|
|
|
|
Alliance in Doubt: American Reaction to the 1960 US-Japanese Security Treaty Crisis
By Nicholas Evan Sarantakes
“Otto von Bismarck, the German Chancellor, said those who like sausage and the law should never watch them being made. We might add the conduct of foreign policy in a decentralized democracy to that list.”
Professor Sarantakes traces the history of U.S. and Japanese reactions to the 1960 treaty between those two nations, a pact that occasioned adverse reaction in both countries. In his view, despite political turmoil and the cancellation of a Presidential visit, the American political system “worked,” resulting in the treaty's adoption by the Senate. — Ed.
In the spring of 1960, the streets of Tokyo were full of crowds protesting a new security treaty with the United States. Despite these protests, the United States Senate ratified the new agreement with a seemingly authoritative vote, 90-2. The lopsided tally, however, is misleading. The riots in Tokyo and their coverage in the American media convinced many senators that Japan was on the edge of a Marxist revolution. Given this view, replacing a treaty that allowed the United States to intervene in Japanese domestic affairs with an agreement that surrendered such a privilege seemed unwise. As a result, many members of the upper chamber were inclined to reject or, at best, table the treaty. It was only the vigorous efforts of Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson, with some modest support from the Eisenhower Administration, that saved the treaty.
Previous English-language works on the security treaty crisis center for understandable reasons on the events in Tokyo. George Packard’s Protest in Tokyo and a series of essays published as Creating Single-Party Democracy under the editorial supervision of Katakoa Tetsuya focus on the riots and the domestic Japanese politics that led to these confrontations. 1 Investigations of the meanings of various clauses in the treaty has been another area of historical inquiry. John Welfield and Michael Schaller explore this topic as part of their book length studies on postwar Japan. 2 This essay is different in that it examines the reaction of Americans to the events in Japan and shows that the protesters came close to achieving their goals in Washington.
Background: one-sided alliance
The background of the story behind of the treaty starts in 1951 when Secretary of State John Foster Dulles negotiated a peace treaty that brought the occupation of Japan to an end. While negotiating that treaty, Dulles and Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru also negotiated a pact establishing an alliance between the United States and Japan. In the agreement, the United States had the right to deploy troops from bases in Japan without seeking Japanese authorization, to intervene in Japan in times of unrest if their assistance was required in efforts to reestablish order, and had no obligation to come to the defense of the archipelago if it were attacked. 3 Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II, nephew and namesake of the general and the U.S. ambassador to Japan in 1960, noted that such an agreement was acceptable only in the immediate context of the war being fought in neighboring Korea. “The treaty was, in a sense, one-sided in favor of the United States, because it had to be, for this reason. At the time that treaty was negotiated, Japan did not have one single man under arms and we took on the obligation of assuring the defense of Japan.” 4
Such concessions quickly became unpopular among the Japanese public once the immediate Communist threat that seemed to exist during the Korean war ended. American officials, however, were reluctant to renegotiate the treaty. In the mid-1950s, Americans suspected that the Japanese might go neutral in the Cold War, or that they might try to use their ongoing efforts to negotiate a peace treaty with the Soviet Union as a way to initiate talks with the United States on security matters. Dulles worried that the Japanese might play the two world powers off against one another. In a private meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru, Dulles used the language of the peace treaty he had helped negotiate to try to scuttle the negotiations with Russia. He warned that Article 26 of the treaty required that the United States receive terms equal to those of the Soviet Union. If the agreement Shigemitsu signed with the Russians conceded sovereignty over the disputed Kurile Islands, then the United States would insist on permanent sovereignty over Okinawa and the Ryukyus. The two archipelagos were hardly equal. The Kuriles were sparsely populated and of little strategic importance, but the Ryukyus were the home to over a million Japanese nationals. America had an important network of military bases on the main island of Okinawa and administered the entire chain as a de facto colony under the legal provision of “residual sovereignty.” The Secretary of State worried that if Japan regained some of the Soviet-occupied Kuriles, it would put political pressure on the United States to surrender the far more valuable Ryukyus. Since this issue involved public perceptions, Dulles went public with his warning at a press conference a little later. 5
It was not until after the resolution of the Japanese-Soviet talks and the arrival in Tokyo of Ambassador MacArthur that the U.S. Government began to consider renegotiating the security treaty. A career Foreign Service officer, the new ambassador had no expertise on Japan to qualify him for this assignment beyond his name. He, however, had the advantage of having a good personal relationship with both Dulles and the President of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower. Prior to his arrival in Tokyo, MacArthur had served as political advisor to Eisenhower during the general’s tenure as the first commander of North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces. Later the diplomat worked closely with Dulles as the counselor of the State Department. The Japanese appreciated these connections and his name. MacArthur presented his credentials to the Emperor in February 1957, and after a year on the job in which he assessed the status of U.S.-Japanese relations, he began lobbying Washington to revise the security treaty and return Okinawa. As a result, Dulles and Eisenhower were prepared when Japanese Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke took the initiative and informed MacArthur that he wanted to draw up a new agreement. Dulles and Eisenhower both realized that the political context of the late 1950s was different from that of the early part of the decade. On September 11, 1958, Dulles and Japanese Foreign Minister Fujiyama Aiichiro announced that their countries would begin negotiating a new agreement. 6
Treaty negotiations and Japanese party politics
The negotiations in Tokyo proceeded quickly. In less than a month MacArthur and Fujiyama produced a working draft of the agreement. The Senate was kept fully informed of the progress being made on the treaty. Before and during the negotiations, Eisenhower directed MacArthur to meet with key congressional leaders. The President wanted him to make sure that there was no opposition to the revision of the treaty. The ambassador took with him a copy of the new proposed treaty. In his meetings with the Republican and Democratic members of both chambers and the senior members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he found that the legislators had little interest in the details, but were in general agreement with him that international events since 1951 warranted a new treaty. He also met twice with Senator J. William Fulbright, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. Afterwards, during the actually negotiations he worked to keep the agreement within the parameters he had discussed with the senators. 7
A number of Japanese political issues stalled further work on the document. Most of them stemmed from the organizational structure of the Liberal Democratic Party. An umbrella organization, the party was the product of a merger in 1955 between the Liberal and Democratic parties in an effort to keep the Socialists from taking control of the cabinet. This new political entity controlled a majority of seats in the Diet and did indeed keep the Socialists out of office, but few in this organization had any institutional loyalty to the party. Rather, members of the LDP belonged to a faction. A senior politician controlled these bands and junior members owed their loyalty to that individual. In return for offering their faction chief a dependable vote in intra-party confrontations, subordinates could expect their leader to act as a patron and help promote their careers. Shifting alliances among the factions, and their changing political strength, determined control of the cabinet as long as the LDP controlled a majority of the seats in the Diet. Faction leaders and their key supporters obtained ministerial appointments in return for supporting the dominate group.
