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National Security Policy and the Strong Executive: The French and American Presidents and the War on Terror
By Tom Lansford
*
and Robert J. Pauly Jr.
**
Introduction
The terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001, presented a test of the transatlantic security regime and challenged the prevailing notions of national security on both sides of the Atlantic. In response, the allied nations provided a variety of direct and indirect support for the American-led military, economic, and legal campaign against terrorism. While British Prime Minister Tony Blair exerted significant influence over the military action in Afghanistan in 2001 and then stood as the most important ally of the United States during the Iraqi campaign of 2003, French President Jacques Chirac found himself marginalized and French influence degraded as Franco-American relations reached their lowest level since that country's withdrawal from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1966.
In order to analyze the limited role of France in the military campaign in Afghanistan and its strident opposition to U.S. policy on Iraq, this essay examines the policy choices and preferences of France and the United States in the aftermath of the September 2001 terrorist attacks. Specifically, it presents a comparative analysis of the foreign policy and national security powers of the French and American presidencies against the framework of longstanding trends in each nation's foreign affairs. Differences in policy over both Afghanistan and Iraq are utilized to demonstrate the manifestation of these trends. In each case, the essay examines the underlying causes of the rift between the George W. Bush administration and Chirac's government over post-11 September policy toward the Greater Middle East broadly and those states suspected of developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and sponsoring terrorist organizations in that context in particular. It concludes with an evaluation of the extent to which such differences of opinion have the potential to undermine cohesion in the transatlantic relationship over both the short and long terms.
"Strong" Presidencies and Foreign Policy
France and the United States have presidential systems which give their nations' highest elected official wide powers to conduct foreign and security policy. To different degrees, the division of responsibilities for both nations' highest office reflects Wildavsky's concept of "two-presidencies" in which one facet represents domestic policy and one represents foreign policy. 1 In writing about the U.S. chief executive, Wildavsky summarized contemporary scholarship on the foreign policy powers of the presidency and identified five main reasons for the concentration of power: 1) since foreign policy and security issues often need "fast action", the executive rather than the legislative branch of government is the more appropriate decision-making structure; 2) the Constitution grants the president broad formal powers; 3) because of the complexities involved voters tend to delegate to the president their "trust and confidence" to act; 4) the "interest group structure is weak, unstable and thin"; and 5) the legislature follows a "self-denying ordinance" since tradition and practicality reinforce the power of the chief executive. 2 Wildavsky's work is echoed by many scholars, including Logan, who contends that in Western democracies, "the mass public consciously or unconsciously cedes influence" to politicians and policy elites. 3
The U.S. government is based on a presidential system and is generally regarded as the first presidential regime. 4 In contrast, France has a semi-presidential regime in which the executive is split between an elected president and a prime minister contingent on a majority in the legislature. 5 Hence, France's semi-presidential system has a dual executive authority in which presidential power is directly correlated to political control of the parliament. This allows for different "balances" of the "autonomy potential" of the executive. 6 For instance, if the president's party controls the parliament, then the power potential of the prime minister tends to be diminished whereas if there is a period of "cohabitation" (the prime minister is of a different party) the power of the president is lessened.
Still the foreign and security powers of both presidents are remarkably similar. 7 In both cases, the concentration of power in the office of the president came as a reaction to the security and diplomatic weaknesses of the previous governments. In the case of the United States, the extraordinary military and foreign policy powers given to the chief executive came as a result of both foreign and domestic dangers exposed by the failure of the Articles of Confederation. The nation's first president, the Revolutionary War hero George Washington, provided the necessary reassurance against tyranny and abuse of authority to assuage the populace, while he enunciated the isolationist principles which continue to influence the country's interaction with the world. 8
In the case of France, the dramatic disintegration of the Fourth Republic against the traumas of decolonization in Indochina and Algeria provided the World War II general Charles de Gaulle the opportunity to serve in a Washingtonian role as the founder of the Fifth Republic. Unlike Washington, however, de Gaulle personally crafted the French presidential system to reflect his personal policy preferences and his belief in the continuing grandeur of France and the nation's rank. 9 For, while exceptionalism in American foreign policy is often manifested through isolationist pressures, in France, the same sense of exceptionalism forms the core of the country's "civilizing mission"—the prevalent belief that it is the duty of France to disseminate culture and economic progress among the lesser states of the globe. 10
The U.S. President and Constitution
In both instances, the weaknesses of the previous regimes paved the way for strong executives. Under the United States Constitution, adopted in 1789, the president is specifically granted the most significant powers in the realm of foreign and security policies. 11 The bulk of the president's power comes from Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, which stipulates that the President is "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States" and of the state militia's when called into federal service. 12 The Section also grants the president the sole power to negotiate treaties (subject to confirmation by a vote of two-thirds of the Senate) and appoint ambassadors (subject to confirmation by a simple majority of the Senate).
