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Attitudes Toward European Security, 1990-1997
By Sorin Lungu
Introduction
Historical Legacy
The Maastricht Treaty
WEU and the Eurocorps
The 1994 Brussels Summit and CJTF
1995-1997 Developments
Final Remarks
Endnotes
The author, a former diplomat in the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, holds advanced degrees from the University of Bucharest and the Naval Postgraduate School at Monterrey, California. He recently immigrated to the United States. ~ Ed.
Among the myriad complex issues raised by the end of the Cold War in Europe, the most confusing and frustrating by far have concerned the elaboration of an institutional security system consistent with the continent’s evolving strategic environment. Before the great changes in Europe began in 1989, things looked rather simple. Not only was the Atlantic Alliance the keystone of Western Europe’s security and defense posture, but it was also the mechanism through which the Western powers determined a common policy in the East-West dialogue. Most of all, however, NATO was a working decision-making body representing a nucleus of Western European and North American states combined under the leadership of the United States.
After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the successful reunification of Germany, and the sweeping democratization of Eastern Europe, the Europeans found themselves being pulled in different directions by states whose interests often worked at cross-purposes to each other. The disappearance of the Soviet threat and the demise of the bipolar system threatened to lift the lid of a Pandora’s box of intra-European politics. Thus, a relatively tense and uncertain situation was reflected in the debates between the advocates of a revitalized NATO, on one side, and the proponents of a new European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), on the other. To the British historian Michael Howard it was clear that “with the evaporation of the threat that called it into existence NATO is falling apart, and the rift between the Anglo-Saxon Atlanticists and European continentalists grows steadily wider.” 1
The background to this debate could be summarized as follows: The integration of Western Europe benefited in the post-war period from U.S. leadership and protection. Since the Second World War the U.S. had generally supported the need for increased cooperation among European states, including in the area of security. This support was the result of conclusions about the latent dangers of European disunity. In this respect, it had become an accepted truth in the United States that Europe’s nationalistic fragmentation was at the root of the continent’s repeated wars.
The first attempt to construct a European Defense Community (EDC) was a response to U.S. insistence, following the outbreak of the Korean War, for West Germany to be rearmed so as to supply military manpower to meet the Soviet threat, thus reducing the necessity for large-scale U.S. forces in Europe (1950-1954). The collapse of this initiative left two lasting legacies: first, the weak Western European Union (WEU), with most of its security functions deliberately transferred to NATO; second, the sense that Western Europe could approach political union only indirectly, starting with economic and energy policies.
The Fouchet plans, and the French and German challenges to “Anglo-Saxon” dominance of the Atlantic Alliance in 1958-1963, left behind a further layer of inhibitions and institutions. In 1963 the Franco-German Treaty of Cooperation (Elysée Treaty) attempted to institutionalize a bilateral dialogue between Bonn and Paris in the area of defense. But all these projects were ill-fated, the EDC and the Fouchet plans being stillborn, and the last premature.
At the moment when President Kennedy used the expression “European pillar” (1962), calling upon Western Europe to share more equitably the “burdensome tasks of building and defending a community of free nations,” 2 the notion of a European defense identity—as opposed to the concept of the defense of Europe— lacked political currency, substance, and stated purpose. Furthermore, in the early 1960’s, the United States sought de facto to increase resource contributions from its European allies as individual nations. Far from sponsoring collective European burden-sharing, the Americans merely asked for greater contributions from each individual ally. 3
The seventies witnessed the creation of the European Political Cooperation (EPC, in 1970) and the numerous resolutions of the European Parliament and several Community reports (from 1973). These began to call for the extension of the cooperative concept to defense and security policies. In the language of one of those documents: “In practice, cooperation in the field of foreign policy can hardly ever be separated from defense and security policy.” 4 In sum, by the late 1970s, Europe’s defense identity began to acquire political visibility without having gained any corresponding substance.
In the same period, as was the case with the ill-fated EDC, the United States was both supportive and mildly wary of European efforts to coalesce institutionally, first in the EUROGROUP initiatives in 1968 and, in a more direct challenge to U.S. dominance in the armaments marketplace, in the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) in 1976. 5
The 1980s, in the context of a new, more assertive, American foreign policy and a parallel worsening of U.S-Soviet relations, witnessed three new initiatives to assert Europe’s distinctiveness in security and defense policy.
First, the French socialist government ultimately succeeded in revitalizing the long-dormant Elysée Treaty by creating the Franco-German brigade. Moreover, it formalized its bilateral defense relations with Spain and Italy.
Second, owing again to a French initiative, the WEU was reactivated in 1984, not as a decision-making body but as a forum where seven (and later ten) European countries might discuss defense and security problems among themselves. 6
Third, the debate on security and defense was deepened in the European Community. With the signature and ratification of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1987, the EC became formally linked to the EPC. Furthermore, the Community recognized that it had a legitimate role in the area of defense industrial cooperation. 7
As new concepts of a distinct European identity grew in the 1980’s, the United States was reassured by the Rome Declaration and Hague Platform 8 documents that the WEU would become the European pillar only within and consistent with the NATO alliance. In addition, the Americans did not see the potential for a challenge to NATO’s exclusive role, for other two reasons.
It can be concluded that until the end of the Cold War the concept of ESDI was defined, for a variety of reasons, as a process for the development of some sort of convergence of West European security interests within NATO. The most prominent of those reasons were to balance American predominance, to better promote a policy of détente vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, and to tie Germany— supposedly vacillating between East and West—not only into an Atlantic, but also into a tight political European framework. It was a primarily political concept developed by West European member states in their search for greater convergence of identity of interests while not changing the basic political and military structure of the Alliance and Europe. 10
In this context, at the end of the decade, with the notion of a European defense identity taking shape, not as an isolated concept but as a necessary complement to Western Europe’s desirable political and economic union, more countries became progressively more attracted to it. In addition, Europe’s security environment was about to change drastically, and West Europeans felt emboldened to express their beliefs in the emergence of a new, more autonomous, security system for the continent.
In this environment, the North Atlantic Alliance as a whole and specifically the American government had to recognize and adapt to the presence of this increasingly popular concept of European security. The post-1989 years witnessed an effort to define the ESDI on the basis of the European Union (EU) and the WEU. This has included the definition of a new type of relations between NATO and the WEU and, thus, three countries became strongly involved in this process: France, Germany, and the United States.