The leader of this group was the president of the party and as a result of holding that office, he also served as prime minister. In the late 1950s, Kishi Nobusuke controlled one of the strongest LDP factions, even though he had little popularity in the party or among the Japanese people. A prewar bureaucrat, Kishi moved up through the Ministry of Commerce, eventually becoming the minister in the cabinet of General Tojo Hideki just before Japan declared war against the United States. During the conflict he played a key role in keeping the Japanese economy from falling apart. He spent three and a half years in prison during the allied occupation of Japan awaiting trial as a war criminal before the prosecutors dropped the charges. In 1952 he reentered public life. He completed his political resurrection in 1957 when he became Prime Minister. Despite his rapid comeback, he remained unpopular for a variety of reasons, including his association with Tojo, a tendency throughout his career to turn on his mentors, and the widespread feeling that he was not a genuine convert to democracy, but simply a crafty politician riding the wave of current events. In the fall of 1958 a number of faction leaders challenged Kishi for control of the party in the election for the presidency of the party. His opponents coalesced around a challenger at the last minute but failed to deliver enough votes. 8
Kishi and Fujiyama’s success in securing U.S. consent put the prime minister’s opponents within the Liberal Democratic Party in a bind. Revision of the security treaty had been a major goal of the party for over a year and a half, and Kishi seemed to be on the verge of securing this prize; he showed every intention of using his success in an effort to extend his tenure as president of the party beyond the customary two term limit. Allowing Kishi such a victory was clearly out of the question. Yet, overt opposition would be political suicide. Instead, Kishi’s opponents raised troubling questions about the side issues, stalling progress on the agreement. What was the geographic scope of the treaty? Was U.S.-occupied Okinawa to be considered part of the national territory that Japan would be obligated to defend? The island was a Japanese prefecture, but Americans administered the territory and had built a number of important bases that might be the target of an attack in a future conflict. Another issue: under what conditions could American soldiers be deployed from bases in Japan? Could the United States station nuclear weapons in Japan? What would be the duration of the agreement? Final work on the new compact had to wait until the LDP reached a consensus on the treaty. Kishi needed LDP unity on the treaty since the other political parties would oppose any agreement that perpetuated the alliance with the United States, put Japan at risk and violated the spirit, if not the letter of the antiwar constitution.
Since MacArthur generally saw Kishi as the main force responsible for keeping the Liberal Democratic Party in power and with it democratic government in Japan, he urged Dulles to agree to terms that that the prime minister had proposed: that the Japanese would be expected to defend the home islands only; that the U.S. would seek prior approval before sending troops from bases in Japan into combat; that the treaty would have a ten year life, after which either party would have to give one year’s termination notice; and that nuclear weapons would not be stored in Japan (U.S. naval ships with such instruments of war could, however, transit the home islands). The secretary of state trusted the ambassador’s judgment and accepted his advice. 9
When U.S. and Japanese diplomats reached final agreement, Prime Minister Kishi traveled to Washington for a meeting with Eisenhower and a signing ceremony at the White House. He appeared on the cover of Time magazine and was generally welcomed in the United States as the leader of a valued ally. Although some commentators marveled at the dramatic turnaround in relations between the two countries, few took note of the fact that Kishi had been one of the individuals who had signed the Japanese declaration of war in 1941. The warm reception he received was a sign of either the American ability to forgive or a total ignorance of Japanese politics. 10
The bulk of the American public paid little attention to the new treaty, but the attentive, interested section of the populace was generally quite supportive of the new agreement. The editors of the Los Angeles Times argued, “Terms of the treaty formalize the entrance of the two nations into a new era of co-operation, recognizing not only their common stake in free world security, but also the need of joint economic efforts.” The editorial board of the New York Herald Tribune wrote, “The essential point, however, recognizes that the destinies of the United States and Japan are bound up inextricably together in the Far East.” The official editorial position of the Hearst newspaper chain was that “the United States will be stronger for having Japan as a voluntary ally in the far east instead of an occupied nation. All the nations of the west will benefit from the change, and so will the general cause of friendship among nations.” Various publications across the country agreed, citing the agreement as an important sign that the bilateral relationship between the two nations had entered a new phase. 11
More importantly, reaction in the Senate suggested that the administration would have little problem in getting the new treaty ratified. In a summary of the new agreement that went to members of the Foreign Relations Committee, a staff member described the treaty as “defensive" in character. It has been opposed most forcibly—at moments hysterically—by the Sino-Soviet bloc because it will serve to strengthen Japan’s security by discouraging aggressive action against Japan. As one of the four great industrial complexes in the world, Japan and her vigorous, enterprising people represent a great prize; none perhaps ranks higher on our adversaries’ list, certainly none in Asia.” In another memo, a congressional analyst noted that the new agreement was important mainly as a political instrument. “The new treaty formalizes the fact of Japan’s rebirth as a sovereign nation. This acknowledgement is found in the tone of the preamble, which brings Japan into alliance with the United States as an equal partner.” Both studies agreed that the United States had an interest in offering this status to the Japanese. “The old treaty had become a severe political liability, and was making our country’s position in Japan extremely difficult. The new treaty is fair, unburdensome.” The Status of Forces agreement was also revised, making it similar to others signed by representatives of the United States. “In general, the new Administrative Agreement is closer in spirit to the Status of Forces agreement with the NATO countries, which was ratified by the Senate in 1953.” 12
The Foreign Relations Committee staff favored ratification even though in doing so they directly challenged the view of some Senators. Russell Long, the Louisiana Democrat, complained that that the treaty was unequal, requiring the United States to come to the assistance of Japan without any reciprocal commitment. “This is not realistic,” a staff study declared. “If the U.S. is attacked, it is likely that a general nuclear conflict will result. This is the war that both the Soviets and ourselves regard as inadmissible. If it should occur, Japan’s assistance, or lack of it, would be completely irrelevant.” 13
Japanese bitterly debate treaty ratification
While the treaty faced no real problems in ratification in the United States, such was not the case in Japan. The pact, despite the American concessions, was extremely unpopular among the political left because it perpetuated the alliance with the United States. Despite representing about a third of the electorate, the opposition parties were never much of a force in Japanese politics due to deep internal divisions. Almost all Japanese to the left of the political center agreed that the treaty should be opposed and organized the People’s Council for Preventing Revision of the Security Treaty (Ampo Jyaku Kaitei Soshi Kokumin Kaigi). The membership of the People’s Council included the socialist parties, labor unions, and the communist party, and was, up to that time, the closest thing to a united front that postwar Japan had seen. Differences and divisions remained among the member organizations, limiting the effectiveness of the People’s Council. Nevertheless, the debate in Tokyo over ratification of the treaty was extremely bitter. One member of the Diet circulated before and after photos of Kishi as a member of the Tojo cabinet and as a prisoner during the occupation. Public interest in the treaty issue was extensive and the media provided intense coverage. The LDP had the votes in the Diet to force the treaty through, even though such action would have run counter to elements of Japanese culture that encouraged consensus.