While the power to declare war is vested in the hands of Congress through Article 1, Section 8, the president may deploy forces and engage in combat for up to 60 days without congressional approval under the terms of the 1973 War Powers Resolution. While the law theoretically limits the ability of the president to use U.S. troops in combat and increases the oversight ability of Congress, contemporary history has shown the measure does not significantly impede the chief executive's capacity to use military force. 13
In addition to the explicit constitutional and legal foundations of presidential security powers, a variety of factors, including tradition, necessity and interpretations of the Supreme Court have expanded the boundaries of executive authority. The traditional freedom given to U.S. presidents to use military force without a congressional declaration of war has come to be seen as a manifestation of executive privilege. 14
Furthermore, American foreign policy is rooted in the notion of the "sole organ theory" which holds that the president is the "sole" source of foreign and security policy. 15 This theory has served as the underpinning for the dramatic twentieth-century expansion of executive power. For instance, the Supreme Court decision United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corporation (1936) gave executive agreements the weight of law (and thereby bypassed the senatorial approval required of treaties), while Goldwater v. Carter (1979) confirmed the ability of the president to withdraw from international treaties without congressional consent. 16
The result of this concentration of power has been the repeated presidential use of the U.S. military throughout the nation's history without a formal congressional declaration of war and an increased preference by both the executive and the legislature for such actions. 17 One feature of this trend was consistency in U.S. foreign policy, especially during the Cold War era. Even during periods when the United States experienced divided government, with the White House controlled by one political party and all or half of the Congress controlled by the party in opposition, the executive was able to develop and implement foreign and security policy with only limited constraints. 18 Given the nature of the terrorist groups that attacked the United States on 11 September 2001, such policy habits proved useful since a formal declaration of war was seen as problematic in terms of the specific identification of the foe and the ability of the Bush administration to expand combat operations beyond Afghanistan to countries such as Iraq.
The French President and Constitution
Like the U.S. Constitution, the Constitution of the Fifth Republic concentrates foreign and security policy powers in the hands of the President of the Republic. However, in case of France, such power is concentrated to an even greater degree. Former French Prime Minister Pierre Messmer asserted that there is no real decision-making process and no room for legislative input when it comes to foreign and security policy because "the President is the sole decision-maker." 19 Ideally, de Gaulle envisioned a presidency that would be "above political struggles" and a "national arbiter." 20 The reality was that the office provided the president with wide ranging powers and successive presidents have used their position to pursue both partisan policies and to reinforce long-standing traditions in the nation's foreign policy. 21
The result of such concentration of power has been a degree of stability in the nation's politics that was absent during the Fourth Republic. While the American Constitution emphasizes limitations on executive power through a system of checks and balances, de Gaulle formulated the constitution of the Fifth Republic with an eye toward making the executive strong and effective. Rohr contends that the constitutions of the two nations then "pull in opposite directions." 22 The result gives the French president greater explicit power, although his American counterpart may have greater implicit power.
Under Article 15 of the Fifth Republic's Constitution, the president is the commander-in-chief of the nation's armed forces and presides over the meetings of France's highest military councils and committees. While the Council of Ministers appoints ambassadors, officials for the overseas territories and senior military officers, the president does make appointments for both the foreign service and most military officers (Article 13 of the Constitution distinguishes between which posts are appointed by the Council of Ministers and those appointed by the president). Under Article 52, the president also negotiates and ensures the ratification of treaties, although like his U.S. counterpart, there are constraints on this power in that treaties must be countersigned by the prime minister. 23
There are two major powers granted by the constitution to the president that are unmatched in American politics. First, under Article 11, the French president has the power to call referenda on issues and thereby bypass the Assembly. For instance, during the first period of cohabitation, then Prime Minister Chirac sought to participate in the American Strategic Defense Initiative or Star Wars program. However, he was forced to back down after President François Mitterrand threatened to call for a referendum on the issue (Mitterrand stated "France will never participate [in Star Wars] as long as I am here. If you insist, I will make a referendum on this issue and I will win"). 24
The second major constitutional option enjoyed by the French president, but not his American counterpart, is contained in Article 16 of the constitution. The Article gives the president the power to assume exceptional emergency powers in the case of a national crisis. The Article has only been used once, during the 1961 military rebellion in Algeria, and was designed to deal with emergencies such as a nuclear war. 25 There are strict criteria which must be met, including consultations with the Prime Minster, Constitutional Council and presidents of the Assemblies. Nonetheless, the measure gives the president extraordinary powers to deal with significant threats to national security or the functioning of the government. And while it requires the president to consult with various officials, it does not require their assent for the invocation of Article 16. 26 It reaffirms that, during times of national crisis, the executive, in the office of the president, is superior to the rest of the government. 27
The president's authority in foreign and security matters is directly tied to control of parliament. When the president's party is in power, there has been little opposition or interference in these policy areas as the president's and prime minister's "preferences are likely to be close. 28 Writing in 1964, Mitterrand even commented that: "There are Ministers in France. It is even rumored that there is still a Prime Minister. But there is no longer a government. Only the President of the Republic orders and decides. 29 Vallee asserts that this "predominance is based first on law, second on the legitimacy conferred by the election mode, and third on the majority factor." 30 In other words, the double electoral victory, first for the office of the presidency and then his party's victory substantially enhances the legitimacy of presidential primacy in foreign and security policy.