To understand ESDI’s true character, and further the German and American attitudes towards it, it is essential to examine, at a minimum, the following principal manifestations 11 —which are all intergovernmental:
Since the London Declaration in July 1990, the Alliance has repeatedly called upon the allies “to enhance the role and responsibility of the European members.” Furthermore, it has welcomed the “efforts of the EC to strengthen the security dimension in the process of European integration and recognized the significance of the progress made by the EC countries towards the goal of a political union, including the development of a common defense and security policy.” 12
The Europeans took the initiative and, thus, the Treaty on European Union, finalized at the European Council meeting in Maastricht on 9-10 December 1991 and signed on 7 February 1992, declared as one of its first objectives “the implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time led to common defence.” 13 The Treaty further requested WEU (which it referred to as “an integral part of the development of the Union”) “to elaborate and implement decisions on actions of the Union which have defense implications.” 14
In two “Declarations” attached to the Treaty, the nine nations that were then WEU members stated their aim “to develop the WEU as the defense component of the European Union and as [a] means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.” 15 Simultaneously, states which were members of the European Union and not, at that time, members of the WEU 16 were invited to accede to the WEU 17 and the WEU proposed that other European member-states of NATO 18 become associate members of the WEU in a way that would give them the possibility of “participating fully” in its activities. 19
The Maastricht Treaty was the outcome of fierce debates and battles within and among states, and the section dealing with the CFSP, which is riddled with ambiguous language and concepts, reflected the lack of consensus on Europe’s future role. It was clear that the twelve had not taken a significant qualitative step towards a common, integrated European policy on foreign and security matters. But the important contribution of the Treaty has been that the member countries of the Union started to work together in a tighter and more coordinated framework on CFSP matters.
At the same time, it may be well that Maastricht has marked a crucial shift in Western defense, from U.S. leadership within an integrated Atlantic Alliance towards an integrated West European pillar within NATO and towards an independent ESDI dimension. 20 Thus, it is important to understand the motivations of the main protagonists (especially Germany and France) and the American perspective on this important event. In the negotiations, as during many previous attempts to define Western Europe’s international identity, “France and Britain represented initially opposing positions, with the U.S. an outsider and Germany attempting to hold close to France without losing touch with the others.” 21
Specifically, the French retained their traditional suspicion of NATO, the integrated military structure and the institutionalized U.S. leadership within it. The Federal Republic of Germany shared not only the Atlanticism of some European capitals (such as London and The Hague), but also the French pro-European declaratory policy. Bonn wanted to reassure all its allies that “Germany was anchored firmly in the western community, as the process of unification was completed, as Soviet acquiescence was gained and as new links with the former socialist states were made.” 22 In the German perception, a closer EU legitimized the pursuit of German aims in Central and Eastern Europe. 23 Neither the French nor the German government had an entirely coherent position throughout the interconnected negotiations of 1990-1991.
At the same time, from the German viewpoint, certain factors promoted the development and implementation of an ESDI.
First, in the context of German unification, strengthening and enlarging cooperation within a West European structure 24 would lock Germany into tight security framework.
Second, the future direction of U.S. policy towards Europe after the end of the Cold War did not appear to be outlined clearly. 25 Europeans wanted to be prepared for a possible American withdrawal from Europe.
Third, Russia remained Germany’s main security concern in Europe. Russia’s view of NATO was always more critical than its view of the EU and ESDI. In the new European context, Western Europe could aim at balancing Russian and Western (implicitly German) interests. 26
In this context, the Maastricht Treaty “has been approved by an overwhelming majority in the Bundestag, and no major political party has voiced substantial objections against a further strengthening of the EU, even in the field of foreign [, security and defense] policy.” 27 The belief that a Germany more integrated into Europe could balance also the Euro-Atlantic disputes—especially by continuing its role as a mediator between France and the United States—was prominent in Germany’s post-Cold War political arena.
The U. S. position had similar inconsistencies. Repeated support for a stronger West European role within the Atlantic Alliance was matched by warnings about the adverse impact of moves towards a European caucus on America’s European commitment. Bilateral tours of prominent U.S. officials cautioned European governments against any practical steps towards a separate European Defense identity. The U.S. administration communicated its views more directly to a WEU ministerial meeting in February 1991, through the so-called “Bartholomew Telegram,” laying down U.S. preconditions for a European Defense Identity— although some officials were evidently embarrassed by such a peremptory intervention in the European debate. 28
Preceding the Maastricht Treaty provisions, the most significant of the Franco-German initiatives on the European defense identity was the Kohl-Mitterrand proposal of October 14, 1991. Its purpose was to develop the existing Franco-German brigade into a complete European army corps. 29 The Eurocorps plan reflected the willingness of France and Germany to move ahead of their partners in the EC, with the hope of subsequently drawing those partners in their wake. This proposal was a direct challenge to the NATO Rapid Reaction Corps 30 and stimulated a debate about the WEU’s role between NATO and the EU. 31
The NATO summit in Rome on 7-8 November 1991 brought some of these disagreements to a head. The United States was irritated by the different signals coming from European capitals. President Bush was reported to have said, “if your ultimate goal is to provide independently for your own defense, the time to tell us is today.” 32 Furthermore, some U.S. officials arrived “enraged” by apparent French encouragement for the “development of alternative structures to NATO, interpreting this as a sign that Paris hoped and believed that the United States would soon leave Europe.” 33
The German delegation at the summit was relatively silent. This silence reflected the inherent tensions in Bonn’s position; it wanted to retain a central role for the United States and NATO, while at the same time it wanted to cooperate with France in plans for a stronger European defense identity. At the summit, Chancellor Kohl had “stoutly defended the Franco-German proposals, hinting that Washington had been kept fully informed about these plans from an early stage, and affirmed his commitment both to the continuance of NATO and to the evolution of a common European security policy.” 34
The attitudes of the Europeans discussed above throw light on some of the obstacles that have hampered progress towards ESDI. First, any positive development towards ESDI inevitably raises difficult questions concerning the responsibilities of Europe’s existing security institutions.
Before Europe can establish itself as an effective actor in international politics, the respective roles of the EU, the WEU, and NATO should be clarified. This argument would be inevitably linked with the possible risk of “regionalization” of European security, in the context of the simultaneous processes of “deepening” and “widening” the EU—that is, strengthening the EU’s supranational institutions and an ESDI and CFSP, while enlarging the EU. Last, but not least, the problem of resource allocation for the establishment of the autonomous defense structure would be another issue to be solved by the Europeans.
In this context, the WEU is playing the role of a passe-partout in European security and defense affairs: it could be considered both the possible defense arm of the EU and the European pillar within the Atlantic Alliance. Taking into account the fact that the WEU does not possess many assets that could be used as a framework for developing an ESDI, its role in crisis management and peace operations deserves analysis.
With the Maastricht Treaty, the WEU has become an integral part of the West European integration process. The WEU has been designated the EU’s organization of choice to formulate and implement defense and military aspects of policy. Although the WEU maintains its independent legal basis (the 1948 Brussels Treaty, as modified in 1954) for the Union’s CFSP to be effective, close cooperation between the EU and WEU is indispensable; this might eventually result in the amalgamation of both organizations.