Far more important, many faction leaders in the party had misgivings about Kishi’s honesty and honor. Since many suspected that he would make some effort to use the treaty to seek an third term as party president, the support that his opponents within the party offered him in confrontations with the left was qualified. The People’s Council organized a large rally in Tokyo that began on April 26. This date was key, because it was the last day that the Prime Minister could have a vote on the treaty without seeking an extension of the current legislative session. Ratification required a vote in both chambers of the legislature. If the upper chamber refused to act, approval would occur automatically thirty days after the House of Representatives vote. The Diet had to be in session for this authorization, but in this case was set to recess on May 26. The rallies continued to grow in size throughout April and into May as this date neared. An assembly estimated at 600,000 gathered in Tokyo on May 1.
In the wake of public sentiment, which was beginning to turn against the treaty, the anti-Kishi LDP faction leaders insisted that the prime minister take a soft approach on ratification and continue to allow the Diet to debate the treaty. Needing the votes these politicians controlled and still hoping to secure the support of one of the socialists parties, Kishi agreed. The Diet continued to argue over the treaty and Kishi now faced the double task of extending the legislative session and ratifying the treaty. Then, on May 1, the U-2 incident galvanized an already intense debate. Soviet air defense forces shot down a Central Intelligence Agency photo reconnaissance plane while it was over the Soviet Union. The pilot, Gary Powers, survived. The Soviets had living proof that the United States had violated their airspace on a national holiday and on the eve of a summit meeting between Eisenhower and Premier Nikita Khrushchev in Paris. Khrushchev flaunted the evidence, shattering the U.S. cover story about a missing weather plane, a story that humiliated Eisenhower before he canceled their meeting. This episode stunned the Japanese and made many rethink their relationship with the Americans, especially since such planes flew missions from air bases in Japan. 14
In the middle of May, Kishi faced a series of difficult choices and decided to seek an extension of the legislative session and have the House of Representatives vote on the treaty. The decisive day came on May 19. The Liberal Democratic Party formally proposed an extension of the current legislative session. The Socialists, in an effort to prevent a vote on extension which the left had no chance of winning based simply on numbers, staged a massive sit-down strike in front of the office belonging to the Speaker of the House trapping him inside. At 11:00 p.m., after being stuck in his office all day, the Speaker ordered the police to forcibly remove the Socialists. The opposition party legislators responded with a boycott of the plenary session that met just before midnight. With only the LDP members present, the Diet authorized a fifty-day extension and then six minutes after midnight approved the treaty. The treaty would go into effect the day Eisenhower arrived in Japan. Kishi and the LDP had won a parliamentary victory, but the public was stunned. Commentators and editorial writers in the press roundly condemned him and his followers for their antidemocratic actions. The left refused to participate in Diet proceedings, protest rallies grew even larger in size and labor unions organized nationwide strikes. 15
The American public had little good information about these events. American journalists in Tokyo generally did a poor job of giving their readers a nuanced understanding of the factors behind the protests, particularly after May 19. Most newspaper editors in America put the developments in Tokyo on the front page, but were dependent on Associated Press or United Press International news stories. The quality of AP stories was bad; those of UPI, even worse. These reporters presented the maneuvering and protest rallies in terms of a simple pro- and anti-U.S. dichotomy. Projecting the nature of the U.S. two-party system on the Japanese and ignoring the operational structure of the LDP, these journalists suggested that if Kishi were driven from office this development would give politicians of the left wing opposition parties control of the cabinet. Copy editors in newsrooms across the country put these articles under dramatic headlines that promoted an exaggerated sense of confrontation. Some of the papers with the largest circulations in the country, such as the New York Times, the Chicago Tribune, and the New York Herald Tribune, had their own reporters in Tokyo and these journalists did an adequate job of putting the events in Tokyo into the appropriate political context. These papers, however, like those in smaller markets did use accounts from the news services that contained the same blemishes. 16
Despite the Tokyo mobs and the sensational reporting in the United States, ratification still seemed certain. The hearings of the Foreign Relations Committee on June 7 were almost pro forma. The Senators asked questions about treaty provisions based on suggestions that staff members prepared. Secretary of State Christian Herter gave fairly predictable answers to these inquiries. There was little concern among the American people about the treaty. Religious and peace organizations did oppose the agreement. “The United States has not by this treaty strengthened her position in the Far East,” the executive secretary of the Arkansas Council of Churches wrote in the Arkansas Gazette. The committee even heard critical testimony from two witnesses, but their objections were never seriously considered by the Senators. The protests in Japan appeared to have had little impact. 17
Only once was ratification ever brought into doubt. Tennessee Democrat Albert Gore, Sr., asked Herter whether, in light of current events, it be wise to delay confirmation. “Would the security of Japan or the United or the United Nations or international peace be in any way jeopardized if the Senate considered ratification in 1961?” Herter responded to this issue in a forthright manner: “I don’t think necessarily,” he said. “I frankly don’t know why there should necessarily be a postponement. We feel it is a desirable matter on both sides. It is of mutual interest to go ahead with this treaty. The question of a delay would not necessarily be a fatal thing. On the other hand, there might be some real doubts in Japan as to whether we intended to go ahead with it or not if there were an extreme delay.” Later, behind the closed doors of the executive session of the committee, Gore offered a candid explanation for his query. “I raised the question as to timing of ratification because I thought it might possibly be helpful to have a little show of critical questioning, if not possible opposition. If that would be helpful to play this little game out a little bit, I will be glad to cooperate. If it would be helpful for a show of unanimity I shall not raise a question further.” 18
President's proposed trip to Japan questioned
The main issue in executive session, when the Senators were more candid, was the question of timing and the wisdom of the President going forward with his visit. Once Fulbright gaveled the committee to order, he told Herter, “We want to be reassured, I suppose, about that matter. I know they are all interested in it. Would you discuss both of these questions?” Comments he had made the day before on the President’s trip appeared prominently in that morning’s issue of the New York Times just under the paper’s masthead. “I wouldn’t be surprised if it might be wise to defer the visit until sometime in the fall,” he told the reporter writing the story. Senators John C. Stennis of Mississippi and Mike Mansfield of Montana were quoted and listed as other legislators expressing wariness about the excursion.
The Secretary of State discussed the complicated political scenario in Japan and told the legislators that he expected the Japanese to ratify the treaty four days before Eisenhower arrived. He also said that MacArthur had already raised with Kishi the possibility of delaying the President’s trip until the late summer. “Mr. Kishi reacted very strongly against a postponement and he reacted strongly against it for fear that if it were announced prior to the complete ratification of the treaty that it would indicate a doubt as to whether the government could survive or those who were proponents of the treaty could hold on.” Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs J. Graham Parsons added that tinkering with Eisenhower’s travel plans could undermine democracy in Japan. “If the President were to cancel out at a particular time in a way it would lend force to the proposition that all these agitators have to do is try hard enough and they can achieve just the result of mob rule and minority decision, and the results for a Japanese democracy in the future would be unfortunate. I think the fate of parliamentary democracy in Japan is really the basic issue which is being thrashed out at the present time.”