On the other hand, during periods of cohabitation, the prime minister will use his parliamentary majority to increase his influence in the nation's security policies and diplomacy. As a result, irreconcilable policy priorities may occur. Colombani and Lhomeau contend that cohabitation "implies that the President keeps the prerogatives of which the constitution gives him, but also that the Prime Minister governs according to his own views." 31
To a large degree, the degree of struggle and strife is dependent on the personalities in office. During the first period of three periods of cohabitation (1986-1988), Socialist Mitterrand faced a National Assembly of the Right, led by Prime Minister Chirac. However, Chirac preferred to concentrate his priorities on domestic issues and usually gave Mitterrand wide latitude in foreign and security policy, including naming non-partisan politicians, Jean-Bernard Raimond and Andre Giraud, as Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense, respectively. During the second period (1993-1995), Mitterrand insisted that Conservative Prime Minister Edouard Balladur consult with him over appointments related to defense and foreign policy. Still, friction arose. In 1986, Chirac tried to gain equal status as Mitterrand at the Tokyo Summit of the G-7 and Jospin endeavored to compete with Chirac for recognition at the 1997 Franco-German Summit. 32
The cohabitation era between Chirac and Jospin was the longest of the three periods and lasted from 1997 to 2002. In terms of foreign and security policy, it was also the most contentious. Jospin signaled his intention to challenge Chirac in the 2002 presidential election, and endeavored to use office to undermine the president's traditional command of security and diplomatic policy. Chirac's authority was undermined in the public eye by his decision to call for early elections (a factor in the electoral loss of the Right). During the five-year cohabitation period, Jospin enhanced the powers and prestige of the office of prime minister while the stature of the presidency declined. For instance, Lawday claimed that the presidency became an almost ceremonial position as head of state without the normal executive powers. 33 Nonetheless, the core elements of French foreign and security policy remained in place throughout the period thanks to the general acceptance of the Gaullist consensus on France's place in the world.
American Foreign Policy
The foreign policies of both the United States and France are rooted in the belief in exceptionalism. However, this widespread and domestically popular belief in both nations is manifested in divergent fashions. In the United States, exceptionalism was based on the idea that the United States was unique because of a variety of factors including geography, politics and culture. Lepgold and McKeown contend that the belief in this exceptionalism lay in the longstanding manner in which "Americans depreciate power politics and old-fashioned diplomacy, mistrust powerful standing armies and entangling peacetime commitments, make moralistic judgements about other people's domestic systems, and believe that liberal values transfer readily to foreign affairs." 34
As a result of this exceptionalism, Kerry asserts that successive "American presidents have been addicted to citing the absence of territorial claims as evidence of the high purpose and moral purity with which the U.S. projects power to far places. This virtue is believed by Americans to distinguish the U.S. from any other power in the world, including other democracies." 35 The idea of American exceptionalism was expressed domestically in the doctrine of manifest destiny and its explicit belief in the superiority of Euro-Americans over native peoples. 36 In foreign affairs, the notion of exceptionalism can be tied to two contradictory trends: isolationism and internationalism.
George Washington's oft-quoted admonishment to "avoid permanent alliances" and the principles of the Monroe Doctrine acted as dual constraints on any efforts to project American influence outside of the hemisphere. Dunne suggests that the term most used to describe U.S. foreign policy during this period—"isolationism"—should be replaced with the more accurate phrase "hemispheric unilateralism." 37 This concept holds that Americans may have actively sought to avoid political or security entanglement with Europe, but successive administrations were able to garner public support for expansion and interaction in Central and South America. The ability of the president to rally public opinion lay in the nature of American attitudes toward foreign policy. For instance, Almond asserts that for the most part, Americans are, and have traditionally been, "indifferent" to foreign affairs, but that indifference could quickly turn to "anger" with the right motivations (leading to "dangerous overreactions" on the part of the populace). 38
For presidents such as Theodore Roosevelt, and later Woodrow Wilson, who believed in American internationalism, exceptionalism also carried with it an implicit duty to apply uniquely American qualities such as democracy and individual rights to other nations. This belief in "democratic universalism" reflected that the political ethnocentrism at the core of most Americans' view of the world—"everyone ought to be like us." 39 Such beliefs would be used to justify intervention in Central and South America and the acquisition of territories such as the Philippines since it was incumbent upon the United States to foster democracy in these developing nations. Following this line of reasoning, manifest destiny was rooted in the drive to spread American political and economic values throughout the continent and once the "Americanization" of the continent was fairly secure, ideological forces drove the nation to endeavor to spread these same values throughout Asia and the Caribbean. 40 Rosenberg argues that this "liberal developmentalism" was based on five principles: 1) the belief that other nations could copy the development patterns of the United States; 2) the promotion of free enterprise; 3) championing global free trade and open markets; 4) staunch support for the free flow of information (including an open and free media); and 5) an "acceptance" of government actions to protect and promote American business interests. 41