Only six months after the Maastricht Treaty had been signed, WEU member states adopted the Petersberg Declaration (19 June 1992), which clarified the WEU’s role in conflict prevention and crisis management. The ministers of foreign affairs of the WEU member countries agreed that, besides making a contribution to collective defense in accordance with the treaties of Brussels and Washington, military units of the member states of the WEU could be deployed for “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, [and] tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.” 35
Deployment could take place on the basis of a mandate from the CSCE or the United Nations Security Council. In order to implement the decisions, a Planning Cell was set up in early 1993 in the WEU headquarters in Brussels. “With these Petersberg tasks the WEU was a step ahead of NATO since peace enforcing could be carried out by the WEU, but not by NATO.” 36
The new Franco-German “Eurocorps” which was announced on 22 May 1992 would be excellent for carrying out the Petersberg tasks. 37 This new army concept was consistent with the decision of the Alliance Strategic Concept that “integrated and multinational European structures, as they are further developed in the context of an emerging European Defense Identity, will also increasingly have a similar role to play in enhancing the allies’ ability to work together in the common defense.” 38 The United States was at best ambivalent toward the Eurocorps proposal. The Pentagon, often more relaxed toward European initiatives than the State Department, was generally supportive of the Franco-German initiative. The Administration generally saw it as needless at best and at worst potentially damaging to the North Atlantic Alliance. 39
One of the most difficult and controversial aspects of the corps has been its relationship with NATO and its integrated commands, a question that produced differences not only between the corps’ Franco-German sponsors and their allies, but between the French and the Germans themselves. Whereas Germany (all of whose troops are assigned to NATO anyway) wanted a close NATO link, France (whose forces are not integrated in the commands) had reservations. NATO leaders such as SACEUR John Galvin argued that independent European structures would create force redundancies, cause confusion in command structures, and complicate military planning. Germany was caught in a familiar position of trying to placate both Washington and Paris and often found itself making somewhat contradictory promises to both sides on the “priority” of the corps’ forces. 41 This was one of the many instances of Germany trying to find middle ground between the French and American positions.
From the French perspective the Eurocorps would represent the first step toward truly independent European capacities for scenarios in which the United States would be unable or unwilling to act, and function as a means to influence more heavily U.S. decisions when it did act. The corps would be the basis for a future European army with autonomous capabilities for defense within Europe, peacekeeping and peacemaking tasks, and force projection abroad. It should also be recalled that numerous French leaders (for instance, Mitterrand and Rocard) have claimed to be uncertain whether the Americans would remain in Europe and whether they would be as prepared in the future to provide leadership in dealing with European security challenges as they had been during the Cold War.
The German conception emphasized the Eurocorps’ role in organizing a better European contribution to the Atlantic Alliance and in drawing France closer to NATO. German officials repeatedly stated that they could not imagine the Eurocorps ever acting without the United States and often described it as a “second best” solution to full Euro-Atlantic integration. As one German diplomat put it: “We would have preferred that France simply reintegrate within NATO and that NATO serve as West’s primary security organization. But the French aren’t willing to do that, so we took the next best thing.” 42
Another opinion was that creating common instruments (such as the Eurocorps) without ensuring a common foreign, security, and defense policy that such instruments would have to serve, is not without risk. It could well lead to disappointment when it becomes clear that common instruments could not be used in a given situation where no commonality in interest does exist. 43
Despite these risks and constraints (including the CFE Treaty), multinationality became an increasingly important concept for the Germans. It was to be used to tie as many units as possible into the defense of the national territory and to “broadcast the message that [Germany] was not aiming at solo initiatives in Europe.” 44 Moreover, the acceptance of a military unit with international peacekeeping and peacemaking as declared missions represented a new commitment to play an international security role and to do so in the multilateral context. However, as Guillaume Parmentier has pointed out,
Germany remains marked by an extremely territorial conception of its defence, as reflected by its strong resistance to France’s discreet requests aimed at encouraging the Eurocorps to move towards greater flexibility and inter-army capabilities and hence to its adaptation to selective light operations. 45
Initially, several West European governments were skeptical about the benefits of the Eurocorps, which could be seen as an unproductive duplication of military cooperation that was already taking place in NATO. Much of the doubt was taken away by the so-called SACEUR agreement of January 1993, which stipulated that the Eurocorps would be deployed within NATO in case of war in Europe, and that it could be also used by NATO for peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. 46 In practice this implied that the French troops of the Eurocorps would be subordinated to the SACEUR in a case of Article 5 engagement (i.e., in the case of war). 47
Owing to its limited operational military capabilities, the Eurocorps today primarily serves as a political signal and will perhaps, in due course, offer an institutional model for closer military cooperation between WEU member states. In the long run, considered as a contribution to the development of an ESDI, it could create—as many American officials fear and as many French officials explicitly seek—a European “caucus” that would make it difficult for the United States to influence European decisions once they are taken.
The 1994 Brussels Summit and CJTF
At the same time, the conflict in the former Yugoslavia was escalating and it was impossible for the West Europeans to find an effective answer on their own. NATO’s position was not much better. After the 1991 Rome summit the Alliance “seemed to lapse into permanent confusion” as to which course to follow. The years 1992 and 1993 witnessed some steps towards NATO’s adaptation to the new challenges. The profound differences of opinion among the allies were about practical action outside the treaty area and Article 5; countries such as Germany, Denmark and Belgium articulated reservations. “This was expressed in the difficulty which these countries had in recognizing that the Alliance was playing an increasingly visible role in former Yugoslavia.” 48
In this context, the German Defense Minister, Volker Ruehe, sounded an alarm at the end of 1993. He called for reform of NATO since “we cannot just confine ourselves to reconfirming the Alliance’s basic mission in the past.” 49 This was followed by a plea for an Alliance that could undertake an active role outside the treaty area, and for “force and command structures” which reflected this.
Moreover, this function would require closer cooperation within the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union. The WEU would have to take on the defense aspects of this policy and, in conformity with the Maastricht Treaty, develop into the European pillar of NATO.
In May 1993, U.S. Senators Bob Dole and Richard Lugar voiced their discontent with President Clinton’s NATO policies, putting pressure on the administration to find a solution to the impasse. At the Spring Session of the North Atlantic Assembly, they complained about NATO’s impotence and failure to take action in former Yugoslavia: “The inability of NATO to act effectively is bound to raise grave doubts among both the American people and the Congress about whether the enormous yearly investment we make in NATO is reaping sufficient benefits.” 50
In this context, President Clinton advanced in June 1993 the proposal of organizing a NATO summit later in the year. “The summit was intended to confirm the continuing relevance of NATO as a European security organization and the American commitment to Europe.” 51
The important steps in preparation for the summit were the “brainstorming sessions” of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) during July-September 1993 and the informal meeting of ministers of defense which took place in Travemunde at the invitation of the German defense minister from 19 to 21 October 1993.
During the “brainstorming sessions,” among other issues, the relationship between NATO and the WEU was of particular concern. Secretary of State Warren Christopher and the new U.S. Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council, Ambassador Robert Hunter, had insisted that “there must be separable but not separate capabilities,” but it was not very clear what the Americans meant by it. A second American proposal concerned an increase in the effectiveness of NATO in crisis management in Europe and, thus, an adjustment of the command and force structures would be required in order to make NATO a more efficient instrument for dealing with “Bosnia-type” crises. Finally, the Americans insisted on a greater European role in crisis management outside the NATO area. This implied that the NATO command structure would become more European and that it could also be used for carrying out missions under the flag of the WEU. 52
At Travemunde, Les Aspin, the American Secretary of Defense, presented the U.S. proposal to make the force and command structures better suited for out-of-area operations. This proposal was known as “the combined joint task force concept” (CJTF) and “has been developed in secret in consultation with SACEUR and was intended for carrying out peacekeeping and other operations by NATO and WEU.” The basic assumption was that the integrated command structure was still at the moment completely geared to Article 5 operations but was, in principle, flexible enough to carry out other missions. The idea was that SACEUR would commission the Major Subordinate Commanders to form central staff within their headquarters to carry out these operations. In the event of a crisis the CJTF would be activated and supplemented with specialized personnel. The CJTF would hold periodic exercises, especially in the field of peacekeeping. Finally, the CJTF should form the basis for the “separable but not separate” forces of a European security and defense identity. 53
With these preparations among others, the summit took place on 10 and 11 January 1994 in Brussels. The heads of states and government approved three important documents of the Partnership for Peace (PFP) and the CJTF concept on the first day. Besides the approval of these documents several decisions were taken which would significantly influence NATO’s agenda in the coming years.