Several senators agreed with this line of reasoning. “Mr. Chairman, I just want to say that I think the reasoning stated is absolutely correct,” John Sparkman of Alabama remarked. “It seems to me if the President canceled or delayed his trip it would encourage a continuation and the buildup of these activities not only in Japan but any other country that he might want to go to.” George Aiken of Vermont agreed, “I don’t see any way how the President can avoid going to Japan now unless there is greater danger involved than is indicated at the present time. It seems as if he avoids going on the demands of possibly 2 percent of the people of Japan that the President will be just prohibited from traveling anywhere from now on because in almost any country a minority can organize 1 or 2 percent of the people to protest.” 19
That afternoon in a telephone conversation with Herter about the hearing, Eisenhower said he was more than a little offended that Fulbright and his committee had the gall to contend that they had a say in his travel plans. According to a White House summary of the conversation, “The President said what he is worried about is this thing building up in Japan; that he was not disturbed by the people in Congress or on TV who think they know better, but that he was disturbed as to whether Kishi may be making a mistake in using the President for an internal thing.” He was not worried about any threat to his person, but that organized mobs might end up embarrassing him, which would be a national humiliation since he was traveling as the representative of the American people.
Eisenhower then admitted that the critics in Congress might have some well-founded concerns. “The President said he was almost getting to the point of feeling that he ought to see whether his own country feels he is making a mistake.” If the trip were to be canceled, he told Herter he wanted it done before he departed for the Far East. If he had to remove Japan from his itinerary once he had departed, he expected there would be a considerable deal of recrimination back in the United States about how he had ignored good advice. Eisenhower then mentioned Fulbright’s comments in the New York Times. Herter told him not to worry; the committee had been supportive of the decision to go forward with the junket. The President had said he wanted his trip to be a way of paying respects to a sister democracy, but noted as he closed the conversation that his presence might end up highlighting Japanese political shortcomings. The White House scribe’s notes read, “The President said he was trying now to get together a speech for the Diet, but it is a sorry thing when you think you are going in there with armed guards at the doors.” 20
The differences about the Presidential journey were taking on signs of a partisan division. Two days after talking with Herter, Eisenhower had a meeting with the Republican leaders of the House and Senate. After two and half hours, the President raised the issue of his pending trip to Asia and the Pacific. He expected that there would be some protesters, but on the whole he assumed he would receive a warm welcome from the Japanese people. Eisenhower also told the legislators that if they were asked about his trip that he wanted their standard response to be that the President should never be prevented from taking action because of a little harsh rhetoric from a small minority. 21
In early June, the bulk of newspaper editorial commentary supported Eisenhower in his determination to visit Japan. The official position of several editorial boards was that seeing the trip through to the end served the best interests of Japanese democracy. An editorial in the New York Herald Tribune held that the President should stick with his planned schedule; to do otherwise would deliver a death blow to the Kishi government, legitimize mob rule, and essentially take sides in a political struggle between the Kishi and his political rivals that had little to do with the United States. The editors of the Washington Evening Star agreed: “The hostile demonstrations will detract from the usefulness of the visit, but the adverse consequences of cancellation by Mr. Eisenhower, it seems to us, would be much greater. Popular government will not survive for long in any free country if the duly chosen representatives of the majority are going to bow every time the mobs and the hoodlums take to the streets.”
Others argued that delaying the trip would undermine the U.S. position in international affairs. The editorial board of the Cincinnati Enquirer declared, “We commend President Eisenhower for reaffirming his intention to visit Japan at the time originally scheduled for his good-will mission. He thus demonstrates that the United States is not going to let itself be intimidated by a noisy mob.” In Baltimore, their counterparts on The Sun agreed: “A decision to cancel or defer would look like a bow to the Japanese Socialist and Communist minority that has been making such a fuss against the visit. It would look timorous. It would mean ‘loss of face’ by the President in many parts of the East. It might even mean the compromising of the new United States-Japanese security treaty and in that case a damaging blow at our general military position in the Far East.” Despite the strength of their support, however, many journalists had little enthusiasm for Eisenhower’s undertaking. The editors of The Sun noted that the President’s previous trips abroad were less successful than generally thought. “Whatever happens in the course of this particular goodwill mission, let it be the last of its kind.” 22 Editorials in a number of other papers voiced similar reservations and made a fairly obvious observation that Eisenhower should alter his plans if the Japanese were unable to protect him. 23
There were also signs in the media that a partisan division was forming about the presidential excursion. The editors of the Louisville Courier-Journal took a strong stand against the goodwill trip. “There is a time and a place for everything, we are told. In deference to that sound old rule, we doubt that this is the time for President Eisenhower to set out on another sweeping ceremonial tour. We doubt even more strongly that Japan is the place at this moment for him to visit.” These journalists took an inventory of the political situations in all of the countries where the President planned to stop, noting that each one was in a turbulent period of crisis. “It is very difficult to see how the forces friendly to America in any of these areas could benefit just now from an Eisenhower visit.” Why then was he making such a journey? Writing for a paper that had been Democratic since its founding, the editors found an explanation within the context of the forthcoming presidential election. “The only logical answer is that it is being prompted by strategists of the Republican Party.” 24
A few editors took extreme positions and questioned the utility of the alliance with Japan. These journalists thought the Japanese were in process of defining the very nature of their domestic political order and alignment in the Cold War. With these considerations in mind, editorial writers on the staff of a few papers argued that the United States should rethink the wisdom of aligning itself with a nation of such uncertain resolution. 25
Political temperatures rise in Japan
The protests in Tokyo escalated on June 10 and forced such fundamental questions to the forefront of American thinking. White House Press Secretary James C. Hagerty arrived in Japan to make final arrangements for Eisenhower’s visit. The People’s Council decided to stage a small demonstration at the airport and present Hagerty with a letter protesting the pending presidential visit. The Japanese Communist Party was a strong force within the Council and pushed the organization into a political confrontation. When Hagerty’s plane landed at the airport, he and MacArthur quickly got into a waiting limousine and headed for the embassy. In doing so he decided against taking an available Marine Corps helicopter, believing that as a representative of the President of the United States that he could not back down in the face of a Communist challenge. As the car left the terminal complex and reached the access bridges to the airport, it met up with a crowd numbering between 8,000 and 10,000 people. The protesters quickly surround the car and forced it to stop. Chanting in English “Go Home Hagerty” and “Go Home Yankee,” the mob smashed the windows of the vehicle and were in a position to overturn the car as they rocked it and picked up its right side. Hagerty sat inside, unable to understand what the crowd was yelling. After about fifteen minutes, the police arrived and waded into the crowd, attempting to make room for the Americans to leave. Half an hour later the protesters had given enough room for the Marine helicopter to land and retrieve Hagerty and MacArthur. An Associated Press reporter covering the incident wrote, “No move was made to reach inside, unlock the limousine’s door and seize the three Americans.” A correspondent for United Press International took a more dramatic view and said that Hagerty and MacArthur would have been killed were it not for the actions of the police.