One common manifestation of the combination of isolationism and internationalism in American foreign policy is unilateralism since exceptionalism leads policymakers to assume that other nations do not have the same motives or interests as the United States. Hence while isolationism and the potential for a U.S. withdrawal "haunted" the Western Europeans during the Cold War era, Boniface points out that the current fear among European capitals is the "specter of U.S. unilateralism." 42
French Foreign Policy
French foreign policy is also based on exceptionalism. At the core of this concept are the twin, interrelated principles of grandeur and rank. 43 Grandeur in foreign policy is inexorably tied to the "civilizing mission" of France whereby it is incumbent upon the French to export the ideals and values of the Revolution. 44 Meanwhile, both grandeur and rank revolve around the central axis of global responsibility. Because France continues to promote itself as a great power,French policy is rooted in the assumption that the nation has both international status and duty. For instance, its white papers on defense still speak of the nation's "world rank." 45
From the mid-twentieth century onward rank and grandeur have been expressed through the evolution of the Gaullist consensus in foreign policy. 46 This approach, which has been embraced by both the Left and Right mainstream parties is based on three main principles: 1) autonomy in foreign affairs; 2) the "construction" of a united Europe to enhance French influence and diminish German power; and 3) the preservation of influence in former French colonies and other areas of the developing world. 47 The key to all three goals is the first. Preservation of independence in foreign and security policy was the only way to ensure the nation's global rank (and to counter both U.S. isolationism and later unilateralism).
In light of declining resources and power in the post-World War II era, the principle means to maintain autonomy became power magnification As their national power declined with the loss of the empire, successive French governments endeavored to utilize the growing institutions that marked the transatlantic community to augment the nation's dwindling power and influence.Thus, as Becker notes, France's support for the institutional framework of Europe was "a projection of its national aims on a larger scale." 48 This support is described by Treacher as the "transferral of national ambitions to a European collectivity." 49
The periodic assaults on the global prominence of France, such as the defeat in Indochina, the Suez Crisis, and the Algerian quagmire, reaffirmed the Gaullist consensus and ensured its continuation even as specific policies were transformed. As a result, de Gaulle's "double no" ("no" to NATO and "no" to a federated Europe) would later be translated into support for both NATO and the European Union (EU) as these organizations were seen as a means to maximize French influence and leadership. 50 Three major phases can be identified within this transition: "First was the transfer of national ambitions onto France's European partners and subsequent attempts to mobilize them into a cohesive global political actor under implicit French leadership. With this in mind, promotion of the French "exception" was equally a central tactical tool at the time. The second phase was characterized by a downplaying of the French "exception" and a greater emphasis on working within [italics in the original] NATO. And the third phase has seen the resurrection of the autonomous European project." 51
One manifestation of policy which was designed to both reaffirm autonomy and to elevate global rank was the strategy of acting as an interlocutor. For instance, at the height of the Cold War, France endeavored to develop itself as a third way or alternative to the two superpowers in a bid to maximize its policy independence and world influence. 52 In the aftermath of the Cold War, France tried to develop itself as a bridge between the United States and those nations the superpower deemed to be pariahs, including Iraq, Libya and Iran. 53 This was particularly true of the events surrounding the Persian Gulf War and would later be replicated during the successive Balkan crises where France endeavored to forestall military action against the Serbs, even though it created a strain in Franco-German relations. The strategy would find its ultimate expression in the diplomatic wrangling over Iraq.
As these efforts to present itself as an interlocutor failed in succession, Rynning asserts that France continued to try to establish a "bridging position that implied neither unilateralism nor alliance integration." 54 Still, by the mid-1990s, there was an emerging acceptance of joint military operations. Under Chirac, Paris even began to reintegrate into the military structure of the Alliance as "joint allied work on military missions was accepted by all political parties (unlike NATO's political role) and has lost political significance." 55
It was Mitterrand who first accepted the necessity of multilateral military coordination at a strategic level, as a way to achieve more strategic influence within the Alliance. 56 Chirac continued this process and supported NATO and other Allied military operations, all the while endeavoring to remain true to two of the basic premises of Gaullism: maximum diplomatic autonomy; and a leadership role for France commensurate with the nation's global rank. French participation in operations in the Balkans or even Afghanistan was simply an extension of traditional policy in which multilateral structures or coalitions were viewed as vehicles to enhance the role and influence of Paris. Although France participated in these campaigns, there remained resistence to American command dominance of the command and control structures, even when the United States provided the overwhelming bulk of the forces. This was simply a manifestation of the continuing resistence to American unilateralism.