First, it was decided that active support should be given to the development of the ESDI as a European pillar within NATO. In the statement, support was given to the WEU, as the embodiment of the European pillar within NATO. An important contribution was the commitment that NATO was
. . . ready to make collective assets of the Alliance available, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council for WEU operations undertaken by the European allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy. We support the development of separable but not separate capabilities that could respond to European requirements and contribute to Alliance security. 54
This approach could avoid a costly duplication of military capacities within the WEU.
Second, the decision to develop further functions outside the NATO area was taken. This required immediately the revision of the “command and force structures,” with a view to better co-operation with the WEU and the NACC. The ambassadors were commissioned, with the advice of the Military Authorities,
to examine how the Alliance’s political and military structures and procedures might be developed and adapted to conduct more efficiently and flexibly the Alliance’s missions, including peacekeeping as well as to improve co-operation with the WEU and to reflect the emerging European Security and Defense Identity. As part of the process we endorse the CJTF concept as a means to facilitate contingency operations, including operations with participating nations outside the Alliance. 55
The conspicuous interest of Germany in stabilizing Central and Eastern Europe led Bonn to support the effort to create CJTFs, because CJTFs might give the WEU an increased role in possible operations in the region. This idea is emphasized also in the 1994 German White Paper on Defense:
In the future, it [the WEU] will be able to fall back on NATO structures and forces. This will render Europe capable of taking strategic action and at the same time prevent the building of dual structures that no one is able and willing to afford. . . . This new command structure must also be assured for European ends. The WEU must have the opportunity to use these headquarters. 56
It can be concluded that, in January 1994, NATO leaders approved an initiative to give the Alliance’s decades-old integrated military structure strikingly different capabilities for the future. Because the range of the decisions taken was much greater than was the case in Rome, the Brussels summit could be described as “without doubt the most important NATO meeting held in recent decades.” 57
The 1994 Brussels summit established the CJTF concept as the key instrument for updating the Alliance’s military structures in order to deal more efficiently with non-Article 5 missions and to support ESDI’s development. Although the term CJTF denotes a multinational, multiservice task force, the heart of the concept entails creating in advance a combined structure with staff, procedures, and planning, so that a group of countries responding to a non-Article 5 crisis could use assets according to the particular need. 58
“U.S. defense officials conceived CJTF as a means both to further adapt NATO’s military structure to post-Cold War missions and to support ESDI by making NATO assets available to a WEU military operation.” 59 CJTF intervention would essentially take place either under NATO command, if the U.S. were a major player, or under that of the WEU for distinctly European operations. Overall, it would allow for more effective sharing of global military burdens between the United States and Europe and pave the way for the WEU to conduct missions in which the Americans had little or no direct interest or involvement. 60
However, efforts to implement CJTF have been the object of considerable frustration. Significant differences emerged between the U.S. and France on how to set up both NATO- and WEU-led CJTFs. “Whereas the US wanted to use CJTF to give NATO’s IMS [International Military Staff] the flexibility to respond to non-Article 5 missions, the French argued that the IMS is inherently unsuited for those type of missions.” 61 The French in particular resisted extending the existing American-led major NATO commands—especially Allied Command Europe—to non-Article 5 missions. They worried that this extension would effectively mean American political control over the mission. As a consequence they leaned heavily in the direction of European structures for non-Article 5 missions. For its part the United States was particularly concerned about the use of NATO assets in European-led CJTF missions in which the Americans did not participate. 62
The French position toward NATO began to change under the leadership of President Jacques Chirac. On 5 December 1995, France announced its decision to return to the Military Committee (MC), from which it had withdrawn in 1966, and to participate in deliberations about NATO reform. France’s decision, which represented a reorientation in its relations with the Alliance, “was warmly welcomed by the German leaders and the German defense community.” Despite the rapprochement with the Alliance, the French have continued their efforts to merge the WEU into the EU. The Germans supported them. Chancellor Kohl in particular wanted to push forward the “proud and symbolic European phalanx.” 63
Thus, when the French and the Germans met with other European ministers at a seminar at Freiburg, on 27 February 1996, they “arrived at a compromise alternative to Germany’s early proposals for the extension of majority voting to CFSP deliberations of the European Council.” 64 The adopted proposal for “constructive abstention” should provide, in the medium term, the framework under which the WEU could merge into the EU. But, taking into account the strictly Atlanticist conceptions of the German military and those of the majority of the German diplomats and politicians in politico-military matters, each Franco-German initiative must be “corrected” by a gesture toward NATO. On 19 March 1996, Werner Hoyer, Parliamentary State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry, signaled immediately the extent to which the French and German conceptions on European defense still diverge: “We clearly reject the [French] ideas that would end [up by] replacing NATO’s integrated command structure and [we] will speak out against every measure that could give the impression of driving a wedge into the transatlantic relationship.” 65
Inside the Alliance the differences between the Americans and the French concerning the implementation of the CJTF concept were overcome. The NAC was designated to steer CJTF operations politically and the operation itself would be guided by the newly established Capabilities Coordination Cell, under the MC and within the IMS. Despite some notable unanswered questions, 66 the acceptance of the political CJTF could be considered as an important element in the restructuring of NATO’s integrated military structure. German officials were supportive of this process and remained sincerely attached to a form of Europeanization of NATO, but the reflex of resisting strong U.S. pressure maintained their “dual-track” approach in the Franco-American debate. They looked forward with optimism to the important June 1996 NAC, which was to be held in Berlin. In the words of Klaus Kinkel, the German Foreign Minister:
Therefore [they] welcome the fact that the links between NATO and the WEU have increasingly been strengthened on the basis of the agreed principles of complementarity and transparency. NATO will support the WEU in developing its operational capabilities, but this must not lead to a duplication of structures and bureaucratic procedures if only for reasons of efficiency and cost. The concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) is the key to this. Here, too, Berlin must set the course for the future. 67
The decisions taken by the ministerial NATO Council on 3 June 1996 concerned basic political requirements for the adaptation of the Alliance. The final communiqué contained three important points, under which the Allies agreed to several practical arrangements in support of ESDI, but avoided dispositions that might have led to a split within the Alliance. It is important to mention that during the negotiations concerning the “most European” communiqué of all NAC meetings, “none of the member states had clear-cut ideas about the European Security and Defense Identity and the precise relationship between the European Union, the WEU and NATO.” 68
The first of these concerned the maintenance of the Alliance’s military effectiveness, both for Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations. These tasks should be carried out by a single multinational command structure in which the European element would predominate and which would facilitate participation by the PFP partners and other non-NATO countries. The CJTF element should be the key concept in this.