Five days later, on June 15, one of the largest and most violent demonstrations took place. A crowd of 70,000 gathered in front of the Diet. Around 4:30 p.m. a group cut its way through the fence and rushed onto the grounds of the Diet Building. For the next twelve hours police and protesters battled one another with rocks and clubs. The police also used high pressure fire hoses and tear gas. Approximately 4,000 people made it into the compound and overturned and burned a number of vehicles. The police drove the mob back in the early morning, but only after arresting 196 people. There were also hundreds of injuries to individuals on both sides and one fatality. 26
The attack on Hagerty and the bloody riots of June 15 led many Americans to believe that that Eisenhower’s trip would play a large role in determining the fate of Japanese democracy and orientation in the Cold War. Columnists Max Lerner and Harold Martin thought the President was putting his life in jeopardy with the visit. Many other journalists agreed that the President would be in danger. The trip was now a high-level gamble, but most observers thought Eisenhower had few options; the future of Japan was at stake and this was worth the risk he was taking with his life. 27 The editors of the Washington Evening Star disagreed and asked him to call off the trip. “We think that Mr. Eisenhower, in the light of all that has happened, ought not to go to Tokyo.” 28
Eisenhower cancels Japan trip
As Americans debated the merits of the presidential expedition, Eisenhower began heeding the concerns he and others had and initiated efforts to cancel the trip. He had little concern about the future of Japanese democracy, but wanted to avoid being pulled into an internal Japanese dispute. Herter instructed MacArthur to meet with Kishi and tell him that unless he could guarantee the President’s safety, the Prime Minister should request that the President delay his visit until another time. The ambassador did as instructed and Kishi stalled; his political survival was at stake. But the police had informed him that there was no way they could promise with a hundred percent certainty that there would be no attacks on Eisenhower; guarding the 11.6 mile route between the airport and the palace was beyond their resources. After the riot of June 15, Kishi had to admit defeat and formally requested that the President postpone his visit. 29
Through inept coordination, Eisenhower inflicted on himself the scenario he had feared; the cancellation of the trip came after he had departed on his Pacific trek and waves of recrimination did indeed follow in the United States. A number of critics blamed the President’s “personal diplomacy.” The editors of the Wall Street Journal argued that officials within the administration were basing their approach on a faulty assumption about world affairs. “The trouble lies in the naive notion that good national relations can be created by friendly personal relations between the heads of states or by friendly visiting.” An editorial in Life magazine called the cancellation “the gravest setback for the Eisenhower foreign policy in seven years” and said the United States needed foreign policy goals other than simple anticommunism. The editors of the Des Moines Register agreed, complaining that U.S. policy in the Far East had been too negative. Members of Congress were more specific in blaming the President, being careful, though, to avoid mentioning him by name. Senator Olin Johnston of South Carolina blamed him for “7 years of drifting, weak foreign polices.” His colleague from Missouri, Stuart Symington, said, “The United States has suffered a serious loss in prestige among all people as a result of its determination to tailor its over-all strength, technological and psychological as well as physical, to the balancing of the budget.”
Eisenhower was not the only person blamed for the setbacks in Tokyo. A number of accusations were made against MacArthur. The ambassador had a number of bureaucratic rivals in the State Department and they used the riots as an opportunity to leak news to reporters blaming him for the catastrophe and even suggesting that he might be recalled as a result. 30
A dominant theme in these reactions was that the island nation was in the early stages of a Marxist revolution. A headline in the Los Angeles Times blared, “Japan Near Revolution as Mob Storms Parliament.” A page one editorial in that paper announced, “A little band of devoted Reds skillfully seized the opportunity of domestic unrest to bring Japan to the verge of revolution.” Columnist David Lawrence observed, “Today the left wing, inspired by Moscow, has turned Japan toward communism and a loss of the freedoms that democracy has given the Japanese people since World War II.” Several other columnist agreed that the ringleaders of the mob were working under orders from Moscow. The editorial board of the Washington Evening Star thought that the protesters were did not represent the bulk of the Japanese people but still feared that they might take control of the government. “The persistency and violence of their demonstrations have nonetheless reached a point where they threaten to paralyze, if not destroy, the country’s democratic legislative processes under a government freely elected by a large majority.” The editors of the Chicago Daily Tribune believed, “The question now becomes what Mr. Kishi can do to save his country from falling into anarchy and from being pried loose from its military alliance with the United States. If the Kishi government were to fall, there can be little doubt that any successor regime would, at the best, be neutral if not positively inclined toward the Moscow-Peking axis.” If such a development were to happen, then United States might have to concede the entire western Pacific. While more optimistic than their Chicago counterparts, the editors of the Kansas City Times suggested that no less was at stake. The editorial board of the Birmingham News thought Kishi had to impose martial law and arrest his political opponents, if Japan were to be saved from disappearing behind the Iron Curtain. 31
Such dire predictions of doom were overdone as the events of the next few weeks would show, but in the middle of June 1960 these ideas were a natural development from the understanding Americans had at the time of prewar Japan. The dominant historical interpretation of the 1920s argued that the archipelago had enjoyed a brief period of representative government known as “Taisho democracy.” During this time political parties came to dominate the Diet and gained control of the cabinet. The Japanese people seemed to be adopting western ideologies, fashions and culture, only to have all these progressive gains destroyed in the 1930s when right-wing militarists seized control of the government and attempted to purge the nation of what it saw as western decadence. 32
A few scattered voices challenged the exaggerated views of the setback in Japan. The editorial board of the Atlanta Constitution asserted that the cancellation of the Eisenhower’s visit was not about to propel Japan into a Marxist revolution. “To assume as a result of it that the Communists are about to take over that country equally is unrealistic.” While conceding that a red Japan would be a huge blow to the U.S. crusade in the Cold War, “the situation is by no means hopeless and there’s no reason for panic.” The editors of the New York Herald Tribune agreed. “The reservoirs of good will for America have by no means been emptied in the critical areas of the world.” The official position of the Fort Worth Star-Telegram was that all was not lost. “A real defeat for the United States would lie in any inclination to mark Japan off as lost.” 33