Afghanistan as Prelude
The early policy choices of the Bush administration were perceived to foretell of a renewed U.S. unilateralism. Officials in Paris pointed to transatlantic strains over the Kyoto Treaty, National Missile Defense in the United States, and a range of trade disputes as proof that the Bush administration intended a retreat from the post-Cold War multilateralism of previous American governments. 57 The attacks on 11 September seemed to change this. Chirac was the first foreign head of state to visit Washington in the aftermath of the attacks and he pledged broad French support for the United States. In fact, France supported U.S. efforts to improve intelligence-sharing and law enforcement cooperation on terrorism. The French further supported the U.S. effort to gain invocation of Article V of the NATO charter (the collective defense clause). 58 However, there quickly emerged divergences between the two countries over the strategy and scope of the American war on terror.
The French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine (who had previously denounced the United States as a "hyper-power") attempted to establish France as an interlocutor in the Arab-Israeli Conflict and continued to oppose U.S. policy on transatlantic trade. 59 Chirac pressed for a greater role in planning the military strategy of Operation Enduring Freedom and demanded greater French influence in planning as a precondition for significant participation in the campaign. This was refused by the Bush administration, which instead relied mainly on U.S. military assets during the military phase of Operation Enduring Freedom. Subsequently, Jospin and Vedrine were especially vocal in their denunciations of Bush's "axis-of-evil" speech which they described as "simplistic and absurd." 60
Once the campaign was over, France protested the post-Taliban division of labor under which the United States retained operational command in Afghanistan, even over the UN peacekeeping forces. 61 Chirac especially objected to being tasked to "clean-up" after the American campaign. He perceived that the signal from the Bush administration was that the Americans would "do the cooking and prepare what people are going to eat, then you [the French] will wash the dirty dishes." 62 The result of U.S. policy was the loss of prestige or rank for France and a seeming confirmation of the unilateralism of the Bush administration.
Chirac became determined to avoid marginalization. Buoyed by electoral successes in 2002 which gave him a majority in the National Assembly, the French President endeavored to increase the role of the UN in the war on terrorism. For instance, France steadfastly maintained that any expansion of the war on terrorism would require approval by the UN Security Council. 63 Throughout the build-up to the campaign in Iraq, Chirac categorically maintained that military operations against Iraq were "not a topical issue," and he stated, "I hope it will never become a topical issue because intervention would have serious consequences for the international coalition against terrorism." 64 Instead, he insisted that Iraq was a separate issue from the war on terrorism and that the UN was the best way to disarm the regime of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). 65
American Preemption and French Obstructionism
Speaking before the UN General Assembly on 12 September 2002, Bush issued a stern warning to Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, one demonstrative of a fundamental shift in American foreign and security policy. In the context of that address, the President made three unambiguous points. First, he demanded that Iraq refrain from the development of nuclear, chemical and biological WMD, a promise Saddam's regime made in the context of its surrender at the conclusion of the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War and had since broken repeatedly. Second, he challenged the UN to carry out its responsibilities by impressing upon Saddam the need to disarm in an internationally verifiable manner as stipulated in myriad previous Security Council Resolutions. Third, he emphasized the United States would act—multilaterally if possible but unilaterally if necessary—to remove the threats posed to American interests by Iraq's development of WMD and support for transnational terrorist groups including but not limited to Al Qaeda. 66
Five days after Bush's UN address, his administration released its first formal National Security Strategy (NSS), an initiative designed to warn American adversaries generally and Iraq specifically that the United States would no longer tolerate either the development and proliferation of WMD or the state sponsorship of terrorist. Essentially, Bush's NSS represented a shift in strategy from the containment doctrine of the Cold War era and comparably reactive policy-making of the Clinton administration to the use of preemptive means to safeguard U.S. interests at home and abroad. It was a shift necessitated by the changing nature of the severity of the threats posed to American security in the post-11 September world. 67 As National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice has argued, "some threats are so potentially catastrophic—and can arrive with so little warning, by means that are untraceable—that they cannot be contained. . . . So as a matter of common sense, the United States must be prepared to take action, when necessary, before threats have fully materialized." 68
Put simply, the Bush administration used its policy toward Iraq as a test case for the practical implementation of the NSS. It did so through a three-part strategy that has unfolded between September 2002 and the present. First, Bush attempted to use diplomatic measures to ensure Iraqi disarmament, most notably by securing the return of UN weapons inspectors to Iraq under the auspices of Security Council Resolution 4112, which was passed unanimously on 8 November 2002. 69 Second, when Saddam refused to comply fully with the weapons inspectors, the United States collaborated with the United Kingdom—and, to a lesser degree, allies including Australia and several Eastern and Central European states—to forcibly remove the Iraqi regime from power in orchestrating a campaign that lasted just over one month between mid-March and mid-April 2003. Third, the Americans and British are currently leading a coalition of the willing to build a democratic system in Iraq over the long term.
