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Allies on Board
By Jonathan S. Kallmer
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The author of these observations, while noting the divergence of views between the United States on the one hand and France, Russia, and Germany on the other, expresses the belief that "in the long run, none of these countries will actually abandon the United States." —Ed.
It was hard not to notice the Great Power smiles that the Russian, French, and German heads of state were flashing at their April summit in St. Petersburg. In proclaiming their solidarity following the war in Iraq, Presidents Putin and Chirac and Chancellor Schröder have looked positively chummy. By all accounts, their countries appear committed to close diplomatic coordination, and they are all clearly motivated, at least in part, by a desire to offset American influence and reinvigorate a beleaguered United Nations.
To be sure, the United States scored an important diplomatic victory on May 22, when the United Nations Security Council voted 14-0 (with Syria abstaining) to approve an Iraqi reconstruction plan that gives the Americans and British an enormous degree of authority over Iraq's political and economic affairs for an indefinite period of time. That virtual unanimity included the votes of Russia and France, both permanent Council members with veto power, and non-permanent member Germany.
Yet the United States should not be lulled into thinking that such significant consensus amounts to an agreement by Russia, France, and Germany to shed their opposition to the American war in Iraq. Nor should it think that the three countries are unlikely to rise up again with such vocal unity against American policy. On the contrary, these countries' votes for the reconstruction plan were not so much a blank check to the war coalition but a statement that the Security Council continues to have a meaningful role to play in defining the landscape of international affairs. Even more broadly, the past year of difficult diplomacy signals a new sense of confidence and conviction for these three countries, and portends an altered gestalt for international policymaking.
At first glance the United States will be troubled by this collaboration. Since the end of the Second World War its relations with both France and Germany have never been worse, and what began twelve years ago as a relatively constructive, if lurching, new relationship with Russia has suddenly been blunted. The prospects for achieving the kind of cooperation essential to rebuilding Iraq, stabilizing the Middle East, and dealing with countless other serious security threats are not overly promising. Yet in the frustration over the course of diplomacy after the war, and with the memory of all the injured egos and vitriol that preceded it, one must not overlook a crucial feature of the present strategic terrain. That is the fact that, in the long run, none of these countries will actually abandon the United States.
Russia has many reasons to stay friendly with America, above all in order to create and maintain stability in its vast region. To begin with, Russia needs the United States as a partner to check China's growing influence in Asia. As China modernizes its economy and feels more muscular about its regional position, Russia runs the risk of becoming diplomatically weak if it does not have American support. In addition, the threat posed by a soon-to-be (if not already) nuclear North Korea has serious consequences for Russia. Friendship with the United States is critical to its ability to have the North Korean threat contained in a way acceptable to Russia. Furthermore, Russia desperately needs American cooperation to fight its own war on terrorism, a problem that not only plagues its southern territory but also beckons uncomfortably from Central Asia. President Putin has worked hard (if inconsistently) over the past three years to improve bilateral relations with the United States and to forge partnership on these security issues. It is unlikely that he would abandon the fruits of that labor now.
Moreover, President Putin recognizes that Russia's only path to a truly modern society and economy is through alliance with the United States. To the extent that Russia's fiscal health depends on world oil prices (which is now considerable), Russia cannot afford to alienate the American market. Beyond the energy sector, Russia needs both the scale and scope of foreign investment that U.S. companies can potentially provide. On a less tangible level, Russian business and Russian youth have looked fondly at the United States since the fall of communism. As a large sprawling country with a proud history, the Russians see much in common with their American counterparts, and as a result there will be strong cultural pressures not to break from the United States.
Germany's greatest political departure from the United States since 1945 occurred in the months leading up to the war in Iraq, as Chancellor Schröder made opposition to the war the basis of his re-election bid last autumn. Nevertheless, while the present rift is serious, it is not structural. Germany remains bound to the United States by both the security guarantee that protected four fifths of its people for half a century and for the facilitative role that the Americans have played in German reunification over the past 13 years. The German electorate likes to express its discomfort with what it (sometimes rightly) perceives as American arrogance, but it has too much historical affection for the United States to allow current differences to permanently damage the alliance.
In addition, Germany still relies heavily upon transatlantic relationships, such as that with NATO, for its defense. Its armed forces remain small, and its desire to fight real wars remains even smaller. Unless and until the European Union can forge a truly supranational foreign policy—a prospect this author doubts will ever happen—Germany simply cannot abandon its security alliance with the United States. Beyond the military reasons, Germany has become bound up economically with the United States in a way that few other countries are. Exports account for about one third of Germany's economy, and it is unlikely that its leaders would take measures that would estrange one of Germany's largest export markets.
France may appear the most fickle of the three countries, but in a way its long-term alliance with the United States is the most reliable. Though they shudder at the suggestion, the national interests of the French are fundamentally aligned with those of the United States. For starters, France has a strong security interest in fighting terrorism and promoting stable and democratic political systems. The French are no keener than the Americans to see the Korean Peninsula go nuclear, to experience the threat of a rebuilt al Qaeda, or to see relations between the Israelis and Palestinians slip further out of the reach of peace. And while it is stronger militarily than Germany, France is not strong enough on its own to give up the protection of allied transatlantic defense.
French economic interests are also closely tied to those of the Americans. Like the United States, France would like to give its corporations access to developing markets, not least in the areas of oil and natural gas. France also wants to see progress on the current round of World Trade Organization negotiations, the success of which depends largely on the extent to which both France and the Americans liberalize their agricultural policies. Continued Franco-American hostility would surely prevent that success. Finally, just like the United States, France has a strong social interest in promoting "cultural intangibles" such as respect for human rights and vibrant civil societies.
Ironically, the renewed confidence of Russia, Germany, and France may turn out to be the best thing that could have happened to "postwar" American diplomacy. Presuming each of these countries looks rationally at its strategic political and economic interests, they will arrive at three intimately related conclusions. First, it would be extraordinarily difficult for the three countries to forge their own coalition against the diplomatic and strategic influence of the United States. Second, even if they succeeded in creating such a coalition, it would be unlikely to actually counterbalance American influence. Third, and as a result, none of these countries acting individually will be willing to give up the friendship of the Americans, no matter how difficult relations may become at times.
Russia, France and Germany may become more vocal players on the geopolitical stage; that is in fact looking increasingly likely. It is also likely that they will at times disagree with the United States on key global issues. But that is a development the Americans should ultimately welcome, not spurn, for in the long run it will make those countries stronger and more credible partners, and will therefore magnify the influence of future U.S.-led coalitions.
There may come a day when the United States is not so singularly dominant in the world, but it will not come this decade, and it is unlikely even to come in the next generation. The leaders of Russia, Germany, and France are smart enough to understand that, in this age, they cannot fully offset American influence, and as a result it is unlikely that any one of them will choose to abandon good relations. This should all cause President Bush to greet those gleaming smiles with a deep Texas belly laugh.
Endnotes
Note *: The writer practices international law in Washington, with an emphasis on litigation and arbitration. His articles have appeared in the Philippine Daily Inquirer, Moscow News, Pravda, and the Prague Business Journal, among other publications. Back