Many other journalists, in assessments of the President’s Far Eastern trip, argued that, taken as a whole, the cheering crowds that welcomed Eisenhower in the Philippines, Korea and Taiwan indicated that the United States still had strong support in the region regardless of the developments in Japan. “On balance Mr. Eisenhower did well,” an editorial in the Chicago Sun-Times contended. Such voices were few and far between and rarely had much more knowledge about Japanese affairs than those voicing notes of impending disaster. In fact, in many cases they shared similar assumptions about the nature of politics in Japan and conceded disaster in Tokyo. 34
Doubts about treaty grow in Washington
The dominant, sensationalist view of events in Japan that held center stage in the middle of June might be easy to dismiss were it not shaping the opinions of U.S. senators who were beginning to question the merit of approving the new treaty. Richard Russell, the senior senator from Georgia and chairman of the Armed Services Committee, wanted to delay ratification. Events in Japan, he told the press, “border on anarchy.” Later, while debating the treaty on the floor of the Senate, he admitted that he got his information on Japan from the media. He also suspected that the press might be misrepresenting the events in Japan. The riots against a new treaty in which America made a number of concessions without receiving any return made no sense to him; the accord clearly favored Japan and that was why he had to oppose the new pact. In the new treaty the United States would relinquish its right to intervene in Japan during moments of domestic unrest, a concession that he thought looked unwise in light of recent events. He also wondered about Japan's reliability as an ally. Minnesota Democrat Hubert Humphrey said that while he supported the treaty, he believed it would be best if the Senate waited. Johnston of South Carolina was more direct, “What advantage is there in retaining an alleged alliance or friendship with a nation which cannot guarantee the peaceful visit of our Chief Executive to that country?” On June 16, Lyndon Johnson warned Herter that Russell might be a problem. He also said Humphrey and some liberals might object to prompt ratification. 35
The day after that conversation, Carl Marcy, chief of staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, sent a memo to Fulbright, Johnson, and Mansfield recommending that the Senate delay ratification until 1961. If the Kishi government fell after Senate ratification, Marcy predicted headlines that read “Japanese People Repudiate United States Treaty.” This would be yet another “diplomatic disaster.” Of greater importance, the future of Japanese democracy was uncertain. “Should the Japanese situation deteriorate to the point of requiring outside intervention, there is authority for that intervention under the existing treaty, but not the new treaty.” He believed the Senate should wait until order returned to Japan. “As soon as the Japanese people have a government with a fresh mandate from the people, the Senate will act on the treaty.” Even if he were wrong, he doubted waiting would damage relations between the two countries. “There is no evidence that Senate delay until next January would hurt the United States interests in Japan.” Herter had admitted as much in front of the committee. In a postscript, Marcy added that he had presented one side and that the Senators might want to consult with the administration before settling on a course of action. 36
Lyndon Johnson quickly rejected Marcy’s advice. Both political and diplomatic factors demanded rapid action. Since the U-2 incident and the breakup of the Paris Summit he had been the only Democratic presidential candidate to offer the administration his unqualified support. His actions appeared non-partisan and bolstered his image as a statesman. His emphasis on his experience as he discussed foreign policy at weekend gatherings of Democrats strengthened his declared candidacy and badly wounded the front runner for the nomination, Senator John F. Kennedy. Many began to wonder that June if the Massachusetts Democrat really had the qualifications to be the President of the United States. 37
If Johnson delayed ratification, it would be a vote of no confidence in both the administration and the Japanese. Such an event would bring about a break with Eisenhower, undoing all his hard work at building a statesman-like image. He also wanted to help the Japanese recover from their psychological war wounds and develop a stronger sense of self respect. “I am one person who is not disturbed about the actions of a small minority in Japan,” he told the Mainichi Shimbun. “It is my conviction that the great majority of the Japanese people desire good relations with our country and this, I believe, we should reciprocate.” He expressed the hope that the Japanese people would “acquit themselves of their obligations nobly and that the future will bring our two nations ever closer together.” He had to win over Fulbright before the pact reached the floor of the Senate. The Arkansas Senator’s opinion would carry a good deal of wait with his colleagues. Delaying ratification would do little to advance such interests and could very well do a good deal of damage to U.S.-Japanese relations. The People’s Council might just win—in Washington rather than Tokyo. A New York Times reporter covering the ratification effort on Capitol Hill wrote in his lead paragraph, “Limited but significant pressure has developed here for a reassessment of United States relations with Japan.” According to this report, talk in the Senate about delaying a vote was beginning to worry administration officials; they feared such an action would play into the hands of the communists in Tokyo. 38
Lyndon Johnson mounts Senate ratification bid
Johnson had several advantages as the Senate prepared to address the treaty. The Texan controlled the initiative of when the debate would start in the Senate. He kept the exact date the treaty would reach the floor of the upper chamber undecided, making it difficult for opponents to organize and prepare. Fulbright was in the hospital for the treatment of his foot, which diverted his attention from legislative issues and gave Johnson time to get administration help in his efforts to secure the support of his colleague from Arkansas. Johnson told Herter through Senator Leverett Saltonstall of Massachusetts to expect ratification on June 20 or 21. Still worried about Russell and Humphrey, he told the two Republicans to keep the news to themselves. Confused by this indirect communication, Herter called Johnson for clarification. Johnson told him about Marcy’s suggestions and said many senators had doubts about the treaty. He asked Herter for his “considered judgment” on postponement, and then, without giving him a chance to respond, explained how he would secure Fulbright’s support and get the treaty ratified. He wanted to have control over the introduction of the administration’s response to the Marcy memo. “You just give me your views in a letter and then I’ll put it in my inside coat pocket and start telling the boys I want to bring it up pretty soon and when I run into any obstinacy I can show them what you say.” 39
Herter agreed, and composed a letter that undoubtedly delighted Johnson. The flexibility the Secretary had displayed at the Foreign Relations Committee hearings on timing was gone. The Senate had to ratify the treaty, he wrote; the future of Japan was at stake:
If we are not in a position to exchange ratifications fairly shortly, the pressures building up in Japan for a dissolution of the Diet to regularize the present abnormal political situation may force Prime Minister Kishi to resign and dissolve the Diet before the exchange takes place. In this event, the position of those in Japan who favor close ties with the United States, whom we believe to be at the present time a substantial majority of the Japanese people, would be considerably weakened during the election campaign and thereafter. If the Japanese conservatives are able to enter the election campaign without the treaty an accomplished fact, this should create conservative unity behind a policy of close cooperation with the United States and help maintain the dominance in Japan of conservative, pro-Western elements whose position has been shaken by recent events.