During the initial stage of the above process, Chirac consistently voiced his unambiguous opposition to the use of military force to disarm Iraq and employed all diplomatic measures at his disposal to block that course of action. For example, although France voted for Resolution 4112, it did so only because that measure did not explicitly sanction the use of force against Iraq. Ultimately, when the United States, the United Kingdom and Spain indicated they would seek a second resolution condoning military action to disarm Saddam's regime, Chirac responded that "whatever the circumstances, France will vote no," ensuring that the campaign for any such resolution was stillborn. 70
Chirac's behavior raises one overarching question: Why was he so insistent that the United States not remove Saddam from power? In short, there are three reasons, each of which includes both domestic and international components that require more detailed independent explanations. First, France had close public and private economic ties with Saddam's regime, which it was understandably eager to preserve. Second, France plays host to a growing Muslim population, one whose members were unequivocally opposed to U.S. military action against Iraq and by no means averse to expressing their opposition in violent—and thus socially destabilizing—ways. Third, Chirac perceived the Iraq crisis as an opportunity to revitalize flagging French prestige—both within and outside of Europe—in opposition to American predominance in the post-Cold War international system.
Economically, France had much to lose as a result of the liquidation of Saddam's regime. At the governmental level, Baghdad is in debt to Paris to the tune of approximately $8 billion. 71 While the sum itself is not substantial, it suggests the potential existence of linkages between Chirac's administration and the regime in Baghdad that may extend at least peripherally to collusion on the development of WMD. In theory, economic connections between France and Iraq are perhaps even more relevant with respect to the private sector. Most significantly, French oil companies such as TotalFinaElf (TFE) are suspected of negotiating contracts to develop Iraqi oil resources that would enter into force concurrent with the removal of UN economic sanctions against Iraq. While TFE Chairman Thierry Demarest denies signing any such contracts, published reports indicated that the finalization of a deal for TFE to "exploit the huge Majnoon field, with 20 billion barrels of oil, in southern Iraq, as well as the smaller Nahr Umr field nearby" was all but a formality prior to the outbreak of hostilities. 72 Given French opposition to the war, the nascent democratic Iraq is unlikely to TFE nearly so favorably as was true of Saddam.
In addition to these economic considerations, Chirac faced equally pressing domestic political concerns over the potentially volatile reaction of Franco-Muslim communities to any governmental support whatsoever for the American-led use of force against Iraq. There are presently between five and seven million Muslims residing in France. 73 Collectively, they compose both the largest and most economically and socially marginalized French minority group. As a result, Chirac was justifiably concerned over the likelihood if not certainty of domestic instability emanating from the urban housing projects in which most Franco-Islamic communities are situated given past acts of Franco-Muslim defiance ranging from public demonstrations to the prosecution of terrorist attacks. Yet, while Chirac's anti-war strategy mollified France's Muslims in the short term, deeper ethnic and religious divisions are likely to prevail without the development of a more effective governmental strategy to integrate Islamic communities within the societal mainstream over the long term.
Notwithstanding Chirac's domestic economic and political motivations, his opposition to and attempted obstruction of the Bush administration's preemptive strategy toward Iraq was, at its core, a product of the traditional French aversion to the expression of American power in the world. During the Cold War, France consistently sought to create independent roles for itself as a hub of opposition to U.S. leadership within Europe and across the developing world. Manifestations of this trend included de Gaulle's acquisition of a nuclear force de frappe and subsequent withdrawal of France from NATO's military command structure in 1966. It is not unreasonable to characterize Chirac's behavior of late in similar terms to that of de Gaulle. Lacking the economic vitality or military capacity to portray France as a legitimate rival to the United States, Chirac attempted to achieve that objective by using the one body in which Paris possesses power relatively equivalent to that wielded by Washington: the UN Security Council. Regrettably, in the process, he may well have damaged the Franco-American relationship to an extent that will require months—and perhaps—years to repair.
Conclusions
The history of relations between the United States and its European allies has been characterized by alternate periods of collaboration and discord. Notwithstanding short-term European-American disagreements over a variety of economic, military and political issues since the end of World War II—some of which (the 1956 Suez Crisis and stationing of Intermediate Nuclear Forces in Germany in the 1980s, for instance) proved more serious than others—the broader transatlantic relationship has grown progressively deeper with each passing decade. Thus, in one sense, the imbroglio over the 2003 war against Iraq simply represents the latest proverbial broken fencepost for the Americans and Europeans to mend in order to maintain political cohesion across the Atlantic. However, in another sense, the repair work may prove markedly more challenging in this instance than was the case in the past in that it will coincide with the largest widening of the twin pillars of the transatlantic community—NATO and the EU—in either institution's history.