The second basic principle was the maintenance of the transatlantic link. NATO should remain the principal forum for transatlantic consultations and the instrument through which common interests were promoted.
The third point was the promotion of the ESDI. 69
From the American viewpoint, the 1996 Berlin NAC meeting concluded that, in the words of Walter Slocombe, the U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy:
In the future, part of NATO’s peacetime responsibilities must include preparing for such assistance, in planning, exercises, training and staffing, for WEU-led operations. All of this should be done within the Alliance and within its military command structure, not as a separate (including de facto separate) parallel structure, or by elements that are ‘European only, American clean.’ It is essential from the U.S. point of view not to foster a bifurcated NATO, in which de facto if not explicitly, there are two systems, one for the U.S. and Article 5, and one for Europe and non-Article 5 operations. 70
Despite some divergent positions, it can be appreciated that the June 1996 Berlin NAC meeting was
a turning point in the debate on NATO’s internal adaptation, because it reconciled the Alliance-wide desire for more flexible, mobile forces that could be deployed for the full range of Alliance missions—from collective defence to crisis management and peace-keeping—with the aspiration of those Allies in the European Union to develop a tangible, credible European Security and Defence Identity. 71
A few days later, on 13 June 1996, the ministers of defense of the NATO member countries met in Brussels for the spring meeting of the Defense Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group. During the discussions, the Germans pressed for strong political guidelines concerning the reform of NATO’s command structure, while the Americans reportedly felt that too many concessions had already been made to support the WEU. The United States also opposed a proposal to direct planning specifically toward the WEU’s Petersberg tasks. Despite the fact that Germany felt that CJTF “would provide, if properly used by the Europeans, sufficient opportunity for the expression of European identity on the military level,” the Germans considered, together with the French, that “’the Berlin signal well and truly represented the founding act of European identity within NATO.” 72
The year 1997 witnessed wide conceptual differences between the French and the Germans in pushing forward the merger of the WEU within the EU, a condition sine qua non for realizing a genuine ESDI.
First, the debate concerning the acceptance of the concept of a “lead-nation” capable of playing a key reconnaissance role in the conduct of an operation, ended with a last minute rapprochement on the conceptual plane at the May 1997 WEU ministerial meeting in Paris, supposedly due to the experience of Bosnia.
Second, their different conceptions of the necessary degree of national sovereignty to be abandoned for achieving an effective decision-making body in the EU that would implement the projected CFSP, led to a fragile compromise.
Third, within the framework of the EU, following the February 1996 Franco-German initiative, the EU member countries succeeded in updating at the Amsterdam Summit Article J-4 of the Treaty of Maastricht in connection with the Common Foreign and Security Policy operations. 73 But, because the adopted guidelines did not receive unanimous agreement among the EU partners—the German and French conceptions in particular were widely different—a more significant achievement at the summit in the field of the ESDI was not realized. 74
It could be concluded that 1997 was a year of minimum progress in the institutional development of the ESDI.
On the American side, in 1996-1997 the only major concern was the AFSOUTH debate. The Americans attempted to delay the discussion about the subject because this topic, combined with the “Deputy SACEUR” one, could lead to adjustments in the European position within the Atlantic Alliance and undermine American leadership. William Perry, then Secretary of Defense, stated that “the presence of the American Sixth Fleet was a determining factor in the regional balance of power. He also considered American leadership crucial as he thought this region to have the highest risk of crises.” 75 Focused on the process of NATO enlargement, the United States tried to maintain a status quo in the American-European defense relationship and, thus, to avoid any source of further tension.
The German position during 1997 toward the Southern flank debate might be described as follows:
In the quarrel which began in the summer of 1997 [in fact, in the summer of 1996] between the French and the Americans over the nationality of the commander of the Southern region, the Germans have supported France strongly and openly by very firm public declarations (e.g. Mr. Ruhe in Oslo on 25 September 1996), probably because they felt that a visible Europeanisation of NATO would reassure the Russians that NATO enlargement would not come at their expense. As a matter of fact, as soon as Russia accepted the fait accompli of NATO enlargement . . . at the Helsinki summit in March 1997, the Germans retreated and came up with proposals for a division of responsibilities in the Southern region which is far to say were impossible for the French to accept. 76
In September 1997, the chairman of NATO’s Military Committee, General Klaus Naumann of the German Army, said, “The European nations in the region concerned do not support the French proposal. France is not speaking in behalf of Europe. The Mediterranean is NATO’s most endangered region. From a NATO point of view, at this time, it is good to have American command in AFSOUTH.” 77
In theory, in the post-Cold War period, the United States had always been supportive of European efforts to develop a CFSP and an ESDI to help implement it, as called for at Maastricht. Yet seen from the European perspective, the efforts of the United States had not always seemed to match the rhetoric. As the Soviet threat disappeared, and as the West Europeans, for the first time in the post-Second World War period, began to feel that they might be able to meet more of their own immediate security needs without direct assistance from the United States, the Americans appeared to be ambivalent at best (if not openly hostile) toward the efforts of the European members of NATO to develop their own security identity. 78 “The tension between the European desire for greater independence and the American desire to avoid creation of a competition for NATO became a source of considerable frustration among Allies.” 79
On the one hand, there was no U.S. interest to contribute to the creation of a possible competitor to NATO. On the other hand, the construction of an ESDI was seen, legitimately, to be primarily a European concern. This was to be translated in a period of two years (1990-1992) in which the debate on ESDI was reduced to a cycle:
European proposals would be put forward with very little input from Washington; the U.S. would then react negatively to the elements of the concept it did not like, while saying nothing about the elements if found acceptable. Underlying this Washington approach was also a subtle suspicion among many on both sides of the Atlantic that, left to their own devices, the Europeans would never be able to agree on any alternative to acting within NATO. 80
In November 1992, a new administration was elected on the theme of change and responding to domestic concerns. A fundamental shift in the U.S. position on ESDI took place for two reasons.
It is important to mention that the 1994 Brussels summit communiqué contained 28 references to ESDI, the WEU, and related concepts such as CFSP and the Eurocorps. On this occasion, the United States accepted Europe’s goal of establishing ESDI within NATO and separable from NATO, depending on the circumstances; and in fact the United States would help develop the ESDI through the new concept: the CJTF. It is nonetheless important to underline that cautionary phrases such as: “separable but not separate,” “transparency and complementarity,” “not in competition with NATO,” and “does not dilute NATO” remain (and are endorsed by all the allies) in the official documents of NATO.
After 1994, the United States was still ambivalent with regard to a more prominent European role in the spheres of security and defense:
On the one hand greater European responsibility was welcomed because it allowed the Americans to concentrate on their global commitments.
On the other hand, the Americans in NATO did not wish to be confronted with irreversible European positions as result of common foreign and security policy within the European Union. 81
There continues to be a tendency in the United States to see a choice between defense structures dominated by NATO and those organized around the EU and/or the WEU, and at least part of the present U.S. satisfaction with the state of the transatlantic relationship can be attributed to an unstated view that NATO has “won” the competition, at least for now.