On the other hand, if the United States does not act promptly this could be interpreted in Japan as a lack of confidence in the future of the U.S.-Japanese partnership. It could also lead to pressures in Japan for reviewing the treaty with the goal of altering the provisions of the treaty in a manner which will satisfy certain Communist-inspired demands. 40
The letter served Johnson’s needs. When the treaty went before the Senate as a whole on June 21, Fulbright acted as the floor manager, introducing the committee’s unanimous report recommending approval. He answered numerous questions about the meaning of prior consultations and the impact it would have on the deployment of U.S. troops abroad. 41 He exchanged views with Aiken and Russell about the role of Japan in the international balance of power of East Asia. Russell also stated that Article IX of the American-imposed constitution, which renounced war as an instrument of state, was a mistake and he hoped the Japanese would void that section in the near future. 42
After these replies, various senators began offering statements in support of the agreement. A close reading of these remarks shows that support for the treaty remained uncertain. Seven of the twelve senators that bothered to make public comments either came out against the agreement or expressed some uneasiness about recent events in Japan and said they were going forward with misgivings and reservations. This process was going along at decent pace until Bourke Hickenlooper and Wayne Morse made long speeches before an empty chamber. These speeches were mainly for the record but delayed ratification for another day, adding a little last minute suspense to the proceedings. Johnson used this delay to refine his image. It had been good politics to present himself as a bipartisan supporter of U.S. foreign policy, but he had to make sure that he did not become Eisenhower’s token Democrat. The next day he made some quick remarks complaining about “a depressing lack of vital new ideas in our foreign policy.” The gambit worked. The sub-headline of the article in the New York Herald Tribune read “Johnson Attacks Foreign Policy.” His comments dominated the account found in the Washington Evening Star. When the Senate final voted, the treaty passed 90-2, but the outcome was closer than the final tally indicates. Both Fulbright and Everett Dirksen of Illinois, the minority leader, told the press before that they expected between ten and twenty negative votes. 43
The two senators who cast negative ballots were blunt in explaining why. “In the light of recent circumstances, I do not feel that the stability of the government of Japan justifies our surrendering the advantages that the old treaty afforded to the United States,” Russell stated. Long offered objections he had voiced before: “This treaty is entirely a one-way street. We give much and gain practically nothing that we do not already have.” He, however, had a new objection in light of the protests in Tokyo. “The Communists around the world will seize upon the ratification of this treaty to claim that we have imposed upon a vanquished nation terms and conditions to which the people of that nation were unwilling to agree.” 44
The formal exchange of the instruments of ratification was a quick process. Just seven hours after the Senate vote a ceremony took place in the personal residence of Foreign Minister Fujiyama. The event took all of three minutes. Guards kept protesters at bay, but Fujiyama had an escape route planned for himself and MacArthur in case a mob broke through. 45
Observers in the media were quick to praise the Senate for ratifying the new pact but warned that the crisis was still far from over. Editorials in the New York Herald Tribune, Washington Evening Star and Washington Post stated that America needed a new foreign policy for Japan. What that policy should be was a matter that went unaddressed. 46 Writing from Tokyo, Herald Tribune correspondent Marguerite Higgins predicted, “America is going to have quite enough trouble in its relations with Japan in the turbulent months ahead without continuing to pay the penalty of the kind of self-deception that so greatly contributed to the fiasco of the canceled Eisenhower trip.” The problems in the relationship were of Japanese making. In late June the Hearst chain ran a series of articles entitled “Are we Losing Japan?” But when Kishi resigned, order returned to Tokyo. The prophets of doom were soon in an embarrassing situation as Japan returned to normal without a fundamental reconsideration of U.S. foreign policy. In July, an article in U.S. News and World Report appeared under the headline “Did U.S. Win in Japan After All?” 47
In concluding this study, one would do well to remember that Otto von Bismarck, the German Chancellor, said those who like sausage and the law should never watch them being made. We might add the conduct of foreign policy in a decentralized democracy to that list. A popular idea in the United States holds that partisan politics should stop at the water’s edge; foreign affairs should not be made a political issue, but in this particular episode, partisanship made treaty ratification work the way the founding fathers intended. There was a debate—it was ugly at times—but each side had a case to make on certain issues. The Democrats in the Senate had the better position on Eisenhower’s trip to Japan. The Republican administration had a stronger case on the treaty. It took the work of Lyndon Johnson, however, to help advance the administration’s argument. (He was, of course, interested in advancing his own career and fortunes.) In both instances, the side with the stronger case prevailed. Foreign policy is made by politicians and it would be wrong to expect politics to be taken out of the process. Politics, even partisan politics, has an important role to play in the making of U.S. foreign policy.
End Notes
Note 1: George R. Packard, III, Protest in Tokyo: The Security Treaty Crisis of 1960 (Princeton, NJ, 1966); Katakoa Tetsuya, Protest in Tokyo: Japan’s Postwar Political System (Stanford, CA, 1992). Back
Note 2: John Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System—A Study in the Interaction of Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy (Atlantic Highlands, NJ, 1988); Michael Schaller, Altered States: The United States and Japan Since the Occupation (New York, 1997). Back
Note 3: Ronald W. Pruessen, John Foster Dulles: The Road to Power (New York, 1982), 450-452, 458-460, 472-476. Back
Note 4: Douglas MacArthur II oral history, part three, 19-20, Foreign Service Oral History Program, Lauinger Library, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. (hereinafter cited as FS Oral History). Back
Note 5: Memorandum of Conversation, August 19, 1956; Secretary of State to the Department of State, August 22, 1956, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, vol. 23, part 1, Japan, 202-204. (Hereafter referred to as FRUS with appropriate volume and page numbers). Back
Note 6: New York Herald Tribune, September 11, 1958; Douglas MacArthur II oral history, part three, 1, 4, 18, 50, FS Oral History. Back
Note 7: Schaller, Altered States, 138; Packard, Protest in Tokyo, 70-71; MacArthur to Acting Secretary, April 29, 1959; MacArthur to Department of State, April 29, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 18, Japan and Korea, 126-127, 134-139; Douglas MacArthur II oral history, part three, 24, Foreign Service Oral History Program, Lauinger Library, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. Back
Note 8: Packard, Protest in Tokyo, 47-54, 64-69. Back
Note 9: Schaller, Altered States, 138-142; Packard, Protest in Tokyo, 69-81. Back
Note 10: Time, January 25, 1960; Schaller, Altered States, 143-144; editorials noting the dramatic change that had taken place in only 15 years can be found in The Christian Science Monitor, January 21, 1960; The Washington Daily News, January 18, 20, 1960; Washington Evening Star, January 18, 1960; Los Angeles Times, January 21, 1960; St. Louis Globe-Democrat, January 20, 1960. An editorial in the Fort Worth Star-Telegram, January 20, 1960 did express some wariness of the Japanese, seeing them as a possible future enemy, but supported the treaty as a necessary step to take to protect the U.S. against its current enemies. Back