In the process of opposing the use of force to remove Saddam from power, Chirac sparked divisions within both NATO and the EU. Most significantly, Germany elected to join France in obstructing U.S. attempts to forge consensus within NATO on Washington's policy toward Iraq, resulting in a de facto division of the European continent into wings favoring and opposed to the Bush administration's doctrine of preemption. These divisions, in turn, had spillover effects in the context of the EU. With respect to transatlantic community broadly defined, France and Germany—and a number of less influential states including Belgium and Luxembourg—entrenched themselves on one side of the debate over Iraq, while the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Portugal, and the vast majority of prospective EU and NATO members from Eastern and Central Europe aligned themselves with the United States on the other side. Put bluntly, such divisions pose an inopportune—and unnecessary—complication to the scheduled enlargement of NATO and the EU to include several Central and Eastern European states that have staked out positions in opposition to two of the three most politically influential states in Europe.
Ultimately, the United States and France are each at least partially responsible for the predicament in which the transatlantic community finds itself on the eve of the dual enlargement processes slated to move forward in 2004. Bush, for example, could have done a better job accommodating Western European concerns over issues ranging from global warming to the imposition of American steel tariffs in 2001. Chirac, on the other hand, could have been more understanding of U.S. worries over Iraq's development of WMD and sponsorship of terrorist groups, particularly in light of the tragic events of 11 September. Yet, irrespective of the share of the blame apportioned to Washington and Paris, the Bush and Chirac administrations each now have an opportunity if not an obligation to restore cohesion across the Atlantic rather than remain stubbornly aloof and risk a delay—or perhaps a more serious derailment—of the completion of the idea of a Europe whole and free launched in the aftermath of World War II.
Endnotes
Note *: Tom Lansford received his Ph.D. from Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Va. Currently he is an assistant professor of political science, University of Southern Mississippi, Gulf Coast Campus. Back
Note **: Robert J. Pauly, Jr., holds a Ph.D. from Old Dominion University, He is adjunct professor of history and political Science at Norwich University, Northfield, Vermont, and Midlands Technical College. Back
Note 1: A. Wildavsky, "The Two Presidencies," in S. Shull, ed., The Two Presidencies: A Quarter Century Assessment (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1991): 11-25. Back
Note 2: Ibid., 14-17. Back
Note 3: M. Logan, "Elite Analysis of Democracies' International Policy," Perspectives on Political Science 29/1 (2000): Back
Note 4: See M. Shugart, M., and J. Carey. Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Back
Note 5: See M. Duverger, "A New Political Model: Semi-Presidential Government," European Journal of Political Research 8 (1980): 165-87. Back
Note 6: G. Sarotri, Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes, 2nd ed. (New York: New York University Press, 1997): 131-32. Back
Note 7: See J. Rohr, "French Constitutionalism and the Administrative State: A Comparative Textual Study," Administration and Society 24/2 (1992): 224-259. Back
Note 8: On this, see G. Phelps, George Washington and American Constitutionalism (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1994). Back
Note 9: J. LaPonce, The Government of the Fifth Republic: French Political Parties and the Constitution (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1961), 8-9. Back
Note 10: See P. Gordon, A Certain Idea of France: French Security Policy and the Gaullist Legacy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993). Back
Note 11: See L. Fisher, Presidential War Power (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995). Back
Note 12: U.S., The Constitution of the United States of America (1789). Back
Note 13: See E. Collier, The War Powers Resolution: Twenty Years of Experience (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1994). Back
Note 14: D. Adler, and L. George, eds., The Constitution and the Conduct of American Foreign Policy (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996). Back
Note 15: C. Lehman, Making War: The 200-Year-Old Battle Between the President and Congress Over How Americans Go to War (New York: Scribner's, 1992). Back
Note 16: See C. May, In the Name of War: Judicial Review and the War Powers (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1989). Back
Note 17: See, for instance, E. Keynes, Undeclared War: Twilight of Constitutional Power (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1982). Back
Note 18: G. Silverstein, Imbalance of Power: Constitutional Interpretation and the Making of American Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University, 1996). Back
Note 19: M. Kessler, La politique étrangère de la France: Acteurs et processus (Paris: Presses de Science Po, 1999), 166. Back
Note 20: L. Nooman, France: The Politics of Continuity and Change (New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, 1970), 98. Back
Note 21: J. Rohr, "Executive Power and Republican Principles at the Founding of the Fifth Republic," Governance 7 (1994), 113. Back
Note 22: Rohr, "French Constitutionalism," 224. Back
Note 23: France, La Constitution, Journal officiel de la République Française (Paris: 1995). Back
