members were responsive to US proposals largely on their merits, although the US was not above using pressure tactics to influence waverers.

In 2002-2003 the younger Bush, along with his closest advisors and some leaders of the Republican-controlled Congress, viewed the UN as largely untrustworthy and obstructionist. Spurred by the events of 9/11, the US had a plan of action–war–that was assured of success, but its objectives exceeded those deemed acceptable by other Council members, in particular France, Russia, and China (and Germany after January 1, 2003). While there is little likelihood the Council could have been persuaded to support the use of force, the US take-it-or-leave-it approach appeared to rule out compromise, maximize resentment and undercut the basis for post-combat cooperation.

In any event, Anglo-American forces invaded Iraq in March 2003 and within several weeks declared "victory." But, in the wake of the military successes of April 2003, it was by no means clear what the ultimate fate of Iraq would be. In fact, history seemed not to be cooperating with the forces of occupation. Washington (despite British opposition) initially blocked a larger UN role in Iraq, and thus pressed ahead with plans to pacify the region and its restive populations itself. In the face of ongoing civil chaos throughout Iraq (reminiscent, one might add, of the resistance to British domination of Iraqi society during and after the mandate), the U.S. began calling for a more proactive role for the United Nations in Iraq, an appeal jeopardized when the UN headquarters in Baghdad was destroyed in August 2003 with significant loss of life, including the head of mission, Sergio Vieira de Mello. What remains to be seen, and what most observers have failed to note, is that the fate of Iraq will ultimately be determined by the Iraqi people themselves, not by the fiat of the Anglo-American forces of occupation. If the past history of Iraq offers any instruction, the omens bode ill for outsiders seeking to determine Iraq's destiny.

Underlying the differences between the two Security Council cases is the question of whether the 1990-1991 success was a fluke–like the response to the Korean War–or a precedent relevant for the future. Conversely, was 2002-2003 more a result of Florida presidential election ballot counts or a revelation of the Council's fatal flaws that require rebuilding from the foundation up? The following section offers some judgments.

Conclusions: What is to be Done?

The invasion of Iraq and its aftermath have spawned a vigorous and often confusing debate over the future of the Security Council. Is it the right institution for the job; how useful is it; should it be done away with; should it be reformed and if so how? What should the US advocate in the wake of its experience before, during, and after the lightning quick coalition victory of 2003?

The benefits derived with Security Council engagement in the first Gulf War were enormous. For starters, other nations provided $54 billion for the war effort, defraying 88 percent of the $61 billion total US military costs. Sanctions voted by the Council had the force of international law immediately upon passage by the Council. The legitimacy or political cover afforded by Council approval went far to defuse potential religious or ethnic resentments. And additional troops, such as those contributed by France and Egypt in Desert Storm, if not essential to victory, did their part on the battlefield and conveyed an important political message of unity in the process.

The "coalition of the willing" of 2003 obviously did not go nearly so far to share the pain and work. While the Administration still argues that the invasion was necessary, doubts have grown about the rationale for military action. It is perhaps impossible to say that a serious effort to impose "smart" sanctions and make UNMOVIC work would have brought a better outcome, but US inflexibility and evident disdain for the Security Council surely maximized resentment and minimized the possibilities for compromise.

The train wreck at the Security Council of 2002-03 was the end of a downward spiral that started before the dust settled from Desert Storm in 1991. The Iraq policy of US Administrations through the 1990s was caught between hawks at home who demanded strong measures against Saddam and doves (or opportunists) abroad who wanted to return as soon as practicable to business as usual with the Iraqi government. Over the decade, UNSCOM inspections were emasculated and finally ended, the sanctions regime was weakened even as Saddam managed to win the propaganda war wrongfully blaming the US for deaths of thousands of children, and the French and Russians became entangled in the future of Iraqi oil. Thus, even before the terrible events of September 11, 2001, the split within the Permanent Five of the Security Council was virtually irreconcilable. By 2002-2003, the gut issue had become whether the Perm Five would at best find a way to agree to disagree.

Does the US Really Need the Security Council?