After the 1994 summit, European-U.S. relations were evolving toward a more balanced partnership because Europe was growing increasingly stronger, more integrated, and more independent. ESDI is a deliberately vague concept reflecting the intent of NATO’s European members to develop a collective identity in security and defense matters. It is intended not only to reflect the importance of NATO but also to provide a separate identity and complementarity to national defense policies.
In addition to its impact on the U.S. role in Europe, ESDI could deeply affect EU cohesion. Thus, the United States wants an ESDI that will not result in its facing fait accompli positions at NATO consultative meetings. In sum, the Americans recognized and accepted the reality of ESDI and are committed to furthering it within the context of a broader NATO structure.
Germany’s special interests regarding ESDI are twofold:
On the one hand, there is a rather strong institutional interest in maintaining and developing the overall EU framework.
On the other hand, due to the tremendous burdens it carries with regard to its unification and to Central and Eastern Europe, some argue that Germany no longer has sufficient financial means to promote and finance ESDI and favor de-emphasizing the ESDI concept.
Thus, Germany has a stake in balancing its European and Atlantic ambitions, and in continuing its role as a mediator between France and the U.S. in their traditional disputes.
Bonn’s priorities in stabilizing Central and Eastern Europe encouraged Germany to try to involve as many EU and NATO countries as possible in the region. In this respect, NATO provided the best multilateral instrument in the military field. Therefore, Germany is interested in engaging as many institutions as possible in this region. This is the reason for Bonn’s strong inclination to give the ESDI (WEU) a role in the region, too, although its real capabilities to play an efficient role are limited. Furthermore, for a number of historical and societal reasons, Germany tended to take the role of international organizations, institutions, and alliances as a boundary condition, a factor that sets limits to national policies. At the same time, Bonn strives to modify these boundaries by changing the policies of these international institutions in specific desired directions.
From the German perspective, in the post-Cold War period the evolution of the WEU and the creation of an ESDI were pursued while taking into account the following factors:
First, despite the disagreements of the 1990-1992 years, the transatlantic relationship, and in particular the close German-U.S. ties, were not jeopardized. Since the military component of this relationship is most visible and best realized within NATO, Germany always had certain reservations with regard to the creation of a “purely” European defense. Thus, it was in the German security interest to ensure that both alliances (i.e., NATO and the WEU) would remain fully congruent and compatible rather than move toward conflict with one other and that this fact would be reflected in both form and structure.
Second, the development of a CFSP of the EU will take many years, but is nevertheless a precondition for the creation of an ESDI. Thus, the United States should give up its reservations and remind the Europeans, if they want to build the WEU as the European pillar of NATO, what this “means in terms of a defense burden and a more responsible role for defending common Western interests outside the traditional NATO treaty area.” 82
Third, in 1995-1997 it became very difficult for Germany to balance the Franco-American relationship. On one hand, Germany needs France for Chancellor Kohl’s vision of a united Europe. On the other, Germany also needs the U.S., because “[o]nly the United States can provide a number of indispensable contributions to German and European security; the alliance with the United States serves the fundamental foreign and security policy interests of Germany.” 83
Germany clearly could not afford to decide between the United States and France. But there are factors that hamper progress towards an ESDI, such as the lack of European political will to spend the resources necessary to acquire the assets that would diminish dependence on American capabilities, the risk of a “regionalization” of European security, and the conspicuous lack of consensus among West European countries on what sort of role Europe should play as a unitary actor on the world stage. The unifying, centripetal forces affecting the development of an ESDI are few and seem rather weak, whereas the centrifugal forces are numerous. All those factors might lead to the thought “that a common [European] security and defense policy would pose a threat to NATO.” 84
In this context, with the unification of Europe to remain a long-term vision for the time being, Germany might give highest priority to the Americans. This decision could mean for the Germans “to have a fair chance to accomplish all three national interests in parallel: a strategic alliance between the United States and Europe, West European integration, and all-European security.” 85
The post-Cold War period shows that America has become a nation more like others, the only remaining superpower, but actually less influential with its allies than it used to be. The United States will need friends and markets even when it does not have enemies. Finally, the United States feared a separate West European path in political, military, and economic affairs. In this context, a united Europe could play a new and more important role in the transatlantic relationship, and it may be able to function as a more powerful partner of the U.S. in the international arena. However, the gap in U.S.-European military capabilities, evident also before the end of the Cold War, continues to widen, and this trend contributes to the increased European dependence on advanced U.S. military assets, such as airlift, sealift, and communications, command, control, computers and intelligence.
In this setting, Germany could play an active and constructive role in shaping the European unification process while ensuring that the transatlantic link remains intact. As Chancellor Kohl stated in his speech to the French Senate in November 1993, “Europe needs the United States—but the United States needs a Europe which takes more responsibility for itself and for international security.” 86
Nevertheless, at the Cold War’s end, Western societies must do more to define positive perspectives, for that is the only way that CEE can be permanently Westernized. The political and social cohesion and economic health of the EU and its CEE partners must be considered among the most important determinants of the future of security in Europe.
Author's note: My analysis is heavily indebted to the valuable comments and advice that Professor David Yost ( Department National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA) provided me, and I would like to use this opportunity to thank him for his constant and continous support in my endeavours.