Note 24: G. Chaddock, "In France, Two Heads Are Not Always Better," Christian Science Monitor (16 June 1997). 6. Back
Note 25: M. Harrison, "The French Experience of Exceptional Powers: 1961," Journal of Politics 25/1 (1961), 142. Back
Note 26: Rohr, "French Constitutionalism," 232-4. Back
Note 27: Harrison, 142. Back
Note 28: L. Metcalf, "Measuring Presidential Power," Comparative Political Studies 33/5 (2000): 663-4. Back
Note 29: F. Mitterrand, Le Coup d'Etat Permanent (Paris: Plon, 1964), 98. Back
Note 30: J. Poulard, "The French Double Executive and the Experience of Cohabitation," Political Science Quarterly 105/2 (1990): 243-267. Back
Note 31: J. Colombani and J. Lhomeau, Le Mariage Blanc (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1986), 207. Back
Note 32: Chaddock. Back
Note 33: D. Lawday, "Chirac Shrinks the Presidency", New Statesman 127 (1998): 20-21. Back
Note 34: T. Lepgold and L. McKeown, "Is American Foreign Policy Exceptional? An Empirical Analysis," Political Science Quarterly, 110/3 (1995), 369. Back
Note 35: R. Kerry, The Star-Spangled Mirror: America's Image of Itself and the World (Savage, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 1990), 3. Back
Note 36: J. Robertson, American Myth, American Reality (New York: Hill and Wang, 1980), 17. Back
Note 37: M. Dunne, "US Foreign Relations in the Twentieth Century: From World Power to Global Hegemony," International Affairs 76/1 (2000), 27. Back
Note 38: G. Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1960), 53, 76. Back
Note 39: Kerry, 3. Back
Note 40: M. Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987). Back
Note 41: E. Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982). Back
Note 42: P. Boniface, "The Specter of Unilateralism," Washington Quarterly 24/3 (2001), 157-8. Back
Note 43: Grandeur in terms of foreign policy means "greatness" and is based on the notion of the exceptionalism of French culture, politics, religion and so forth, while rang is tied to notions of global rank or status; P. Cerny, The Politics of Grandeur: Ideological Aspects of De Gaulle's Foreign Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980). Back
Note 44: Gordon, A Certain Idea of France, 87. Back
Note 45: France, Ministry of Defense, White Paper on Defense, 1994 (Paris: SIRPA, 1994), 64-5. Back
Note 46: On the Gaullist consensus, see A. Knapp, Gaullism Since de Gaulle (Brookfield, Vt: Dartmouth Publishing, 1994). Back
Note 47: S. Hoffman, "French Dilemmas and Strategies in the New Europe," in R. Keohane, J. Nye, and S. Hoffman, eds., After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 128-9. Back
Note 48: J. Becker, "Asserting EU Cohesion: Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Relaunch of Europe," European Security 7/4 (1998), 23. Back
Note 49: A. Treacher, "Europe as a Multiplier for French Security Policy: Strategic Consistency, Tactical Adaption," European Security 10/1 (2001): 41. Back
Note 50: See the essays in G. Flynn, ed., Remaking the Hexagon: The New France in the New Europe (Bolder: Westview Press, 1994). Back
Note 51: Treacher, 22-3. Back
Note 52: For a further examination of the French effort to develop a "third way", see E. Kolodziej, French International Policy Under De Gaulle and Pompidou: The Politics of Grandeur (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1974). Back
Note 53: D. Moïsi, "The Allure of Gaullism," The Financial Times (19 April 1996). Back
Note 54: S. Rynning, Changing Military Doctrine: Presidents and Military Power in Fifth Republic France, 1958-2000 (Westport: Praeger, 2002), 187. Back
Note 55: Ibid, 182. Back
Note 56: R. Grant, The Changing Franco-American Security Relationship: New Direction for NATO and European Defense Cooperation (Arlington, VA.: U.S.-CREST, 1993). Back
Note 57: For a more through analysis, see M. Walker, "Post 9/11: The European Dimension," World Policy Journal 18/4 (2001/2002), 1. Back
Note 58: Article V specifically states that "an armed attack against one or more of them [NATO members] in Europe or North America shall be considered against them all; and . . . each of them . . . will assist the Party or Parties so attacked;" NATO, The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington, D.C., (4 April 1949). Back
Note 59: C. Bremner, "The Great Divide," The Times (21 May 2002). Back
Note 60: C. Bremner, "˜Good Friend Jacques' Lays on the Charm," The Times (27 May 2002). Back
Note 61: C. Hoyos, A. Parker, and H. Williamson, "Anti-terrorist Coalition threatened With Split," Financial Times (20 December 2001). Back
Note 62: J. Fitchett, "U.S. Allies Chafe at ˜Cleanup' Role," International Herald Tribune (26 November 2001). Back
Note 63: France, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Military Operations Outside of Afghanistan to Fight Terrorism," Press Release (5 December 2001). Back
Note 64: T. Baldwin and R. Watson, "Blair and Chirac United Against American Hawks," The Times (30 November 2001). Back
Note 65: France, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Fight Against Terrorism/Iraq: Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Deputy Spokesperson," Press Release (19 February 2002). Back
Note 66: George W. Bush, "Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly," White House Office of the Press Secretary (12 September 2002). Back
Note 67: George W. Bush, "National Security Strategy of the United States of America," White House Office of the Press Secretary (17 September 2002). Back
Note 68: Condoleezza Rice, "2002 Wriston Lecture at the Manhattan Institute," White House Office of the Press Secretary (1 October 2002). Back
Note 69: United Nations (UN) Security Council, "UN Security Council Resolution 1441," UN Press Office (8 November 2002) Back