The primary purpose served by Security Council approval of military action is the conferment of "legitimacy," in effect endorsement by the mainstream international community. Secretary General Annan's "fork in the road" represents a choice in his view between what is now "the unique legitimacy provided by the United Nations" and an unfilled, potentially dangerous, void. The Security Council is the only body that can confer internationally recognized legality. Many neoconservatives deride the notion of Security Council legitimacy. They find it meaningless since it hinges on the approval of countries, like China, which they believe is not fit to stand in judgment of the United States, or France or Russia, which may (heaven forbid!) act upon narrow national interest. Nonetheless, the fact remains that a Security Council mandate is the most credible measure of world opinion and has a recognized function in international law, however imperfect the system may be. Without the Council's blessing, one group's knight errant in shining armor can be another group's wild west bandit in the movie classic "Treasure of the Sierra Madre," who, when asked to prove his authority, responded, "I don't need no stinkin' badge."

The Security Council's worldwide legal reach is especially important whenever sanctions are at issue. The UN Charter obligates member nations to carry out Council decisions, thus providing an international framework for implementation of embargoes on trade, transportation or financial transactions. Absent a Council fiat, some basis in a treaty or international agreement is required. The Security Council's post September 11 terrorism resolution requires all countries to prosecute terrorists, freeze their assets and take steps against funding and recruitment–within a few months over 170 countries had designated official points of contact for coordination. This running start could not have been achieved otherwise without complex, time-consuming negotiations, government-by-government.

When the United States has proceeded on its own, there has been a price to pay, although not an unbearable one for a superpower. The US military actions to force regime change in Grenada and Panama elicited reproach from many quarters, but no nation, took any serious action, and within months the events faded from view. Nonetheless, such American interventions doubtless linger in memories and contribute to resentment of American power–how much Security Council approval would negate this factor is difficult to say. There is little doubt, however, that billions of dollars would flow from an amicable arrangement that led to Council approval for reconstruction of Iraq in 2003 and beyond.

In any case, for most of the last sixty years the world has survived without an effective Security Council. As noted in preceding sections, the confrontation between East and West neutralized the Council soon after it came into being. For the next four decades, the Council was able to deal only with minor crises that did not affect vital interests of the veto-wielding powers. After the Cold War it flexed its muscles briefly, only to find itself within a short time once again hobbled by Perm Five disunity. When Americans dissented on Arab-Israeli issues or the Russians went their way on the former Yugoslavia, there was grumbling–but few pronounced the Council terminally ill, until the American outbursts in 2002-2003.

But while the United States may be able to act without Security Council approval, it is wrong to discard the Council like an old shoe. Intervention by a coalition of the willing should be seen as regrettable and temporary, lest a minority group of nations, self-selected by virtue of wealth and power, become an unrestrained world policeman. To move in this direction gives up on the progress made since 1945 toward a rule of law. As Michael Ignatieff has put it, "The signal failure of American foreign policy since the end of the Cold War has not been a lack of will to lead and to intervene; it has been a failure to imagine the possibility of a United States once again cooperating with others to create rules for the international community."

Would Security Council Reform Help?

Can reform of the Security Council make it more supportable in the United States and assure it a more effective role on the international stage? Criticisms of the Council have focused on three issues: its membership and voting makeup; procedures that allow countries like Syria to be seated; and weaknesses in its operational capabilities for peace operations.

There is no denying the membership anomalies that exist, in particular given the rise of Japan, Germany, and India (some would throw in Brazil, perhaps others) to positions of world leadership arguably on par with at least France and Britain among the Permanent Five. But no reform proposals have gotten very far in the face of harsh realities: at least one of the Permanent Five is virtually certain to veto any effort to deny or dilute its veto power; and there is no easy way to accommodate regional competition such as that between India and Pakistan or Brazil and Latin American peers for any favored seating arrangement with or without a veto.

The Security Council could be made more representative even without structural change. Non-permanent members are chosen by regional caucus and have an implicit duty to fairly represent the regional consensus. Ways could be sought to make this obligation more explicit and thereby give greater weight to the regional group. Moreover, if white South Africa could be denied a seat because of apartheid policies, in theory any country could be barred for activities such as supporting terrorists. The practice of rotating seats on the Council (and other UN bodies) to achieve "equitable geographic representation," without regard for the government's character, seriously compromises the institution's credibility and effectiveness.

A second set of reform proposals concerns the Council's operational capabilities to respond to crises. In 2000, the UN issued a comprehensive study, the Brahimi Report, detailing issues in UN peacekeeping operations and recommending changes, which have been partially implemented. Here too, lack of vision frustrates progress on crucial aspects such as funding limits, the size and power of the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the sources and sharing of intelligence, the relationship between troop contributors and the Security Council, and the relevance of women's issues. Washington has offered few concrete proposals to advance the dialogue and much of the State Department's energy has been devoted to securing country-by-country agreements to exempt US peacekeeping participants from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.