Note 1: Michael Howard, “Europe’s Phoney Warlords,” The Times, 29 July 1992. Back
Note 2: Although the pillar metaphor is widely thought to have been contained in President’s Kennedy speech, there is no explicit reference to it in the text. See “The Goal of an Atlantic Partnership,” Department of State Bulletin 47 (23 July 1962), pp. 131-133. Back
Note 3: The U.S. took the position that the Europeans must do more as they emerged from the devastation of the war and re-established strong (and) competitive economies. Especially in the Congress, there seemed to be no justification for the U.S. to continue to bear defense burden as it had in the early 1950’s. See Charles Barry, “ESDI: Toward a Bi-Polar Alliance?,” in Charles Barry, ed., Reforging the Trans-Atlantic Relationship (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996), p. 73. Back
Note 4: European Parliament, Session Documents 1973-74, doc. 12-73, p. 3. As quoted in Michael Fortman and David G. Haglund, “Europe, NATO and the ESDI debate: In Quest for Identity,” in David G. Haglund, ed., From Euphoria to Hysteria: Western European Security after the Cold War (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), p. 26. However, Article 223 of the Treaty of Rome has still not been modified. Back
Note 5: See NATO Facts and Figures (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1989), pp. 20-22. Back
Note 6: With the October 27, 1984, Rome Declaration the WEU was reorganized as a “light” structure comprising: (1) a council, which meets regularly at the ministerial and ambassadorial level; (2) a staff and several working groups, which assist the council; and, (3) a parliamentary assembly that gathers four times a year. Back
Note 7: See David Owen, “Disarmament, Détente and Deterrence,” European Affairs 1 (Summer 1987), pp. 12-13. Back
Note 8: 27 October 1987. Back
Note 9: Barry, p. 73. Back
Note 10: Peter Schmidt, “ESDI: A German Analysis,” in Ch. Barry, Reforging the Trans-Atlantic Relationship (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996), p. 37. Back
Note 11: A complete analysis would include also the debate concerning the common defense policy and the cooperation in the field of the armaments industries. Back
Note 12: “London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, 5-6 July 1990,” NATO Review 38 (August 1990), pp. 32-33. Back
Note 13: Article B, Title I of Treaty on European Union, Maastricht, 7 February 1992. Available [On line]: [http://europa.eu.int/en/record/mt/title1.html]. [10 February 1998]. The signing took place some eight weeks later because of the need to consolidate and translate the text properly. Back
Note 14: Ibid. Back
Note 15: Treaty on European Union, Final Act, Declaration on Western European Union, Declaration I, par. 1. Available [On line]: [http://europa.eu.in/en/record/mt/final.html]. [10 February 1998]. Back
Note 16: Greece, Denmark, and Ireland. Back
Note 17: Treaty on European Union, Declaration II. Back
Note 18: Turkey, Norway, and Iceland. Back
Note 19: Treaty on European Union, Declaration II. Back
Note 20: However, only the broadest outlines of such a pillar were defined at Maastricht. Back
Note 21: Anand Menon, Anthony Forster and William Wallace, “A common European defence?,” Survival, vol. 34, no. 3 (Autumn 1992), p. 104. Back
Note 22: Menon, Forster and Wallace, p. 105. Back
Note 23: If a decision were to be forced, Paris was more important to Bonn than London, because France was the preferred (if difficult) partner with which Germany had worked closely for more than 30 years. However, Washington was as important as Paris, because the United States offered a special relationship for global economic cooperation, as well as for European security. Ibid., pp. 105-112. Back
Note 24: This was seen, at that time, as the only real alternative to NATO. Back
Note 25: Some speculated that the United States might adopt a Pacific orientation or domestic policy as its priority. For a complete analysis of the impact of the possible U.S. orientation toward the Pacific on the transatlantic relationship, see Robert O’Brien, “Manifest Destiny and the Pacific Century: Europe as No. 3,” in Jarod Wiener, ed., The Transatlantic Relationship (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), pp. 95-127. Back
Note 26: Schmidt, pp. 38-40. Back
Note 27: Ibid., p. 52. Back
Note 28: Menon, Forster and Wallace, p. 105. Back
Note 29: The original proposal was, in fact, no more than a two-line footnote at the end of a long letter on political union, but it soon took on larger proportions. The text can be found reprinted in Europa Archiv, vol.46, no. 22 (1991), pp. 571-574. The text called for expanding the joint brigade into “the basis for a European corps, to which the armed forces of other WEU member-states could be added.” Back
Note 30: The ministerial meeting of the NATO Defense Planning Committee on 28-29 May 1991 agreed on and announced a NATO command structure review, which involved the creation of the multinational Rapid Reaction Corps for ACE, under British command. This multinational corps brought together British, Dutch, Belgian, and German troops. Back
Note 31: Britain wanted agreement on a statement setting the future role of the WEU and its links with the EU before the Maastricht summit; France wanted the grandes lignes alone to be outlined. Germany was generally supportive of the French position. Back
Note 32: Robert Mauthner and Lionel Barber, “Bush calls on Europe to clarify role in NATO,” Financial Times, 8 November 1991. Back
Note 33: Information from European participants at the NATO summit, as presented in Menon, Forster and Wallace, p. 111. Back
Note 34: The Franco-German letter of 14 October 1991 had specifically identified political and economic relations with the former members of the Warsaw Pact as a priority area for the CFSP of the EU. Back
Note 35: WEU Council of Ministers, Petersberg Declaration. Bonn, 19 June 1992, chapter 2, sect. 4. Back
Note 36: Rob de Wijk, NATO on the Brink of the New Millenium: The Battle for Consensus (London and Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1997), p. 56. Back
Note 37: At the May 1992 Franco-German summit in La Rochelle, the Common Defense and Security Council decided on the implementation of the measures necessary for the creation of the Eurocorps. The corps’ missions were also officially announced: (1) the defense of Western Europe in the context of Article 5 of the NATO and WEU treaties; (2) peacekeeping and peacemaking; and (3) humanitarian tasks. See “Summit of the French-German Defense and Security Council on 22 May 1992 in La Rochelle,” press release provided by the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, Washington, D.C., 26 May 1992.
BackNote 38: North Atlantic Council (Heads of State and Government), The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept. Rome, 7-8 November 1991, par. 52. Back
Note 39: Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney called the proposal “basically sound.” The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, suggested that European units like the corps would be “politically and militarily well equipped to deal with interregional crises, humanitarian missions and peacekeeping.” NATO SACEUR John Galvin, while expressing some misgivings about command structures, urged Congress to support the Eurocorps because “we want the Europeans to grow stronger without loosening their Atlantic ties.” See Scott A. Harris and James B. Steinberg, European Defense and the Future of Transatlantic Relations, MR-276 (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1993) and The Franco-German Corps and the Future of European Security: Implications for U.S. Policy (Washington, D.C.: Foreign Policy Institute Policy Consensus Report, June 1992). Back
Note 40: See William Drozdiak, “France, Germany Unveil Corps as a Step Toward European Defense,” Washington Post, 23 May 1992.
Note 41: See, for example, the German agreement at La Rochelle that the new units would be given assigned “as a priority” to the Eurocorps, and Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel’s assurance to U.S. Secretary of State James Baker in Lisbon one week later that NATO would have first rights. (“ Das erste Zugriffrecht hat die NATO,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 29 May 1992). Back
Note 42: Interviews conducted by Philip Gordon with a German diplomat in Washington, D.C., May 1992. As quoted in Gordon, p. 44. Back
Note 43: Holger M. Mey, “View from Germany: A European Security and Defense Identity—What Role for the United States?” Comparative Strategy, vol. 14, no. 3 (July-September 1995), p. 313. A typical example could be different perceptions by France and Germany regarding operations in the former French colonies in Africa. Back
Note 44: de Wijk, p. 44. Back
Note 45: The word “projection” is not in the Germans’ military vocabulary. See Guillaume Parmentier, “Painstaking Adaptation to the New Europe: French and German Defence Policies in 1997,” France and Japan in a Changing Security Environment, 23-24 June 1997, The Japan Institute of International Affairs, Tokyo, Cahiers de L’IFRI, no. 21., p. 28. Back
Note 46: See Karl Feldmayer, “Einbindung des deutsch-franzosischen Korps in das atlantische Bundnis,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 5 December 1992. Back