Note 11: Los Angeles Times, January 21, 1960; New York Herald Tribune, January 20, 1960. The same editorial appeared in Hearst papers on January 20, 1960. This citation is to the issue of the Chicago American for that day. For editorials voicing similar views see The Atlanta Constitution, January 20, 1960; The Washington Daily News, January 18, 20, 1960; St. Louis Globe-Democrat, January 20, 1960; Baltimore Sun, January 20, 1960; Fort Worth Star-Telegram, January 20, 1960; The Washington Post, January 18, 1960; Washington Evening Star, January 18, 1960; New York Herald Tribune, January 18, 1960. For a dissenting voice that saw little new in the treaty and disagreed with the idea that the accord ushered in a new era in U.S.-Japanese relations, see the Chicago Daily News, January 20, 1960. A front page article in the January 19, 1960 issue of The Wall Street Journal also questioned the importance of the new agreement. Back
Note 12: “Summary of Main Points of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with Japan,” no date; Staff memorandum, “Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States of America and Japan,” no date, envelop 2 of 3, Sen 86 B-B5, box 41, Treaty File, Records of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Records of the U. S. Senate, Record Group 46, U.S. National Archives, Washington, D.C. Back
Note 13: “Summary of Main Points of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with Japan,” no date, envelop 2 of 3, Sen 86 B-B5, box 41, Treaty File, Records of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Records of the U. S. Senate, Record Group 46, U.S. National Archives, Washington, D.C. Back
Note 14: Packard, Protest in Tokyo, 82, 105-124, 182-236. Back
Note 15: Ibid, 237-270. Back
Note 16: This assessment is based on a sampling of the various newspapers cited in the notes of this paper on key dates throughout the late spring and early summer. Back
Note 17: Arkansas Gazette, January 31, 1960; Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with Japan, June 7, 1960, Eighty-Sixth Congress, Second Session, 1960. (Washington, 1960). Back
Note 18: Ibid, 28; “Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with Japan,” June 7, 1960, Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series) vol. 12, Eighty-Sixth Congress, Second Session, 1960. (Washington, 1982), 410. Back
Note 19: Ibid, 405-409, 411; The New York Times, June 7, 1960. Back
Note 20: “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Herter,” June 7, 1960, FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 18, 327-328. Back
Note 21: Notes on Legislative Leadership Meeting, June 9, 1960, Whitman File, Legislative Meeting Series, box 3, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kansas (Hereafter referred to as DDEL). Back
Note 22: Washington Evening Star, June 8, 1960; New York Herald Tribune, June 8, 1960; The Cincinnati Enquirer, June 4, 1960; Baltimore Sun, June 8, 1960; Chicago Daily News, June 7, 1960. Back
Note 23: Fort Worth Star-Telegram, June 3, 1960; The Philadelphia Inquirer, June 8, 1960; Washington Evening Star, June 8, 1960. Back
Note 24: Louisville Courier-Journal, June 2, 1960. Back
Note 25: The Denver Post, June 1, 1960; The Wall Street Journal, June 8, 1960. Back
Note 26: New York Herald Tribune, June 11, 1960; Packard, Protest in Tokyo, 288-290, 294-297. Back
Note 27: New York Post, June 13, 1960; The Atlanta Constitution, June 14-16, 1960; The Cincinnati Enquirer, June 11, 1960; The Indianapolis Star, June 16, 1960; The Boston Herald, June 11, 1960; The Philadelphia Inquirer, June 13, 1960; Chicago Daily Tribune, June 10, 1960; New York Journal-American, June 11, 1960; The Providence Journal, June 11, 1960; Fort Worth Telegram-Star, June 14, 1960. Back
Note 28: Washington Evening Star, June 12, 1960. Back
Note 29: Packard, Protest in Tokyo, 293, 300; Schaller, Altered States, 156-158. Back
Note 30: The Wall Street Journal, June 17, 1960; New York Daily Mirror, June 12, 1960; New York Herald Tribune, June 19, 1960; Life, June 27, 1960, 32-33; The Des Moines Register, June 21, 1960; The Denver Post, June 23, 1960; The Washington Daily News, June 23, 1960; The Washington Post, June 17, 1960; Congressional Record, 86th Congress, 2d. session, 13209. Back
Note 31: Los Angeles Times, June 16-17, 1960; Lawrence’s column can be found in the Washington Evening Star, June 17, 1960; for the few of other columnists see Max Lerner in the New York Post, June 1, 1960; Roscoe Drummon in the Chicago Sun-Times, June 21, 1960; and Peter Edson in The Washington Daily News, June 22, 1960; Washington Evening Star, June 17, 1960; Chicago Daily Tribune, June 17, 1960; The Kansas City Times, June 17, 1960; The Birmingham News, June 17, 1960. Back
Note 32: Edwin O. Reischauer, Japan Past and Present (Second edition, New York, 1958), 142-185; Edwin O. Reischauer, “What Went Wrong?” in James Morley, ed., Dilemmas of Growth in Prewar Japan (Princeton, NJ, 1971), 489-510. For a different interpretation that comes to similar broad conclusions see Robert Scalapino, Democracy and Party Movement in Prewar Japan: The Failure of the First Attempt (Los Angeles and Berkeley, 1953). In the 1960s and 1970s scholars of Japan challenged this view, arguing that the Japanese actually had very little attachment to democracy. See the essays in Robert E. Ward, ed., Political Development in Modern Japan (Princeton, NJ, 1968); Bernard S. Silberman and H.D. Harootunian, Japan in Crisis: Essays on Taish Democracy (Princeton, NJ, 1974) and the others in Morley, Dilemmas of Growth. Back
Note 33: The Atlanta Constitution, June 17, 1960; New York Herald Tribune, June 20, 1960; Fort Worth Star-Telegram, June 22, 1960. Back
Note 34: This view was the official position of the Hearst chain. An editorial to that effect was printed in all Hearst papers on June 23, 1960. This citation is to the issue of the Seattle Post-Intelligencer for that day. Other papers offering similar assessments include The Philadelphia Inquirer, June 21, 1960; The Washington Daily News, June 21, 1960; Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, June 21, 1960; Chicago Sun-Times, June 22, 1960. Back
Note 35: New York Herald Tribune, June 12, 1960; The Washington Post, June 17, 1960; The New York Times, June 18, 1960; Herter-Johnson Telephone Conversation, June 16, 1960, Box 1, Notes and Transcripts of LBJ Conversations, LBJ Archive, Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas (Hereafter referred to as LBJL).; Congressional Record, 86th Congress, 2d. session, 13551-53. Back
Note 36: Marcy to Fulbright, June 17, 1960, Foreign Relations-Japan Folder, Box 770, Senate File, LBJ Archive, LBJL. Back
Note 37: Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, “Lyndon Johnson, Foreign Policy, and the Election of 1960,” Southwestern Historical Quarterly, Forthcoming. Back
Note 38: Johnson to Uchida Genzo, June 27, 1960, 1960, Foreign Relations-Japan Folder, Box 770, Senate File, LBJ Archive, LBJL; The New York Times, June 18, 1960. Back
Note 39: The New York Times, June 18, 1960; Telephone Conversations, June 20, 1960; Christian A. Herter Telephone Calls from March 28, 1960 to June 30, 1960 Folder, Box 12, Papers of Christian Herter, DDEL; Herter-Johnson Telephone Conversation, June 20, 1960, Box 1, Notes and Transcripts of LBJ Conversations, LBJ Archive, LBJL. Back
Note 40: Herter to Johnson, June 20, 1960, Foreign Relations-Japan Folder, Box 770, Senate File, LBJ Archive, LBJL Back
Note 41: Congressional Record, 86th Congress, 2d. session, 13544-13550. Back
Note 42: Ibid, 13550-13553. Back
Note 43: Ibid, 13553-13572; 13574-13582; 13585-13589; 13594-13597; 13708; 13737-13740; The New York Times, June 22, 1960; Los Angeles Times, June 23, 1960; New York Herald Tribune, June 23, 1960; Washington Evening Star, June 22, 1960. Back
Note 44: The Atlanta Constitution, June 23, 1960; Los Angeles Times, June 23, 1960. Back
Note 45: New York Herald Tribune, June 23, 1960; Schaller, Altered States, 158. Back
Note 46: New York Herald Tribune, June 23, 1960; The Washington Post, June 23, 1960; Washington Evening Star, June 23, 1960. Back
Note 47: New York Herald Tribune, June 20, 1960; the citation for this five part series that appeared in all Hearst newspapers is New York Journal-American, June 26-30, 1960; U.S. News and World Report, July 18, 1960, 98. Back