In today's context, however, such reform proposals put the cart before the horse, given the US Administration's challenge to the basic principles of existing UN security mechanisms. The Security Council as an institution was not to blame because France and Russia disagreed with the US and Britain over what to do about Saddam Hussein in 2002-2003. Nor could the Council be expected to somehow knock down the fence between the two sides and no amount of tinkering with the Council's make-up or guidelines will give it the capability to do so in the future.

The United States: Leading Citizen or Top Cop?

The contretemps of 2003 has made evident that there is now no clear consensus on the extent of Security Council responsibility nor on how to deal with crises when the Council is deadlocked. Perhaps the most salient question is not what to do with the Security Council, but what to do when the Perm Five cannot agree. In the case of Saddam Hussein in 2002, the US answer obviously was a "coalition of the willing," while opponents resentfully acquiesced. It is not a heartening precedent, but it demonstrated America's dominating position. The key to progress toward a workable system for international security lies in Washington, not New York. Neither major military action nor economic sanctions can succeed without US participation. For the foreseeable future, the US will remain the only superpower and, for better or worse, Uncle Sam's seal of approval is necessary if any global security architecture is to be viable.

When massive military force is required, active US participation is essential for success. No other nation has the power to mount and sustain military operations on the scale of the two wars with Iraq. Not all crises are of such enormous proportion, however. In more circumscribed situations, smaller forces under UN auspices have succeeded without major US support, such as the Australians in East Timor and the British in Sierra Leone. Unfortunately, this experience has not been built upon and the Security Council has not been able to devise truly effective responses to the horrors of internecine fighting in places such as Liberia and the Congo.

As for economic sanctions, the commanding position of the US in the world economy is similarly crucial to success for any international effort. Although Washington at times undermined trade restrictions imposed against South Africa and Rhodesia, private campaigns inside the US, such as the widespread calls to withdraw US capital from South African investments, helped sustain the pressure that contributed to the end of minority white rule in both countries. On the other hand, the US alone cannot assure success. Porous borders and/or noncooperative nations can dilute the impact of sanctions as happened to Washington's great frustration in the case of Iraq after the Gulf War.

Ironically, throughout the 1990's and on to the present day, US public opinion has consistently favored working through and with the UN. Congressional action has not reflected this reality, although, after the more moderate Senator Richard Lugar replaced Helms, the tenor has markedly improved and the United States has cleared up most of its overdue payments. Liberals who would put the UN more to the fore have been unable to articulate the case for more robust support for UN programs or to find ways to deal with controversial issues such as the Kyoto Protocol and the International Criminal Court.

It is time to again make America the world's leading citizen rather than just its strongest cop. This does not mean America has to forswear the use of force, but it does mean Washington should take the lead in advancing the rule of law and rely on armed combat only as the last resort. Whether the 2003 invasion of Iraq was justified or not, Americans should look at the genesis and consequences of that event to help prepare for the next such test.

The successes of the Security Council, first and foremost in the Persian Gulf War, demonstrate that it is in the US interest to participate fully in the Council. The Council's failures demonstrate that it is still an imperfect instrument, and the United States should take the lead in exploring ways to improve it. But the perfect should not become the enemy of the good–it makes far more sense to build on the progress made since 1945 than to throw away the Council or reduce it to a small claims court that takes on only problems of minor consequence.

A sensible US policy to right things after the debacles of the last decade would flow from the following principles:

Now is the time to start such a return to a stronger multilateral orientation for America's foreign policy, although a major turn in this direction is unlikely under the current Administration. The issue is already on the agenda for the presidential election in 2004. It remains to be seen whether the US public's support for greater international cooperation will translate into action.

February 6, 2004

 

Endnotes

Note *: M. James Wilkinson, a retired career U.S. Foreign Service officer, served as deputy U.S. representative on the UN Security Council with the rank of ambassador. Earlier he was deputy assistant secretary of state for European affairs. His recent publications include The Cyprus Drama: The Last Act (2002). Back

Note **:Christopher D. O'Sullivan received his Ph.D. from the London School of Economics and is currently a lecturer in history at the University of San Francisco. He is the author of Sumner Welles, Postwar Planning, and the Quest for a New World Order, 1937-1943 (2003), which won the American Historical Association's Gutenberg Prize. Back