Note 47: The Eurocorps represents the first French acceptance of multinational military integration since 1966, allows for the first peaceful permanent stationing ever of German soldiers on French soil, and provides a legal means for the continued presence of French troops in Germany. Back
Note 48: de Wijk, p. 72. For Germany there was also a political constitutional taboo on the deployment of forces outside the NATO area, although this did not mean that Germany did not see a role for NATO outside the treaty area. It was not until July 1994 that the Constitutional court in Karlsruhe clarified the restrictions in the Basic Law about possible German participation in military operations other than self-defense against external aggression and indicated that the Federal Parliament may approve German participation in internationally sanctioned "collective security" operations. Back
Note 49: Volker Ruehe, "Adapting the Alliance in the Face of Great Challenges," NATO Review, December 1993, pp. 3-5. Back
Note 50: North Atlantic Assembly, European and Transatlantic Security in a Revolutionary Age, Sect. 27. As quoted in de Wijk, p. 73. Back
Note 51: de Wijk, p. 73. Back
Note 52: Ibid., p. 74. Back
Note 53: Ibid., p. 76. Back
Note 54: North Atlantic Council (Heads of State and Government), Declaration, Brussels, 10-11 January 1994, Sect. 6. Back
Note 55: Ibid., Sect. 9. Back
Note 56: White Paper on the Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Situation and Future of the Bundeswehr, 1994 (Federal Ministry of Defense, Bonn), chapter 4, sect. 426, p. 54; sect. 428, p. 57. Back
Note 57: de Wijk, p. 80. Back
Note 58: For a detailed analysis of the CJTF, see Charles Barry, “Combined Joint Task Forces in Theory and Practice,” in Philip H. Gordon, ed., NATO’s Transformation: The Changing Shape of the Atlantic Alliance, (London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1997), pp. 203-220. Back
Note 59: Robert Grant, “France’s New Relationship with NATO,” in Philip H. Gordon, ed., NATO’s Transformation: The Changing Shape of the Atlantic Alliance (London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1997), p. 62. Back
Note 60: In addition, it could accommodate participation by forces from non-NATO counties, especially CEE countries, in the framework of PFP cooperation. Back
Note 61: Grant, p. 63. Back
Note 62: Ibid., pp. 64-65. The American position in 1995 reflected views at the time when, in the context of the Yugoslav crisis, in Republican circles particularly, voices (such as Newt Gingrich, the Speaker of the House of Representatives) were arguing that European problems require European solutions, certainly when American interests were not at issue in the crisis. Back
Note 63: Parmentier, p. 30;International Security Review 1997, published by the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (Whitehall, London, 1997), p. 5. Back
Note 64: International Security Review 1997, p. 9. Back
Note 65: Ibid. The “constructive absention” proposal envisaged that: (1) No EU member state will be obliged to provide national forces for multinational European military and police actions against its will; (2) Any member state that felt unable to take part in such multinational European action will be unable to hinder the others. The abstaining country will be expected to show solidarity with other EU states through political support for this majority-approved European action and by means of financial contributions through the EU budget. In the meantime the Council of Ministers should have the competence to decide on CFSP actions which the WEU is to carry out on behalf of the EU. See also de Wijk, pp. 122-125. Back
Note 66: These included the role that the NATO Major Commanders, SACLANT and SACEUR, would be able to play in CJTF operations, the conditions under which the WEU could make use of CJTF and NATO assets and which headquarters would receive CJTF nuclei. Back
Note 67: Klaus Kinkel, “Prospects for the Berlin Meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in June,” NATO Review, Webedition, no. 3 (May 1996), pp. 8-12. Available [On line]: [http://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/9603-2.htm]. [10 January 1998]. Back
Note 68: de Wijk, p. 132. A small step was taken on 6 June 1996 when the WEU-NATO Security Agreement came into force and classified NATO documents were made available to the WEU. Back
Note 69: North Atlantic Council, Final Communiqué, 3 June 1996, par. 5-9. Back
Note 70: Walter B. Slocombe, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Remarks to the Atlantic Council, 14 June 1996. Text furnished by Professor David Yost, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Back
Note 71: Admiral Norman W. Ray, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defense Support, Speech at the Assemblee Nationale, 23 January 1997. Text furnished by Professor David Yost, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Back
Note 72: Parmentier, p. 32. See also North Atlantic Council in Defense Ministers Session, Final Communiqué, 13 June 1996, par. 5-7. Back
Note 73: Amsterdam European Council, 16-17 June 1997. The key words for these operations are: “reinforced co-operation,” “replacement of the veto by abstention,” and “constructive abstention.” Thus, the Treaty does allow for a form of “constructive abstention,” whereby a state could abstain from a vote, allowing the decision to go ahead but without having to implement it. See The Treaty of Amsterdam, 2 October 1997, Article 1-Amendments to the Treaty of Maastricht, Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy (Title V of the Treaty on European Union). Available [On line]: [http://ue.eu.int/Amsterdam/en/amsteroc/en/treaty/treaty.htm]. [10 February 1998]. Back
Note 74: Parmentier, pp. 32-34. The changes made in Amsterdam were limited to the setting up of a foreign policy planning and analysis unit at the EU Council of Ministers; the appointment as a High Representative of an EU bureaucrat (the Secretary-General of the Council of Ministers), rather than a prominent politician, as some member states wanted; and closer cooperation--but no merger--between the EU and the WEU. Majority voting, it was agreed, would be used only in the “implementation” phases of foreign policy, whereas strategic choices would still have to be agreed unanimously. Back
Note 75: de Wijk, p. 136. After all, in the U.S. opinion, differences between Greece and Turkey could complicate the designation of a European commander for the southern region. France and the United Kingdom wanted a permanent ruling creating a Deputy SACEUR, who, in addition to his function as “second in command,” would also become the strategic operations commander or co-ordinator for WEU-led operations. Germany too moved gradually towards this position, which was adopted by the Alliance, in rather general terms. Back
Note 76: Parmentier, p. 30. Back
Note 77: He added that statistically Europeans do contribute much to the AFSOUTH forces: about 70% of land forces and 60% of air assets. “ In purely mathematical terms, there is some justification [for France’s argument, but] you have to look at the Mediterranean.” Deutsche Presse Agentur, 30 September 1997. Text furnished by Professor David Yost, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Back
Note 78: As Gunther van Well, the insightful former German Ambassador to the United States pointed out, "the U.S. has always followed a two-track policy that combines principled support for European unity with insistence that the military and economic position of the United States in Europe must remain so strong that its influence would not diminish in the face of further steps toward European integration." As quoted in Jonathan Dean, Ending Europe's Wars: The Continuing Search for Peace and Security (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1994), p. 284. Back
Note 79: Nelson S. Drew, "From Berlin to Bosnia: NATO in transition, 1989-1994," in Charles Barry, ed., Reforging the Trans-Atlantic Relationship,(Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996), p. 11. Back
Note 80: Ibid. Back
Note 81: de Wijk, p. 122. Back
Note 82: Holger Mey, “German-American Relations: The Case for a Preference,” Comparative Strategy, vol. 14, (1995), p. 208. Back
Note 83: Ibid, p. 315. Back
Note 84: Daniel Nelson, “Germany and the balance between threats and capacities in Europe,” International Politics, vol. 34, no. 1 (March 1997), p. 67. Opposition to a common European defense force, although far less than the proportion supporting this key aspect of European integration, remained in Germany higher than in Britain or France in 1995 (28% versus 25% and 15%, respectively just as in 1993). The proportion of Germans opposing such defense integration had, moreover, increased from 25% to 28% between 1993 and 1995. See U.S. Information Agency, The New European Security Architecture: Public Assess the Building Block of European Security (Washington, D.C.: USIA Office of Research and Media Reaction, September, 1995), p. 31. Back
Note 85: Mey, “German-American Relations: The Case for a Preference,” p. 209. Back
Note 86: As quoted in Helmut Willman, "The European Corps-Political Dimension and Military Aims," RUSI Journal, vol. 139, August 1994, p. 33. Back